Western Rangeland Conservation Ass'n v. Zinke (265 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 2017)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST FOR MANDATORY IN-JUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND DISMISSING THE ACTION

Jill N. Parrish, United States District Court Judge

Now before the court is. Rlaintiffs’ demand for injunctive relief pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). (See Docket Nos. 2, 51, 103).

INTRODUCTION

This lawsuit was initiated in April of 2014 by Plaintiffs Western Rangeland Conservation Association; Pearson Ranch; Yardley Cattle Company; Runnin C Family Partnership LP; Wintch & Co. Ltd.; Joel Hatch; R. Larson Sheep Company LLC; Matthew Wood; Marilyn Wood; Platt Livestock LLC; Sage Valley Holdings; Escalante Farms, LLC; Dustin Huntington; Terril Hunt; and Mark Evans against Defendants Sally Jewell, then-Secretary of the Interior; the United States Department of the Interior; Neil Kornze, then-Director of the United States Bureau of Land Management; and Juan Palma, then-Utah State Director of the Bureau of Land Management (collectively, “Federal Defendants” or “BLM”). On August 27, 2014, the court granted a motion to intervene as defendants filed by the American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign, the Cloud Foundation, Return to Freedom, John Steele, and Lisa Friday (collectively, “Defendant-Intervenors”) pursuant to Fed. R. Crv. P. 24(a). (Docket No. 40).

Plaintiffs are holders of federal grazing permits issued pursuant to the Taylor Grazing Act, see 43 U.S.C. § 315b, which allow them to graze their livestock oh public rangelands throughout central and southern Utah. Plaintiffs contend that BLM has failed to perform certain ministerial duties under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971 (‘WHA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331, et seq., and claim that BLM’s failure has adversely impacted their ability to utilize their grazing allotments. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that BLM has failed to properly manage the excess population of wild horses that directly compete with livestock for forage and water on public lands and damage the rangeland ecosystem. Plaintiffs also allege that BLM has failed to properly remove excess wild horses present on lands owned by the State of Utah and private landowners. Thus, Plaintiffs ask this court to compel BLM to perform its statutory duties under the WHA to remove excess wild horses from both public and private lands.

I. THE WILD FREE-ROAMING HORSES AND BURROS ACT OF 1971

Plaintiffs’ challenge centers on the duties imposed on BLM by the WHA, which delegates the management of free-roaming wild horses and burros to the Department of the Interior and BLM. Development and passage of, the "WHA was prompted by the rapid disappearance of wild horse and burro populations from western rangelands. See 16 U.S.C. § 1331. Congressional inquiry found that grazing land previously available to wild horses and burros was “fenced off for private use, while the animals were slaughtered for sport and profit.” Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423, 1425 (10th Cir. 1986). The once-prevalent herds of wild horses and burros were hunted to the verge of extinction, and the “remaining animals were driven to marginal, inhospitable grazing areas.” Id.

To preserve these “living symbols of the historic and pioneer spirit of the West” from “capture, branding, harassment, or death,” Congress enacted the WHA, which designated all wild free-roaming horses and burros as “integral part[s] of the natural system of the public lands,” 16 U.S.C. § 1331, and entrusted their protection and management to the Secretary of the Interior and BLM, id. § 1333(a) (placing all wild horses and burros under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior and directing that the animals be protected and managed as “components of the public lands”). In essence, the Act is “a land-use regulation enacted by Congress to ensure the survival of a particular species of wildlife.” Mountain States, 799 F.2d at 1428.

Several years after passage of the WHA, Congress found that its attempt to prevent the decline of wild horses and burros had worked far too well. By 1978, the wild horse and burro populations had rebounded and redoubled, and now threatened to disrupt the delicate ecological balance on western rangelands. See Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n, Inc. v. Watt, 694 F.2d 1310, 1315-16 (D.C. Cir. 1982). A congressional report calling for amendments to the WHA explained:

.In the case of wild horses and burros in the Western States, Congress acted in 1971 to curb abuses which, posed a threat to their survival. .The situation now appears to have reversed, and action is needed to prevent a successful program from exceeding its goals and causing animal habitat destruction.

Id. at 1316 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-1122, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1978)). Based on these findings, Congress amended the WHA

to avoid excessive costs in the administration of the Act, and to facilitate the humane adoption or disposal of excess wild free-roaming horses and burros which because they exceed the carrying capacity of the range, pose a threat to their own habitat, fish, wildlife, recreation, water and soil conservation, domestic livestock grazing, and other rangeland values,

43 U.S.C. § 1901(a)(6). The 1978 amendments to the WHA “struck a new balance — or at least clarified the balance Congress intended to strike in 1971—between protecting wild horses and competing interests in the resources of the public ranges.” Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n, 694 F.2d at 1316. As amended, the Act’s central goal is not only'to protect wild horse and burro populations, but to “achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public lands.” 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a). Thus, BLM is tasked with harmonizing the protection of wild horses and burros and the preservation of other rangeland values and uses.

To that end, the WHA requires BLM to compile and' maintain “current inventories]' of wild horses and burros on given areas of the public lands.” Id. § 1333(b)(1); 43 C.F.R. § 4710.2. Inventories of wild horse and burro herds are used to designate appropriate herd management areas (“HMAs”), see 43 C.F.R. § 4710.3-1, and to “determine appropriate management levels” (“AMLs”), 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1). “An AML is expressed as a population range with both an upper and lower limit, within which wild horses or burros can be managed for the long term.” Am. Wild Horse Pres. Campaign v. Jewell, 847 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2016) (quotations and alterations omitted). Where a given wild horse or burro population exceeds its designated AML, BLM must decide whether to bring the herd back within AML “by the removal or destruction of excess animals, or other options (such as' sterilization, or natural controls on population levels).” 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1). “In this way, [the] AML is a vehicle used to move towards a thriving natural ecological .balance, and a trigger by which the BLM is alerted to address population imbalance.” In Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 751 F.3d 1054, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2014) (alterations omitted). In sum, “[t]o comply with the Act’s directive to manage wild Horses ‘in a manner that is designed to achieve and maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public lands,’ .., the BLM (a) maintains a current inventory of wild horses in each HMA, (b) determines the [AML] of wild horses that each HMA can sustain, and (c) determines the method of achieving the designated AML.” Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 839 F.3d 938, 940 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a) and citing id. §. 1333(b)(1); 43 C.F.R. §§ 4710.2, 4710.3-1); see also Am. Wild Horse Pres. Campaign, 847 F.3d at 1178.

