Slate v. Public Defender Service (31 F. Supp. 3d 277, 2014)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BERYL A. HOWELL, United States District Judge

Plaintiff. Gregory Slate, who is proceeding pro se, was employed for less than two years at the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia (“PDS”), arid has now filed a lawsuit against PDS and his former PDS supervisor, Rachel Ann Pri-mo, claiming discrimination on the basis of his race and sex, and retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act of 1977 (“DCHRA”), D.C.Code §§ 2-1401.01 et seq., as well as various common law claims. See Notice Filing Redacted Doc. Ex. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 127-214, ECF No. 15-2. Pending before the Court are both defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). PDS’ Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 17; Primo’s Mot. Dismiss (“Primo’s Mem.”), ECF No. 22. For the reasons set forth below, the defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Allegations in the Plaintiffs Complaint

As set forth in the Complaint, the plaintiff is a formerly licensed private detective who was employed by PDS- as a felony-1 investigator beginning in August 2008. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 6, 11. PDS is a federally funded, independent legal organization that provides legal representation to persons who are financially unable to obtain adequate representation. Id. ¶ 2; PDS’ Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss.' (“PDS’ Mem.”) at 2, ECF No. 19. According to the plaintiff, he was informed at the time of his hiring that “if [the plaintiff] accepted PDS’s offer of employment,” he “would only be terminated if the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia or the District of Columbia Attorney General’s Office developed a line of cross examination that rendered [the plaintiffs] testimony ineffective or adverse.” Compl. ¶ 9. The plaintiff accepted the offer of employment, id. ¶ 10, and never signed an “at-will” contract. Id. ¶ 13.

For the duration of his employment at PDS, the plaintiff was supervised by Pri-mo. Id. ¶ 14. The plaintiff alleges that “[o]ver the course of [his] employment, he was subjected to a long series of overtly sexist, racist, and religious harassment,” id. ¶ 18, including that Primo “would call Plaintiff a ‘pussy’ or a ‘faggot’ and question his manhood,” id. ¶ 25; Compl. (unredact-ed) ¶ 63, and also refer to men using a number of similarly crude references, as well as using racial slurs in reference to African-Americans, Compl. ¶¶ 28, 42, 43, 46, Hispanic people, id. ¶ 28, and “Muslims, Arabs, and anyone from a middle-eastern country,” id. ¶¶ 28, 80.

On May 30, 2009, the plaintiff and Primo were involved in a car accident. Id. ¶¶ 82-87. According to the plaintiffs version of these events, after work, the plaintiff drove Primo towards Arlington, Virginia, in her car. Id. ¶¶ 82-84. While en route, Primo, who was the passenger, somehow “caused her vehicle to veer off the road,” and collide with a pole. Id. ¶ 86. After the accident the plaintiff, who alleges that he was injured, accepted a ride from a passing motorist, while Primo remained with the vehicle “to file a police report.” Id. ¶¶ 87-89. Approximately five weeks after the car accident, on July 9, 2009, the plaintiff claims that he filed an internal formal grievance against Primo, alleging “that he was being discriminated against based on his race, color, sex, and- religion.” Id. ¶ 91. At some unspecified point thereafter, the plaintiff states that PDS no longer permitted him on the premises, id. ¶ 93, and prevented him from communicating with PDS employees, using his PDS identification or his PDS email account, or working on any PDS cases, id. ¶¶ 93, 95-97.

The plaintiff claims that “in retaliation for Plaintiffs complaints” he was instructed to “travel to 3 different police stations ... to inquire if a warrant .had been issued for Plaintiffs arrest” and cautioned that he would be placed on unpaid leave until he could “demonstrate there was no warrant for his arrest by a date certain.” Id. ¶¶ 98-99. The plaintiff alleges that he made such demonstration but that, nevertheless, a PDS employee placed a call to “a law enforcement official in Virginia and insisted that he charge Plaintiff with leaving the scene of an accident.” Id. ¶¶ 100-01. The plaintiff contends that he was subsequently placed on unpaid leave, id. ¶ 102, and terminated by PDS “on the pretext that he was ‘vulnerable to being impeached upon testifying.’ ” Id. ¶ 108. He further alleges that “[njeither the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia or the District of Columbia Attorney General’s Office ever developed a line of cross-examination that rendered Plaintiffs testimony ineffective.” Id. ¶ 110." He additionally claims that PDS “ultimately claimed that Plaintiff was barred from performing his job because of a ‘website’ about Plaintiff that PDS knew about before Plaintiff was hired.” Id. ¶ 103.

The plaintiff states that, “[o]n April 15, 2009,” he filed “a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity .Commission ... alleging discrimination and retaliation.” Id. ¶ 118. At some unspecified time after his termination and filing of a formal EEO complaint, the plaintiff claims that he “submitted an application to PDS for certification as a [Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”) ] investigator,” id. ¶ 120, but was denied admission into the program on April 28, 2010, “in retaliation” for his protected activity, id. ¶ 121. Also “in retaliation for his engaging in protected activity,” id. ¶¶ 123, 125, the plaintiff claims that he was not hired at some unspecified time by PDS for positions at PDS as a staff investigator and an eligibility examiner, for which he had submitted applications on April 30 and July 25, 2010, respectively, id. ¶¶ 122,124.

The plaintiff filed a second EEO complaint on November 17, 2010, “stating that PDS had engaged in further retaliation by failing to certify him as a CJA investigator, denying him a position as a staff investigator, and denying him a position as an eligibility examiner.” Id. ¶ 126.

The plaintiff filed the instant suit on-May 30, 2013. See generally Complaint (“Compl.(unredacted)”), ECF No. 1.

