Ramos v. Department of Education (52 F. Supp. 3d 387, 2014)

United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico 2014-10-02

Citations

Full opinion text

OPINION AND ORDER

CAMILLE L. VELEZ-RIVE, United States Magistrate Judge.

INTRODUCTION

The present case is yet another in a long line of cases that swamp the federal docket every four (4) years following gubernatorial elections held in Puerto Rico, where the incumbent party is defeated. Plaintiffs are four (4) career employees of the Puerto Rico Department of Education, Josefina Arroyo Sauri (“Arroyo”), Luis Rodriguez Ramos (“Rodríguez”), Juan Del Valle Me-léndez (“Del Valle”) and Carmen Rosa Garcia (“Rosa”). They claim violations to the First Amendment, to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as a sprinkling of state law violations. At this stage, the remaining Defendants in the case are Je-sús Rivera Sánchez (“Rivera”), former Secretary of Education, and Sonia Dalila Román (“Román”), one of his aides. Plaintiffs claim these Defendants, members of the New Progressive Party (“NPP”), subjected them to short of dismissal demotions and inferior working conditions, all on the basis of their political affiliation to the Popular Democratic Party (“PDP”).

In November of 2008, Gubernatorial candidate Luis Fortuño of the NPP won the election over incumbent Aníbal Acevedo Vilá of the PDP. Due to the dire financial situation the island’s economy was in, Governor Fortuño implemented a series of measures, as applied to this case, Law 7, which was geared at reducing government spending and stabilizing finances. Law, 7 was passed on March 9, 2009 and amongst its cost-reducing measures, it contained an island-wide layoff plan. Pursuant to the directives of Law 7, the Fiscal Restructuring and Stabilization (“JREF”) was created, which was entrusted, among others, with ensuring agency compliance with Law 7 regarding the layoff plan.

At that time, the Department of Education had a budget deficit, yet there were over three (300) hundred available school directors positions, and the government was not going to assign any additional budget to the Department of Education to fill these positions with transitory employees. Since the Secretary of Education had the authority to appoint/transfer/relocate employees due to service needs, a decision was made to send employees on administrative leave (“destaque administrativo”) as school directors for one year with the same salary they held for their previous positions, which would thus solve the problem of the vacancies and also avoid any budgetary impact on the department’s payroll.

In the meantime, the JREF determined that, effective November 6, 2009, public employees that as of April 17, 2009, had thirteen (13) years six (6) months and zero (0) days of service or less would be affected by the layoffs. Since they would still have the problem of school director vacancies for the upcoming year, the Department of Education then carried out an internal analysis of what staff within the Department of Education complied with the requirements to become school directors and finally identified some thirty-eight (38) employees who did not have the required time and would be affected by Law 7. Two (2) of the Plaintiffs in the present case, Rodríguez and Del Valle, fell into this category. In order not to be affected by the layoffs, they would have to “accept” a demotion to that position voluntarily, which would ensure their continued employment after the detail ended. Those who accepted the proposal had to submit a letter requesting the demotion to the JREF. Both Rodríguez and Del Valle submitted their letters in October, 2009.

By the following June, 2010, the administrative detail had ended, and an agreement had been reached with the Federal Department of Education to establish a new structure that consolidated the school districts and reduced them from eighty-nine (89) to twenty-eight (28), with the objective of strengthening the student’s academic achievements. By that time, Carlos Chardón was no longer Secretary of Education and co-Defendant Rivera had already been appointed Acting Secretary of Education. Rivera began the implementation of the Department’s restructuring, which resulted in the consolidation of several districts, the elimination of some, and the consolidation of other positions. The reorganization was implemented across the island. As a result of this, the employees who had been on administrative leave were now reinstated to their previous positions or a similar position. In the case at bar, Plaintiffs Rosa and Arroyo were reinstated to their previous positions as Auxiliary Superintendents. Plaintiffs Rodriguez and Del Valle were reinstated as School Directors, per the “demotion” letter they had signed in October, 2009. Plaintiffs take issue with the administrative detail, as well as to their reinstate-ments and other actions, alleging they were charged with political animus as they were members of the PDP.

Before the Court now is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 121), Plaintiffs opposition thereto (Docket No. 130), and Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiffs opposition (Docket No. 144). Defendants urge dismissal of all claims brought against them on the following grounds: 1) time bar; 2) lack of a causal connection between Defendants’ acts and Plaintiffs’ circumstances; 3) failure to show political affiliation as a substantial or motivating factor in the decision-making process; 4) the equal protection and due process claims cannot lie; and 6) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

Plaintiffs in turn posit their claims are not time-barred because the continuing violation doctrine applies; they have established a prima facie case of political discrimination; their due process rights were violated, as no pre-termination hearing was held for two (2) Plaintiffs and Defendants’ actions shock the conscience; and qualified immunity should be denied.

For the reasons explained herein, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Pursuant to the language of the rule, the moving party bears the two-fold burden of showing that there is “no genuine issue as to any material facts,” and that he is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Vega-Rodríguez v. Puerto Rico. Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 178 (1st Cir.1997).

After the moving party has satisfied this burden, the onus shifts to the resisting party to show that there still exists “a trial worthy issue as to some material fact.” Cortés-Irizarry v. Corporación Insular, 111 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir.1997). A fact is deemed “material” if it potentially could affect the outcome of the suit. Id. Moreover, there will only be a “genuine” or “trial worthy” issue as to such a “material fact,” “if a reasonable fact-finder, examining the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences helpful to the party resisting summary judgment, could resolve the dispute in that party’s favor.” Id.