Sections Three and Four of the Act delineate specific actions that BLM is required to undertake as part of its management of wild horse and burro populations. Section Three deals with wild horse and burro herds present on public lands and requires BLM to “immediately remove excess animals from the range” once BLM determines (1) that a population of wild horses on a given HMA exceeds its established AML and (2) “that action is necessary to remove excess animals.” 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2); see also Wyoming, 839 F.3d at 944 (delineating the two-step process that triggers BLM’s ministerial duty to “immediately remove” excess wild horses). Section Four requires BLM to arrange for the removal of wild horses and burros that stray off of public land and onto adjacent private land. See 16 U.S.C. § 1334.

II. INTERACTION OF WHA WITH FLPMA AND NEPA

BLM makes management déterrriina-tions and conducts necessary removals' in compliance with both the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”), 43 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq., and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq.; see also Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 14-cv-0248, 2015 WL 12916334, at *2 (D. Wyo. Apr., 21, 2015) (unpublished), aff'd, 839 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2016).

FLPMA directs BLM to “manage public lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield” and, to that end, requires the development of both comprehensive resource inventories and broad, programmatic resource management plans for public lands. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a); Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 58, 124 S.Ct. 2373, 159 L.Ed.2d 137 (2004) (explaining that FLPMA' mandates “a dual regime of inventory and planning”). BLM establishes HMAs, sets AMLs'within those HMAs, and conducts all wild horse and burro management activities “in accordance with approved land use plans prepared pursuant to” FLPMA. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 4710.1, 4710.3-1; Am. Wild Horse Pres. Campaign, 847 F.3d at 1178 (outlining BLM’s interrelated management under the WHA and FLPMA).

NEPA requires BLM to “pause before committing resources to a project and consider the likely environmental impacts of the preferred course of action as well as reasonable alternatives.” N.M. ex rel. Richardson v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 565 F.3d 683, 703 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)). Thus, before conducting gathers, removals, or other management actions related to wild horse and burro populations on public lands, BLM prepares an environmental assessment (“EA”) to evaluate potential environmental impacts, to outline the agency’s proposed course of action and reasonable alternatives, and to provide for public comment on- the agency’s proposal. See Friends of Animals v. Sparks, 200 F.Supp.3d 1114, 1119 (D. Mont. 2016); Fund for Animals, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 460 F.3d 13, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2006); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4, 1508.9 (describing the purpose and form of EAs generally). If adopted, the proposed course of action is authorized in a document known as a decision record (“DR”).

BACKGROUND

At issue in this ease are eight HMAs, a single HA, and certain private lands encompassed within or lying adjacent to public lands. The eight HMAs under scrutiny here are known as Frisco, Four-Mile, Bible Springs, Sulphur, Choke Cherry, Muddy Creek, North Hills, and Swasey. Together, the boundaries of these HMAs encompass just shy of one million acres of public and private land. The lone HA at issue, known as Blawn Wash, covers nearly 63,000 additional acres. These arid rangelands make up large swaths of central and southern Utah and are home to a fragile and complex ecosystem that includes substantial herds of wild horses and burros, as well as numerous other species of wild animals and plants. The HMAs and HA at issue also provide forage and water for significant numbers of private livestock and therefore form an integral component of the local agricultural economy. Since the 1971 passage of the WHA and 1978 amendments thereto, BLM has been tasked with balancing these often conflicting interests. That conflict has bubbled under the surface or boiled over in many western states, including Utah, where the federal government manages a large percentage of available rangeland. The situation has grown especially severe in recent decades, as BLM has struggled to keep apace of the ever-increasing wild horse and burro populations. Currently, the number of wild horses and burros present on Utah’s range-lands is nearly triple the collective AML maximum for the region. Overpopulation is similarly severe across nine other western states. (See Docket No. 107-1, at 2).

Frustrated with the state of the range and BLM’s management efforts, Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit April 30, 2014 to compel immediate removal of excess wild horses from public and private lands. (Docket Nos. 2 (original complaint), 51 (first amended complaint)). The administrative record was filed on June 12, 2015, (Docket Nos. 65, 66), and updated on November 11, 2015 and May 16, 2016, (Docket Nos. 81, 94). Plaintiffs filed an opening brief, requesting mandatory injunctive relief under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), on August 17, 2016. (Docket No. 103). Several amicus curiae briefs were filed on behalf of Plaintiffs by various parties, including the State of Utah, the Public Lands Council, Western AgCredit ACA, and Beaver, Iron, and Emery Counties, as well as certain associated conservation districts located in central and southern Utah. (Docket Nos. 102, 105, 107, 115). Federal Defendants responded on October 28, 2016. (Docket No. 117). Defendant-Intervenors responded the same day. (Docket No. 120). Plaintiffs replied to Federal Defendants and to Defendant-Intervenors on November 21, 2016. (Docket Nos. 122, 123). Federal Defendants filed a limited surreply on January 30, 2017. (Docket No. 135). The court held oral argument on the request for mandatory injunctive relief on April 11, 2017. (Docket No. 142). The court now considers the arguments of the parties under authority granted by 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706, and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiffs bring their claim for in-junctive relief under § 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), which requires a reviewing court to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). “[A] claim under § 706(1) can proceed only where a- plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64, 124 S.Ct. 2373, 159 L.Ed.2d 137 (2004) (emphasis in original). To that end, Plaintiffs assert that BLM has “unlawfully withheld” and “unreasonably delayed” action to remove excess wild horses from public and private lands in violation of the WHA. See 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2) (requiring removal of excess wild horses and burros from public lands upon certain triggering conditions); id. § 1334 (requiring BLM to “arrange to have [stray wild horses and burros] removed” from private lands upon request).

Although Plaintiffs insist that BLM has both “unlawfully withheld” and “unreasonably delayed” action under the WHA, (see Docket No. 122, at 13-25), the two terms are mutually exclusive. Each applies- to a distinct statutory structure and is evaluated under a distinct standard. See Forest Guardians v. Babbit, 174 F.3d 1178, 1189 (10th Cir. 1999). Consequently, in order to properly evaluate the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, the court must determine whether BLM’-s alleged failure to remove excess wild horses under the WHA. is properly characterized as an “unlawful with[olding]” or an “unreasonable] delay” of agency action under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).