B. Factual Matters Referenced In The Complaint

The plaintiff expressly refers to, but fails to candidly represent, several documents and events in his Complaint, including his EEO complaint allegedly filed on “April 15, 2009,” id. ¶ 118; PDS’ letter placing the plaintiff on leave subsequent to the May 30, 2009 car accident, id. ¶¶ 98-99; PDS placing the plaintiff on unpaid leave on July 15, 2009, id. ¶ 102; the criminal charge against the plaintiff following his car accident, see id. ¶ 101; and the plaintiffs termination by PDS on an unspecified date, id. ¶ 108. The documents related to these events directly bear upon the plaintiffs allegations, as evidenced by the Complaint’s reference to them, but they are not attached to the Complaint. Nonetheless, the defendants have submitted documents related to these events, and the plaintiff in his opposition has raised no objection to their submission or to their authenticity. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n Def. Primo’s Mot. Dismiss & Mot. File Opp’n Def. PDS’ Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 27.

As a general matter, “[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). This conversion rule need not be triggered, however, when a court considers “the facts alleged in the complaint, documents ... incorporated by reference in the complaint ... or documents upon which the plaintiffs complaint necessarily relies even if the document is produced not by the plaintiff in the complaint but by the defendant in a motion to dismiss.” Hinton v. Corr. Corp. of America, 624 F.Supp.2d 45, 46 (D.D.C.2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Abhe & Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao, 508 F.3d 1052, 1059 (D.C.Cir.2007) (court may consider on a motion to dismiss “facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached thereto or incorporated therein, and matters of which it may take judicial notice” (quoting Stewart v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 471 F.3d 169, 173 (D.C.Cir.2006))). Courts have considered documents attached to motions to dismiss and opposition papers without converting the motion into one for summary judgment when the documents were referenced in the Complaint and were central to the plaintiffs claims. See, e.g., Saunders v. Mills, 842 F.Supp.2d 284, 293 n. 2 (D.D.C.2012) (considered “Letter of Counseling attached to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss without converting the motion to one for summary judgment because the letter is repeatedly referenced in the Complaint ... and ‘is central to plaintiffs claim’ that the letter was retaliatory”) (citation omitted); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Veolia Transp. Servs., Inc., 592 F.Supp.2d 86, 92 n. 5 (D.D.C.2009) (citing Langer. v. George Washington Univ., 498 F.Supp.2d 196, 202 n. 1 (D.D.C.2007) (declining to convert a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment after taking into consideration a letter that was “referred to and quoted from in the complaint” and was “central to plaintiffs claim”)); Pearson v. District of Columbia, 644 F.Supp.2d 23, 29 n. 1 (D.D.C.2009), aff'd, 377 Fed.Appx. 34 (D.C.Cir.2010) (considering on a motion to dismiss several' exhibits, including memo-randa, emails, and letters, attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss and mentioned at least once in the Complaint). In addition, a court may consider, without triggering the conversion rule, “matters of which ... judicial notice” may be taken, such as public records. EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C.Cir.1997); see Kaempe v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958, 965 ( D.C.Cir.2004) (finding that court may take judicial notice of 'public records on motion to dismiss); District Hosp. Partners, L.P. v. Sebelius, 971 F.Supp.2d 15, 32, 2013 WL 5273929, at *12 n. 14 (D.D.C.2013) (same).

Set against these legal principles, the Court properly considers the following documents that were referenced in the Complaint and are central to the plaintiffs claims, or are a matter of public record, without converting the instant motion into a motion for summary judgment: (1) the EEO complaint filed by the plaintiff and referenced at paragraph 118 in the Complaint, see Peters v. District of Columbia, 873 F.Supp.2d 158, 179 (D.D.C.2012) (concluding that EEO complaint and right-to-sue letter in a Title VII action could be properly considered on a motion to dismiss and were not deemed “outside the pleadings”); Dyson v. District of Columbia, 808 F.Supp.2d 84, 87 n. 3 (D.D.C.2011) (finding that in Title VII action, “[ejxhibits such as the EEOC ... documents attached to plaintiffs opposition may be considered in deciding the motion to dismiss”); Baird v. Snowbarger, 744 F.Supp.2d 279, 287-8 n. 2 (D.D.C.2010) (citing Rogan v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 113 F.Supp.2d 777, 782 (W.D.Pa.2000) (“It is clear to us that ... we may consider the EEOC complaint and related EEOC documents ... either as undisputed documents referenced in the complaint or central to the plaintiffs claim .... ”)), vacated in part on other grounds, Baird v. Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246 (D.C.Cir.2011); (2) the letter placing the plaintiff on administrative leave with pay and advising the plaintiff that he could be placed on unpaid leave if he did not demonstrate that there was no warrant for his arrest, which letter is referenced in paragraphs. 98-99 of the Complaint, see Vanover v. Hantman, 77 F.Supp.2d 91, 98 (D.D.C.1999), aff'd, 38 Fed.Appx. 4 (D.C.Cir.2002) (concluding that court' could properly consider on a motion to dismiss chapter of Personnel Manual and “various letters and materials produced in the course of plaintiffs discharge proceedings” attached to plaintiffs opposition that were “referred to in the complaint and [were] central to plaintiffs claims” without converting to a summary judgment motion); (3) the warrant for the plaintiffs arrest, which is referenced in paragraph 101 of the Complaint and is a matter about which the Court may take judicial notice, as it is a matter of public record, see Causey v. Parish of Tangipahoa, 167 F.Supp.2d 898, 906 (E.D.La.2001) (finding that court may take judicial notice of an arrest warrant); McPhearson v. Anderson, 874 F.Supp.2d 573, 579 n. 7 (E.D.Va.2012) (considering arrest warrant when ruling on motion to dismiss because it was “a public document [which] does not necessitate conversion of the Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary judgment”); and (4) the plaintiffs guilty plea in connection with the May 30, 2009 car accident, which is not referenced in the Complaint but is a matter of public record about which the Court may take judicial notice, see Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 407 F.3d 1220, 1222 (D.C.Cir.2005) (citing Marshall Cnty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1228 (D.C.Cir.1993) (court may look to record of another proceeding “to avoid unnecessary proceedings when an undisputed fact on the public record makes it clear that the plaintiff does not state a claim upon which relief could be granted”)); Morris v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 09-2034, 2010 WL 2574142, at *1 (D.D.C. June 25, 2010) (collecting cases and concluding that “the Court may take judicial notice of matters of public record, such as prior court proceedings”).

