Thai Meditation Ass'n of Ala., Inc. v. City of Mobile (349 F. Supp. 3d 1165, 2018)

TERRY F. MOORER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. Defendant City of Mobile filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support, (Docs. 89 & 90), a reply brief in support, (Doc. 104), a response and supporting documents to Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, (Docs. 100 & 101), and a response in opposition to Plaintiffs' sur-reply, (Doc. 110). Plaintiffs Thai Meditation Association of Alabama, Inc., Sivaporn Nimityongskul, Varin Nimityongskul, Serena Nimityongskul, and Prasit Nimityongskul have filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support, (Docs. 91 & 94), a reply brief in support (Doc. 106), a response and supporting documents to Defendant's motion for summary judgment, (Docs. 97 & 98), and a sur-Reply in opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment, (Doc. 112). For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is due to be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART , and Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is due to be DENIED.

I. Procedural Background

This matter arises out of the Defendant's denial of Plaintiffs' zoning applications to construct a Buddhist meditation center in a residential district. The Complaint asserts seven counts: (1) Defendant imposed and implemented land use regulations, both on their face and as applied, in a manner that places a substantial burden on Plaintiffs' religious exercise in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) ; (2) Defendant imposed and implemented land use regulations, both on their face and as applied, in a manner that discriminates against Plaintiffs on the basis of religion and religious denomination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2) ; (3) Defendant imposed and implemented land use regulations, both on their face and as applied, in a manner that treats Plaintiffs on terms that are less than equal to nonreligious assemblies in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) ; (4) Defendant has deprived Plaintiffs of their right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; (5) Defendant has deprived Plaintiffs of their right to equal protection under the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; (6) Defendant imposed and implemented land use regulations, both on their face and as applied, in a manner that places a burden on Plaintiffs' religious exercise in violation of Article I, § 3.01 of the Alabama Constitution ; and (7) Defendant has negligently misrepresented facts relating to Plaintiffs' zoning classification in violation of Alabama state law. (Doc. 1).

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss certain parts of the Complaint. (Doc. 18). The Court granted in part Defendant's motion to dismiss as to the facial components of Counts 1, 2, and 3. (Doc. 31). Defendant's motion to dismiss as to Count 7 was denied. Id. The parties subsequently filed cross motions for summary judgment-Defendant's motion on all counts, and Plaintiffs' motion on Counts 1 through 6. Each party briefed their position and provided evidentiary support thereof to the Court. This matter is now ripe for consideration.

II. Factual Background

In 2015, Plaintiffs Sivaporn Nimityongskul ("Nimit"), Varin Nimityongskul ("V. Nimit"), Serena Nimityongskul ("S. Nimit"), and Prasit Nimityongskul ("P. Nimit") (collectively, "the Nimit Plaintiffs") purchased property located at 2354 and 2410 Eloong Drive ("the Eloong property") for the primary purpose of constructing a Buddhist meditation center on the site. (Doc. 92-4; Doc. 92-29; Doc. 92-30, p. 19 ¶¶ 12-22). Plaintiff Thai Meditation Association of Alabama, Inc., ("TMAA") has a leasehold interest in the Eloong property. (Doc. 92-29).

In September 2015, Nimit submitted an application to the City of Mobile Planning Commission ("the Planning Commission") for Planning Approval, Planned Unit Development ("PUD"), and Subdivision Approval (collectively, the "Applications" or "Plaintiffs' Applications") to permit TMAA's development on the Eloong property. (Doc. 93-21). In the Applications, Plaintiffs sought construction of a 2,400-square foot meditation center building, a 2,000-square foot cottage for visiting monks, a 600-square foot restroom facility, and associated parking. (Doc. 93-22). The Planning Commission ultimately denied Plaintiffs' Applications, and the Mobile City Council ("the City Council") denied Plaintiffs' appeal, upholding the Planning Commission's decision. (Doc. 92-20, p. 2).

A. The Zoning Ordinance

Chapter 64 of the Code of the City of Mobile, Alabama ("the Zoning Ordinance") divides Mobile into fifteen zoning districts, identified in Section 64-3 of the Zoning Ordinance. (Doc. 92-12, pp. 20-53). Section 64-3 of the Zoning Ordinance sets forth the specific regulations governing the applicable districts and delineates uses permitted by right and uses requiring planning approval. Id. at p. 22-53, 137. If a requested use in a particular zone is not specifically listed, the City of Mobile's director of inspection services or his agent may determine in which district the use may be permitted by right or with planning approval. Id. at p. 137.

Under the Zoning Ordinance, a "church or religious facility" is permitted by right in all business districts, but it must receive planning approval to locate in any residential district. Id. at p. 146. Accordingly, before a church or religious facility may locate in a residential area, the Planning Commission must determine if the facility's location would be in harmony with, and appropriate for, the residential district. Id. at p. 137.

The Eloong Property is located in an R-1 Residential District ("R-1 District"). (Doc. 93-1). R-1 Districts are composed of primarily "one-family dwellings and small open areas ... where residential development seems likely to occur." (Doc. 92-12, p.22). Churches and schools are permitted with Planning Approval in R-1 Districts because Defendant wishes to encourage suitable neighborhood environments for families. Id. Because Plaintiffs sought to build a religious facility in an R-1 District, they were required to apply for Planning Approval.

B. Plaintiffs' Religious Beliefs

TMAA is a Buddhist religious organization. (Doc. 93-24, p. 1). The organization's purpose is "[t]eaching and research into growth and development of mind and spirit through meditation and to expand the knowledge of Buddhism." Id. It is affiliated with the Dhammakaya school of Buddhism, a sect of Theravada Buddhism headquartered in Wat Phra Dhammakaya in Pathum Thani, Thailand. (Doc. 93-75 ¶¶ 14-16). TMAA's religious exercise includes "prayer, meditation, various religious ceremonies, lectures, teaching and learning." Id. at ¶ 17. While there are many different schools of Buddhism, TMAA engages in the meditation technique known as Dhammakaya meditation, which is practiced by thousands of temples in Thailand. Id. at ¶ 13, 17. Meditation sessions at TMAA are led by either monks or lay teachers trained in Dhammakaya meditation. Id. at 17. Plaintiffs believe "Shakyamuni Buddha, the founder of the Buddhist religion, achieved his great spiritual insights as a result of years of meditation, and he taught that mediation is central to following his teachings." Id. at ¶ 21. Every week, TMAA offers four meditation classes with talks on Buddhist scriptures and morality. Id. at ¶ 36.