At all times during the consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the Court must examine the entire record “in the light most flattering to the non-movant and indulge all reasonable inferences in the party’s favor.” Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994). There is “no room for credibility determinations, no room for the measured weighing of conflicting evidence such as the trial process entails, [and] no room for the judge to superimpose his own ideas of probability and likelihood.... ” Greenburg v. Puerto Rico Mar. Shipping Auth., 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir.1987). In fact, “[o]nly if the record, viewed in [this] manner and without regard to credibility determinations, reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact may the court enter summary judgment.” Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 960 (1st Cir.1997).

The First Circuit Court of Appeals has “emphasized the importance of local rules similar to Local Rule 56 [of the District of Puerto Rico].” Hernández v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2007); see also, Colón v. Infotech Aerospace Services, Inc., 869 F.Supp.2d 220, 225-226 (D.Puerto Rico 2012). Rules such as Local Rule 56 “are designed to function as a means of ‘focusing a district court’s attention on what is—and what is not—genuinely controverted.’ ” Hernández, 486 F.3d at 7 (quoting Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 427 (1st Cir.2006)). Local Rule 56 imposes guidelines for both the movant and the party opposing summary judgment. A party moving for summary judgment must submit factual assertions in “a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs.” Loe. Rule 56(b). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must “admit, deny, or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party’s statement of facts.” Loe. Rule 56(c). If they so wish, they may submit a separate statement of facts which they believe are in controversy. Facts which are properly supported “shall be deemed admitted unless properly controverted.” Loc. Rule 56(e); P.R. Am. Ins. Co. v. Rivera-Vázquez, 603 F.3d 125, 130 (1st Cir.2010) and Colón, 869 F.Supp.2d at 226. Due to'the importance of this function to the summary judgment process, “litigants ignore [those rules] at their peril.” Hernández, 486 F.3d at 7.

FINDINGS OF FACT

At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendants’ statement of uncontested material facts is procedurally non-compliant with the Local Rules. As previously mentioned, Loe. R. Civ. P. 56(c) specifically requires that the respondent either admit, deny, or qualify each of movant’s proffered uncontested facts, and for each denied or qualified statement, the non-movant must cite the specific part of the record which supports the denial or qualification. If the non-moving party wishes, he can prepare its separate statement of issues of material fact which he deems are in controversy, and which preclude the entry of summary judgment. See Loe. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Plaintiffs failed to properly deny many of Defendants’ proffered facts, as many of the denials were not supported by any record citation whatsoever.

As second procedural matter, many of Plaintiffs’ denials are also non-compliant, insofar as many do not oppose the truth of the statement offered. A review of Plaintiffs’ qualifications of Defendants’ factual statements shows that they are either irrelevant to the matter at hand, or consist of mere “speculation, generalities, conelu-sory assertions, improbable inferences, and, for lack of a better phrase, a lot of ‘hot air.’ ” Eli Lilly and Co., 958 F.Supp. 721, 728 (D.Puerto Rico 1997). Furthermore, many of Plaintiffs answers consist of “admitted-denied” with a wholly self-serving explanation for the denial, citing Plaintiffs deposition testimony. For instance, although Plaintiff admitted Defendants’ proffered fact no. 227, they then “denied” it, alleging it was not the correct “outcome” given that particular plaintiffs years of experience and past jobs, thus injecting factual matters into the original submission, with only Plaintiffs’ testimony to proffer for the “denial”.

Another example of this are Defendants’ proffered fact nos. 137, 138 and 139, which all state that Defendants never asked Plaintiffs about their political affiliation. While admitting this, Plaintiffs then add that it was “not necessary to ask, since it was known”, yet they proffer no facts besides their self-serving testimony in support of such a claim. Others, like Defendants’ proffered fact nos. 184 and 185, deny the statement and supply a citation to the record for this fact (yet another self-serving deposition statement), but the explanation offered does not contradict the proposed fact. For instance, Defendants’ proffered fact no. 184 states that co-Defendant Rivera did not participate in the process of certifying eligible candidates for the position of Auxiliary Superintendent performed by the Recruitment Division. Plaintiff counters this statement with “Denied, since he sent a representative to these interview” (sic). While Plaintiffs proffered opposition statement may serve to perhaps add information about who was present at the interviews, the additional facts as proffered, even if considered, cannot serve to deny that Sánchez did not personally participate in the certification interview process. Insofar as this denial is not properly supported, it must be deemed as admitted pursuant to the Local Rules. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ proffered explanation offers additional facts that should have been included in a separate reply statement of material facts. Therefore, this fact, and all others like it, are in violation of the Local Rules and will not be considered by the Court.

Third, the Court is troubled to note that almost all of Plaintiffs’ denials of Defendants’ facts and their own proffered facts are unsupported by anything in the record except their deposition testimony, which are, of course, rather self serving and wholly conclusory. While deposition testimony is acceptable evidence, at the summary judgment stage, Plaintiffs must bring more to the table than their word, conclusions and opinions in their opposition. They must present facts, acts and documents to buttress their allegations, and cannot merely create an issue of fact by opposing all of Defendants’ proffered facts with their self-serving deposition testimony. Otherwise, it would be the same as proving the case with just the allegations in the complaint, and summary judgment would never be granted. At this stage, this is insufficient to oppose summary judgment. See, Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46 (1st Cir.1990)(“We have repeatedly held that, while notice pleading is sufficient to open the federal courthouse door, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment, properly put, may not ask the court to try the case in order to determine the facts”); Castro-Medina v. Procter & Gamble Commercial Co., 565 F.Supp.2d 343 (D.Puerto Rico 2008)(“However, we note that the only evidence she provides in support of these conclusory allegations is her own deposition testimony, without any explanation or reference to evidence. ‘Summary judgment cannot be defeated by relying on such conclusory allegations.’ ”(quoting Ríos-Jiménez v. Principi, 520 F.3d 31, 42 n. 7 (1st Cir.2008)); Brisbin v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 679 F.3d 748, 754 (8th Cir.2012) (holding “self-serving affidavit not sufficiently specific to raise genuine issue of material fact in face of uncontra-dicted facts in record”); Hexcel Corp. v. Ineos Polymers, Inc., 681 F.3d 1055, 1063 (9th Cir.2012) (quoting FTC v. Publ’g Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir.1997) (“ ‘[CJonclusory, self-serving affidavits], lacking detailed facts and any supporting evidence,’ are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact”)); Santiago v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 138 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1998) (“A plaintiff [claiming discrimination] ‘may not prevail simply by asserting an inequity and tacking on the self-serving conclusion that the defendant was motivated by a discriminatory animus.’ ”) (quoting Coyne v. City of Somer-ville, 972 F.2d 440, 444 (1st Cir.1992)).