I. ACTION “UNLAWFULLY WITHHELD” AND ACTION “UNREASONABLY DELAYED” UNDER 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)

The Tenth Circuit has articulated the distinction between action that is “unlawfully withheld” and action that is “unreasonably delayed” under § 706(1) as follows:

[I]f an agency has no concrete deadline establishing a date by which it must act, and instead is governed only by general timing provisions — such as the APA’s general admonition that agencies conclude matters presented to them “within a reasonable time,” see 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) — a court must compel only action that is delayed unreasonably. Conversely, when an entity governed by the APA fails to comply with a statutorily imposed absolute deadline, it has unlawfully withheld agency action and courts, upon proper application, must compel the agency to act.

Thus, the’ distinction between agency action “unlawfully withheld” and “unreasonably delayed” turns on whether Congress imposed a date-certain deadline on agency action.... In our opinion, when an agency is required to act — either by organic statute or by the APA — within an expeditious, prompt, or reasonable time, § 706 leaves in courts the discretion to decide whether agency delay is unreasonable. However, when Congress by organic statute sets a specific deadline for agency action, neither the agency nor any court has discretion. The agency must act by the deadline. If it withholds such timely action, a reviewing court must compel the action unlawfully withheld.

Forest Guardians, 174 F.3d at 1190.

Applying this standard to Section's Three and Four of the WHA, the court can find no “absolute” or “date-certain deadline”' by which the agency must act upon removal determinations. See id. Although Section Three requires that BLM “immediately remove” excess wild horses and burros when certain conditions are met, it does- not specify any deadline or delineate any timeframe for completion of required removals. See Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n, Inc. v. Watt, 694, F.2d 1310, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (interpreting the 1978 Amendments to require that excess horses “be removed expeditiously” (emphasis in original)). Though obviously more urgent in tone, the command to “immediately remove” carries no more of a specific deadline than the “APA’s general admonition that agencies conclude matters presented to them ‘within a reasonable time.’ ” See Forest Guardians, 174 F.3d at 1190 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)). Instead, the term “immediately” provides a measure by which the reasonableness, of any delay may be evaluated.

Similarly, Section Four imposes no “absolute” or “date-certain deadline” for removal actions from private lands. See Forest Guardians, 174 F.3d at 1190. The Act requires only that BLM “arrange to have [stray] animals removed” from private lands upon notice from affected landowners, See 16 U.S.C. § 1334. Moreover, BLM has interpreted the Act to require prompt action without a precise deadline. See 43 C.F.R. § 4720.2-1 (requiring authorized BLM officers to “remove stray wild horses and burros from private land as soon as practicable” (emphasis added)).

Because neither Section Three nor Section Four impose explicit statutory deadlines that would warrant the application of the “unlawfully withheld” standard, the court will treat BLM’s alleged failures to act under those sections as action “unreasonably’ delayed” and apply, the corresponding standard. See Forest Guardians, 174 F.3d at 1190.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR AGENCY ACTION “UNREASONABLY DELAYED” UNDER. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)

Although the Tenth Circuit has not definitively adopted a standard by which courts may evaluate the reasonableness of agency delay under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), it has favorably cited to the District of Columbia Circuit’s so-called TRAC factor test, see Telecomms. Res. & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70. (D.C. Cir. 1984) [TRAC], which is widely accepted as a touchstone for evaluating such claims, see Qwest Comm’ns Intern., Inc. v. FCC, 398 F.3d 1222, 1238-39 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing the D.C. Circuit’s TRAC jurisprudence in the context of a claim of “unreasonably delayed” agency action). The Tenth Circuit has emphasized that “a court-imposed deadline for agency action constitutes an extraordinary remedy,” id. at 1238-39 (citing In re Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 958 F.2d 1144, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1992)), and has articulated the following five factors (drawn from TRAC jurisprudence) for consideration:

(1) [T]he extent of the delay, (2) the reasonableness of .the delay in the context of the legislation authorizing agency action, (3) the consequences of the delay, and (4) administrative difficulties bearing on the agency’s ability to resolve an issue. To this we might expressly add [ (5) ] consideration of the complexity of the task envisioned by a court’s remand order.

Id. at 1239. The court will explain and apply this standard in more detail below.

DISCUSSION

The court will now address the arguments of the'parties under jurisdiction granted by 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. First, the court must resolve two jurisdictional challenges raised by Defendant-Intervenors. Second, the court will address Plaintiffs’ claims under Section Three of the WHA. Finally,' the court will address Plaintiffs’ claims under Section Four of the WHA.

I. DEFENDANT-INTERVENORS’ JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGES

Before proceeding to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, the court must address two challenges to its subject matter jurisdiction raised by Defendant-Intervenors. They argue that all of Plaintiffs’ claims regarding the eight HMAs and single HA at issue are either moot or unripe; and therefore this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims. The court addresses Defendant-Intervenors’ mootness argument first,-then their ripeness argument.

A. MOOTNESS OF CERTAIN CLAIMS UNDER SECTION THREE

First, Defendant-Intervenors argue that any claims regarding pre-2012 determinations of the need to gather and remove wild horses are moot because those gathers and removals have been completed. ,They insist that “there is no point in ordering an action that has already taken place.” (Docket No. 120, at 29) (quoting So. Utah Wilderness All. v. Smith, 110 F.3d 724, 728 (10th Cir. 1997) (alterations- omitted)). If Plaintiffs’,, claims challenged the gathers or removals themselves, the court would be inclined to agree. See Fund for Animals, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 460 F.3d 13, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that challenges to completed gathers are moot and therefore not justiciable); Cloud Found., Inc. v. Salazar, 999 F.Supp.2d 117, 127 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that a challenge to categorical exclusion based on previously completed gathers was moot). But Plaintiffs do not challenge the pre-2012 gathers and removals in and of themselves — instead, they argue that BLM has a current duty to remove wild horses because of findings and determinations in the EAs and DRs for the' pre-2012 gathers. If nonsuch duty' exists, then Plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law, not- as a matter' of mootness. In other words, the question before' the court is not whether claims regarding the pre-2012 gathers are moot, but whether Plaintiffs have stated a legally cognizable claim for injunctive relief. Accordingly, the court holds that these claims are not moot.