Defendant, however, questions Plaintiffs' meditation practice as religious exercise. (Doc. 100, p. 3). Defendant bases its viewpoint on various public announcements, in which Plaintiffs explained why religion is not important for meditation. (See, e.g. , Doc. 92-16). For instance, in a 2010 article published by AL.com, Nimit explained, "[T]his meditation center was established in order to teach people how to find inner peace and happiness. My ultimate mission is to spread world peace through inner peace, and have people see that mediation is not to be associated with any one particular, race, culture, and religion ...." (Doc. 92-16, p. 7). TMAA also holds itself out to be a non-profit, non-religious organization on social media and other website directories. Id. at p. 10; 14-15. Furthermore, in her deposition, Nimit agreed:

The great thing about meditation is that philosophy/religious belief is not important. Meditation is about consciousness. The beliefs of the mind become trivial. You dive deep into the heart of the matter to gain access to your soul - your inner reality. Therefore, meditation can be practiced by people of different religions or no religion at all.

(Doc. 101-2, pp. 6-7).

Plaintiffs assert they describe their meditation practices as "non-religious" because TMAA is open to all, and "following Buddhist teachings does not require rejection of the particular theistic concepts that are central to Judeo-Christian notions of what is meant by 'religion.' " (Doc. 94, p. 5). In fact, both the Planning Commission and City Council heard testimony to this effect at the hearings in front of each body. (See Doc. 92-19, p. 18) ("The meditation [center] has elicited itself on Facebook and other social media as non-religious to indicate that one does not have to be Buddhist in order to come learn meditation."); Doc. 93-34, p. 12 ("Buddhist liberation is essentially tied to meditation and meditation practice."). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs' religious beliefs were questioned throughout the processing of the Applications. (See Doc. 92-19; Doc. 93-34).

C. Plaintiffs' Location History

TMAA began in 2007 at a home located at 4567 Airport Boulevard, Mobile, Alabama. (Doc. 93-73 ¶ 23). The home provided housing for a Buddhist monk who taught meditation classes there. Id. In August 2007, a citizen complained to Defendant that Plaintiffs had posted a sign that advertised services that were provided inside of the home. (Doc. 93-10, p. 1). A City Inspector came to the home and informed Nimit the sign was not permitted and must be removed. Id. Nimit removed the sign, and the inspector issued a Notice of Violation. Id. , pp. 1-2. The Notice gave Plaintiffs ten days to either cease the violation or apply for Planning Approval. Id. at p. 2.

On September 14, 2007, Plaintiffs applied for Planning Approval to continue offering meditation services at the home. (Doc. 93-12). The application received tremendous community opposition, and many neighbors came to the Planning Commission hearing to oppose the application. (Doc. 1 ¶ 85; Doc. 32 ¶ 85). Similar to the Applications at issue in this case, opposition to Plaintiffs' application for the Airport Boulevard home targeted both legitimate community concerns as well as Plaintiffs' religious beliefs. For instance, one resident wrote a letter stating:

There is no concern on their part for the welfare of children growing up in this quiet area, no thought given to the additional traffic and the danger it represents, and no concern for the loss of property value that we will all suffer because of their unwanted intrusion .... While serving with the Air Force in Vietnam many years ago I had the occasion to visit Thailand, where there are countless temples, and the streets are filling with Buddhist priests, wearing their colorful, orange robes. It was a quaint sight, but I had no desire to bring one back to my neighborhood, and install him there .... We do not want a meditation center, a non-sectarian church, a dental clinic, a service station, a bingo palace, or anything that is alien to family life intruding upon the citizens of this area ....

(Doc. 93-14).

On November 1, 2007, the Planning Commission recommended denial of Plaintiffs' application based on concerns regarding the possibility for future rezoning or use variance requests, and the lack of compliance with the parking surface, maneuvering, tree and landscaping, and buffering requirements of the Zoning Ordinance.

(Doc. 93-13, p. 3). The Planning Commission's Staff Report explained, "[T]he meditation center would likely be a relatively 'quiet' neighbor and might generally be conducive to location in a residential area. However, as parking improvements and, most likely, building code improvements would be required to accommodate the proposed use, the general compatibility appears to be less favorable."Id. Plaintiffs later withdrew their application. (Doc. 93-11).

In 2009, Plaintiffs relocated TMAA to its current site at 3821 Airport Boulevard, Mobile, Alabama. (Doc. 93-73 ¶ 6). The current site is located in a shopping center on a busy street. Id. at ¶ 7. Plaintiffs assert its current location creates significant hardships for their religious exercise because their meditation practice requires a serene environment, they lack sufficient space for visiting monks and overnight retreats, and participants have encountered safety issues while attending classes. Id. at ¶¶ 10-16. Defendant, however, asserts Plaintiffs' proposed meditation center would not alleviate Plaintiffs' size concerns because it is only 200 square feet larger than its current location, and Plaintiffs own numerous homes throughout the city where they could host visiting monks. (Doc. 100, p. 7). Additionally, Defendant asserts Plaintiffs have received 100 acres of viable land where they could host their meditation activities. Id.

Plaintiffs aver they received approximately 100 acres of donated land in November 2014 for the purpose of building a meditation center. (Doc. 92-30, pp. 41-44; Doc. 93-73 ¶ 25). However, after investigating the property and consulting with their land use professional, Plaintiffs found the donated acreage was not a feasible location. (Doc. 93-73 ¶ 26). Thus, Plaintiffs began searching for other property suitable for their meditation practices, and they discovered the Eloong Property. Id. at ¶ 27.