Compounding Plaintiffs’ troubles is the fact that for the statements offered for one of the Plaintiffs, Rodriguez, (referred to as “Exhibit I” of their opposition), they outright failed to include any deposition transcript as part of the record. As a result of all these procedural mishaps by Plaintiffs, unless otherwise stated, the Court admitted most facts from Defendants’ statement of uncontested material facts and did not accept Plaintiffs’ submissions.

Finally, the Court must address Defendants’ lengthy motion, statement of facts, and reply. Although it is cognizant that this case is a contested one with many issues, it is undeniable that Defendants’ reply to Plaintiff’s statements contained a great deal of “copied and pasted” arguments, particularly in their opposition to Plaintiffs’ uncontested facts. The Court advises Defendants that not all Judges are willing to accept the lengthy submissions they submitted, and urges them to select more carefully the contents of their briefs on future occasions.

In light of the documentary evidence before it, and based on the parties’ submissions, the Court deems the following facts to be uncontested:

Law 7

1. Plaintiffs filed the instant complaint on July 11, 2011. (Docket No. 1).

2. On March 9, 2009, Law 7-2009 was approved. (D. Exhibit 84, Law 7-2009).

3. In Chapter III of the law, a three phase plan is set forth to reduce government spending. These costs include those directly related to the payroll of employees in public service. Phase II is a severance plan to be employed in public service. The law provides that the layoff plan will apply only to agencies and employees that are not excluded by Section 37.02 of the law. (D. Exhibit 84, Law 7-2009, pgs. 77-96).

4. Section 37.02 of Law 7-2009 provided that teachers assigned to the school classroom would be excluded from the provisions of Section 37. Auxiliary Superintendents were not among those excluded from the layoff plan. (D. Exhibit 84, Law 7-2009, pgs. 86-87).

5. Section 37.02 of Law 7-2009 was amended on July 10, 2009 by the Legislative Assembly to add exclusions from the law’s layoff plan. Again, Auxiliary Superintendents were not excluded. (D. Exhibit 86, Law 37-2009, pgs. 49-50).

6. Section 37.04 of Law 7-2009 details the procedures and rights of employees affected by the layoffs. (D. Exhibit 84, Law 7-2009, pgs. 87-95).

7. Pursuant to Section 37.04(b)3 of Law 7, the layoffs of employees with a permanent or career appointment were to be implemented by observance of the seniority criteria, so that those who had less seniority would be the first ones to be laid off. (D. Exhibit 84, Law 7-2009, Section 37.04(b)(3), pg. 90).

8. JREF means the Fiscal Restructuring and Stabilization Board, which was created pursuant to Section 37.04(b)(5) of Law 7, and which was entrusted with taking all the necessary actions for compliance with the law. (D. Exhibit 84, Law 7-2009, Section 33(f), pg. 78).

9. The JREF was created by Section 37.04(b)(5) of Law 7, and its members included the President of the Government Developmental Bank as its President, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of the Department of Economic Development and Commerce, the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury and the Executive Director of the Office of Management and Budget. (D. Exhibit 84, Law 7-2009, Section 37.04(b) 5, pgs. 90-91).

10. The JREF had the necessary powers to undertake the tasks entrusted to it by Law 7-2009, including but not limited to: directing the agencies or departments in its care; conduct any necessary studies; obtain information from the different agencies in order to perform its tasks; and advise the Governor and the agencies regarding employees to be laid off. (D. Exhibit 84, Law 7-2009, Section 37.04(b) 6, pg. 91).

11. The JREF was tasked with the responsibility of determining the total number of employees to be laid off. (D. Exhibit 84, Law 7-2009, Section 37.04(b) 7 pg. 92).

12. Pursuant to Law 7-2009, the agencies had to identify and certify the seniority of each of its employees and certify in writing and individually the date of seniority of the potentially affected employees as it appeared in their records. This information had to be supplied to the JREF within a term not greater than fifteen (15) calendar days after the beginning of Phase II. (D. Exhibit 84, Law 7-2009, Section 37.04(b) 8 p. 92).

13. The layoffs under Phase II of Law 7 were implemented in a staggered manner beginning on July 1, 2009, and continuing during fiscal year 2009-2010. The JREF established the order in which the layoffs were implemented and during that process, the necessary measures were taken to ensure that the affected agencies continued to operate properly after the layoffs. (D. Exhibit 84, Law 7-2009, Section 37.04(b) 16 pg. 95).

14. The second round of dismissals, as determined by the JREF, was to be effective November 6, 2009, and would affect public employees who as of April 17, 2009, had less than thirteen (13) years six (6) months and zero (0) days of service. (D. Exhibit 85, Circular Letter 2009-16, pg. 2 Part III section 3).

15. Law 7 was not going to affect people who worked in schools, teachers, school directors and personnel who worked directly with the students in the academic area. (D. Exhibit 62, Del Valle’s Deposition, pg. 42, lines 1-4).