B. RIPENESS OF CERTAIN CLAIMS UNDER SECTION THREE

In a similar vein, Defendant-Inter-venors argue that Plaintiffs’ claims regarding post-2012 determinations of the need for removal are not ripe because BLM is still in the process of implementing those removals. They assert that each DR contemplated a “phased-in” removal approach that will not be complete for several years and urge that any decision regarding BLM’s implementation of this approach would be premature. As with the mootness argument disposed of above, the court must disagree. Though Plaintiffs hint at challenges to the specific terms of the post-2012 DRs, (see Docket No. 123, at 21), the broad thrust of their challenge is that BLM’s “phased-in” approach does not fulfill the WHA’s mandate to “immediately remove” excess animals and, as a result, BLM is illegally delaying compliance with that mandate, (see id. (“[A] phased-in approach of six to ten years, on its face, does not satisfy Section 1333(b)(2)’s requirement of ‘immediate removal.’ ”)). This challenge need not wait for the completion of BLM’s “phased-in” approach because Plaintiffs argue that the approach itself fails to fulfill BLM’s duty under the WHA. Cf. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“At some point administrative delay amounts to a refusal to act, with sufficient finality and ripeness to permit judicial review.”). Whether BLM is under an obligation to “immediately” remove excess animals from certain HMAs and whether the agency’s “phased-in” approach actually fulfills that obligation are not “abstract disagreements” the court must avoid. See Rural Water Dist. No. 2 v. City of Glenpool, 698 F.3d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 2012). Thus, the court concludes that a ripeness analysis is inapplicable here.

As both of Defendant-Intervenors’ jurisdictional challenges are unavailing, the court now turns to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims against BLM.

II. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS REGARDING REMOVAL FROM PUBLIC LAND UNDER SECTION THREE OF THE WHA

First, the court addresses Plaintiffs’ claims under Section Three of the WHA. As noted above, Section Three imposes a statutory duty on BLM to “immediately remove excess animals from the range” when certain conditions are met. See 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2). The Tenth Circuit has recently delineated the conditions that trigger this statutory duty in Wyoming v. United States Department of Interior, 839 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2016). In that case, the State of Wyoming sued BLM, arguing that BLM had failed to remove excess wild horses from certain HMAs within the State’s boundaries, unlawfully withholding or unreasonably delaying action required by. the WHA. See id. at 942 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)). The State argued that because BLM had determined that wild horse populations exceeded the upper limit of the AML established for each HMA, the statutory duty under § 1333(b)(2) was triggered, requiring BLM to “immediately remove” excess wild horses from the overpopulated HMAs. Id. at 943-44. The Tenth Circuit rejected the State’s argument as “contrary to the plain language” of the WHA and held that the Act affords the BLM discretion to decide how to handle overpopulations of. wild horses on public lands. Id. at 944. The court noted that the Act directs BLM to maintain inventories of wild horse populations in order “to ... make determinations as to whether and where an overpopulation exists and whether action should be taken to remove excess animalsE,] ... and [to] determine whether [AMLs] should be achieved .by the removal or destruction of excess animals, or other options (such as sterilization, or natural controls on population levels).” Id. at 944 (internal quotations removed, alterations in original) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1)). This language “quite clearly affords ... BLM with discretion to decide whether or not to remove excess animals.” Id. The court concluded that this discretion is not extinguished when BLM determines that a particular wild horse population exceeds its assigned AML: “[Contrary to the State’s argument, a determination that an overpopulation exists in a given HMA is not sufficient, standing alone, to trigger any duty on the part of the BLM.” Id. Instead, BLM has a mandatory, non-discretionary duty to “immediately remove excess animals” only after BLM “determines ... [1] that an overpopulation exists on a given area of the public lands and [2] that action is necessary to remove excess animals....” § 1333(b)(2) (emphasis added); see also Wyoming, 839 F.3d at 944. Although it was clear that an overpopulation of wild horses existed on the disputed HMAs, the court held that the State had failed to demonstrate that the second requirement was satisfied “because ... BLM has not determined that action is necessary to remove the excess animals.” Wyoming, 839 F.3d at 944. As a result, the court concluded that BLM was not obligated to remove excess wild horses under the WHA and therefore had not “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed” an action it was required by law to take. Id. at 944-46.

Here, as in Wyoming, it is undisputed that wild horse populations exceed the respective AMLs of each of the eight HMAs and one HA at issue. Still, the parties differ as to whether BLM has determined that removal of excess animals is necessary on certain of the HMAs, i.e., whether a mandatory duty to remove the excess animals has been triggered. Plaintiffs assert that BLM has determined that removal of excess horses is necessary on each of the eight HMAs and one HA at issue. BLM concedes that it has determined that removal is currently necessary on five of the eight HMAs and’ one HA, but denies that any such determination has been made for the four remaining HMAs. More specifically, BLM acknowledges that, since 2014, it has determined that removal' of excess horses is necessary in the Frisco, Four Mile, Bible Springs, and Sulphur HMAs, and the Blawn Wash HA. (Docket No. 117, at 10-11). Thus, BLM agrees that it has a statutory duty to remove excess horses from these areas.

By contrast, BLM insists that it has not determined that removal of current over-populations is necessary in the Choke Cherry, Muddy Springs, North Hills, and Swasey HMAs. BLM argues that any previous determinations regarding the necessity of removal from those HMAs are no longer operative and cannot bind the agency. Plaintiffs disagree and insist that determinations made prior to 2014 regarding the necessity of removal from the four remaining HMAs are sufficient to trigger BLM’s statutory duty to “immediately remove” current overpopulations pursuant to Section Three.

The court will first address the.adequacy of BLM’s efforts to remove wild .horses from Frisco, Four. Mile, Bible. Springs, and Sulphur HMAs, as well as the Blawn Wash HA, where BLM acknowledges a statutory obligation to remove under Section Three. The court will then address whether a statutory duty to- remove exists in the Choke Cherry, Muddy Creek, North Hills, and Swasey HMAs and, if so, whether that duty has been adequately fulfilled.