D. Procedural History of Plaintiffs' Applications

On April 24, 2015, Plaintiffs attended a predevelopment meeting with their attorney and realtor, Bill Youngblood ("Youngblood"), and two City of Mobile Planners, Bert Hoffman ("Hoffman") and Marie Cross York ("York") to discuss the possibility of relocating TMAA to the Eloong property. (Doc. 93-27; Doc. 93-25, p. 3). The purpose of a pre-development meeting is for Defendant to gather information from applicants or potential applicants about what they are proposing to do at a specific location. (Doc. 93-5, p. 3). Additionally, Defendant provides applicants information about the process they must go through in order to obtain approvals. Id. Defendant reviews, inter alia , the district in which applicants wish to locate and whether the property is a legal lot of record. Id. Thus, if an applicant's proposed use is not permitted in the district, in which the property is zoned, Defendant would inform the applicant of such at the predevelopment meeting. Id. at p. 4.

At the predevelopment meeting for Plaintiffs' potential Applications, the discussion centered around concerns about construction as well as the religious nature of their proposed meditation. (Doc. 93-25, p. 9). Following the meeting, Defendant concluded Plaintiffs' Applications would need the following approvals: "(1) Planning Approval for worship related use; (2) PUD because of a second habitable structure on the property; (3) Subdivision; and (4) Variance for non-paved parking and maneuvering." (Doc. 93-27).

On September 11, 2015, Plaintiffs submitted the Applications to construct a meditation center on the Eloong property. (Doc. 93-21). The Applications were, then, assigned to York for review and preparation of a Staff Report. (Doc. 93-4, p. 5; Doc. 93-25, p. 7). The Planning Commission issued the first Staff Report for Plaintiffs' Applications on October 15, 2015, which noted:

The applicant is requesting Planning Approval to allow a meditation center in an R-1, Single-Family Residential District, Planned Unit Development approval to all multiple buildings on a single building site, and Subdivision approval to create one legal lot of record. Religious facilities require Planning Approval when located in R-1 districts.

(Doc. 93-1, p. 4).

Furthermore, the Staff Report recommended the Applications be held over until the November 19, 2015, Planning Commission meeting so Plaintiffs could revise the Applications to reflect compliance with Engineering, Traffic, and Landscaping requirements. (Doc. 93-1, pp. 6-11). However, their Applications were ultimately reviewed at the October Planning Commission meeting instead of the proposed November meeting.

At the October 15, 2015 Planning Commission meeting, Plaintiffs' Applications were met with strong community opposition. (See Doc. 93-43). Specifically, a nearby resident of the Eloong property, Tamela Esham ("Esham") explained every single neighbor in the community opposed the project. Id. Some residents opposed the Applications for environmental reasons, and other residents opposed them because of the "lack of information" regarding the proposed project. Id. at pp. 12-13.

Additionally, questions were raised regarding Plaintiffs' religious beliefs. Id. at p. 7. The Planning Commission's attorney, Doug Anderson ("Anderson"), stated:

For this to be proper within the zoning ordinance, it has to be a religious use. We're going to need written documentation, more than just an application, that says this is a religious building or religious use. We're going to need documentation to show - to prove that this actually is more than just a yoga or a meditation facility but that it is a religious use[;] otherwise planning approval is not going to be the proper procedure but a Board of Adjustment variant would be proper .... If you can just provide us whatever written documentation other than just saying that it's religious. We've got to have something that shows it's not a commercial use but it is a religious use.

Id. at pp. 7-8.

Hoffman, also, informed the Planning Commission his staff "separately did some research trying to determine if it was a religious or non-religious facility based on how it's handled in other cities [,] and [they] found mixed results." Id. at p. 19. The Planning Commission recommended holding over Plaintiffs' Applications until the December Planning Commission meeting. Id. at pp. 15-17.

During the time between the October 2015 Planning Commission meeting and the December 2015 holdover meeting, Plaintiffs provided Defendant documentation addressing their religious status. The documentation included TMAA's articles of incorporation, tax documentation, letters from Buddhist monks, letters from the Dhammakaya Foundation, and a letter from Eric Loomis, an associate professor of Philosophy, explaining the centrality of meditation to the Buddhist religion. (Doc. 93-29, pp. 3-5; Doc. 93-24; Doc. 93-34, pp. 10-12). TMAA's articles of incorporation state, "The corporation has been organized for ... teaching and research into growth and development of mind and spirit through meditation and to expand the knowledge of Buddhism." (Doc. 93-24). Upon receipt of the items, Hoffman consulted Anderson to further evaluate Plaintiffs' religious status. (Doc. 93-45). In a November 23, 2015, email to Anderson, Hoffman requested, "Doug - If you can give us a legal opinion as to whether the attached documentation is sufficient to determine if the proposed meditation center on Dog River is 'religious' or not, it would be appreciated." Id. at p. 1. In response, Anderson asserted:

I do not think it is. This shows the IRS has given it tax exempt status as a charity or foundation - there are tests a church has to go through with the IRS to be classified as a church/religious organization. Just because meditation is part of a religion (my preacher teaches contemplative prayer) does not make the building a church or the owner a religious organization. Recommend denial.

Id.

At the December Planning Commission Meeting, the Planning Commission, once again, entertained viewpoints from those in favor of Plaintiffs' Applications as well as those in opposition to them. (Doc. 93-34). Similar to the October meeting, there was discussion regarding both Plaintiffs' religious status as well as residents' concerns regarding the compatibility of the meditation center in the Eloong neighborhood. Id. Following extensive discussion, the Planning Commission moved to deny Plaintiffs' Applications. (Doc. 93-34, p. 44-47).

On December 3, 2015, the Planning Commission issued the Staff Report recommending denial of Plaintiffs' Applications. (Doc. 93-22). In relevant part, the Staff Report recommended denial because Plaintiffs' proposed use was not "approvable via the Planning Approval process," "multiple buildings cannot be allowed for unapproved use," and "legal counsel of the Planning Commission" determined Plaintiffs had not provided sufficient IRS documentation to be classified as a church or religious facility under the Zoning Ordinance. Id. at p. 12. However, Defendant informed Plaintiffs their Applications were denied based on compatibility, site access, and traffic increase. (Doc. 92-17, p. 2). Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal to the City Council seeking reversal of the Planning Commission's denial. (Doc. 92-18).