The 2009-10 Administrative Detail

16. During the end of school year 2008-2009, the Department of Education was planning the 2009-2010 school year. The Department of Education had a budget deficit and there were over three hundred (300) school’s directors positions that were open. The central government was not going to assign additional monies to the Department for school director transitory positions. (D. Exhibit 79, Brenda Virella’s (“Virella”) Deposition, pg. 55, lines 22-25, pg. 56, lines 1-4; D. Exhibit 82, Circular Letter 1-2010-2011 dated July 13, 2010 Rivera, pg. 1, lines 1-4).

17. The Department of Education then carried out an internal analysis of the staff within the Department who complied with the school director requirements, and they identified several school Superintendents, Auxiliary Superintendents, teaching Facilitators and subject Supervisors who complied with those requirements. It was decided to send these people on administrative detail as School Directors for the 2009-10 year. (D. Exhibit 79, Virella’s Deposition, pg. 56, lines 12-18, pg. 57, lines 7-13 pg. 58, lines 1-16).

18. Over three (300) hundred people who had certification as directors were sent on administrative detail. (D. Exhibit 62, Del Valle’s Deposition, pg. 42, lines 22-24; Exhibit 72, Rodriguez’ Deposition, pg. 32, lines 12-18; Exhibit 82, Circular Letter 1-2010-2011 dated July 13, 2010 Rivera, pg. 1, lines 1-4).

19. The administrative details were done to ensure that the 2009-10 school year started with the school director’s positions filled, as well as meeting the existing needs before the beginning of the school year without affecting the payroll budget. Meetings were scheduled for this purpose in all seven (7) educational regions, to wit: Bayamón, Arecibo, Mayaguez, Ponce, Caguas, Humacao and San Juan. (D. Exhibit 2, Carmen Rosa’s Deposition, D. Exhibit marked # 1, Letter dated July 1, 2009 from Edward Moreno Alonso (“Moreno”), D. Exhibit 62, Del Valle’s Deposition, pg. 42, lines 9-13; D. Exhibit 72, Rodriguez’ Deposition, pg. 22, lines 6-9; D. Exhibit 79, Virella’s Deposition, pg. 58, lines 13-19;’ D. Exhibit 83, Roman’s Response to Interrogatory # 6, pg. 5 lines 18-22).

20. At the time of the administrative detail went into effect, Carlos Chardón was the Secretary of Education. (D. Exhibit 72, Rodriguez’ Deposition, pg. 22, lines 6-9).

21. Virella, Auxiliary Secretary of Human Resources Division from March 6, 2009 to December 11, 2009, gave the general orientation of how the process was going to be carried out. Prior to that orientation, Secretary of Education Char-dón, and in his absence Deputy Secretary Edward Moreno would explain the reasons for the transfers, and questions were answered during the process. (D. Exhibit 79, pg. 46, lines 11-14, pg. 59, lines 9-17; D. Exhibit 83, Román’s Response to Interrogatory # 6, pg. 5 ■ lines 19-26),

22. In a meeting where Defendant Roman was present, Moreno explained the purpose of the meeting, and Chardón asked the participants which of them had 13.5 years of service or less. He stated that those employees would not have a job as a result of enactment of Law 7, because administrative positions were not protected. (D. Exhibit 83, Román’s Response to Interrogatory # 6, pg. 5 lines 19-27; D. Exhibit 98, Román’s Statement under Penalty of Perjury # 3 lines 1-7).

23. Superintendents, Auxiliary Superintendents, both state and federal, educational facilitators and executive directors were sent on administrative detail. Even individuals who were working at the administrative level were sent on detail to schools. (D. Exhibit 62, Del Valle’s Deposition, pg. 41, lines 7-21).

24. As to the process of selecting schools regarding the administrative detail, School Superintendents would select first within their own district, followed by Auxiliary Superintendents, School Facilitators and Subject Supervisors. (D. Exhibit 62, Del Valle’s Deposition, pg. 43, lines 7-13, D. Exhibit 79, Virel-la’s Deposition, pg. 58, lines 17-25, pg. 59, lines .1-8; D. Exhibit 2, Rosa’s Deposition Exhibit marked # 1, Letter dated July 1, 2009 from Moreno; D. Exhibit 98, Román’s Statement under Penalty of Perjury, # 6 lines 1-6).

25. The letters assigning the administrative details were prepared for . three hundred (300) positions. These letters were created with a merge program, and had some basic language and also had blanks where specific information was entered into the document. (D. Exhibit 79, Virella’s Deposition, pg. 63, lines 10-20).

26. The detail letters did not include a notice regarding the right to challenge or appeal the transfer because it was a voluntary action by the employee. (D. Exhibit 79, Vi-rella’s Deposition, pg. 63, lines 21-25, pg. 64, lines 1-2; D. Exhibit 66, Del Valle’s administrative detail . letter dated July 6, 2009; D. Exhibit 76, Rodriguez’ administrative detail letter dated July 8, 2009; D. Exhibit 80, Arroyo’s administrative detail letter dated July 14th, 2009).

The School Director Positions

27. In the fall of 2009, the Department of Education identified thirty-eight (38) employees occupying positions of Auxiliary Superintendents, Superintendents, Subject Supervisors, Teaching Facilitators, among others, who by April 17, 2009 did not have the required time the avoid Law 7’s impact, and who at that moment were on administrative detail as School Directors. (D. Exhibit 89, Presentation to JREF (Exceptions (38) Administrative Detail as School Directors) pgs. 10-12; D. Exhibit 90, Maria Lizardi’s (“Lizardi”) Statement Under Penalty of Perjury # 4 to # 6 and # 21).