A. REMOVAL DETERMINATIONS FOR FRISCO, FOUR MILE, BIBLE SPRINGS, AND SULPHUR HMAs, AND BLAWN WASH HA ,

BLM concedes that it has a current duty-under Section Three of the WHA to “immediately remove” excess wild horses from the Frisco, Four Mile, Bible Springs, and Sulphur HMAs, as well as the Blawn Wash HA. Plaintiffs claim that BLM has “unreasonably delayed” removal action in these, areas such that mandatory injunctive relief is warranted under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). As explained previously, such claims are typically evaluated under the multi-factor TRAC analysis as outlined in Qwest Comm’ns, 398 F.3d at 1238-39. However, before proceeding to an application of the TRAC factors, the court must address two more fundamental issues. First, the court must define the duty imposed on BLM by Section Three of the WHA and, second, the court must decide whether BLM has in fact “delayed” execution of that duty.

1. THE DUTY IMPOSED ON BLM BY SECTION THREE OF THE WHA

Before evaluating BLM’s removal efforts on the four HMAs and single HA at issue, the court must delineate the removal duty imposed by Section Three. As explained above, Section Three requires BLM to maintain current inventories of wild horse and burro populations on public lands. See 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1). BLM uses these inventories to establish AMLs and to determine “whether and where an overpopulation exists” in a given area of the public lands. Id, Once BLM determines that an overpopulation in fact exists in a given area, the agency has wide discretion in how it addresses that overpopulation. See Wyoming, 839 F.3d at 944. BLM uses available data to .“determine whether [AMLs] should be achieved by the removal or destruction of excess animals, or other options (such as sterilization, or natural controls on population levels).” 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1). Thus, BLM may address the- identified overpopulation through removal or through other methods it deems more suitable. See Wyoming, 839 F.3d at 944 (“Subsection (b)(l)’s use Of the phrase ‘whether action should be taken to remove excess animals’ quite clearly 'affords the BLM with discretion to decide whether or not to remove excess animals.”).

However, under certain conditions, Section Three-requires BLM to conclusively prioritize removal over other management activities. Specifically, when BLM identifies an overpopulation of wild horses in a given area and determines that action is necessary to remove that overpopulation, Section Three unequivocally requires that the agency address the identified overpopulation through removal. See 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2). Though BLM indisputably has discretion “to determine whether action should be taken to remove excess animals” and “whether [AMLs] should be achieved by the removal or destruction of excess animals, or other options (such as sterilization,- or natural controls on population levels)[,]” 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1); Wyoming, 839 F.3d at. 944, that discretion evaporates once BLM determines “that action is necessary to remove excess animals,” 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2). A determination that removal of an identified overpopulation is “necessary” indicates that BLM cannot “achieve [or] maintain a thriving natural ecological balance on the public lands” without the removal. See 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a), (b)(2). Accordingly, once that determination is made, the statute explicitly and unequivocally directs that BLM “shall immediately remove excess animals from the range so as to achieve appropriate management levels.” Id, § 1333(b)(2). There is no discretion in this command; BLM must eschew other management techniques and address the overpopulation through removal.

Section Three also provides some indication of the urgency with which BLM must accomplish necessary removals: the statute directs that BLM must “immediately remove excess animals.” 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2) (emphasis added). The parties in this case dispute the practical significance of this language. Plaintiffs, seeking the rapid removal of excess animals from the range, insist that this language'requires removal to within established AML “without delay.” (Docket No. 122, at 13 (quoting Immediate, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014))). By contrast, BLM argues that the lack of specific statutory deadlines indicate that “pace and timing of [BLM’s] removals are discretionary.” (Docket No. 117, at 19). BLM and Defendant-Intervenors emphasize that removal is a “process” and must proceed in phases until completion. (See Docket No. 117, at 19; Docket No. 120, at 50, 58).

Evaluation of these arguments turns on the practical meaning of one particularly vexing adverb — “immediately.” The term is not defined in the Act, see 16 U.S.C. § 1332, so the court turns to the plain, ordinary meaning of the word to guide interpretation, see Schindler Elevator Corp. v. U.S. ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401, 407-08, 131 S.Ct. 1885, 179 L.Ed.2d 825 (2011). As Plaintiffs assert, the plain meaning of the term suggests action that occurs “[without interval' of time -... [or] without delay.” Immediately, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th rev. ed. 1968). “[T]he word, without any very precise signification, denotes that action is or must be taken either instantly or without any considerable loss of time.” See Immediate, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th rev. ed. 1968). Thus, Congress’ use of this term to govern necessary removal actions under Section Three evokes significant urgency and shuns delay.

Nonetheless, as BLM is quick to explain, an overly literal interpretation of the term belies practical reality. (Docket No. 117, at 19). Put simply, the physical removal of wild animals from the open range cannot be accomplished “instantly” or “at once”— the process necessarily entails some delay. For example, BLM generally cannot gather during certain months of the year, particularly during the spring foaling season, for fear of disrupting the targeted herd’s reproductive cycles or general health. Conditions on the ground — including inclement weather, an unexpectedly scattered target herd,- or the failure of skittish animals to respond to gather techniques — may also delay or disrupt removal efforts. Even when timing and conditions are right, BLM must carefully plan and execute the gather and removal so as to avoid eroding the target herd’s physical health, social cohesion, or genetic viability. BLM must also comply with planning and public comment requirements under FLPMA and NEPA and retain contractors with the necessary skill and resources to safely, efficiently, and humanely execute the removals.

Based on these practical realities, the court cannot interpret Section Three to require removal of excess wild animals without any intervening delay — such an interpretation would contravene the ultimate purposes of the WHA by forcing BLM to act recklessly and without regard for the continuing viability or humane treatment of creatures it is specifically tasked with preserving. See Am. Wild Horse Pres. Campaign, 847 F.3d at 1178 (explaining that the WHA was “enacted by Congress to ensure the survival” of wild horses and burros); In re Overland Park Fin. Corp., 236 F.3d 1246, 1252 n.9 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948)) (“[C]ourts will reject an interpretation of a statute that produces an absurd result.”). Section Three’s mandate to “immediately remove” must therefore include some discretionary space in which BLM may plan and execute safe, efficient, and effective removals consistent with the broader purposes of the WHA and in compliance with other statutory duties.