The week before the City Council reviewed Plaintiffs' appeal, Esham composed an email to City Councilman C.J. Small ("Councilman Small") expressing her concerns about Plaintiffs' proposed construction. (Doc. 93-35). In her first email to Councilman Small, Esham expressed her concerns that the meditation center would increase traffic and noise, which would "fundamentally change the nature and character of our residential neighborhood." Id. at p. 2. A second email to Councilman Small, however, touched on the religious nature of Plaintiffs' meditation center. (Doc. 93-36, p. 1). In defending her position regarding TMAA's compatibility within the neighborhood, Esham wrote that Nimit's "version of events that this is a religious issue" is "inaccurate and misguided." Id.

Another resident of the Eloong neighborhood also reached out to members of the City Council prior to the January appeal meeting. Resident Greg Marshall ("Marshall") wrote Councilman John Williams ("Councilman Williams") regarding a rumor that TMAA would be a "NUDE yoga center." (Doc. 93-53). Marshall expressed, "It's just not compatible with the neighborhood, and it's just a business flying under the veil of religious use exemptions." Id. Councilman Williams responded to the email, "You just saying nude makes me certain NO is the answer. CJ [Councilman Small] is with us here as well[.]" Id.

The City Council reviewed Plaintiffs' appeal on January 19, 2016. (Doc. 92-19).

After extensive discussion regarding TMAA's compatibility with the Eloong neighborhood as well as dialogue regarding Plaintiffs' religious beliefs, the City Council upheld the Planning Commission's decision. Id. at p. 91. Plaintiffs' appeal failed by a vote of six to one, with one council member abstaining. Id.

Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment asserts Defendant's application of the Zoning Ordinance burdened their religious exercise and discriminated against them on the basis of religion. Defendant's motion for summary judgment attempts to rebut Plaintiffs' assertions on all claims.

III. Standard of Review for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment should be granted only if "there is no issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (" Rule 56"). The party seeking summary judgment bears "the initial burden to show the district court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial." Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc. , 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. "If the nonmoving party fails to make 'a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,' the moving party is entitled to summary judgment." Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (footnote omitted) ). "In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determination of the truth of the matter. Instead, evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen , 965 F.2d 994, 999 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The mere existence, however, of any factual dispute will not necessarily compel denial of a motion for summary judgment; rather, only material factual disputes preclude entry of summary judgment. Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children and Family Servs. , 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004).

The applicable Rule 56 standard is not affected by the filing of cross motions for summary judgment. See Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of America v. Gallagher , 267 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2001). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that "[c]ross-motions for summary judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely disputed." United States v. Oakley , 744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). However, it is, also, true cross motions may be probative of the absence of a factual dispute where they reflect general agreement by the parties as to the dispositive legal theories and material facts. Id. at 1555-56.

IV. Analysis

A. Standing

Before addressing the parties' substantive claims, the Court must first determine whether TMAA has standing to bring this action.

"The question of standing 'involves both constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.' " Bennett v. Spear , 520 U.S. 154, 162, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (citations omitted). "To satisfy the 'case' or 'controversy' requirement of Article III standing, which is the 'irreducible constitutional minimum' of standing," the plaintiff must demonstrate three elements. Id. (citations omitted). "First, the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact' - an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized ... and (b) 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.' " Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (internal citations and citations omitted). "Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Id. (citations omitted). "Third, it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.' " Id. (citations omitted).

First, Defendant argues TMAA has not suffered an actual injury because it was not an applicant on the Applications submitted to Defendant and the Planning Commission. (Doc. 90, p. 46). Defendant maintains TMAA does not have standing to bring this lawsuit because it had no legal interest in the Eloong property from the day the Applications were submitted through the day the Applications were denied. Id. TMAA did, however, gain a leasehold interest in the Eloong property prior to the filing of this lawsuit. (Doc. 92-29, p. 2).

Standing under Article III is determined at the time that the complaint is filed. Dillard v. Chilton Cty. Comm'n , 495 F.3d 1324, 1339 (11th Cir. 2007). In this case, at the time Plaintiffs filed their Complaint, TMAA had a leasehold interest in the Eloong property. (See Doc. 1; Doc. 92-29). Additionally, TMAA was referred to as an interested party throughout the paperwork and proceedings before the Planning Commission and City Council, and Plaintiffs' Applications specifically requested using the property as a meditation center. (See Doc. 92-7). Defendant's assessment of TMAA's ability to bring suit is contrary to the purpose of the doctrine of standing: it "is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court." 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parties § 29 (2018). All of the Plaintiffs in this case have a legally protected interest in the Eloong property, they were all injured by Defendant's denial of planning approval, and a favorable decision by this Court will redress their harm. Thus, TMAA has standing under Article III to bring suit against Defendant. Furthermore, based on the foregoing reasons, TMAA, also, meets the requirements of standing for purposes of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA").

B. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA")

Both parties seek summary judgment with respect to Plaintiffs' RLUIPA claims (Counts 1, 2, and 3). Plaintiffs argue Defendant's decision denying their Applications to construct a Buddhist meditation center violates RLUIPA and their free exercise of religion. The Complaint alleges Defendant violated RLUIPA in the following ways: (1) by imposing and implementing land use regulations in a way that substantially burdens religious exercise (Count 1); (2) by implementing a land use regulation that discriminates on the basis of religion (Count 2); and (3) by applying the Zoning Ordinance in a way that treats Plaintiffs on less than equal terms with other religious and nonreligious assemblies (Count 3).

