Congregation Rabbinical College of Tartikov, Inc. v. Village of Pomona (280 F. Supp. 3d 426, 2017)

OPINION & ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:

Plaintiff Rabbinical College of Tartikov, Inc. (“Tartikov”) is the owner of an approximately Í 00-acre parcel of land (the “Subject Property”) located within the Village of Pomona (the “Village”), upon which it seeks to build a rabbinical college that, in addition to providing all of the facilities necessary to train rabbinical judges, will include housing for its students and their families. Plaintiffs, which include Tartikov and its future-students and faculty, challenge certain zoning and environmental ordinances enacted by the Village, alleging that they are unlawful under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., §§ 3, 9, and 11 of the New York State Constitution, and New York common law. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the enforcement of portions of the Village of Pomona, New York Code (“Village Code”) §-§ 130-4 (defining educational institutions and dormitories) (the “Accreditation Law”), § 130-10(F)(12) (limiting the size of dormitories) (together with the definition of “dormitory”- in § 130-4,. the “Dormitory Law”), and § 126 (establishing wetlands protections) (the “Wetlands Law,” and together, the “Challenged Laws”). Beginning in May and ending- in June 2017, the Court conducted a 10-day bench trial. On September 7, 2017, the Court heard closing statements. (See Dkt. (entry for September 7, 2Q17).) What follows are the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I. Background -

A. Factual Background

The facts leading up to the passage of the Challenged Laws are largely undisputed. The dispute lies in whether the reasons given for their adoption are lawful.

1. The Parties

Plaintiffs are a corporation and individuals affiliated with the Orthodox Jewish community, including various sects of the Hasidic community, all of whom allege an interest In the construction of a rabbinical college on the Subject Property. Plaintiffs Rabbi Mordechai Babad, Rabbi Wolf Brief, Rabbi Hermen Kahana, Rabbi Meir Mar-gulis, Rabbi Meilech Menczer, Rabbi Jacob Hershkowitz, Rabbi Chaim Rosenberg, and Rabbi David A. Menczer (with Chaim Rosenberg, Jacob Hershkowitz, and Mei-lech Menczer defined' as the “Students”) are rabbis who seek to live, teach, and/or study at Tartikov’s proposed rabbinical college.

Tartikov was formed in 2004. (See PL’s Ex. 1, at RC-00002809.) At the time of incorporation, Tartikov’s trustees included Chaim Babad, who indirectly financed Tar-tikov, Michael Tauber (“Tauber”), and four other ’ individuals. (See id, at RC_00002810.) The corporation was formed, among other reasons, “[t]o promote the. religious, intellectual, moral, and social welfare among its. members and their ¡families,” “[t]o establish, maintain and conduct a .school for the [study] of the holy Torah and to maintain classes for the teachings, of the customs,, traditions and mode of worship of the Jewish Orthodox faith,” and “[t]o aid and assist worthy indigent members of the corporation with loans and housing.” (Id, at RC_00002807-08.) Tauber explained that Tartikov was formed to “establish[ ] a rabbinical college in Rockland County, New York in order to provide a religious learning and living community to train [a] new generation of students to, become full-time rabbinical judges.” (PL’s Ex. 1500 (“Tauber Decl,”) ¶ 11; see also PL’s Ex. 1506 ¶ 10).) In August 2004, Tartikov purchased the Subject Property for approximately $13 million dollars. (See Trial Tr. 364, 896.) The Subject Property-is the only parcel of land owned by Tartikov, (see Tauber Decl. f 40), but a related entity owns an additional 30 acres of property within the Village, all of which abut the Subject Property, (see Trial Tr. 128.)

Defendants consist of the Village, its Board of Trustees (or “Board”), its current Mayor Brett Yagel (‘Yagel”), (see Trial Tr. 707), its former mayor and Trustee Nicholas Sanderson (“Sanderson”), and other current and former members of its Board of Trustees — Ian' Banks- (“Banks”), Alma Sanders Roman (“Roman”), and Rita Louie (“Louie”) — each sued in his or her official capacity.' Each of the individual Defendants voted to amend or adopt one or more of the Challenged Laws.

2. Individual Plaintiffs’ Religious Beliefs & Tartikov’s Proposed College

According to Orthodox Jewish belief, Orthodox Jews are not permitted to resolve conflicts in the secular court system, but rather must have their conflicts adjudicated in rabbinical courts (bais din) before rabbinical judges (dayanim or dayan) applying Jewish law. (See Pis.’ Post-Trial Proposed Findings of Fact (“Pis.’ FOF”) ¶¶ 31, 33, 34 (Dkt. No. 326).) Presently, however, Plaintiffs have observed that the rabbinical courts in the United States are overburdened because there are not enough qualified rabbinical judges, forcing Orthodox/Hasidic Jews to go to secular courts to resolve their disputes. (See id. ¶¶38, 40.) To help alleviate this backlog, the Students are seeking to become full-time rabbinical judges trained in all four books of the Shulchan Aruch, a compilation of Jewish laws of the Orthodox Hasidic tradition, also known as the Code of Jewish Law. (See id. ¶¶ 20, 42.) They currently are enrolled at Kollel Belz in Monsey, New York, (see id. ¶¶ 21-23), but Kollel Belz does not offer a “complete” program on the Shulchan Aruch, (Pl.’s Ex. 1503 (“Jacob Hershkowitz Deck”) ¶ 38), leading to their desire to enroll at Tartikov’s rabbinical college.

Tartikov’s rabbinical program will focus specifically on all four books of the Shul-chan Aruch, (see Pis.’ FOF • ¶ 41), which means that Tartikov will be considered a “specialized kollel,” (id. ¶ 44 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Compared to a regular kollel, where students spend their time studying anything related to Jewish law, students'at Tartikov will specialize in a “directed and intense study” of the Shul-chan Aruch. (Pis.’ Ex. 1502 (“Mordechai Babad Deck”) ¶ 49.) Tartikov estimates that its proposed program will take approximately 13 to 15 years to complete because its students must master thousands of religious texts and commentaries, and certain aspects of secular law. (See Pis.’ FOF ¶¶ 48, 53, 57.) During this period of study, the students will be required to “spend their days from about 6 a.m. until about 10 p.m. ... in study, in observation of judges, [and] in collegial examination of the issues that are. presented by their studies.” (Tauber Deck ¶ 69.) Students will break from their studies only “as is required to fulfill the other religious obligations in daily life for an Orthodox Jew.” (See id.) No other rabbinical college in the United States offers this type of program, (see Pis.’ FOF ¶ 51), but one institution in Israel offers one similar to it, (see id. ¶ 52).