Examination of the contents of these documents reveals that .prior to the plaintiffs termination, the plaintiff was involved, and ultimately convicted, in criminal proceedings related to the May 30, 2009 car accident. Less than two weeks after the accident, the plaintiff was placed on administrative leave with pay and told that “[p]rior to returning to work,” he would have to “demonstrate that there is no outstanding-warrant for [his] arrest in Virginia” and “[i]f there [were] a warrant for [his] arrest, PDS will assess the situation and determine [his] status at that time.” See Decl. of John T. Koerner (“Koerner Deck”) Ex. 1, ECF No. 17-4 (June 11, 2009, PDS letter to the plaintiff)). The plaintiff claims to have demonstrated to PDS “that there was no warrant for his arrest” a week after receiving this letter, Compl. ¶ 100, but subsequently, on June 25, 2009, Arlington County issued a felony arrest warrant for the plaintiff for failure to report a hit and run after leaving the scene of the May 30, 2009 accident without calling the police. See Koerner Decl. Ex. 5, ECF No. 17-8 (arrest warrant for felony offense). The plaintiff was then placed on leave without pay on July 15, 2009. Compl. ¶ 102. The plaintiff was charged with driving under the influence and felony hit and run, see Koerner Decl. Ex. 4 at 5:7-13, ECF No. 17-7 (transcript of plea proceedings before the Circuit Court for Arlington County, dated January 2010), and six months after being placed on unpaid leave, he pleaded guilty in January 26, 2010, to driving under the influence and to misdemeanor hit and run. Id. at 20:3-16. Less than two months later, on March 3, 2010, PDS terminated the plaintiff. See Koerner Decl. Ex. 2 at 3, ECF No. 17-5 (EEO Complaint #570-2010-01067, dated April 15, 2010).

Contrary to the allegations in the plaintiffs Complaint, he did not file his EEO complaint on “April 15, 2009,” prior to the accident, see Compl. ¶ 118, but rather this charge was filed against PDS on April 15, 2010, see Koerner Decl. Ex. 2 at 2, after the plaintiff had twice been suspended, once with pay and once without pay, and after he had been terminated. The plaintiffs obfuscation of the details surrounding his termination in the service of his claims is ultimately unsuccessful. With these events in mind, the Court turns to the pending motions to dismiss.

C. The Plaintiffs Claims

The Complaint raises eleven claims. The plaintiff claims that PDS discriminated against him based on his male gender and unspecified race, and retaliated against him, in violation of Title VII, Compl. ¶¶ 127-49 (Counts I, II and III), and the DCHRA, id. ¶¶ 150-80 (Count IV, V and VI); and that Primo also discriminated against him based on his gender and race, in violation of the DCHRA, id. ¶¶ 181-94 (Count VII and VIII). The plaintiff additionally raises three common law claims, alleging that PDS breached its contract with the plaintiff, id. ¶¶ 195-99 (Count IX), and its duty of good faith and fair dealing, id. ¶¶ 200-04 (Count X); and that Primo tortiously interfered with the plaintiffs contractual relations with PDS, id. ¶¶ 205-14 (Count XI). The plaintiff seeks back pay and back benefits, as well as damages for his physical, mental, and emotional suffering, and injunctive relief. Compl. at 31.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Dismiss

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and to “nudge[] [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Instead, the complaint must plead facts that are more than “merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability”; “the plaintiff [must] plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955); accord Rudder v. Williams, 666 F.3d 790, 794 (D.C.Cir.2012). The Court “must assume all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) ... [and] must give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the facts alleged.” Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C.Cir.2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Title VII Discrimination Based on Race or Sex

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or. national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Under Title VII, “the two essential elements of a discrimination claim are that (i) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action (ii) because of the plaintiffs race, color, religion, sex, [or] national origin.” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1196 (D.C.Cir.2008); accord Brady v. Office of the Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C.Cir.2008). An “adverse employment action” is “ ‘a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits.’ ” Baird v. Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 1248 (D.C.Cir.2011) (quoting Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C.Cir.2009)); see also Stewart v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 422, 426 (D.C.Cir.2003) (“An [a]dverse employment action ... [entails a] tangible employment action evidenced by firing, failing to promote, a considerable change in benefits, or reassignment with significantly different responsibilities”)- An adverse employment action occurs if an employee “experiences materially adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or future employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could find objectively tangible harm.” Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1131 (D.C.Cir.2002).

C. McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifting Framework

The Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), set forth a burden-shifting framework to apply in Title VII cases. Under this framework, once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case under Title VII, the “burden shifts to the defendant to prove that ‘the adverse employment actions were taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.’ ” Youssef v. FBI, 687 F.3d 397, 402 (D.C.Cir.2012) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)); see also Ford v. Mabus, 629 F.3d 198, 201 (D.C.Cir.2010) (same). Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework:

After the employer offers a non-discriminatory justification for its actions, the McDonnell Douglas framework falls away, and [the court] must determine whether a reasonable jury “could infer discrimination from the combination of (1) the plaintiffs prima facie case; (2) any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer’s proffered explanation for its actions; and (3) any further evidence of discrimination that may be available to the plaintiff.”

Vickers v. Powell, 493 F.3d 186, 195 (D.C.Cir.2007) (quoting Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C.Cir.1998)); accord Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 678 (D.C.Cir.2009). In other words, once an employer produces a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, “the sole remaining issue [is] ‘discrimination vel non.’ ” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983)). The Supreme Court has made clear that, at the motion to dismiss stage, the question “[is] ‘not whether [the plaintiff] will ultimately prevail,’ ... but whether his complaint [is] sufficient to cross the federal court’s threshold.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011) (citation omitted) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002)).