1. RLUIPA - Substantial Burden Provision (Count 1)

Congress enacted RLUIPA " 'in order to provide a very broad protection for religious liberty.' " Holt v. Hobbs , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 853, 859, 190 L.Ed.2d 747 (2015) (citation omitted). RLUIPA concerns two areas of government activity: land use regulation-the provision at issue in this case-and religious exercise by institutionalized persons. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc ; 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. The Court's analysis of Plaintiffs' substantial burden claim involves three considerations: (1) whether Plaintiffs have jurisdiction to bring a claim under RLUIPA; (2) whether Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case that Defendant imposed a substantial burden on their religious exercise; and (3) if Plaintiffs established a prima facie case, whether Defendant can justify the burden imposed by demonstrating a compelling interest achieved by the lease restrictive means. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside , 366 F.3d 1214, 1225 (11th Cir. 2004).

a. Jurisdiction is Appropriate Under RLUIPA

RLUIPA's land use regulation provision only applies ... where one of three jurisdictional perquisites is met: (1) the land use regulation that allegedly imposes a substantial burden is implemented as part of a plan or activity that receives federal funding; (2) the substantial burden affects, or its removal would affect, interstate commerce; or (3) the substantial burden arises from the state or local government's procedures for making individualized assessments of proposed property use.

Martin v. Houston , 176 F.Supp.3d 1286, 1295-96 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2) ). Plaintiffs allege they were substantially burdened by Defendant's actions, which "took place within a system of formal procedures that permitted the City Defendants to make individualized assessments for the uses for the property involved." (Doc. 1, p. 40 ¶¶ 273-74).

Jurisdiction in this case is appropriate under RLUIPA's "individualized assessment" test. Defendant regulates land use within its jurisdiction, in part, through its Zoning Ordinance. (Doc. 92-12, p. 6). The Zoning Ordinance states a "church or religious facility: including parish house, community house and educational buildings" is "allowed by right" in business districts but requires "Planning Approval" to locate in R-1 residential districts. (Doc. 92-12, p. 146). Planning Approval is a process by which Defendant determines "uses that may be appropriate in certain districts at certain locations, but not in all locations." (Doc. 93-3, p. 3 ¶¶ 20-23). "The review required for Planning Approval examines the applicant's location and site plan with regard to transportation, parking and access, public utilities and facilities, traffic congestion and hazard, and to determine if the proposal is in harmony with the orderly and appropriate development of the district." (Doc. 92-13, p. 5).

Defendant's assessment procedures for Planning Approval ultimately result in a case-by-case evaluation for the proposed activity for each church or religious facility. Midrash , 366 F.3d at 1225. The mere fact that the Zoning Ordinance distinguishes "uses allowed by right" from "uses requiring planning approval" is evidence that each proposed activity is individually assessed against an existing land use regulation. (See Doc. 92-12, p. 137). Defendant's officials "may use their authority to individually evaluate and either approve or disapprove of churches [or religious facilities] in potentially discriminatory ways." Midrash , 366 F.3d at 1225. Thus, the Zoning Ordinance is essentially an "individualized assessment" for churches and religious facilities located in R-1 Districts.

b. Defendant Has Not Imposed a Substantial Burden on Plaintiffs' Religious Exercise

In pertinent part, RLUIPA's "substantial burden" provision provides:

No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution - (A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). The question of "substantial burden" is a "question of law for courts to decide." Eternal World Television Network, Inc. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs. , 818 F.3d 1122, 1144 (11th Cir. 2016). Because the alleged burden in this case results from the application of the Zoning Ordinance, the Court must determine whether the Zoning Ordinance, or its implementation, involves "religious exercise."

Under RLUIPA, "the term 'religious exercise' includes any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). Additionally, "[t]he use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or intends to use the property for that purpose." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). "In passing RLUIPA, Congress recognized that places of assembly are needed to facilitate religious practice, as well as the possibility that local governments may use zoning regulations to prevent religious groups from using land for such purposes." Midrash , 366 F.3d at 1226. Thus, the Court's initial inquiry into a substantial burden claim under RLUIPA is whether Plaintiffs are engaged in the exercise of religion.

Plaintiffs contend the proposed use for the Eloong property is "primarily as a residence, but it will also be used as a meditation center with meditation sessions approximately 3 times a week and an estimated attendance of about 25 people per session." (Doc. 92-9, p. 5). The meditation center's mission is "to help spread Dhammakaya meditation," (Doc. 92-30, p. 63 ¶¶ 5-6), which is "the biggest Buddhist sect in Thailand." (Doc. 92-30, p. 88 ¶¶ 18-19). Additionally, Plaintiffs propose constructing a cottage on the property for "visiting religious clergymen." (Doc. 92-9).

Defendant, however, contends Plaintiffs' meditation practice is not religious exercise. (See, e.g. , Doc. 100, p. 3 ¶ 5). In support of its argument, Defendant provides evidence of Nimit conveying, "[M]editation is not to be associated with any one particular race, culture, and religion," and TMAA "does not promote any religion." (Doc. 92-16, p. 7). Nimit, also, agrees:

The great thing about meditation is that philosophy/religious belief is not important. Meditation is about consciousness. The beliefs of the mind become trivial. You dive deep into the heart of the matter to gain access to your soul - your inner reality. Therefore, meditation can be practiced by people of different religions or no religion at all.

(Doc. 101-2, pp. 6-7). Additionally, Defendant references individuals (specifically neighbors of the Eloong property) who dispute TMAA as a religious facility. (See, e.g. , Doc. 90, pp. 12-13; see also Doc. 93-33 (referencing an email from resident Esham to City Councilman C.J. Small in which Esham begins by stating, "In keeping you apprised of the Meditation Center's business activities ....") ).

Plaintiffs assert they have described their meditation activity as "non-religious" because TMAA "is open to all and that following Buddhist teachings does not require rejection of the particular theistic concepts that are central to Judeo-Christian notions of what is meant by 'religion.' " (Doc. 94, p. 5).

The key language in RLUIPA's broad interpretation of religious exercise is Plaintiffs' exercise does not have to be "compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). It is clear that building a center with the alleged purpose of teaching Dhammakaya meditation falls squarely within RLUIPA's definition of "religious exercise." Accordingly, the Court's inquiry turns to whether or not Defendant has imposed a substantial burden upon Plaintiffs' free exercise of religion.