Admission to the program will be based on interviews conducted by Tartikov’s future dean, Mordechai Babad, who will review the applicants’ backgrounds and assess their knowledge of Jewish law. (See id. ¶ 94; Tauber Deck ¶ 60.) Admission will also be conditioned on completing a high school level program in the Talmud. (See Tauber Deck ¶ 60.) The Students and David Menczer have satisfied these conditions and will be admitted into the college when it opens. (See Mordechai Babad Deck ¶ 50.)

Student progress will be measured by regular testing. (See Tauber Deck ¶ 51.) Some students also may undergo an oral examination to determine whether they are qualified to serve as rabbinical judges. (See id.) If a student passed that examination, the rabbi conducting it will give the student a smicha, which signifies that the student has accomplished proficiency in an area of Jewish law. (See Pis.’ FOF ¶¶ 88, 91.) The smicha is not a degree recognized by the New York State Board of Regents (the “Board of Regents”), (see id. ¶ 90), and Tartikov does not plan on offering any degree recognized by that body, (see Pis.’ Ex. 1507 (“Kinser Deck”) ¶ 29).

As part of the program, Tartikov plans to construct and foster the development of a Torah community, i.e., on-campus housing where its students and their families can live, so that the students can study from 6 a.m. until 10 p.m., (see Tauber Deck ¶69), and also meet their religious obligations to their families. (See id. ¶ 19; Pis.’ Ex. 1501 (“Chaim Rosenberg Deck”) ¶ 52; Pis.’ FOF ¶ 62.) Jewish law requires that Tartikov’s students live with their families, (see Chaim Rosenberg Deck ¶ 55; Jacob Hershkowitz Deck ¶ 86(n); Pis.’ Ex. 1504 (“Meilech Menezer Deck”) ¶38⅛)), and teach their children the Torah, (see Trial Tr. 197). Jewish law also requires men to marry at a young age and have large families, and imposes conjugal duties .upon a husband and wife while forbidding them from engaging in any family planning or using birth control. (See Pis.’ FOF ¶¶ 24, 25.)

The purpose of a Torah community is to isolate the students from the distractions of the outside world, permitting them to devote themselves to the study of Jewish law. (See Pis.’ FOF ¶ 69.) The Students have professed that they are motivated by their religious beliefs to live in such a community. (See Chaim Rosenberg Deck ¶ 54 (“My religious beliefs motivate me to be part of such a Torah community.”); Jacob Hershkowitz Deck ¶ 49 (“To become a rabbinical judge, I must participate in a program that teaches Shulchan Aruch, and do so in a community of like-minded students and teachers, what we refer to as a Torah community.”); Meilech ' Menezer Deck ¶ 46 (“My religious beliefs motivate me to become part of this Torah Community’s living, learning, and worshipping environment as proposed by the Congregation Rabbinical College of Tartikov.”).) Their belief is grounded in religious texts that, for example, direct- Jews to “[ejxile yourself to a place of Torah.” (Pis.’ Ex. 1508 (“Resnicoff Deck”) ¶ 70 (internal quotation marks omitted).) Without on-campus housing, Tartikov believes that its program will fail, (see Pis.’ FOF ¶ 66), in part because two other kollels in the. area that do not have on-campus housing or a Torah community — Kolíel Belz and Mechón L’Hoyora — have been unsuccessful in producing rabbinical judges trained in all four books of the Shulchan Aruch, (see id. ¶ 70).

In addition to housing, Tartikov’s facilities will include classrooms, study halls, courtrooms, a library, one. or more shuls, and a facility to house .a mikvah. (See Tauber Deck ¶ 61.) The library will hold the “[tjhoqsands of studies and, commentaries” that discuss and explain the Shul-chan Aruch. (Id. ¶ 65.) The mikvahs, or ritual baths, will be provided, out .of religious necessity. (See Pis.’ FOF ¶ 85.) One or more shuls will be constructed so that everyone on campus • can pray together. (See Tauber Deck ¶ 22.)

As proposed, Tartikov’s rabbinical college cannot be accredited by the Board of Regents or any other accrediting body. It cannot be accredited by the Board of Regents because it will not offer a degree recognized by that body and educational institutions cannot be accredited by the Board of Regents until they are fully operational. (See Kinser Deck ¶¶ 29, 41; Trial Tr. 446.) The college cannot be accredited by the Association of Advanced Rabbinical and Talmudic Schools, the accrediting agency for Jewish educational institutions, because it plans to admit students without an admissions test, will not offer a broad enough curriculum, and must be in existence for at least two years before it can be accredited. {See Pis.’ Ex. 2; Trial Tr. 447-49.)

Little' else is known about the structures, curriculum, or features of Tartikov’s rabbinical college because it has not provided a formal plan for, or submitted an application to the Village seeking to construct, their proposed rabbinical college.

3. Chronology of the Challenged Laws

The Villagé, incorporated in 1967, adopted a Master Plan in 1974 which it updated in 1997. {See Joint Pretrial Order Stipulations of Fact ¶ 8 (Dkt. No. 257).) It first adopted zoning laws in 1968, {see Defs,’ Ex. 2000 (“Ulman Aff.”) ¶ 6), which were designed to preserve and enhance the rural residential character of'the Village, {see id,). Since its inception, the Village has been designated as an R-40 residential zoning district. {See id. ¶ 5; Defs.’ Proposed Posh-Trial Findings of Fact (“Defs.’ FOF”) ¶ 1 (Dkt. No. 324).) The R-40 designation requires that there be a minimum of 40,000 square feet per lot. {See Ulman Aff. ¶ 6.) One-family residences, public utilities rights-of-way, libraries and museums, public parks and playground, and agricultural pursuits are permitted land uses as of right. {See Joint Pretrial Order Stipulations of Fact ¶ 6.)

On December 15, 1999, Yeshiva Spring Valley (“YSV”) made an informal appearance before the Village’s Planning Board regarding its desire to build a yeshiva on the Subject Property. (See Pis.’ FÓF ⅜! 127.) During the meeting, a representative from Frederick P. Clark Associates Inc." (“FPC”), the Village’s planner, noted that the Village’s zoning laws for schools “really stink” and recommended that the laws be updated. {See id. ¶ 128; Trial Tr. 799.) One month later, FPC circulated memoranda entitled “YSV-Pomona (Primary School and Pre-School),” and “Proposed Primary School and Pre-School (YSV Pomona) and the Village’s Zoning Regulations regarding schools,” both of which noted the existence of only “scant” regulations for schools and recommended that the Village amend the pertinent laws. (Pis.’ Exs. Ill, 130; see also Pis.’ FOF ¶129.) These recommendations spurred the creation of Local Law No. 1 of 2001, a law designed to regulate educational institutions. While discussing a rough draft of the law, the Mayor of the Village at the time, Herbert Marshall (“Marshall”), stated: “This thing’s going to come in. They’re going to come in and we’re going to be caught with our pants down if we don’t move. That’s why I want to make sure that we’re moving ahead.” (Pis.’ Ex. 114, at 69.)