28. In a meeting held on October 1, 2009 between the Department of Education and the JREF, the latter approved the exceptions related to the thirty-eight (38) employees in career positions of Superintendents, Auxiliary Superintendents, Subject Supervisor and Teaching Facilitators and others to remain in administrative detail as School Directors only if they accepted a demotion to that particular classification upon termination of the detail. (D. Exhibit 91, Email: Summary of Today’s Decisions and Next Steps, pg. 2 Caption: Exceptions 1st paragraph; D. Exhibit 90, Lizardi’s Statement under Penalty of Perjury # 4 to # 8; D. Exhibit 95, Virel-la’s Deposition 2nd part, pg. 13, lines 16-25).

29. A proposal was therefore made to the employees affected by the second round of layoffs to accept a demotion to School Directors in order to protect and exclude them from the layoffs, as approved by JREF. Those who accepted the proposal submitted a letter requesting the demotion, which was notified to the JREF by electronic mail. (D. Exhibit 90, Lizardi’s Statement Under Penalty óf Perjury # 10, # 23; Exhibit 91, Summary of Today’s decisions and Next Steps, pg. 2 Caption: Exceptions 1st paragraph; D. Exhibit 96, Email to Andrés Arsuaga (GDB) (“Arsuaga”) from Lizardi).

30. The proposal to the employees involved in the demotion to School Director was a process that was undertaken by the School Region Directors. (D. Exhibit 95, Virella’s Deposition 2nd part, pg. 15, lines 11-17).

31. Virella gave the orientation to the Regional Directors, not to the people who were going to be accepting the demotions. This was a completely voluntary process. (D. Exhibit 95, Virella’s Deposition 2nd part, pg. 20, lines 17-22).

32. Plaintiffs Del Valle and Rodriguez were among the thirty-eight (38) employees in administrative detail as School Directors who were going to be affected by the second round of layoffs—they both submitted a demotion letter by electronic mail to JREF. (D. Exhibit 89, Presentation to JREF-Exceptions (38) Administrative Detail as School Directors, pg. 11; D. Exhibit 87, Del Valle’s Demotion Letter; D. Exhibit 88, Rodriguez’ Demotion Letter; D. Exhibit 96, Email to Arsuaga (GDB) from Lizardi).

33. For the school year commencing August 2009, personnel at the district level without a school director certifícate remained at the district. (D. Exhibit 19, Arroyo’s Deposition, pg. 56, lines 6-12).

34. Nurses, secretaries, administrative assistants, technology teachers and janitors were some of the personnel who remained at the district level. (D. Exhibit 19, Arroyo’s Deposition, pg. 56, lines 13-16).

The 2010 Reorganization

35. In a letter dated June 25, 2010 from Rivera, Interim Secretary, he notified personnel of an orientation to be held on July 1 and 2, 2010, regarding the reorganization of the school districts and the academic priorities for the 2010-11 school year. (D. Exhibit 5, Rosa’s Deposition Exhibit marked # 7, Letter dated June 25, 2010 issued by the DE from Rivera notifying meetings for July 1 and 2, 2010).

36. The reorganization was implemented across the island. (Exhibit 19, Arroyo’s Deposition, pg. 121, lines 22-23).

37. For some time, the Department of Education had been involved in a process of corrective measures to address longstanding grant management and accountability issues regarding the administration of Federal education grants. One of those issues was that federal funds were not being used in accordance with the grant and federal law requirements—they were instead being used to cover Department of Education payroll expenses, when their use was destined for federal programs. (D. Exhibit 90, Lizar-di’s Statement under Penalty of Perjury, # 13; D. Exhibit 102, Letter June 3, 2010 to Hon. Gov. For-tuño and Rivera).

38. In March 2010, the Department of Education, with the assistance of the Federal Department of Education, underwent a process in order to make certain that federal appropriations were used according to the grant requirements and federal law. This resulted in a federal proposal where an organizational chart on the basis of functions and areas of expertise was developed. A local matching process was then performed, in which the existing positions of Superintendent, Auxiliary Superintendent, School Director and Teaching Facilitators, together with their respective functions, were matched with their functional equivalent in federal organizational chart. (D. Exhibit 90, Lizardi’s Statement under Penalty of Perjury, # 13-# 14; D. Exhibit 99, Organizational Chart School District).

39. A two-part structure resulted from the matching process. On one side was the academic/teaching side (local) and the other was the technical assistance (federal) side. On the technical assistance side, the functions performed by Auxiliary Superintendents related to federal grants could only be supervised by a Superintendent, which was the next and highest position. (D. Exhibit 90, Lizard’s Statement under Penalty of Perjury, # 16; D. Exhibit 99, Organizational Chart School District.)

40. There is a hierarchy within the Classification Plan of the Department of Education-Trust Positions. Special Aide III, a trust position, had the ability to supervise a Superintendent. Special Aides III are commonly located at Secretariats, which are structurally above a School District. An appointed Superintendent in a trust position— like a Special Aide III position— can supervise a Superintendent (head of the technical/federal side) and an Auxiliary Superintendent (academic/teaching/state side) as well. (D. Exhibit 99, Organizational Chart School District; Exhibit 90, Lizardi’s Statement under Penalty of Perjury, # 15, # 17 and #24).

41. Special Aide III was responsible for the implementation of the Department of Education’s academic public policy and supervised compliance with the technical assistance component directives of the U.S. Department of Education. (D. Exhibit 90, Lizardi’s Statement under Penalty of Perjury, # 18).

42. The Special Aide in charge of a District is a trust position. (D. Exhibit 72, Rodriguez’ Deposition, pg. 84, lines 15-17).