"[T]he plaintiff shall bear the burden of persuasion on whether the law (including a regulation) ... substantially burdens the plaintiff's exercise of religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b). The Supreme Court's line of Free Exercise cases has been instructive in defining the term "substantial burden" under RLUIPA. See, e.g. , Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n. , 485 U.S. 439, 350, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988) (specifying no substantial burden exists where a regulation does not have "a tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs"); Sherbert v. Verner , 374 U.S. 398, 404, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (determining a substantial burden existed where an individual was required to "choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion ... on the other"); but see Bowen v. Roy , 476 U.S. 693, 707-08, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986) (no substantial burden existed where government action simply interfered, but did not coerce, the individual's religious beliefs).

Based on the Supreme Court's combined articulations of substantial burdens under the Free Exercise Clause, the Eleventh Circuit has held "an individual's exercise of religion is 'substantially burdened' if a regulation completely prevents the individual from engaging in religiously mandated activity, or if the regulation requires participation in an activity prohibited by religion." Midrash , 366 F.3d at 1227 (citations omitted). Accordingly, a " '[s]ubstantial burden' requires something more than an incidental effect on religious exercise." Id. Such burdens "must place more than inconvenience on religious exercise; [it] is akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly." Id. "Thus, a substantial burden can result from pressure that tends to force adherents to forego religious precepts or from pressure that mandates religious conduct." Id. Though the Eleventh Circuit has held the question of substantial burden is a question of law for courts to decide, the Supreme Court's line of Free Exercise cases "has made clear that the substantial burden hurdle is high and that determining its existence is fact intensive." Church of Scientology of Ga., Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, Ga. , 843 F.Supp.2d 1328, 1354-55 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (citations omitted).

In Midrash , the Eleventh Circuit focused on many key facts in concluding the Town of Surfside had not imposed a substantial burden on the plaintiff congregations. Midrash , 366 F.3d 1214. In Midrash , two Orthodox Jewish Congregations challenged the Town of Surfside's zoning ordinance because it excluded churches and synagogues from business districts. Id. at 1219. However, the zoning ordinance allowed clubs, lodges, theatres, and restaurants to operate in the business districts. Id. at 1220. Churches and synagogues were permitted in residential districts, once they obtained a conditional use permit from the Surfside Town Commission. Id. at 1219. Because Orthodox Judaism forbade the Congregations to use cars or other transportation during the weekly Sabbath and religious holidays, the Congregations preferred to gather for worship in districts closest to their homes. Id. at 1221. The majority of the members, especially elderly members, resided near business districts. Id. Additionally, members of both Congregations argued suitable land was not available in residential districts. Id. Thus, the Congregations contended requiring them to locate in a residential district substantially burdened their religious exercise. Id. at 1228.

The Eleventh Circuit held the Town of Surfside's zoning ordinance did not violate the Substantial Burden provision of RLUIPA. Id. at 1228. The Court, first, found the Congregations' inability to find suitable alternative space did not create a substantial burden. Id. at 1227 n.11 (citation omitted) ("The harsh reality of the marketplace sometimes dictates that certain facilities are not available to those who desire them."). Next, the Court found requiring the Congregations to apply for a conditional use permit did not impose a substantial burden because it allowed "the zoning commission to consider factors such as size, congruity with existing uses, and availability of parking." Id. (citation omitted). The Court explained, "We have found that such reasonable 'run of the mill' zoning considerations do not constitute substantial burdens on religious exercise." Id. The Court, also, concluded requiring the Congregations to relocate, which forced its members to walk a few additional blocks, did not create a substantial burden. Id. at 1228. Ultimately, the most significant facts the Court noted were the Congregations' failure to claim the religious significance of the particular site, the Congregations' ability to apply for a permit to operate a few blocks away from its current location, and the Town of Surfside would find it virtually impossible to ensure no individual would be burdened by walking to their temple of choice. Id.

Plaintiffs argue they have been pressured into foregoing their religious precepts because Defendant is denying them an adequate location for their Buddhist meditation practices as well as other religious exercise. (Doc. 94, pp. 32-41). Plaintiffs contend:

The current location is so noisy that sirens, other road noise, and noise from passersby can be heard in the mediation room and interrupts the concentration of those attempting to meditate. The Center cannot host monks because there is not sufficient space for them, given their particular religious needs, which limits their religious practices. The current location has also posed safety concerns, as the donation box has been stolen twice, and attendees have had their cars broken into.

(Doc. 94, p. 33). Plaintiffs, also, note churches and religious facilities are only "permitted by right" in business districts, which create the same issues as their current location. (Doc. 106, p. 15). Unlike the congregations in Midrash , Plaintiffs claim the Eloong property has religious significance because they "need a quiet, serene environment" to practice meditation. (Doc. 94, p. 37). Additionally, Plaintiffs contend an alternate location is unavailable because the 106-acre donated property is not a "ready alternative," according to their land development professional. (Doc. 106, p. 16). Moreover, because the donated property is, also, zoned in an R-1 district and surrounded by residential uses, Plaintiffs argue they "need not waste further resources attempting to use an inadequate property which will likely be denied, and where there will again be a substantial likelihood of neighborhood opposition, even if there is some remote possibility of being approved." (Doc. 106, p. 17). Furthermore, in 2007, Defendant took issue with the Center's location on a major road but now suggests the Center would not be suitable on a minor road. (Doc. 94, p. 38). "The City's actions have 'to a significantly great extent lessened the prospect of [Plaintiffs] being able to construct a [meditation center] in the future ....' " (Doc. 94, p. 38).