On January 22, 2001, following a public hearing, the Board of Trustees adopted Local Law No. 1 of 2001. {See Pis.’ FOF ¶ 130; Defs.’ FOF ¶ 114.) As relevant here, the law defined “educational institution,” for the first time, as “[a]ny school or other organization or institution conducting a regularly scheduled comprehensive curriculum of academic and/or alternative vocational instruction similar to that furnished by kindergartens, primary[,] or secondary schools and operating under the Education Law of New York State, and duly licensed by the State of New York,” and subjected such institutions to certain restrictions under the special permit approval process, including minimum net lot area, maximum development intensity, frontage, access, set back, parking, and noise guidelines. CSee Defs.’ Ex. 1010 (“Local Law No..l of 2001”)) as codified at Village Code §§ 130-4,130-10.) For example, the law imposed a minimum net lot area of 10 acres, “plus an additional 0.05 acres for each pupil enrolled.” (Id. § 4(F)(1)(a).) The Board of Trustees passed the law because it sought to have educational institutions as.special permit uses rather than uses as of right and to set standards by which such uses would be regulated. (See Ulman Aff. ¶ 25.) Following the passage of Local Law No. 1 of 2001, YSV determined that it was impossible for it to build the yeshiva it wanted on the Subject Property, (see Nathan Fromowitz Dep. 60), and eventually built the yeshiva outside of the Village, (see id. at 14-15).

In December 2002, Marshall spoke on behalf of the Village at a community meeting to support the formation of the Village of Ladentown. (See generally Pis.’ Ex. 94.) The Village of Ladentown was proposed in opposition to the Town of Ramapo’s (“Ra-mapo”) September 2002 Draft-Comprehensive Plan, which sought to re-zone a 200-acre parcel of land known as the Patrick Farm Property. (See id. at. 1.) The plan specifically contemplated the development of multi-family housing for adult students on the property. (See id.) Trial Tr. .729.) Marshall, stated that Ramapo’s' plan, re-' fleeted its decision to “support the special agenda of a small but vocal group of citizens who would prefer replacing our. trees with apartment buildings, our wetlands with asphalt, and our wildlife with traffic,” (Pis.’ Ex. 94, at 1.)

In May 2004, the Village filed a lawsuit against' Ramapo seeking to set aside Ra-mapo’s Comprehensive Plan for failing to comply with the New York State Environmental Quality Review Act (“SEQRA”). (See generally Pis.’ Ex. 155.) The petition noted that Ramapo “attracted a burgeoning Hassidic community,” which “caused development and political pressures in the Town to increase its housing stock and infrastructure.” (Id. ¶¶ 31-32.)

On,June 15, 2004, Ramapo adopted the Adult' Student 'Housing Law (“ASHL”) which 'permitted married adult student multi-family housing for Orthodox/Hasidic Jews in residential zones throughout the unincorporated portion of Ramapo. (See Pis.’ Ex. 156 ¶¶ 7, 133.) On June 28, 2Ó04, the Board of Trustees voted to challenge the ASHL. (See id. ¶ 27.) The petition, which was filed in October 2004, noted that the law was passed “to secure for one religious community a unique and significant zoning benefit.” (Id. ¶ 216.) Marshall strongly opposed the ASHL, stating that Ramapo officials “were pandering to the special interest groups able to deliver the critically important block vote.” (Pis.’ Ex. 109, at PQM0013281.) The “block' vote” Marshall was referring to was the Orthodox Jewish vote out of New Square, New York. (See Trial Tr. 619.)

During the summer of 2004, the Board of Trustees discussed amending the laws relating to educational institutions. (See Ulman Aff. ¶ 42.) On September 7, 2004, Village Attorney Doris Ulman (“Ulman”) provided formal recommendations to the Board regarding which provisions should be amended. (See id.) Defs.’ Ex. 1016.) Ulman recommended removing the .05 acre-per-student lot area requirement, adding a provision allowing dormitories, clarifying.the definition of educational institution, and removing the requirement that educational institutions be on a state or county road. (See Defs.’ Ex. 1016.) These recommendations served as the bases for Local Law No. 5 of 2004. As relevant here, Local Law No. 5 of 2004 redefined “educational institution” as “[a]ny private or religious elementary, junior high or high school, college, graduate[,] or postgraduate school conducting a full-time curriculum of instruction ... accredited by the New York State Education Department or similar recognized accrediting agency,” and amended the minimum lot area, frontage, access, setback, and screening guidelines. (Defs.’ Ex. 1011 (“Local Law No. 5 of 2004”) §§ 1, 4-5, as codified at Village Code §§ 130-4, 130-10 (emphasis added).) The minimum lot area was changed to 10 acres — omitting the “net lot” requirement — and the .05 acre-per-student requirement was eliminated. (See id. § 4.) The law also included a provision permitting the development of dormitories:

A building that is operated by a school located on the same lot and which contains private or semi-private rooms which open to a common hallway, which rooms are sleeping quarters for administrative staff, faculty or students. Communal dining, cooking, laundry, lounge and recreation facilities may be provided. Dormitory rooms shall not contain separate cooking, dining or housekeeping facilities except that one dwelling unit with complete housekeeping faeilities may be provided for use of a Superintendent or supervisory staff for every fifty dormitory rooms. Not more than one communal dining room shall be provided in any building used for dormitory purposes. Single family, two-family and/or multi-family dwelling units other than as described above shall not be considered to be dormitories or part of dormitories.

(Id. § 2.) Ulman based this definition on the laws in Chestnut Ridge and Ramapo, (see Ulman Aff. ¶ 46), both of which provide that dormitories “shall not contain separate cooking” facilities, (Defs.’ Ex. 1017, at 2; Defs.’ Ex. 1018, at XVIII-12.) The Board of Trustees adopted Local Law No. 5 of 2004 on September 27, 2004. (See Joint Pretrial Order Stipulations of Fact ¶24.)