D. Title VII Retaliation Claims

“Title VU’s anti-retaliation provision makes it unlawful for an employer ‘to discriminate against [an] employee ... because he has opposed any practice’ made unlawful by Title VII or ‘has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in’ a Title VII proceeding.” Steele v. Schafer, 535 F.3d 689, 695 (D.C.Cir.2008) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). The Court assesses Title VII retaliation claims under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. First, the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of retaliation by showing: “(1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 1357 (D.C.Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the prima facie case is made, the defendant must establish that the adverse employment action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Youssef, 687 F.3d at 402. The Court then determines “whether a reasonable jury ‘could infer discrimination’ ” from the plaintiffs pleadings, the defendant’s proffered explanation, and any further rebuttal evidence or evidence of discrimination provided by the plaintiff. Vickers, 493 F.3d at 195 (quoting Aka, 156 F.3d at 1289).

As to the first element, protected activity encompasses utilizing informal grievance procedures such as complaining to management or human resources about the discriminatory conduct. Richardson v. Gutierrez, 477 F.Supp.2d 22, 27 (D.D.C.2007) (“It is well settled that Title VII protects informal, as well as formal, complaints of discrimination.”); see also Bell v. Gonzales, 398 F.Supp.2d 78, 94 (D.D.C.2005) (“Initiation of EEO counseling to explore whether an employee has a basis for alleging, discrimination constitutes protected activity, even in the absence of an unequivocal allegation of discrimination.”).

A plaintiff meets the second element to show a prima facie case of retaliation if “a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse,” meaning that it “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making of supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White (“Burlington Northern ”), 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, adverse actions giving rise to retaliation claims are broader than for disparate impact claims and are “not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment,” but reach any harm that “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Baird, 662 F.3d at 1249 (quoting Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405). Yet, the Court in Burlington Northern distinguished “materially adverse” actions from “trivial harms,” “petty slights,” and “minor annoyances.” Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405. The Court also noted that “[c]ontext matters” and “the significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances.” Id. at 69, 126 S.Ct. 2405; see also id. (“[A]n act that would be immaterial in some situations is material in others.”) (citation omitted).

Finally, the third element of the test requiring a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action requires “proof that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.” Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013). In other words, “traditional principles of but-for causation” apply and the plaintiff must show that “the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the' alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” Id. at 2533.

Significantly, however, even if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, dismissal may still be warranted for failure to state a claim if the defendant shows a legitimate non-diserimi-natory reason for its actions. See Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1231 (D.C.Cir.2006). Such a legitimate reason breaks the causal connection between the first two elements and defeats a retaliation claim. Then “the court must simply deterr mine whether the plaintiff has put forward enough evidence to defeat the proffer and support a finding of retaliation.” Bright v. Copps, 828 F.Supp.2d 130, 142 (D.D.C.2011) (citing Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 530 (D.C.Cir.2007)); McGrath v. Clinton, 666 F.3d 1377, 1383 (D.C.Cir.2012).

III. DISCUSSION

The defendants contend that each of the plaintiffs claims are flawed, warranting dismissal of the Complaint. First, PDS asserts that the plaintiffs race and sex discrimination claims are both time-barred and fail to state a cause of action, PDS’ Mem. at 5-9. Second, PDS argues that the plaintiff fails to state a claim for retaliation, id. at 9-12, and has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to virtually all of the alleged retaliatory actions he claims, id. at 12. Finally, PDS argues that the common law claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 13-14: In addition to adopting all of the grounds for dismissal set out by PDS, Primo’s Mem. at 1 n.2, Primo asserts that the case against her should be dismissed for three reasons: first, Primo was not properly served, id. at 5-6; second, the DCHRA and common law claims against her are time-barred, id. at 6-7; and, finally, none of the claims for race and sex discrimination or for tortious interference with contractual relations state a cause of action, id. at 8-14. The Court will address the plaintiffs race and sex discrimination claims against both PDS and Primo, his retaliation claims, and, finally, his common law claims, seriatim. For the reasons explained below, the Court dismisses all the plaintiffs claims.

A. Gender and Race Discrimination Claims

The plaintiff alleges that he was discriminated against based on his. gender under Counts I and IV of his Complaint, and was discriminated against based on his race under Counts II and V of his Complaint. The plaintiff alleges that he was subject to the following discriminatory treatment based on his gender: (1). he was treated “differently than similarly situated female employees in the terms and conditions of employment, based on unlawful considerations of gender,” including “assignment of dangerous and undesirable job duties,” Compl. ¶¶ 132-33, an example of which is having to serve a subpoena in a residence protected by “a large vicious dog,” id. ¶¶ 34-35; see also id. ¶151 (alleging that the plaintiff faced gender discrimination “with respect to the terms, conditions, and privileges of Plaintiffs employment at PDS”); (2) his supervisors tolerated, without reprimand, sexually demeaning comments by his supervisor Primo, id. ¶¶ 19, 21, 32, and Primo improperly “slappfing] Plaintiff in the crouch [sic],” id. ¶40.

The plaintiff alleges he faced race-based discrimination because PDS: (1) “treated Plaintiff differently than similarly situated employees in the terms and conditions of employment, based on unlawful consideration of race,” id. ¶141; and (2) tolerated Primo’s racist comments despite the plaintiffs complaints, id. ¶¶ 19, 28, 38. The plaintiff additionally alleges discrimination based on both his race and gender based on PDS: (1) failing to investigate and take corrective action - regarding the plaintiffs complaints of race and gender discrimination, id. ¶¶ 153, 163; (2) placing the plaintiff on leave and terminating hi m, id. ¶¶ 154-55, 165; (3) denying the plaintiff admission into an investigator certification program that PDS administered, id. ¶¶ 119-21; and (4) not hiring the plaintiff for open positions at PDS as a staff investigator or an eligibility examiner, id. ¶¶ 122-25.

In response to the plaintiffs race and gender discrimination claims, PDS argues, first, that any “on-the-job discrimination” is time-barred under Title VII because the plaintiff “had been placed on leave before ” June 19, 2009, which is 300 days before the plaintiff filed his EEO complaint, PDS’ Mem. at 7 (emphasis added); and, second, that the plaintiff has failed to allege a causal link between these acts and the plaintiffs race or gender, id. at 8. In addition, although not an argument raised by the defendants, many of the alleged acts underlying the plaintiffs discrimination are simply not adverse employment actions under either Title VII or the DCHRA.