At the same time, the court cannot accept BLM’s contention that the “pace and timing” of removals are entirely discretionary. (See Docket No. 117, at 19). The term “immediately” must mean something — its presence in the statute necessarily places some temporal limits on any discretion BLM has to plan and execute removal actions. The D.C. Circuit has explained that the term “immediately” indicates that Congress desired that “excess horses ... be removed expeditiously” and decided that “prompt action was needed to redress ... imbalance” in wild horse populations on public lands. Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n, Inc. v. Watt, 694 F.2d 1310, 1316-17 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (emphasis added and in original). Indeed, the statute indicates that “immediate! ]” removal action is required “so as to restore a thriving natural ecological balance to the range! ] and [to] protect the range from the deterioration associated with overpopulation.” 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2); Blake v. Babbitt, 837 F.Supp. 458, 459 (D.D.C. 1993) (citing Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n, 694 F.2d at 1317-19) (explaining that Section Three requires action, even when that action is based on incomplete knowledge of conditions on the ground, because “the endangered and rapidly deteriorating range cannot wait”). Any unnecessary delay or lack of urgency in reducing the population to within AML would contravene these purposes by allowing excess wild horses to persist, propagate, and consume an imbalance of already scarce resources. With the viability of the range and the wild horses themselves in immediate peril as a result of overpopulation, BLM cannot postpone action to remove excess wild horses once it determines that such action is necessary. To the extent that practical realities preclude truly “immediate” removal, BLM may only delay necessary removal actions insofar as delay is necessary to plan and execute the actions safely and effectively. Proper planning and execution would of course account for many of the practical realities that BLM has identified, including due analysis of circumstances on the ground, compliance with NEPA and FLPMA, and retention of experienced contractors.

In sum, once BLM determines that an overpopulation exists in a given area and action is necessary to remove that overpopulation,' Section Three demands that BLM address the overpopulation through removal and that the agency begin and complete removal as soon as logistically possible.

2. WHETHER BLM HAS DELAYED EXECUTION OF ITS SECTION THREE DUTY

With this understanding of BLM’s Section Three removal duty in mind, the court turns to BLM’s efforts to fulfill that duty. Again, BLM acknowledges that it has a current duty under Section Three to “immediately remove” excess wild horses from the Frisco, Four-Mile, Bible Springs, and Sulphur HMAs, as well as the Blawn Wash HA. In each area, BLM has- made the necessary determinations that an overpopulation of wild horses exists and that action is necessary to remove that overpopulation. (See AR001490 (Frisco 2012 DR); AR001350 (Bible Springs Complex 2014 DR, including Bible Springs HMA, Four-Mile HMA, and Blawn Wash HA)); (Docket No. 117-1, at 42 (Sulphur 2016 DR)). To address these findings, BLM has begun implementation of “a pilot management alternative that calls for a phased-in approach to reach AML over a six to ten year period by gradually removing excess animals, implementing fertility control, and adjusting sex ratios.” (See, e.g., AR001477 (explaining the plan as proposed for the Frisco HMA in 2012)). The initial removal actions contemplated by this approach are not meant to eliminate the identified overpopulation — they serve instead to reduce the -number of animals present on the range to a targeted population level somewhere above, the established AML. Full removal of any overpopulation would be achieved only after successive removal actions over approximately six to ten years. (See, e.g., Docket No.. 117-1, at 23 (spelling out BLM’s 2016 plan to initially achieve a “targeted population of approximately 100 animals” in the Frisco HMA within several years, followed “additional phased-in gathers to achieve the low range of AML” over approximately five years)). During gathers, BLM plans to administer immunocon-traceptives to mares, adjust the herd’s sex ratio, and then release certain gathered animals back onto the range. Importantly, the post-gather population would remain above AML in anticipation of subsequent removals approximately every two years. Thus, the “phased-in” approach eschews immediate removal to within AML in favor of longer-term management techniques and population controls that will eventually result in a population size within. AML, Since 2012, BLM has adopted this approach in the Frisco, Four-Mile, Bible Springs, and Sulphur HMAs, as well as the Blawn Wash HA,

Plaintiffs argue that BLM’s “phásed-in” approach to removal over a six to ten year period in these areás constitutes an “unreasonable] delay,” see 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), of action that must be completed “immediately,” see 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2). In response, BLM and Defendant-Intervenors argue that BLM has not in fact delayed its ministerial duty to “immediately remove” excess animals from the range under Section Three. Instead, the defending parties suggest that -BLM has wide discretion in how to implement Section Three’s mandate and that the current “phased-in” approach to wild horse management fulfills BLM’s statutory obligation-to-“immediately remove” excess animals: “Because the [WHA] imposes no specific , timetable for removing horses after [BLM] has made the required removal determinations, especially when taking into account all the complex and competing factors surrounding removal actions, there has been no ‘delay in this case, much less unreasonable delay.” (Docket No. 117, at 19; see also Docket No. 120, at 49-51). The court must reject BLM and Defendant-Intérvenors’ arguments on this point.

BLM’s “phased-in” approach to removal fails to fulfill the agency’s Section Three duty to “immediately remove” excess animals in at least two fundamental ways. First, the “phased-in” approach prioritizes gradual removal and other management techniques over prompt removal to within AML. As explained above, Section Three unequivocally requires BLM to address ov-erpopulations through immediate removal of excess animals once the agency makes certain triggering determinations regarding an area of the public lands. Having made the requisite determinations in the areas at issue, BLM cannot choose to address the identified overpopulation through gradual removals and the application of immunocontraceptives and adjustment of sex ratios — the agency must address the overpopulation through immediate removal.