Prior to the adoption of Local Law No. 5 of 2004, dormitories were not permitted in the Village. (See Ulman Aff. ¶ 38.) Ulman said she drafted the law to authorize schools to build dormitories to house their students on campus, (see id. ¶ 39), to comply with “recent case law developments in New York State,” (id. ¶ 48), and to fix “inconsistencies and vagueness” in the existing laws, (see id. ¶ 52). For example, the code provided different accreditation requirements for “schools” and “educational institutions.” (See id.) Schools had to be approved by the Board of Regents or the New York State Department of Education. (See id.) Educational institutions were required to be licensed by the State of New York. (See id.) The Village Code was amended to remove the definition for “school” and clarify that educational institutions could be approved by the New York State Education Department or similar accrediting body. (See id.) The accreditation requirement was not completely eliminated from the Village Code because Ulman wanted to prevent certain institutions that might call themselves schools from building in the Village. (See id. ¶ 51.) Ulman believed that these changes would make it easier for applicants and Village officials to understand the laws applicable to educational institutions. (See id. ¶ 52.)

The Village learned that Tartikov had purchased the Subject Property at least as early as November 2004. (See Joint Pretrial Order Stipulations of Fact ¶ 15.) In 2005 and 2006, the Village approved Tarti-kov’s tax exemption applications. (See id. ¶ 16.) Ten board meeting agendas from July 2006 through December 2006 reflect that the Board planned to discuss Tartikov in executive session. (See Pis.’ Exs. 80, 88, 85, 87, 89-92, 119-20.) The agendas do not provide the basis upon which the Board determined that executive session was necessary, but minutes from the September 25 and December 18, 2016 Board meetings reveal that the Board closed the meeting to the public to discuss “matters of litigation.” (See Pis.’ Ex. 105, at 12; see also Pis.’ Ex. 121, at 6.) During some of these same Board meetings, certain of the Challenged Laws were discussed. (See Pis.’ Ex. 115, at 5 (Board of Trustees minutes from November 27, 2006, noting that Ul-man distributed proposed laws relating to dormitory buildings and houses of worship); Pis.’ Ex. 121, at 5 (Board of Trustees minutes from September 25, 2006, noting that Ulman was working on a “local law revision for wetlands”).)

As Village Counsel, Ulman regularly reviewed the Village Code and made recommendations to the Board of Trustees regarding additions and amendments. (See Defs.’ FOF ¶¶ 132,134.) In 2006, Ulman determined that the code provisions relating to dormitories needed tc be amended, so she drafted Local Law No. 1 of 2007. (Id.) As relevant here, the law: (1) requires an educational institution to have & net lot area of 10 acres; (2) removes certain slopes from net lot area calculations; (3) provides that “[a] dormitory building shall not occupy, more than twenty (20) percent of the total, square footage of all buildings on the lot”; and (4) provides that the maximum height for a dormitory building is 25 feet. (Defs.’ Ex. 1012 (“Local Law No. 1 of 2007”), as codified at Village Code § 130-10(F).) Ulman testified that the law was designed to make clear that a dormitory use is an accessory use to a principal educational use, to clarify that Local Law No. 5 of 2004 imposed “net” lot area requirements rather than “lot area” requirements, and to remove references to “school” that had inadvertently been left in the code after the definition for school was deleted in 2004. (See Ulman Aff. ¶ 54; Local Law No. 5 of 2004.)

On December 18, 2006, the Board of Trustees held a public hearing on Local Law No. 1 of 2007. (See Ulman Aff. ¶ 55; Defs.’ Ex. 1041, at 4.) During the hearing, an attorney for Tartikov, Paul Savad (“Savad”), asked the Board of Trustees to delay voting on the law until the ' next Board meeting. (See Defs.’ FOF ¶ 135.) The Board agreed to continue discussing the law at the Board meeting scheduled for January 22, 2007. (See id.)

Before the Board held its next meeting, on January 9, 2007, Preserve Ramapo, a political action group in the region, leaked tentative plans for Tartikov’s proposed rabbinical college .to the public. (See Pis,’ Ex. 65.) The leaked information stated that Tartikov was. planning to build “1,800 square feet” residences that would house 4,500 people. (Id. at POMOOÍ3256.) Shortly, thereafter, The Journal News published an article referencing Preserve Ramapo’s disclosure and adding additional information. (See Pis.’ Ex.. 157.) Savad is quoted in the article as stating that the rabbinical college would house 1,000 rabbis and their families. (See id. at RCL1634.) Ulman learned about Tartikov’s plan for the Subject Property from reading the article in The Journal News. (See Ulman Aff. ¶ 57.)

On January 22, 2ÓQ7, the Board of Trustees held a public hearing on Local Law No. 1 of 2007, during'which it passed the law. (See Pis.’ FOF ¶¶ 148-49; Defs.’ FOF ¶¶ 138, 148.) The turnout was overwhelming, (see Pis.’ FOF ¶ 235), likely because of the information that was leaked by Preserve Ramapo and contained in The Journal News article. During the hearing, the Board considered changing the height limitation for dormitories from 25 feet to 35 feet. Ulman stated that the proposed change would make dormitories consistent with all other uses in the Village Code. (See Joint Pretrial Order Stipulations of Fact ¶ 18.) The Board also considered increasing the number of permitted dining halls from one to two. (See Pis.’ Ex. 137, at 45.) After receiving input from the largely hostile audience, the Board decided to keep the height limitation at 25 feet and declined to increase the number of dining halls. (See Joint Pretrial Order Stipulations of Fact ¶ 19; Pis.’ Ex. 137, at 77 (Sanderson stating that “based on the input from the public this evening, I think ... [w]e' should cut out the two dining rooms and go back to one”); Trial Tr. 633 (Marshall testifying that increasing the height limit was rejected based on the comments from the — from .the citizenry who attended”); Local Law No. 1 of 2007 § 3.)

Many of the people who spoke during the hearing expressed opposition to Tarti-kov’s proposal, as'they understood it based on the rumors that were circulating. Many of the comments focused on the size of the project and its effect on the Village, rather than the fact that it was being proposed by Orthodox/Hasidic Jews, (See, e.g., Pis.’ Ex. 137, at 10-11 (“I urge you not to allow that type of housing that’s being discussed in that law. I don’t think the area calls for it. The village is too small, and I don’t think that we should have that kind of housing anywhere in the village.”).) However, comments related to the religious nature of Tartikov’s proposal and its proposed student body. (See, e.g., id. at 47 (“You know, let me ask you one thing, it’s really funny how we’re talking about law, when you have a group that breaks every law there is, and we are talking about law.”); id. at 56 (“You know in America, we have the sense of community. That’s our face. We’re going to be another Kiryas Joel [a Hasidic community]. That’s why we are emotional. You can get into the environmental impact and all that. That’s all I have to say.”).) Approximately half-way through the meeting, in an attempt to calm the audience, Marshall stated:

Ladies and gentlemen, let me say something. We sitting at this table have limitations that are placed on us as to what we can say, and what we can’t say, because our attorney tells us what we can say and what we can’t say. I can’t say what I feel — I can’t — if I agree with you, I don’t agree with you, I don’t have that luxury of being able to say that here. All that I can say is that every member of this board works very, very hard to do what is best for this community. You you’re your issues. Don’t assume because no one has gotten up and said,, wow, I agree with you, oh boy; don’t assume that be'cause we didn’t do that we don’t agree. We may or we may .not, but please give us the.benefit.of the doubt. We have all been doing this — we work very hard at what we do. We try and do what is best for the community, but it’s our home.: .