1. Most Alleged Discriminatory Actions Occurring While Plaintiff Was On-the-Job Are Time-Barred And Not Adverse Employment Actions

At the outset, the plaintiff does not dispute that, in the District of Columbia, the filing period for an EEO charge is 300 days. Pl.’s Opp’n at 2 (assuming, without disputing, that “thé charge filing period in this case began on June 19, 2009”). While Title VII requires “aggrieved persons” to file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, this period is extended to 300 days when the person has initially instituted a procedure with a state or local agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). A “work-sharing” arrangement between the EEOC and the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights (“DCOHR”) deems timely-filed EEO charges as cross-filed with the DCOHR, making the deadline for filing EEO charges in the District of Columbia under Title VII 300 days from the date of the alleged discrimination. Peters, 873 F.Supp.2d at 197; Tucker v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 764 F.Supp.2d 1, 6 (D.D.C.2011) (“In the District of Columbia, an EEOC charge must be filed within 300 days of the date of the alleged discrimination.”); Ellis v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 631 F.Supp.2d 71, 78 (D.D.C.2009) (“When a charge of discrimination is filed with the EEOC in the District of Columbia, a claim is automatically cross-filed with the D.C. Office of Human Rights (“DCOHR”) pursuant to a ‘worksharing agreement’ between the two agencies.”) (citing Carter v. George Washington Univ., 387 F.3d 872, 879 (D.C.Cir.2004)). This limitations period requirement is one of “the prerequisites that a plaintiff must satisfy before filing suit.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002); see also Singletary v. District of Columbia, 351 F.3d 519, 522-23 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.2003); Currier v. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., 159 F.3d 1363, 1366 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1998); Smith-Thompson v. District of Columbia, 657 F.Supp.2d 123, 131 (D.D.C.2009) (employee claiming discrimination under Title VII must comply with this timing requirement “or lose the ability [to] recover for it.”).

In this case, because the plaintiff filed his first EEO charge on April 15, 2010, only allegedly discriminatory acts occurring after June 19, 2009 are timely for consideration of his race and gender discrimination claims, and any allegations describing conduct that occurred earlier than that date are time-barred. The plaintiff was put on administrative leave on June 11, 2009, one week before the limitations period began. See Compl. ¶ 99; Koerner Decl. Ex. 1 (PDS Letter, dated June 11, 2009, advising plaintiff that he was placed on administrative leave with pay). Consequently, none of the alleged acts that occurred while he was at work, before his suspension, are timely to support his discrimination claims, leaving only his claims regarding his suspension and termination as a basis for his race and gender claims.

In any event, even if not time-barred, the litany of allegedly discriminatory acts described in the Complaint as occurring during the plaintiffs year of in-person employment do not constitute adverse employment actions. First, as “offensive and repugnant” as his supervisor’s verbal comments may have been to. the plaintiff, Compl. ¶ 33, this conduct does not amount to an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 753, 764 (D.C.Cir.1997) (noting that “[c]ourts applying Title VII have consistently focused on ‘ultimate employment decisions such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating ... [and not] interlocutory or mediate decisions' having no immediate effect upon employment conditions.’ ”); Stewart v. Evans, 275 F.3d 1126, 1135 (D.C.Cir.2002) (no adverse employment action where there was no change in position, benefits, or pay grade); Weng v. Solis, 960 F.Supp.2d 239, 249-50 (D.D.C.2013) (holding that “offensive racial, ethnic and/or sexually charged slurs, comments, and jokes by OED management” are not “adverse employment actions within the meaning of Title VIP). “ ‘[M]ere utterance of an ... epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee’ does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (citing Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (finding that “simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents, (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the “ ‘terms and conditions of employment’ ”) (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998) (citation omitted)); George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 416 (D.C.Cir.2005) (same); Bowden v. Clough, 658 F.Supp.2d 61, 80 (D.D.C.2009) (same). Indeed, “the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that ‘casual or isolated manifestations of a discriminatory environment, such as a few ethnic or racial slurs, may not raise a cause of action.’ ” Goode v. Billington, 932 F.Supp.2d 75, 89 (D.D.C.2013) (quoting Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 906 (D.C.Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Furthermore, while the plaintiff complains about being required to perform tasks that he considered “dangerous, un-' safe and undesirable,” Compl. ¶ 34, nowhere does he deny that these tasks were part of his employment responsibilities and, therefore, being required to perform his job cannot and does.not amount to discrimination. See, e.g., Mungin v. Katten Muchin & Zavis, 116 F.3d 1549, 1556-57 ( D.C.Cir.1997) (finding that, “changes in assignments or work-related duties do not ordinarily constitute adverse employment decisions if unaccompanied by a decrease in salary or work hour changes”); Stewart, 275 F.3d at 1135 (holding that “minor changes in work-related duties or opportunities do not constitute an actionable injury unless they are accompanied by some other adverse change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”); Bowden, 658 F.Supp.2d at 82 (finding that plaintiff failed to state a claim for discrimination based on being “given extra tasks, including heavy lifting” in relation to his female counterparts in part because all employees “must perform some lifting” and “the tasks among all [co-workers] vary according to their skill and experience”); Koch v. Schapiro, 759 F.Supp.2d 67, 75-76 (D.D.C.2011) (holding that increased workload that was within scope of job responsibilities was non-discriminatory). Indeed, “ ‘[n]ot everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action under Title VII.’ ” Rhodes v. Chertoff, No. 04-1715, 2005 WL 3273566, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 4, 2005) (quoting Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir.1996)). Courts have made clear that “Title VII is not a ‘general civility code’ for the workplace, and it does not redress ‘the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as sporadic use of abusive language.’ ” Rattigan v. Gonzales, 503 F.Supp.2d 56, 80 (D.D.C.2007) (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80, 118 S.Ct. 998, and Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275) (internal citations omitted).