43. There are differences between the duties of a Special Aide in charge of the District and a Superintendent. The Superintendent is in charge of all the academic activities in the schools and teaching duties. The Special Aide has the same . duties and in addition, supervises the Superintendent and oversees the district’s personnel. (D. Exhibit 72, Rodriguez’ Deposition, pg. 86, lines 4-15).

44. As of 2014, the School Superintendent/Special Aide III position exists. At least one of those positions was held by a School Director and not by a School Superintendent while Plaintiff Arroyo was Special Aide to the Undersecretary of Academic Affairs in 2013. (D. Exhibit 19, Arroyo’s Deposition, pg. 143, lines 4-25, pg. 144, lines 1-12).

45. By June 2, 2010, an agreement had been reached with the federal Department of Education to establish a new structure that consolidated the school districts and reduced them from eighty-nine (89) to twenty-eight (28), with the objective of strengthening the student’s academic achievements. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Perjury Rivera # 16).

46. In February 2010, Dr. Pineiro, Secretary of Education after Dr. Char-dón left, worked with the Federal Department of Education in the development of the new school district structure. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Perjury Rivera # 15 lines 1-3).

47. When he was named Interim Secretary of the Department of Education in June 2010, Defendant Rivera implemented the new school district structure he had inherited. He had no participation in the development or design of the new school districts—when the program was being developed by Dr. Piñei-ro, he was Under Secretary for Academic Affairs, a position which did not include administrative matters. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Perjury Rivera, # 5 lines 3^1 # 7 lines 2-5; and # 15 lines 1-5.)

48. In July, 2010, the Secretariat of Human Resources of the Department of Education proceeded to notify the end of the administrative detail for school year 2009-2010 that had been established by Dr. Chardón. These employees were then placed within the new structure of the consolidated school districts. (Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Perjury # 17).

49. The result of the schools’ compliance with 2014 state and federal standards of academic achievement was that the schools then could be removed from the School Improvement Plan, thus avoiding the possibility of placing at risk federal funds from the “No Child Left Behind” federal law. By 2010, half of the public schools (about 730) were in the School Improvement Plan. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Rivera # 10).

Co-Defendant Rivera

50. Between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2009, Defendant Rivera was employed as a Professor at the University of Puerto Rico, Ponce campus, as part of the Teacher’s Professional Development Division. The University of Puerto Rico was his official employer. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Rivera, # 2 lines 1-2; and # 3 lines 2—4).

51. Defendant Rivera did not have any participation in any matters related to the administrative detail that was implemented during 2009-10 school year, or with any personnel transactions. At the time they were done, he did not hold a position within the Department of Education. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Perjury Rivera # 3 lines 1-3).

'52. Defendant Rivera personally interviewed and considered all Superintendents interested in occupying a position of Special Aide III (trust position) that were to be in charge of the newly structured school districts. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Perjury Rivera # 11 lines 1-4).

53. Defendant Rivera was interested in recruiting the best resources among the Superintendents interested in the position of Special Aide III for the benefit of the students, regardless of political affiliation. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Rivera # 11 lines 4-6).

54. Among the resources that Rivera understood best served the students’ interests, were some Superintendents affiliated to the PDP. Mr. Carlos Iván Morales and Dr. José Altieri, both of whom were affiliated with the PDP, were appointed to the trust position of Special Aide III. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Perjury Rivera # 11 lines 6-13).

55. As Secretary of Education, Rivera collaborated in the making of public policy in the area of education under the administration of former Gov. Fortuño. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Perjury Rivera # 12 lines 1-2).

56. The Special Aide III/School Superintendent assisted eo-Defendant Rivera in the making and implementation of public policy in education. (Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Perjury Sánchez # 12 lines 1-2 and 6-10).

57. Examples of this was when Special Aide III/School Superintendents assisted co-Defendant Rivera when a study was conducted to identify the number of bilingual students in public school, in order to establish the need to develop projects to increase the number of students in said area to ensure the eventual success of the graduates. This allowed the Department of Education to establish a public policy for the creation of special projects in different schools in Puerto Rico, which were paid by federal and state funds. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Perjury Rivera # 12 lines 1-10).

58. Special Aide III/Superintendents had to communicate the Fortuño Administration’s public policy (both state and federal components) to each of their respective school districts. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Perjury Rivera # 13 lines 1-6; D. Exhibit 101, DE-16 Special Aide III item # 2).

59. Given the Special Education Program’s complexity, an Associate Secretariat'was created. The Associate Secretariat had its own work plan, established its own agenda and work calendar in order to comply with the requirements of the federal and state governments. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Perjury Rivera # 26 lines 3-7).

60. The Associate Secretariat has an Associate Secretary for Special Education, who is directly responsible for establishing the public policy and complying with federal and state requirements for that area. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Perjury Rivera # 27 lines 1-3).

61. The Associate Secretary has the responsibility to ensure that all employees of the Associate Secretariat comply with their responsibilities in the time frame established in the work plan. This includes, any person in a position that has any impact or relation with the students of the Special Education program, like the School Director. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Perjury Rivera #27 lines 1-6).

62. Part of the duties and responsibilities of the Associate Secretariat are to ensure the strict compliance with the requirements of federal and state governments by monitoring the different divisions. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Perjury Rivera # 28 lines 1-2).

63. The issues surrounding the scheduling, periods to cover and who gets monitored is determined exclusively by the Associate Secretariat of the Special Education Program. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Perjury Rivera # 28 lines 1-4).

64. Rivera, as Secretary of Education, had no interference, control or participation of any kind in the monitoring, reporting, or in the subsequent follow-ups for cases that were opened. (Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Perjury Rivera # 29 lines 1-2).

65. If the Associate Secretariat of Special Education understands an employee did not comply with laws or regulations, thus resulting in adverse action, they are referred to the legal division. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Perjury Rivera # 29 lines 2-4).