(Id. at 58-59.)

Around this 'same time, the Board of Trustees was considering whether to adopt a wetlands protection law. The Village had considered adopting a similar law in 1998, but ultimately decided against it. (See Ul-man Aff. ¶ 92.) In December 2006, Ulman created a first draft and circulated it to the Board. (See Pis.’ Ex. 123.) As originally proposed, the law prohibited certain development activities from occurring on all properties in the Village within 100 feet of the boundary of any wetland, water body, or watercourse, unless a permit was issued by the Board of Trustees. (See id. §§ 126-3, 126-5.) Ulman: claims that the law was drafted because the Board was concerned about wetlands in the Village that were not regulated by the state or federal governments. (See Ulman Aff. ¶ 68:) Ulman drafted the law after reviewing wetlands laws from other villages and a wetlands study prepared for Westchester. County, New York. (See id. ¶ 71.) The idea for the 10.0-foot buffer zone was taken directly from the New York State Environmental Conservation Law, which requires a permit from the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation for any proposed disturbance within 100 feet of regulated wetlands. (See id. ¶ 68.) Ulman believed that the law would protect the health, safety, and welfare of Village residents. (See id. ¶ 69.)

Before the Board voted on the proposed wetlands law, Village residents began campaigning to become or remain members of the Board. Sanderson, Yagel, and Louie ran together on a slate in the March 2007 Village election. (See Pis.’ EOF ¶275.) A major piece of their platform was opposition to Tartikov’s development .of the Subject Property. (Id. ¶276.) One campaign flier stated:

This year it is imperative that all village residents vote for leadership that have an unwavering long-term commitment to the Village.

We are, according to the lawyers for the Rabbinical College of Tartikoff who have purchased land on Route 306' in the village, going to be faced with a proposal for a huge development that will include housing for thousands of adult students and their families. Their lawyers have not been shy to point out that they will use every legal avenue to pursue their plans, including the federal statute RLUIPA.

From what we know of the plan as it has been'leaked to the public, it will have real environmental and safety problems; compelling interests that will allow the village to fight this plan, if and when presented to the Village Board.

You need to vote for a team that is prepared to stand up to this threat of using the fundamentally unfair RLUIPA statute as a hammer 'against our village. A team that is in it for the long term, and one that has already prepared themselves with a strategy to fight for Pomona.

(Pis.! Ex. 41.) This same flier states that “[t]he single most important issue facing the Village is clearly the Tartikoff development.” (Id.) Sanderson, Yagel, and Louie vowed to “vigorously defend [the Village’s] land use codes and regulations.” (Id.) A second flier reiterated these same concerns- and made the same promises. (See Pis.’ Ex, 42, at 2.) In a campaign video, Sanderson stated that Tartikov “could completely change the village and the make-up of the village.” (Pis.’ Ex. 47, at 1.) Shortly before the election, Yagel and Louie drafted a submission for The Journal News editorial page, (see Pis.’ FOF ¶286), stating their opposition to Tarti-kov’s proposal and noting that “a virtual mini-city within the village[] that will house.thousands of homogenous individuals” was not a “ ‘natural’ progression” for the Village. (Pis.’ Ex. 17.) Yagel was also quoted in the New York Times describing Plaintiffs plans for the Subject Property as “disgusting.” (Pis.’ Ex. 169, at.l (internal quotation marks omitted).) Sander-son, Yagel, and Louie won the March 2007 election. (Joint Pretrial Order Stipulations of Fact ¶ 22.)

The wetlands protection law that ultimately was adopted by the Board on April 23, 2007 — Local Law No. 5 of 2007 — includes an exemption for lots improved with single family homes. (See Defs.’ Ex. 1013 (“Local Law No. 5 of 2007”), as codified at Village Code § 126-3(D) (“The aforesaid 100 foot buffer in which regulated activities are not permitted to take place shall not apply to lots that are improved with single family residences.”).) As relevant here, the law prohibits certain activities within “100 feet of the boundary of any wetland, water body or watercourse unless a permit is issued therefor by the Board of Trustees or the Planning Board.” (Village Code § 126-3.) To obtain a permit, the landowner must show that the law “results in a deprivation of the reasonable use of a property so as to constitute a de facto taking of such property.” (Id. § 126-5.) Prior to its passage, the Village and' members of the Board oí Trustees knew that there were wetlands located on the Subject Property. (See Trial Tr. 670 (Marshall stating that he knew there were wetlands on the Subject Property prior to 2007); Pis.’ Ex. 69, at 1 (email from Yagel discussing the presence of wetlands on the Subject Property); Pis.’ Ex. 104, at 1 (Marshall noting, in January 2002, that there are wetlands on the Subject Property); Pis.’ Ex. 107, at 2 (October 22, 2001 Board meeting minutes noting that Marshall “stressed” that YSV needed to- protect the wetlands located on the Subject Property); Pis.’ Ex. 141, at 20 (1997 Update to the Village’s Master Plan noting that the Subject Property contains “part of a large State-regulated wetland”).

4, The Impact of the Challenged Laws

Collectively, the Challenged Laws prevent the construction of Tartikov’s rabbinical college in the Village. Because the entire Village is zoned R-40, the Village Code permits. only a limited number of land uses in the normal course, namely houses, libraries, museums, public parks, and playgrounds, see Village Code ,§ 130-9, and, by special use permit, some other developments, including educational institutions, see Village Code §• 130-10(F), and houses of worship, see Village Code § 130-10(G). The Accreditation Law bars the construction of the rabbinical college because Tartikov, as proposed, cannot be accredited by any accrediting body. (See Kinser Decl. ¶ 29; Trial Tr. 446-51.) The Dormitory Law also presents several challenges for Tartikov’s proposed development. The prohibitions on student family housing and separate cooking, housekeeping, and dining facilities preclude the rabbinical college from being built in the Village. Limiting housing to 20% of the total square footage of other buildings on the Subject Property is also problematic because Tartikov seeks to provide housing in excess of this limitation. The Wetlands Law restricts Tartikov’s use of the Subject Property because the location of the driveway onto the property falls within the 100-foot buffer mandated by that law. (See Trial Tr. 1018.) An access road cannot be built in any other location because of the presence of wetlands and steep slopes, which would require significant regrading. (See id. at 781, 1017-18; Pis.’ Ex. 1510 (“Beall Deck”) ¶¶ 264-65.)