Finally, the plaintiff cites an incident in which his supervisor Primo “slapped Plaintiff in the crouch' [sic],” as evidence of gender discrimination. Compl. ¶ 40. This gesture may very well constitute an unwelcome, and consequently, inappropriate contact, but the context for this contact belies its import as a basis for a discrimination claim. As the plaintiff describes the contact, his supervisor was walking towards the plaintiff in a public hallway, raised her hand “as if to give' Plaintiff a ‘high five’ as she sometimes did,” and then, “before their hands met Primo abruptly and without warning slapped Plaintiff in the crouch [sic].” Id. The plaintiff clearly understood this hand-action to be a “tease” and noted that “[e]very time Primo would do this Plaintiff would flinch and Primo would laugh.” Id. While being the brunt of such a schoolyard trick may be unpleasant, this does not amount to an adverse employment action that resulted in a modification of any material term of the plaintiffs employment. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787-88, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (finding that “simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the “ ‘terms and conditions of employment’ ”) (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82, 118 S.Ct. 998 (citation omitted)); Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1124 (D.C.Cir.2002) (citing Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir.1997))(applying Johnson court’s analysis that “[m]ost unfortunately, expressions [that employ obscene language] are commonplace in certain circles,” and “they are simply expressions of animosity or juvenile provocation,” even if accompanied by “a crotch-grabbing gesture”); Walker v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 102 F.Supp.2d 24, 29 (D.D.C.2000) (citing Henry v. Guest Servs., Inc., 902 F.Supp. 245, 251-52 (D.D.C.1995) (holding that management personnel jokes directed at the plaintiffs depression were not severe enough to constitute adverse employment action), aff'd, 98 F.3d 646 (D.C.Cir.1996)).

The only timely adverse employment actions the plaintiff has plead are his suspension and termination. See Baird, 662 F.3d at 1248 (An adverse employment action is “ ‘a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits.’ ” (quoting Douglas, 559 F.3d at 552)); Taylor, 132 F.3d at 764 (“Courts applying Title VII have consistently focused on ‘ultimate employment decisions such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating ... [and not] interlocutory or mediate decisions having no immediate effect upon employment conditions.’ ”). With this clarification of which of the plaintiffs myriad of complaints about his PDS employment raise sufficient and timely allegations of adverse employment actions, the Court next turns to an analysis of the sufficiency of the plaintiffs claims that these actions were taken due to his gender and race. The Court looks first to the causal link in the plaintiffs gender discrimination claim, then his race discrimination claim.

2. Insufficient Pleading of Causal Link Between Plaintiff’s Suspension/Termination and His Male Gender

The plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to demonstrate that he was suspended or terminated because of his male gender for two reasons. First, there is nothing to support a causal inference that gender was PDS’ motivating factor, other than the plaintiffs conclusory allegations. See Compl. ¶ 151 (“PDS ... discriminated against Plaintiff on account of his gender”); id. ¶129 (“Plaintiffs gender has continually been a motivating factor in Defendant’s ... discriminatory treatment”). Such “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” at the pleading stage and cannot sustain the plaintiffs discrimination claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Further, the plaintiff specifically pleads that adverse employment actions were taken against him, not on the basis of his gender, but because of his protected EEO activity. See Compl. ¶¶ 92-98 (the plaintiff claims that he was first suspended “[i]n retaliation for Plaintiffs complaints about EEO violations”); id. ¶102 (the plaintiff was suspended without leave “[i]n retaliation for Plaintiffs complaints about EEO violations”). These allegations do not establish that the plaintiff was discriminated against because of his gender. Rather, as the plaintiff himself pleads, these acts were allegedly taken because of his complaints, a matter which the Court addresses under the discussion of the plaintiffs retaliation charges below. These allegations, are insufficient to support a causal inference that his suspension and/or termination were due to his gender.

Second, to the extent the plaintiff attempts to establish gender discrimination based on disparate treatment, the plaintiffs Complaint still falls short. The plaintiff must show that, by contrast to how women were treated by PDS, he was treated differently because of his gender. See Staropoli v. Donahoe, 923 F.Supp.2d 10, 20 (D.D.C.2013), aff'd, No. 13-5070, 2013 WL 4711669 (D.C.Cir. Aug. 2, 2013). The plaintiff has not done so. The plaintiffs only allegation of disparate treatment is that he was fired “on the pretext that he was ‘vulnerable to being impeached upon testifying’ ” because of the charges against him arising from the May 30, 2009 car accident, id. ¶¶ 104, 108, but, in comparison, Primo was not terminated despite having a prior conviction on her record, see id. ¶115. This comparison is unavailing because the plaintiff also alleges that a male colleague continued to be employed by PDS despite having a conviction on his record, id. 11116, a fact which undercuts the plaintiffs allegation that PDS discriminates against males. The plaintiffs Complaint, thus, does not plead facts to show differential treatment based on gender.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs gender discrimination claims against PDS in Counts I and IV, under Title VII and the DCHRA, respectively, are dismissed.

3. Insufficient Pleading of Causal Link Between Plaintiff’s Suspension/Termination and His Unspecified Race

The plaintiff has failed to plead a prima facie case of race discrimination for two reasons. First, nowhere in the Complaint does the plaintiff establish his own race or that of several of his supervisors. See generally Compl. See also McManus v. District of Columbia, 530 F.Supp.2d 46, 76 (D.D.C.2007) (dismissing plaintiffs’ Title VII claims because plaintiffs “do not even state their individual races” thereby “do not allege that they are members of any of the classes protected by that statute”). While not apparent from the plaintiffs pleading, his EEO complaint states that the plaintiff identifies as “American Indian/White,” Koerner Decl. Ex. 2, and the Complaint indicates that he has a “familial relationship with his African-American uncle and cousins.” Compl. ¶ 43. Yet nowhere does the plaintiff clarify the race of which he is actually a member. By omitting a statement of the plaintiffs race in his Complaint, the plaintiff has failed to allege the most basic fact necessary to plead a claim under Title VII — namely, that he is a member of a protected class. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (making it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual “because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”).