Defendant, however, asserts it has not exerted pressure that has forced Plaintiffs to forego their religious precepts. (Doc. 90, p. 27). It contends complaints of outside noise distracting members "are insufficient to constitute a Substantial Burden as such distraction cannot be said to violate Plaintiffs' religious precepts." (Doc. 104, p. 7). Additionally, Defendant asserts lack of housing for visiting monks does not rise to such a level because "there is no pressure on Plaintiffs to violate religious precepts and, as shown by their deposition testimony, Plaintiffs own several different homes in the city which could serve such housing needs." (Doc. 104, p. 7). Defendant, also, contests Plaintiffs' assertion of inadequate space: "Plaintiffs practice meditation in such a location at 3821 Airport Boulevard which consists of roughly 2,200 square feet - nearly the same size as the 2,400 square foot meditation center building proposed for the Eloong property," (Doc. 90, p. 28). Defendant argues Plaintiffs continue practicing meditation in the same manner they were practicing before they submitted their Applications for the Eloong property. (Doc. 90, p. 28). Defendant, also, notes Plaintiffs hold meditation events at their current location and at other locations within the City of Mobile. (Doc. 90, p. 28). Furthermore, Defendant argues denying Plaintiffs' application to locate on a major road in 2007 and a minor road in 2015 "shows uniform reluctance to grant planning approval to non-residential uses in an established, single-family neighborhood." (Doc. 104, p. 9).

While Plaintiffs have presented substantial arguments detailing the inadequacies of their current location against the suitability of the Eloong property, the Court is not merely concerned in comparing the shortfalls of one property to the sufficiency of the other. The Court must determine whether Defendant's application of the Zoning Ordinance has imposed significant pressure that has required Plaintiffs to forego their religious beliefs.

Unlike the Plaintiff Congregations in Midrash , Plaintiffs argue the Eloong property has religious significance. However, the Eleventh Circuit explained the religious significance of the property must be "such that their faith requires a [center] at this particular site." Midrash , 366 F.3d at 1228. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate this. Plaintiffs allege their religious exercise requires them to locate in a quiet and serene area. Such qualities, however, are also attributable to various properties, especially those located in residential areas. Because Plaintiffs' religious significance argument is intertwined with overly common general characteristics of land, they must present evidence of land use characteristics specifically unique to this particular site. For instance, Plaintiffs do not argue they are unable to locate on the 106-acre donated property because it does not possess religiously significant qualities of serenity and quietness. They simply argue it is not a ready alternative. Thus, Plaintiffs' religion could require them to locate at either site. Similarly, Plaintiffs' reasoning for the religious significance of the Eloong property may, also, be used to claim religious significance of other properties, especially those in R-1 districts. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' ability to flexibly argue such a requirement is not proof that their religion requires them to locate at this particular site. While RLUIPA offers broad protection to religious exercise, it does not entitle Plaintiffs to establish a meditation center anywhere they want.

Plaintiffs, also, argue they lack sufficient space to host monks at their current location. (Doc. 94, p. 34). They assert monks live by a strict code of conduct, so they cannot share a room with non-monks or be housed in the same building as women. (Doc. 93-75 ¶¶ 44; 65). Because there is not adequate space at TMAA's current location for separate housing, Plaintiffs argue they are unable to host traveling monks for their overnight retreats or keep resident monks for meditation classes. (Doc. 93-73 ¶ 16). Defendant, however, maintains Plaintiffs own several single-family homes within the City of Mobile that could provide housing for the monks. (Doc. 100, p. 45). Yet, Plaintiffs contend requiring participants to leave the retreats breaks the meditative atmosphere, further inhibiting their religious exercise. (Doc. 93-73 ¶ 15).

Though Defendant does not attempt to respond to the fact that breaking the meditative atmosphere of retreats inhibits Plaintiffs' religious exercise, the Court, nevertheless, finds Plaintiffs' inability to host monks does not amount to a substantial burden. While TMAA holds meditation classes multiple times a week, overnight retreats are occasional, two to three times a year. (Doc. 92-30, p. 11 ¶¶ 15-22). Accordingly, TMAA refers to retreats as "special activities" that "feature experienced instructors and discourses on Buddhism." (Doc. 93-78, p. 4). While the Court rejects Defendant's "anywhere but here" argument regarding Plaintiffs' ability to house monks in a different location, it is, nevertheless, evident Plaintiffs' inability to host monks is, at most, an inconvenience.

Plaintiffs, also, assert the current location has presented safety issues. (Doc. 94, p. 34). While sympathetic to Plaintiffs' concerns, safety is not a matter that implicates religious exercise. In sum, Plaintiffs' arguments are not consistent with the Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent previously discussed.

In addition to Eleventh Circuit precedent, Plaintiffs present persuasive authority from other Circuits' interpretation of the Substantial Burden provision. (Doc. 94, p. 35). The Fourth Circuit has concluded, "When a religious organization buys property reasonably expecting to build a church, governmental action impeding the building of that church may impose a substantial burden." Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cnty. Council , 706 F.3d 548, 557 (4th Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs argue a strong comparison can be made between the facts of this case to the facts of the Bethel case. (Doc. 98, p. 14).

In Bethel , a large religious institution, Bethel World Outreach Ministries, held multiple worship services at two different locations. 706 F.3d at 552. The church sought to build a new location because the size of their current facilities restricted the lengths of their services, which did not allow Communion to be held until after the services; limited their ability to have "Alter Calls," which allowed attendees to dedicate their lives to Christ, join the church, or make prayer requests; caused the church to face overcrowding, which sometimes prevented worshippers from entering; and lacked the facilities to host other religious, educational, and counseling programs. Bethel , 706 F.3d at 552. To alleviate their problems, the church applied to construct an 800-seat church on a 119-acre agricultural reserve. Id. at 553-54. The county denied the application, noting "[t]here were no guarantees that Bethel would get all the necessary approvals to build what it wanted." Id. at 558. However, the county did not contest the fact that other churches were permitted in the same zone where Bethel's proposed property was located. Id. The Fourth Circuit concluded a reasonable fact finder could find the county's actions imposed a substantial burden on the church's exercise. Id. The court, also, found it significant the county completely prevented the Plaintiffs from constructing any church on the property, rather than imposing limitations on the property. Id.