Moreover, Tartikov cannot obtain a variance to develop its rabbinical college because “State law requires an applicant who applies for a use variance to prove that there is no other economic use for the property” and this would be “impossible” for Tartikov to prove. (Ulman Aff. ¶ 80.) Another possible way for Tartikov to build its rabbinical college would be for it to apply for an amendment to the zoning laws. (See id. ¶ 87.) However, the Board of Trustees is not required to consider a petition for a text amendment, (see Trial Tr. 783),. and any such amendment would be subject to the full SEQRA review process, (see Trial Tr. 877).

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs filed their first Complaint on July 10, 2007, (see Dkt. No. 1), and then filed an Amended Complaint on July 30, 2007, (see Dkt. No. 12). Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint on November 19, 2007. (See Dkt. No. 27). Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt. No.'36), which the Court granted in part in an Opinion and Order dated January 4, 2013. See Congregation Rabbinical College of Tartikov, Inc. v. Village of Pomona, 915 F.Supp.2d 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Tartikov I”).

Following the close of discovery, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (see Dkt. No. 137), and Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, (see Dkt. No. 140), on January 22, 2015. The Court granted in part and denied in part both motions. See Congregation Rabbinical College of Tartikov, Inc. v. Village of Pomona, 138 F.Supp.3d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Tartikov II").

•On May 15, 2017, the Court held the final pretrial conference and the bench trial commenced. The trial lasted 10 days and the Court heard testimony from 23 witnesses. Pursuant to the Court’s direction at the conclusion of the trial, the Parties submitted' their post-trial memo-randa and accompanying papers on August 7, 2017. (See Dkt. Nos. 323-29.) The Court heard closing statements on September 7, 2017.

II. Discussion

The issue before the Court is whether Tartikov’s permit application to build its rabbinical college should be governed by the standards set forth in the Challenged Laws. Plaintiffs argue that the Court should enjoin Defendants from enforcing the Challenged Laws because they are discriminatory and substantially burden their religious exercise. Defendants 'assert that the laws were 'passed for legitimate reasons and do not burden the creation of a run-of-the-mill rabbinical college. Any burden, Defendants claim, results from the fact that Tartikov seeks to build a “rabbinical college extraordinaire.” The primary source of Defendants’ opposition to Tartikov’s proposed use is that it will include housing for its students and their families. Indeed, ⅛ appears that they challenge little else about Tartikov’s proposal. Defendants are particularly concerned that providing housing for students and their families will overburden the Village’s infrastructure and detract from its rural character. A secondary source of Defendants’ opposition rests in their severe distrust of Plaintiffs’ motives. Defendants are adamant that Plaintiffs’ primary wish is not to build a rabbinical college, but rather a housing complex for Orthodox/Hasidic Jews and their families dressed as a college, Although the Court finds no support for Defendants’ mistrust of Plaintiffs’ motives, the Court is sympathetic to Defendants’ concerns about the. size and scope of Tartikov’s proposed development. Ultimately, however, the Court concludes that Defendants enacted the Challenged Laws to prevent the spread of the Orthodox/Ha-sidic community into the Village, and in certain respects, to specifically target the Subject Property and Tartikov. This holding is based on the context in which the laws were adopted and the unsatisfactory and incredible reasons presented for their adoption. The- Court takes no position on what Plaintiffs may build upon the Subject Property. The Court’s ruling is limited only to the fact that Tartikov’s. putative permit application need not comport with the requirements imposed by the Challenged. Laws.

A. The Standard Applicable to Facial Challenges

Because Tartikov has not applied for a permit to build a rabbinical college on the Subject Property, Plaintiffs are limited to challenging only the facial validity of the Challenged Laws. See Tartikov I, 915 F.Supp.2d at 596-607 (dismissing the plaintiffs’ as applied challenge because they failed to submit a single proposal). “Facial invalidation is, manifestly, strong medicine that has been employed by [courts] sparingly and only as a last resort,” wherein a plaintiff has a “heavy burden in advancing [his or her] claim.” Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580, 118 S.Ct. 2168, 141 L.Ed.2d 500 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cranley v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. of Vt., 318 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2003) (“A plaintiff making a facial claim faces an uphill battle because it is difficult to demonstrate that the mere enactment of a piece of legislation violates the plaintiffs constitutional rights.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The oft-cited standard for facial challenges is derived from dicta in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), wherein then-Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that “the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [challenged law] would be valid.” Id. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095. In Tartikov II, the Court determined that this standard is inapplicable to Plaintiffs’ claims. See 138 F.Supp.3d at 403-07. The Court provided several reasons for this holding.

First, the Court concluded that Salerno does not apply to First Amendment claims. See id. at 404; see also Finley, 524 U.S. at 580, 118 S.Ct. 2168 (“To prevail [on a facial challenge], respondents must demonstrate a substantial risk that application of the provision will lead to the suppression of speech.”); United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2011) (acknowledging that the Salerno standard is not applicable to First Amendment claims); Lerman v. Bd. of Elections in City of N.Y., 232 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Salerno, however, does not apply to this case, in which the plaintiffs assert the violation of rights protected by the First Amendment.”). Second, relying on rulings made in Tartikov I, the Court echoed that the Salerno line of cases was “distinguishable from the instant case because no case in the Salerno line involved allegations of discriminatory animus grounded in race or religion.” Tartikov II, 138 F.Supp.3d at 404 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court reiterated that “the Salerno test would be met if the Challenged Laws violate Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection or Free Exercise rights because ‘a law that violates the Equal Protection Clause or the Free Exercise Clause will be invalid when applied under any conceivable circumstance, even if it can be justified by a conceivably benign motive.’” Id. (quoting Tartikov I, 915 F.Supp.2d at 613 n.18). Third, the Court held that, in the context of the Free Exercise Clause, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993), offered an alternate and directly applicable standard to apply. Tartikov II, 138 F.Supp.3d at 406. Lukumi provides that “government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot-in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief.” 508 U.S. at 543, 113 S.Ct. 2217; see also Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 2012, 2019, 198 L.Ed.2d 551 (2017) (“The Free Exercise Clause ‘protectts] religious observers against unequal treatment’ and subjects to the strictest scrutiny laws that target the religious for ‘special disabilities’ based on their ‘religious status’ ” (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533, 542, 113 S.Ct. 2217)); Cent. Rabbinical Congress v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 763 F.3d 183, 196 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[Wjhere some purposeful and exclusive regulation exists — where the object of the law is itself the regulation of religious conduct — the law is subject to heightened scrutiny, and not to rational basis review.”); id. (noting that the “burdens” of the challenged regulation fell “on only a particular religious group — and in fact exclusively on members of one particular subset of that religious group”); Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Hooker, 680 F.3d 194, 210 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying this standard to a facial challenge under the Free Exercise Clause).