Second, even if the plaintiff had identified his race, his claim would still fail because he has failed to plead that he was suspended and terminated because of his race. As with his gender discrimination claims, the plaintiff relies on conclusory assertions to assert that “Plaintiffs race has continually been a motivating factor in Defendant’s wrongful and discriminatory treatment,” Compl. ¶ 137, and that he was differently treated “than similarly situated employees ... based on unlawful considerations of race,” id. ¶141. Such statements are “ ‘naked assertion^]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955), and do not satisfy the requirement to plead a prima facie case of race discrimination. The Complaint is devoid of any allegations that would bolster the conclusory assertion that the plaintiffs suspension and termination were motivated by his race. See generally Compl. Indeed, the plaintiff avers that these acts were taken “[i]n retaliation for Plaintiffs complaints about EEO violations,” not based on his race. See Compl. ¶¶ 92-98, 102. To the extent the plaintiff intends to establish a causal link by showing disparate treatment, the Court cannot engage in such an analysis without knowing the plaintiffs race, or the race of the parties he compares himself to. Consequently, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim of employment discrimination based on his race.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs race discrimination claims against PDS in Counts II and V, under Title VII and the DCHRA, respectively, are dismissed.

4. Race and Gender Discrimination Claims against Primo Similarly Fail

The plaintiff alleges in Counts VII and VIII that Primo discriminated against the plaintiff based on his gender and race in violation of the DCHRA. Compl. ¶¶ 181— 94. The plaintiff further claims that Primo “aided and abetted the PDS’s discrimination against Plaintiff on account of his’ gender [and race], during the course of his employment.” Compl. ¶¶ 182, 189. Primo argues that these claims are barred because the plaintiff: (1) failed to execute proper service as to Primo, Primo’s Mem. at 5-6; (2) failed to file an EEO complaint against Primo and limited that complaint to PDS, rendering his claims against Pri-mo time-barred, id. at 6-7; and (3) failed to state a claim for discrimination, id. at 8-9. The Court agrees that the plaintiff has failed to allege a prima facie case of discrimination, thus, dismisses the plaintiffs race and gender discrimination claims against Primo without reaching Primo’s first and second argument.

“Courts have held individuals liable under the DCHRA when they were personally involved in the discriminatory conduct ... or when they aided or abetted in the discriminatory conduct of others.” King v. Triser Salons, LLC, 815 F.Supp.2d 328, 331-32 (D.D.C.2011) (internal citations omitted). Nonetheless, a DCHRA discrimination claim against an individual must still meet the requirements of timeliness and qualify as an adverse employment action. For the same reasons discussed in Part III.A.1 above, other than the plaintiffs suspension and termination, the plaintiff has not alleged any timely adverse employment actions that Primo has personally taken against the plaintiff. Indeed, while the plaintiff alleges that Pri-mo used crude and offensive language in the plaintiff’s presence, see, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 25, 26, 30, and engaged in other unbecoming conduct, see, e.g., id. ¶36, 40, such actions are not “the kind of material harm that the DCHRA demands” to establish an adverse employment action. Dickerson v. SecTek, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d 66, 74-75 (D.D.C.2002). Moreover, the plaintiff does not allege that Primo had sufficient authority, even as his supervisor, to “a£feet[ ] a term, condition, or privilege of [the plaintiffs] employment” to amount to an adverse employment action. See Jones v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC, 755 F.Supp.2d 138, 149 (D.D.C.2010); see generally Compl. In any event, even if Primo were somehow involved in the decisions to suspend and terminate the plaintiff, for the same reasons discussed in Parts III.A.2 and 3 above, the plaintiff has failed to allege any causal link between these adverse employment actions and the plaintiffs race or gender.

To the extent the plaintiff seeks to establish Primo’s liability based on a theory that she aided and abetted PDS, Primo still cannot be held liable because the Court has found that PDS’ actions were not discriminatory. Consequently, Primo cannot be liable for aiding and abetting any discriminatory acts when the Court has found that no discriminatory acts occurred. See Gaujacq v. EDF, Inc., 601 F.3d 565, 576 (D.C.Cir.2010) (holding that “because [employer] did not discriminate against [plaintiff], it is clear that [supervisor] did not aid and abet any unlawful discrimination” (citing Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C.Cir.1983))); Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873, 888 (D.C.1998) (finding that “if [firm] unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff as alleged, then the partners who carried out the allegedly discriminated acts aided and abetted the employer’s discrimination”) (emphasis added). Thus, no aiding and abetting theory against Primo can be alleged as there is no underlying discrimination.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs race and gender discrimination claims against Primo under Counts VII and VIII under the DCHRA are dismissed. .

B. Hostile Work Environment Claim

The plaintiff does not specifically plead a hostile work environment claim as a separate count in his Complaint. See generally Compl. ¶¶ 127-214. Yet, many of the factual allegations listed in the plaintiffs Complaint appear to suggest such a claim against either or both defendants. Consequently, the Court will address the sufficiency of any hostile work environment claims based upon the allegations in the Complaint. The plaintiff alleges that he complained to PDS of “hostile treatment on the basis of his gender, and or race,” id. ¶75, that the treatment in his workplace “creat[ed] a hostile and intolerable environment,” id. ¶¶ 151, 171, and that PDS did not remedy his “harassing and discriminatory working environment,” id. ¶172. He further claims that Primo “creatfed] a hostile and intolerable environment” for the plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 182, 189. The underlying conduct described by the plaintiff to support his hostile work environment allegations are: (1) sexually graphic or crude language by Primo, id. ¶¶ 23-27, 30, 38, 39; (2) inappropriate workplace behavior by Primo, id. ¶78, including three occasions over the course of a year when -Primo allegedly “expos[ed] her buttocks to the plaintiff,” id. ¶36, and one occasion when Primo “slapped Plaintiff in the crouch [sic]” after gesturing “as if to give the plaintiff a ‘high five,”’ id. ¶40; and (3) PDS’ failure to intervene, id. ¶¶ 21, 38, 75. PDS responds that any hostile work environment claim the plaintiff asserts “cannot establish a claim for race or gender discrimination” because “none of the [alleged] incidents occurred within the filing period” for a Title VII claim. PDS’ Mem. at 7. Primo adds that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim because he has failed to allege his race, Primo Mem. at 9, and that the acts described are not severe or pervasive enough to establish a hostile work environment claim, id. at 9-11. The Court agrees that any hostile work environment claim under Title VII is time-barred, and that the plaintiff has failed to plead a prima facie hostile work environment claim under the DCHRA because he has failed to link any hostile work environment to any protected class of which he may be a member.