Second, the “phased-in” approach contemplates gradual, rather than “immediate[]” removal of excess animals. Though Section Three imposes no specific timetable for necessary removals, the statute clearly demands prompt removal and forbids unnecessary delay, BLM urges that a six-to-ten-year delay is necessary “due to limited resources [and] competing removal needs across [ten] western states,” (Docket No. 117, at 19), but such broad administrative concerns cannot erase Section Three’s demand for urgency. While it is clear that Section Three’s mandate to “immediately remove” excess wild-horses must account for the .practical realities of the removal process, the fundamental nature of BLM’s statutory duty cannot be altered by the agency’s budgetary constraints. Here, the six-to-ten-year timetable of the “phased-in” approach is primarily attributable to these broader administrative constraints and not to the practical realities of removal. Indeed, BLM acknowledges that the “phased-in” approach to removal is required because “[nationwide, short and long term holding space for éxcess wild horses- removed from the range is limited.” (See, e.g., AR001351 (Bible Springs Complex 2014 DR)); (Docket No. 117, at 17; Docket No. 117-1, at 23). Further,-the total numbers of animals removed over the life of the plan is at least partially contingent on “administrative factors .(budget, adoptions, holding space, etc.).” (AR001174 (Bible Springs Complex 2014 EA)). Such “administrative factors” do not give BLM license to redefine their statutory obligation under Section Three. As explained above, BLM is required by law to remove excess animals to within AML as soon as the actions necessary to complete removal can be safely and effectively carried out. Removal that occurs gradually over nearly a decade does not fulfill that requirement.

In sum, the court' finds that BLM’s “phased-in” approach to removal as adopted in the Frisco, Four Mile, Bible Springs, and Sulphur HMAs, and the Blawn Wash HA does not fulfill its statutory obligation to “immediately remove excess animals so as to achieve appropriate management levels.” 16 U.S.C § 1333(b)(2). It follows that BLM has in fact “delayed” an action it is required by law to take and that delay is subject to a reasonableness evaluation under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).

3. WHETHER BLM HAS UNREASONABLY DELAYED EXECUTION OF ITS. SECTION THREE DUTY

Having established that BLM has delayed execution of its Section Three duty to “immédiately remove” excess wild horses from the Bible Springs, Frisco, Four-Mile, and Sulphur HMAs and the Blawn Wash HA, the court now evaluates whether BLM has “unreasonably delayed” under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). “Resolution of a claim of unreasonable delay is ordinarily a complicated and nuanced task requiring consideration of the particular facts and circumstances before the court.” Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The Tenth Circuit has indicated that courts evaluating claims of “unreasonable] delay” of agency action under § 706(1) should employ á close variation of the TRAC factors articulated by the D.C. Circuit. See Qwest Comm’ns, 398 F.3d at 1238-39. These factors are helpful to determine “whether the agency’s delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus” or mandatory injunctive relief. See TRAC, 750 F.2d at 79. As formulated by the Tenth Circuit, the pertinent factors include “(1) the extent of the delay, (2) the reasonableness of the delay in the context of the legislation authorizing agehcy action, (3) the consequences of the delay, ... (4) administrative difficulties bearing on the agency’s ability to resolve an issue” and, finally, (5) “consideration of the complexity of the task envisioned by a court’s remand order.” Qwest Comm’ns, 398 F.3d at 1239. In evaluating these factors, the court is mindful that “[a]lthough there is no per se rule as to how long is too long, ‘inordinate agency delay would frustrate congressional intent by forcing a breakdown of regulatory processes.’ ” In re Int’l Chem., 958 F.2d at 1149 (quoting Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 897 n.156 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).

In this case, the court finds that the first three factors weigh in favor of Plaintiffs’ claims of unreasonable delay, but the balance of factors ultimately weighs against such a finding.

1. EXTENT OF DELAY AND REASONABLENESS OF DELAY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WHA

The court will evaluate the first two TRAC factors together. The court must first “ascertain the length of time that has elapsed since the agency came under a duty to act,” Cutler, 818 F.2d at 897, and then determine “the reasonableness of the delay ... in the context of the statute which authorizes the agency’s action,” In re Int’l Chem., 958 F.2d at 1149 (quotations omitted) (quoting Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1158 n. 30 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per cu-riam)). The latter determination “entails an examination of any legislative mandate in the statute and the degree of discretion given the agency by Congress.” Cutler, 818 F.2d at 897. In other words, “where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content” for an evaluation of reasonableness. See TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. As explained below, the court finds that these two factors weigh in favor of Plaintiffs’ claims of unreasonable delay.

The extent of BLM’s delay in this instance is substantial. BLM’s current obligation to “immediately remove” excess horses in the Frisco, Four-Mile, Bible Springs, and Sulphur HMAs, as well as the Blawn Wash HA arose as soon as the agency identified an overpopulation in each given area and determined that action was necessary to remove that overpopulation. See Wyoming, 839 F.3d at 944. BLM made these determinations for the Frisco HMA in September 2012, (AR001477), for the Sulphur HMA in July 2014, (AR002137), and for the Four-Mile HMA, Bible Springs HMA, and Blawn Wash HA in June 2014, (AR001350). While it is not clear from the record exactly how long it would have taken BLM to complete removal to within AML in these areas consistent with its duty under Section Three, it appears that BLM has delayed completion of its duty for multiple years in each area and intends to delay for several years more. Such delay is inconsistent with Section Three’s mandate, which provides a clear “indication of the speed with which [Congress] expects the agency to proceed,” see TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80 — BLM must “immediately remove excess animals from the range so as to achieve appropriate management levels,” 16 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(2) (emphasis added). As explained above, this congressional command affords BLM no discretion to choose other management options or to unnecessarily delay implementation and completion of removal actions. BLM may only delay the necessary removals to the extent that delay is necessary to safely and effectively complete the removals. BLM’s years-long failure to fulfill this obligation in the face of the law’s requirement of prompt.'action weighs in favor of Plaintiffs’ claims of unreasonable delay. •

2. CONSEQUENCES OF THE DELAY

The court next turns to the third TRAC factor and evaluates the consequences of BLM’s delay. See TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. In general, the more drastic the consequences resulting from a given delay, the less likely that such a delay will be found to be justifiable. For example, “[djelays that might be altogether reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human lives are at stake.” Auchter, 702 F.2d at 1157. An agency’s delay may also produce intolerable regulatory repercussions: “[T]he court must also estimate the extent to which the delay undermines the statutory scheme, either by frustrating the statutory goal or creating a situation in which the agency is ‘losing its ability to effectively regulate at all.’ ” Envtl. Def. Fund v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 902 F.2d 785, 789 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Cutler, 818 F.2d at 897-98). As explained below, the court finds that this factor also weighs in favor of Plaintiffs’ claims -of unreasonable delay.