In reliance on this body of law, the Court concluded that' the “effect of the Challenged Laws on Plaintiffs is relevant to determining whether the Challenged Laws were discriminatory under the Equal Protection Clause and/or targeted at religious practice under Lukumi (and the Free Exercise Clause), and may be suggestive of the effect they have on other religious groups.” Tartikov II, 138 F.Supp.3d at 406. The Court will adhere to this ruling because Plaintiffs’ experience serves as an important source of evidence on the question of the constitutionality of the Challenged Laws. See Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1123-24 (10th Cir. 2012) (rejecting application of Salerno and analyzing, in the context of a facial challenge, the particular circumstances of the plaintiffs, and noting that it is proper to “appl[y] the appropriaté constitutional test to the restriction at issue,” rather than “eonjur[ing]up whether or not there is a hypothetical situation in which application of the statute’ might be valid”); Cty. Concrete Corp. v. Township of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding allegations that the defendant township “knew exactly how [the] appellants intended to use their land and passed [ah] [ordinance specifically tailored to prevent that use” to constitute a ripe facial challenge to that ordinance); Dibbs v. Hillsborough Cty., 67 F.Supp.3d 1340, 1349-50 (M.D. Fla. 2014) (“A property owner makes a facial challenge by claiming that a municipality knew exactly how he intended to use his property and passed an ordinance specifically tailored to prevent that use.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cornell Cos., Inc., v. Borough of New Morgan, 512 F.Supp.2d 238, 258 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“The basis of an EPC facial challenge is that the mere enactment of the ordinance violates the EPC because it treats the plaintiffs property differently than other similarly situated landowners.”).

B. Substantive Liability

Plaintiffs assert that the Challenged Laws violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, RLUIPA, the FHA, §§ 3, 9, and 11 of the New York State Constitution, and New York common law. Although there is substantial overlap between many of Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court will address each of them in turn.

1. Equal Protection — Fourteenth Amendment

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); see also Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir. 2001) (same). “Plaintiffs challenging ... facially neutral laws on equal protection grounds bear the burden of making out a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose.” Pyke v. Cuomo, 567 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Pyke II”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tartikov I, 915 F.Supp.2d at 615 (“To prove an equal protection violation, claimants must prove purposeful discrimination by a government actor, directed at a suspect class, such as a racial group, or a religion.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). If Plaintiffs make such a showing, the government action at issue is “subject to strict judicial scrutiny,” such that the law may be upheld only if it “further[s] a compelling state interest and [is] narrowly tailored. to accomplish [that] purpose.” Pyke II, 567 F.3d at 77.

Plaintiffs may establish an equal protection violation by identifying (1) “a law that expressly classifies on the basis of race,” (2) “a facially neutral law or policy that has been applied in an unlawfully discriminatory manner,” or (3) “a facially neutral [law or] policy that has an adverse effect and that was motivated by discriminatory animus.” Id. at 76 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jana-Rock Constr., Inc. v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that the Equal Protection Clause is violated, unless justified by strict scrutiny, when government action is “motivated by discriminatory animus and its application results in discriminatory effect” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As the Court previously held, Plaintiffs rely on the third method here. See Tartikov I, 915 F.Supp.2d at 615.

a. Discriminatory Purpose

“Discriminatory purpose implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 50 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Though the desire to discriminate need not be the sole motivating factor, see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) (“Rarely can' it be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the ‘dominant’ or ‘primary’ one.”), it must be “a significant reason for a public body’s actions,” Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 507 F.3d 778, 786 (2d Cir. 2007). “Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and' direct evidence of intent as may be available.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266, 97 S.Ct. 555 (internal quotation marks omitted). In assessing discriminatory intent in the land use context, courts consider “the series of events leading up to a land use decision, the context in which the decision was made, whether the decision or decisionmaking process departed fi’om established norms, statements made by the decisionmaking body .and community members, reports issued by the deci-sionmaking body, whether a discriminatory impact was foreseeable, and whether less discriminatory avenues were available.” Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Comm’n, 768 F.3d 183, 199 (2d Cir. 2014); see also LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 425 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Discriminatory intent may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances,” including “historical background” and “contemporary statements by members of the decision-making body,” Or “by showing' that animus against the protected group was a significant factor in the position taken by the municipal decision-mak-érs themselves or by those to whom the decision-makers were knowingly responsive.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1221 (2d Cir. 1987) (explaining that “[i]ntent to discriminate may be established in a number of ways,” and may be “inferred from the totality of the relevant facts,” including “historical background ... particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes; [and] the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision, such as zoning changes for á given site enacted upon ... learning of [the plaintiffs] plans for ... construction” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Judged against this standard, the evidence and testimony presented during.trial proves that Defendants passed the Challenged Laws, with a discriminatory purpose. First, the timing of each of the Challenged Laws is suspect, to say the least. The Accreditation Law, the relevant provisions of which were adopted in January 2001 (Local Law No. of 2001) and amended in September 2004 (Local Law No. 5 of 2004), was enacted in direct response to YSV’s desire to build an Orthodox yeshiva on the Subject Property. During an informal presentation made by YSV to the Village’s Planning Board on December 15, 1999, FPC advised the Village that its zoning laws for schools “really stink.” (Pis.’ FOF ¶¶ 127-28.) One month later, FPC circulated memoranda entitled “YSV-Pomona (Primary School and Pre-School),” and “Proposed Primary School and PreSchool (YSV Pomona) and the Village Zoning Regulations regarding schools,” both of which noted the existence of only “scant” regulations on schools and recommended that the Village amend the' pertinent laws. (Pis.’ Exs. Ill, 130; see also Pis.’ FOF ¶ 129.) Both memoranda specifically mention YSV and make reference to YSV’s development plans. {See Pis.’ Ex. Ill, at 1 (“As the Village Board may know, the Planning Board has recently been ap-proaehed regarding a proposed 100,000 square foot, 2-story primary school and a 35,000 square foot, 1-story pre-school on the 100-acre Camp Dora Golding property.”); Ex, 130, at POM0004316 (“We. have reviewed the Narrative Summary and the Preliminary Master Plan Study ... in connection with the [YSV-Pomona] project.”).) The timing of these recommendations is significant because there were no other sphools located in the Village in 2001. (See Joint Pretrial Order Stipulations of Fact. ¶ 11.) At the time, Marshall noted that the Board need to move quickly because “[t]hey[ ],” meaning YSV, “[are] going to come in” and the Board of Trustees was “going' to be caught with [its] pants down.” (Pis.’ Ex. 114, at 69.)