1. Requirements For Hostile Work Environment Claim

Although not explicitly mentioned in Title VII, the law is long-standing that this statute provides a cause of action for a discriminatory hostile work environment. See Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB, 477 U.S. at 73, 106 S.Ct. 2399. A work environment is considered “hostile” in the employment discrimination context when it is “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78, 118 S.Ct. 998 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367); Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 577 (D.C.Cir.2013); Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201. For the Court to consider a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing:

(1) the employee was a member of a protected class; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome[ ] harassment ...; (3) the harassment complained of was based upon [the plaintiffs protected status]; (4) the charged [ ] harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering with the plaintiffs work performance and creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment ...; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.

Davis, 275 F.3d at 1122-23 (quoting Yeary v. Goodwill Industries-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 445 (6th Cir.1997)); Whiting v. Labat-Anderson, Inc., 926 F.Supp.2d 106, 116 (D.D.C.2013) (same). “The key terms, then, are ‘severe,’ ‘pervasive,’ and ‘abusive,’ as not just any offensive or discriminatory conduct rises to an actionable hostile work environment.” Jones, 755 F.Supp.2d at 149 (quoting Lester v. Natsios, 290 F.Supp.2d 11, 22 (D.D.C.2003)); see also Peters, 873 F.Supp.2d at 188-89; Turner v. Shinseki, 824 F.Supp.2d 99, 123-24 (D.D.C.2011); Dorns v. Geithner, 692 F.Supp.2d 119, 135-36 (D.D.C.2010) (citing Hendricks v. Paulson, 520 F.Supp.2d 65, 89 (D.D.C.2007)); Roberson v. Snow, 404 F.Supp.2d 79, 89-90 (D.D.C.2005).

To determine whether a work environment is sufficiently “hostile” to support a claim, the Court must look at the totality of circumstances, including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367. “[C]onduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment....” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275. “[N]ot all abusive behavior, even when it is motivated by discriminatory animus, is actionable.” Stewart, 275 F.3d at 1133 (citations and quotation marks omitted). “[C]asual or isolated manifestations of a discriminatory environment ... may not raise a cause of action.” Park, 71 F.3d at 906 (quoting Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 n. 9 (D.C.Cir.1981)).

In other words, not all forms of workplace harassment are prohibited, only harassment based on a person’s membership in a protected class. See, e.g., Stewart, 275 F.3d at 1133. Indeed, courts have routinely held that hostile behavior, no matter how unjustified, cannot support a hostile work environment claim unless that behavior is linked to the plaintiffs membership in a protected class. See Na’im v. Clinton, 626 F.Supp.2d 63, 73 (D.D.C.2009); Kline v. Springer, 602 F.Supp.2d 234, 243 (D.D.C.2009), aff'd, Kline v. Berry, 404 Fed.Appx. 505 (D.C.Cir.2010).

2. Any Hostile Work Environment Claim Under Title VII Is Untimely

As noted in Part III.A.1, the plaintiff did not file his EEO complaint until April 15, 2010, 308 days after he was first suspended and placed on administrative leave, on June 11, 2009. During his suspension, the plaintiff was no longer allowed on PDS premises, Compl. ¶ 93, and could not communicate with any PDS employees other than a supervisor who was nót Primo, Compl. (unredacted) ¶ 95. In other words, after his suspension, the plaintiff was not permitted to be exposed to his work environment. Thus, the plaintiffs allegations concerning hostile activity at his workplace are time-barred under Title VII because the plaintiff was not exposed to a hostile work environment within three hundred days of the filing of his EEO complaint.

For hostile work environment claims, at least one “act contributing to the claim [must] occur[ ] within the filing period” for the court to consider “the entire time period of the hostile environment” for the purposes of determining liability. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117, 122 S.Ct. 2061. Here, the plaintiff has failed to allege any act contributing to his claim within the filing period. Furthermore, the plaintiff has not alleged any incidents contributing to any hostile work environment claim after he was suspended.

To avoid this conclusion, the plaintiff responds that two statements in his Complaint sufficiently allege acts of discrimination within the filing period. First, he claims' employment with PDS “until March 2010,” when he was terminated, and that “although [he was] occasionally on leave,, [he] was required to work on cases for PDS and receive emails from Defendant Primo through his PDS email account well after [] June 19, 2009,” the date of his suspension. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. Second, he alleges that Primo used offensive terms “in person and by email every day he was employed by PDS.” Id. (citing Compl. ¶ 30). The plaintiff extrapolates from these two statements to reason that he has sufficiently plead that an act of discrimination occurred within the filing period because he has stated that Primo used offensive terms “every day he was employed,” and he was at least formally employed within 300 days of his EEOC filing.

The plaintiffs strained reasoning fails to save the timeliness under Title VII of any hostile work environment claim for two reasons. First, his argument directly contradicts his own pleadings. The plaintiff was placed on administrative leave on June 11, 2009, the conditions of which prevented the plaintiff from “us[ing] PDS equipment, databases, and email accounts” or “participating] in any PDS case.” See Koerner Decl. Ex. 1. The plaintiff confirms this in his Complaint, alleging that he was “banned ... from the PDS premises ... from working on any PDS eases ... [or] using any of PDS’s databases,” id. ¶¶ 93-94, 96, and “banned ... from communicating with any PDS employees other than” a supervisor who was not Pri-mo, Compl. (unredacted) ¶ 95. Indeed, these alleged acts suspending the plaintiff from the PDS workplace form part of the plaintiffs discrimination and retaliation claims.- See id. ¶¶ 92-98 (alleging that PDS undertook t