66. According to the laws and regulations, the Secretary of Education, as the head of the Department, must sign the letter notifying an employee the intention of commencing a disciplinary process, whose sanction could range from a written admonishment up to the firing of an employee.

67. As applied to the case at bar, the signing of this notice for Plaintiff Del Valle was Defendant Rivera’s only participation in the disciplinary proceeding that was commenced against this Plaintiff. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Perjury Rivera # 29 lines 4-8).

68. Co-Defendant Rivera has no knowledge of any Plaintiffs’ political affiliation, participation and/or preference. (D. Exhibit 81, Rivera’s Response to Interrogatory no. 9, pg. 4 lines 11-12).

69. Co-Defendant Rivera had never spoken with Plaintiffs Rosa, Del Valle or Rodriguez about their participation in political activities. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Rivera # 34).

70. Co-Defendant Rivera does not personally know Plaintiffs Rosa, Del Valle or Rodríguez. (D. Exhibit 97, Statement under Penalty of Perjury of Rivera # 34).

71. Co-Defendant Rivera resigned as Secretary of the Department of Education on October 24, 2011. (D. Exhibit 81, Rivera’s Response to Interrogatory # 11, pg. 5 lines 10-11).

Co-Defendant Román

72. In 2008, Román was an Auxiliary Superintendent for Title I Federal Program. (D. Exhibit 98, Román’s Statement under Penalty of Perjury, # 1, lines 6-7.)

73. On July 6, 2009, Román was called to a meeting by Secretary of Education Chardón. At that meeting, she was informed that the Department of Education was implementing Law 7, as well as of the corrective actions of the Memorandum of Agreement and the Compliance Agreement signed with the Federal Department of Education. (D. Exhibit 98, Román’s Statement under Penalty of Perjury, # 2 lines 1-2, # 3 lines 5-7).

74. During the meeting, they announced the administrative detail, and clarified that after that year, depending on the status of Law 7, everyone would be returning to their former positions. (D. Exhibit 98, Román’s Statement under Penalty of Perjury, # 4 lines 5-10).

75. On January 19, 2010, Román was appointed Special Aide to the Under Secretary for Academic Affairs at the central office with Rivera. (D. Exhibit 98, Román’s Statement under Penalty of Perjury # 8).

76. Román’s duties as Special Aide to the Under Secretary of Education for Academic Affairs, as assigned by former Secretary of Education Dr. Piñeiro, were related to academic issues and school improvements. (D. Exhibit 98, Román’s Statement under Penalty of Perjury, # 9 lines 1-4).

77. Defendant Román retired in December of 2012, after a 30+ year career. (D. Exhibit 98, Román’s Statement under Penalty of Perjury, # 18 line 8).

Plaintiff Rosa

78. Plaintiff Rosa is at present retired from the Department of Education; her resignation was effective February 28, 2011. (D. Exhibit 8, Rosa’s Deposition Exhibit marked # 14, Letter of Acceptance of Resignation due to Retirement; Exhibit 15, Rosa’s Appointment and Changes ReporNRetirement).

79. By June-July of 2009, Plaintiff Rosa was occupying the permanent career position of Auxiliary Superintendent Title I. (D. Exhibit 1, Rosa’s Deposition, pg. 28, line 25; pg. 29 lines 1-2; pg. 77 lines 5-7).

80. On July 7, 2009 Plaintiff Rosa received a letter regarding the administrative detail, and went to the meeting regarding that matter in Arecibo on July 8th, 2009. (D. Exhibit 2, Rosa’s Deposition Exhibit marked # 1, Letter dated July 1, 2009 from Moreno).

81. On July 9, 2009, Plaintiff Rosa wrote to the U.S. Department of Education to express her concerns about what was going to happen with her functions as Title I Superintendent, as she was paid with federal funds, and they could not be used to pay for her administrative detail as school director. In her letter, Plaintiff stated that the administrative detail was due to the financial situation in Puerto Rico. (D. Exhibit 1, Rosa’s Deposition, pg. 144, lines 2-12); D. Exhibit 3, Rosa’s Deposition Exhibit marked # 2, Letter dated July 9, 2009 signed by Plaintiff Rosa addressed to the U.S. Department of Education.).

82. Plaintiff Rosa received a letter dated July 23, 2009 from Moreno, Interim Secretary of the Department of Education, which notified her that “effective July 28, 2009, and for need of service, it has been determined to send you in administrative detail, in the position that you occupy, number F75219, as Auxiliary Superintendent of Schools IV of San Lorenzo District to direct the María T. Delgado de Marcano School. This action will not affect your salary, status, classification, and it was taken in consideration of your certification as School Director. This detail will be for the school year 2009-2010.” (D. Exhibit 1, Rosa’s Deposition, pg. 145, lines 15-19); D. Exhibit 4, Rosa’s Deposition Exhibit marked # 4, Letter dated July 23, 2009 to Plaintiff Rosa from Moreno; Exhibit 11, Rosa’s Appointment and Changes Reporb-Adm. Detail).

83. Plaintiff Rosa was notified of her right to appeal to the Appellate Commission of Human Resources’ Administration (“CASARH”) if she did not agree with the personnel transaction regarding her administrative detail, which she did. Because it took so long, by the time a response was received, the administrative detail had ended and she had been reinstated as Auxiliary Superintendent for Title I. (D. Exhibit 1, Rosa’s Deposition, pg. 145, lines 15-25; pg. 146 lines 1-9; D. Exhibit 4, Rosa’s Deposition Exhibit marked # 4, Letter dated July 23, 2009 to Plaintiff Rosa from Moreno).