Then, in 2004, the year in which Local Law No. 5 of 2004 was passed, Defendants took a number of actions which are indicative of discriminatory purpose. In January 2004, the Village passed a resolution noting that the Board of Trustees “opposes in the strongest possible terms any public officials who abdicate their responsibility of office by placing the politics of special interest groups and individual developers ahead of the best interest of the people they are committed to serve.” (Pis.’ Ex. 126, at 7.) The “block vote of the Orthodox Hasidic Jews” is such a special 'interest group. (Trial Tr. 820.) In May 2004, the Village filed a lawsuit against. Ramapo seeking to set aside Ramapo’s Comprehensive Plan for failing to comply with SEQRA. (See generally Pis.’ Ex. 155.) Of particular note, the petition asserted that Ramapo “attracted a burgeoning Hassidic community,” which “caused development and political pressures in the Town to increase its' housing stock and infrastructure.” (Id. ¶¶ 31-32.) After Ramapo adopted the ASHL in June 2004, the Village voted to challenge that law. (See Pis.’ Ex. 156 ¶ 27.) The petition stated that the ASHL was passed “to secure for one religious community a unique and significant zoning benefit.” (Id. ¶ 215.) Although this petition does not specifically name this “religious community,” it is clear the petition is referring to Orthodox/Hasidic Jews. (See id. ¶38 (alleging that Yeshiva Chofetz Chaim of Radin was the owner of two of the properties on which adult student housing was proposed); id. ¶ 141 (noting that the ASHL “was proposed specifically in response to the request from a religious group for multi-family housing ... to house married adult students and their families”).) Marshall strongly opposed the ASHL, stating that Ramapo officials “were pandering to the special interest groups able to deliver the critically" important block vote,” (Pis.’ Ex. 109, at POM0013281), i.e., the Orthodox Jewish vote out of New Square, New York, (see Trial Tr. 619). Also during 2004, YSV had its tax-exempt status denied for the first time, (see Joint Pretrial Order Stipulations' of Fact ¶ 12), and Tartikov purchased the Subject Property, (see Defs.’ Ex. 1057). Although there is no evidence that Defendants were aware that Tartikov purchased the Subject Property until November 2004, (see Joint Prétrial Order Stipulations of Fact ¶ 15), Defendants were aware of the growth of the Orthodox/Hasidic community in Ramapo and sought to prevent the spread of that community into the Village. Significantly, as' noted, there, were no schools within the Village in 2004. (See id. ¶ 14.)

With regard to the Dormitory Law, the relevant provisions of which were adopted in September 2004 (Local 'Law No. 5 of 2004) and January 2007 (Local Law No, 1 of 2007), the evidence of discriminatory purpose is even stronger. The Village opposed Ramapo’s ASHL, and then, to prevent the spread of Orthodox/Hasidic adult student housing into the Village, the Board of Trustees adopted Local Law No. 5 of 2004, which prohibits “[s]ingle family, two-family and/or multi-family dwelling units,” (Local Law No. 5 of 2004 § 2), housing similar to that permitted under the ASHL. Moreover, Local Law No. 1 of 2007, which amended provisions of the Dormitory Law, was passed during a contentious Board of Trustees meeting. Village residents were vehemently opposed to what they believed to be Tartikov’s development, although the information they learned came from Preserve Ramapo. (See Pis.’ Ex; 65.) Many of the attendees’ comments focused on the nature and size of the development, but some of the attendees were opposed to the development because it was proposed by Orthodox/Hasidic Jews. One attendee noted that he or she had heard that Tartikov’s proposal was for “rabbinical students and their families,” and sought a way to prevent institutions from being “flooded with family members and children, and all of that sort.” (Pis.’ Ex. 137, at 70 (emphasis added).) Marshall indicated, in response, that the “[accessory use” provision of the Dormitory Law “addresses that to some degree.” (Id. at 71.) Another attendee stated, in reference to Tartikov’s apparent plan, that “[ejveryone should understand that this is not going to happen, and we’re not going to let it happen. Let’s stop it now. [Multiple shouts of ‘Stop it now’] Their counsel is here to protect their interests. We’re here, the people who live in this village, to protect our interests, okay.” (Id. at 21.) Yet another attendee was fearful that the Village would turn into another “Kiryas Joel,” a Hasidic community located in the Town of Monroe. (Id. at 56.) The Village’s actions and the statements made by the attendees at the Board meeting reveal a fear that Tartikov, and its students, were going to take over the Village and change its “character” and “politics.” (Id. at 10.) Although the opposition from the public was not overtly discriminatory, these statements support a finding of discriminatory animus. See Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 608-09 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that comments about the “flavor” and “character” of a village, although “not overtly race-based” could be “code words for racial animus” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The Wetlands Law, the relevant provisions of which were adopted in April 2007 (Local Law No. 5 of 2007), was' eríácted despite the fact that there is no evidence that the Village conducted any studies pri- or to the adoption of the law to determine where the Village’s wetlands were, what threats they faced, or how best to protect them. Village officials did, however, know there were wetlands located on the Subject Property before the law was adopted,, (see Trial Tr. 670 (Marshall stating that he knew there were wetlands on the Subject Property prior to 2007); Pis.’ Ex. 69, at 1 (email from Yagel discussing the presence of wetlands on the Subject Property); Pis.’ Ex. 104, at 1 (Marshall noting, in January 2002, that there are wetlands on the Subject Property); Pis.’ Ex. 107, at 2 (October 22, 2001 Board meeting minutes noting that Marshall “stressed” that YSV needed to protect the wetlands located on the Subject Property); Pis.’ Ex, 141, at 20 (1997 Update to the Village’s Master Plan noting that the Subject Property contains “part of a large State-regulated wetland”)), indicating that this law was designed to prevent Tartikov from building its proposed rabbinical college. Fur