Plaintiffs contend, similar to Bethel , they reasonably expected to use the Eloong property because: (1) the Zoning Ordinance encourages religious uses in R-1 districts; (2) the property could easily accommodate their use; and (3) there were no land use impacts that would justify denial. (Doc. 94, p. 36). However, Defendant argues, "Nimit also knew from her past experience that such approval was not assured, having been recommended for denial the last time she sought planning approval to convert a single-family home in a neighborhood to a meditation center." (Doc. 100, p. 48).

This Court is cautious to concur with Plaintiffs' reasoning under their "reasonable expectation" argument. Under their line of reasoning, concluding Defendant imposed a substantial burden would be to essentially grant an automatic exemption to religious organizations from discretionary land use regulations. A fundamental role of local governments in zoning matters is to evaluate whether a religious organization's use can be accommodated in the area in which it seeks to locate. To strip a municipality of that determinative power would be to usurp a central function of local government and, in effect, impermissibly favors religious uses over secular uses. RLUIPA should not be interpreted in a way that undermines the legitimate responsibility of local governments in implementing land use regulations. Thus, the Court does not agree with Plaintiffs' "reasonable expectation" argument.

Additionally, Plaintiffs argue, based on the Ninth Circuit's line of reasoning, "(1) that [Defendant's] broad reasons given for its tandem denials could easily apply to all future applications by [Plaintiffs]; and (2) that [Plaintiffs] readily agreed to every mitigation measure suggested by the Planning Division ...." (Doc. 94, p. 37) (citing Guru Nanak Sikh Soc'y of Yuba City v. County of Sutter , 456 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2006) ).

Defendant contends the facts of Guru Nanak are distinguishable from this case. (Doc. 100, p. 49). In Guru Nanak , a Sikh non-profit organization was denied a conditional use permit ("CUP") to construct a temple in a residential area. Guru Nanak , 456 F.3d 978. "The denial was based on citizens' voiced fears that the resulting noise and traffic would interfere with the existing neighborhood." Id. at 982. One year later, the organization was again denied a CUP to construct a temple in a large, agricultural district. Id. at 983-84. The Ninth Circuit determined the Planning Division had imposed a substantial burden because "[t]he net effect of the County's two denials ... is to shrink the large amount of land theoretically available to Guru Nanak." Id. at 991-92,.

Defendant differentiates this case based on the following facts: (1) Plaintiffs' Applications for planning approval were submitted eight years apart for two separate properties (Airport Boulevard in 2007 and the Eloong property in 2015); (2) both of the properties in this case were zoned R-1; (3) both of the properties were historically used as single-family residences; (4) both of the properties are in the middle of established single-family residential neighborhoods; and (5) both applications attempted to convert the properties to the assembly-type use of a meditation center. (Doc. 100, p. 49). Moreover, Defendant contends it has never discouraged Plaintiffs' practices at their current, established location. (Doc. 100, p. 49).

Before Plaintiffs moved to their current location, they provided meditation services at a home on Airport Boulevard. (Doc. 94, p. 6). Because Plaintiffs used signage to advertise their meditation services at the home, Defendant issued a notice of violation on August 30, 2007, ordering Plaintiffs to take the sign down within ten days or apply for planning approval. (Doc. 93-10, pp. 1-2). Plaintiffs removed the sign and subsequently applied for Planning Approval on September 14, 2007. (Doc. 93-12). On November 1, 2007, the Planning Commission recommended denial of Plaintiffs' application because the proposed use and modifications could preclude future single-family residential use to the site, and set the stage for future zoning and variance requests, and Plaintiffs' site plan did not reflect compliance with parking surface and maneuvering requirements, tree and landscaping requirements, and buffering requirements. (Doc. 93-13, p. 3). While the Staff Report noted Plaintiffs would likely be a relatively "quiet" neighbor, the report stated parking improvements and building code improvements made TMAA's compatibility less favorable. Id. at p. 3. Furthermore, Plaintiffs' initial application was met with community opposition, including complaints about increased traffic and child safety. (See Doc. 93-14). Predictably, Plaintiffs moved TMAA to its current location in a shopping center on Airport Boulevard.

Plaintiffs, now, attempt to relocate TMAA to a different residential district. However, Defendant's considerations and stated reasons for denying Plaintiffs' first application should have implied to Plaintiffs there was a possibility those same concerns would arise in their applications for the Eloong property. Plaintiffs should have been on notice compatibility would be an issue, especially since their proposed site on the Eloong property is much larger than its initial location on Airport Boulevard and their proposed construction for their Applications is on a much larger scale than the proposal on their first application. Accordingly, Plaintiffs should have known proposed parking improvements and building code improvements, especially those on a larger scale, may be unfavorable in the same zoning district for which TMAA was first deemed incompatible.

Moreover, unlike the plaintiffs in Guru Nanak , Plaintiffs have not been denied the opportunity to locate in distinctly separate districts. In order for Plaintiffs to make a comparable case to Guru Nanak , Defendant would have had to deny their initial location in an R-1 district and subsequently deny their attempt to relocate in a differently zoned area (i.e. a business district). See 456 F.3d at 989-90 ("The County's stated reasons for denying Guru Nanak's first application implied to Guru Nanak that it should not attempt to locate in higher density districts (two-family residence, neighborhood apartment, general apartment, and the combining district) where nearby neighbors would be similarly bothered. Accordingly, Guru Nanak proposed a smaller temple, with the same seventy-five person capacity, on a much larger parcel of agricultural land.").

In light of the aforementioned standards and based on the facts presented by both parties, as a matter of law, the Court cannot conclude Plaintiffs have been substantially burdened by Defendant's denial of their Applications. Plaintiffs present persuasive authority from numerous Circuits, but the binding Eleventh Circuit's standard is whether Defendant has imposed pressure so significant as to require Plaintiffs to forego their religious beliefs.

Midrash , 366 F.3d at 1227. While Plaintiffs' current location on Airport Boulevard may be less than ideal, Plaintiffs have not met the standard set in place by this Circuit.

This Court is not insensitive to Plaintiffs' concerns that Defendant may use technicalities in the Zoning Ordinance to reject