The consequences of BLM’s delay in this instance are significant. Most crucially, the delay undermines the very purpose of Section Three’s mandate, which is to “maintain a thriving ecological balance between wild horse and burro populations, wildlife, livestock, and vegetation, and to protect the range from the deterioration associated with overpopulation of wild horses and burros.” Blake, 837 F.Supp. at 460 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1737, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 15 (1978)); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1333(a), (b)(2). In each area at issue in this section, BLM has made a determination that the current overpopulation of wild horses is causing and will continue to cause considerable harm to rangeland resources. The horses’ overcon-sumption of already-scarce water and forage has negative effects on neighboring species and even on the land itself — BLM documents cite severe soil erosion, destruction of delicate riparian areas, and increased competition for resources among other wild animals and livestock as predictable consequences of prolonged overpopulation. Moreover, the continued existence of excess wild horses on the range threatens the horses themselves. Dehydration or starvation among individual horses is likely inevitable as competition for forage and water increases, and could be followed by the collapse of existing herd structures. Regardless of BLM’s sincere efforts to mitigate such harm through partial removals and other management techniques, the fact remains that the consistent and unabated ■ presence of overpopulations in the areas at issue severely taxes the rangeland ecosystem and is ultimately unsustainable. Indeed, BLM has openly acknowledged that its current wild horse management program is not on a “sustainable path.” (See Docket No. 115-2, at 2, 14 (May 11, 2016 Letter from then-Director of BLM, Neil Kornze)). Given the pronounced drought conditions across the areas in question in recent years and the rapid reproduction rate of wild horses, this may very well be a “situation in which the agency is ‘losing its ability to effectively regulate at all.’” Envtl. Def. Fund, 902 F.2d at 789 (quoting Cutter, 818 F.2d at 897-98).

There is also a tangible human cost associated with the continued presence of excess- wild horses. Plaintiffs in this action: rely heavily on rangeland forage and water to sustain their livestock and, by extension, their livelihood. As the federal government owns and manages huge swaths of- the open rangeland in this region, available private land is scarce, expensive, and often already put to use for forage or 'otherwise unavailable for livestock grazing. Consequently, Plaintiffs and other ranchers must often rely on the sage grasses and freshwater springs dotting the HMAs and HA at issue to maintain their herds of cattle and sheep. Thus, the health of these areas is inextricably interwoven with the local agricultural economy and, as a result, the continued degradation of rangeland resources by excess wild horses has profound financial consequence. A pertinent example: The owners of the Wintch Ranch report they were forced to sell over 300 head of cattle between 2013 and 2014 owing to the unavailability of sufficient, forage and water-on the HA. Additionally, wild horses on the HA have. repeatedly damaged or destroyed fencing and water improvements installed by the Wintch owners on the HA, necessitating repair and exacerbating drought conditions. Most significantly, the Wintch ranching operation has not been able to utilize- its full allotment of forage in Blawn Wash HA for nearly twenty years because of competition with wild horse herds for forage and water. (Docket No. 103-2, at 2-5). Consistent with this report, BLM concluded in a 2014 EA concerning the Blawn Wash HA and adjacent areas that “[w]ild horses, wildlife, and livestock compete directly for the same cover, water, and forage resources” and- that overgrazing of wild, horses “reducefs] forage availability for livestock.” (See AR001171). In certain other areas around the same time, BLM found that wild horse populations were consuming more than 360% of their allocated forage due to overpopulation, while livestock consumption peaked at a.mere 78% of allotted forage. (AR001490 (Frisco 2012 EA); see also AR001191-AR001192 (reporting a similar situation under drought conditions in the Bible Springs Complex and Blawn Wash HA)). Grazing permittees have been forced to “voluntarily” reduce or eliminate livestock consumption on them allotments in order to avoid wholly depleting rangeland resources, all while wild horse overconsumption continues largely unabated. (See, e.g., AR001192).

The court acknowledges that BLM has made good-faith efforts to mitigate harm from identified overpopulations in each of the areas at issue. In fact, BLM has removed a number of excess horses from some of the areas at issue in recent months, (see, e.g., Docket No. 117-1, at 29-37 (indicating BLM removed 113 head from the Frisco HMÁ in July 2016. and 168 head from Blawn Wash HA in August 2016)), and plans to remove more horses in the coming years, (see Docket No. 117, at 11 (indicating that BLM plans to conduct removal operations in each of the areas at issue in 2017 or early 2018)). Nevertheless, BLM acknowledges that significant overpopulation persists in each area and that the agency’s current plans for removal and mitigation would allow overpopulations to remain for several years into the future. Given the, grave nature of the consequences that flow from BLM’s failure to completely remove identified overpopula-tions of wild horses, the court concludes that this TRAC factor weighs in favor of Plaintiffs’ claims of unreasonable delay.

3. ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES BEARING ON BLM’S ABILITY TO ADDRESS WILD HORSE POPULATIONS

The fourth TRAC factor requires this court to evaluate the “administrative, difficulties bearing on the agency’s ability to resolve an issue.” Qwest Comm’ns, 398 F.3d at 1239. Courts owe final agency action “considerable deference,” see People for Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 852 F.3d 990, 999 (10th Cir. 2017), and, to a certain extent, review of agency inaction is similarly circumspect. Accordingly, any court evaluating the reasonableness of agency delay “should give due consideration in the balance to ‘any plea of administrative error, administrative convenience, practical difficulty in carrying out a legislative mandate, or need to prioritize in the face of limited- resources.’ ” In re Int'l Chem., 958 F.2d at 1149-50; Cutler, 818 F.2d at 898 (explaining that courts should consider “the agency’s explanation, such -as administrative - necessity, insufficient resources, or the complexity-of the task confronting the agency”). In delineating this factor, the TRAC court emphasized “the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority.” 750 F.2d at 80. “Of course, these justifications become less persuasive as delay progresses, and must always be balanced against the potential for harm.” Cutler, 818 F.2d at 898. As explained below, the court concludes that this factor weighs heavily against" Plaintiffs’ claims of unreasonable delay.

BLM’s efforts to both successfully and sustainably manage wild horse populations pursuant to the WHA are hindered by nigh-insurmountable administrative obstacles. Among those obstacles, perhaps the greatest is. the United States Congress. The WÍÍA demands that BLM continually monitor and manage nearly 67,000 wild horses scattered across ten western states and periodically remove excess animals, in the-following “or