84. During the 2009-10 school year, while Plaintiff Rosa was performing the duties of director at the María T. Delgado School, nobody occupied her position of Auxiliary Superintendent for Title I, or performed the functions pertaining to her position. (D. Exhibit 1, Rosa’s Deposition, pg. 76, lines 14-24).

85. During Pláintiff Rosa’s administrative detail as School Director at the María T. Delgado school, she received the same salary of the position that she held as Auxiliary Superintendent Title I. (D. Exhibit 1, Rosa’s Deposition, pg. 140, lines 15-23; D. Exhibit 11, Rosa’s Appointment and Changes Reporb-Adm. Detail).

86. Plaintiff Rosa performed all the functions of School Director as indicated in form DE-16 during her administrative detail at the Maria T. Delgado School. This form indicates what the School Director functions are. Additionally, she participated in interviews to recruit two (2) teachers around beginning of September 2009. (D. Exhibit 1, Rosa’s Deposition, pg. 169, lines 5-25; pg. 170, lines 1-6; D. Exhibit 9, Rosa’s Deposition’s Exhibit marked #9).

87. On June 25th or June 26th, 2010 Plaintiff Rosa received a letter notifying her she was being reinstated to her position as Auxiliary Superintendent Title I at the School District of Yabucoa, effective July 1, 2010, and that the administrative detail would end on June 30, 2010. She was also notified of her right to appeal this decision before CA-SARH. (D. Exhibit 1, Rosa’s Deposition, pg. 80, lines 1-7; D. Exhibit 6, Rosa’s Deposition Exhibit marked # 6, Letter dated June 25, 2010 to Plaintiff Rosa from Rivera; D. Exhibit 12, Rosa’s Appointment and Changes Report-Reinstatement).

88. Plaintiff Rosa filed an appeal on July 23, 2010 before CASARH regarding her reinstatement to Yabu-coa, claiming that it was a hardship to her given the distance she had to travel to and from work. (D. Exhibit 1, Rosa’s Deposition, pg. 153, lines 15-25; pg. 154, lines 1-7, 15-18; and pg. 155, lines 18-20).

89. Plaintiff Rosa’s petition for transfer from the District of Yabucoa to the District of Gurabo was granted effective September 20, 2010. (D. Exhibit 1, Rosa’s Deposition, pg. 94, lines 11-14; D. Exhibit 7 Rosa’s Deposition Exhibit marked # 11, Letter dated September 16, 2010 to Plaintiff Rosa from Rivera; D. Exhibit 13, Classification and Pay-mentAReassignment or Transfer of Position; D. Exhibit 14, Rosa’s Appointment and Changes Reporb-Transfer).

90. Since Plaintiff Rosa’s reinstatement to the position of Auxiliary Superintendent Title I, she has occupied said position and has performed all the duties pertaining to it up until her retirement. (D. Exhibit 1, Rosa’s Deposition, pg. Ill, line 25; pg. 112, lines 1-8; pg. 181, lines 20-25; and pg. 182, line 1).

91. While Plaintiff Rosa was at the District of Yabucoa as Auxiliary Superintendent, she performed all her functions except for function no. 7 of the DE-16 Position Description of Auxiliary Superintendent. Said function was not performed by a Superintendent/Special Aide to the Secretary. (D. Exhibit 1, Rosa’s Deposition, pg. 170, lines 17-25; pg. 175, lines 9-15, pg. 176, lines 8-17; D. Exhibit 10, Rosa’s Deposition Exhibit marked # 17).

92. Plaintiff Rosa does not personally know Rivera or his political affiliation; she only knows him as the Secretary of Education. (D. Exhibit 1, Rosa’s Deposition, pg. 115, lines 21-22, pg. 116, lines 8-14).

93. Plaintiff Rosa does not have personal knowledge of Román’s political affiliation. (D. Exhibit 1, Garcia’s Deposition, pg. 116, lines 15-25; page 117, lines 1-9).

94. Plaintiff Rosa and Defendant Rivera never spoke about their political affiliation or party politics. (D. Exhibit 1, Rosa’s Deposition, pg. 118, lines 9-22).

95. Plaintiff Rosa and Defendant Ro-mán never spoke about their political affiliation or party politics. (D. Exhibit 1, Rosa’s Deposition, pg. 118 lines 23-25; pg. 119, lines 1-12).

96. Plaintiff Rosa did not apply for the position of Superintendent during the years 2009 or 2010. (D. Exhibit 1, Rosa’s Deposition, pg. 120, lines 10-16).

Plaintiff Arroyo

97. Plaintiff Arroyo, a School Superintendent III at Caguas II’s School District, was sent on administrative detail as school director to the Bunker .School in the same district, effective July 24, 2009. No change in position classification or decrease in salary occurred. (D. Exhibit 16, Arroyo’s Appointment and Changes Report-Adm. Detail).

98. During Plaintiff Arroyo’s administrative detail, no one was appointed to her old position of Superintendent. (D. Exhibit 19, Arroyo’s Deposition, pg. 57, lines 9-12).

99. After the conclusion of her detail, on July 1, 2010, Plaintiff Arroyo was reinstated to her position of School Superintendent in Gurabo’s School District. She was notified of her right to appeal said personnel transaction. (D. Exhibit 17, Arroyo’s Appointment and Changes Report-Reinstatement; D. Exhibit 21, Letter to Arroyo from Rivera, Interim Secretary).

100. During the 2010-11 school year, Arroyo was a leader in the newly created Technical Assistance Unit. Said unit was established in Puer-to Rico in conjunction with the federal government. (D. Exhibit 19, Arroyo’s Deposition, pg. 87, lines 5-13).

101. During that first year of the unit, Arroyo developed tools and processes which were not solely for the benefit of Gurabo’s District but were also shared with other twenty-seven (27) districts, and obtained satisfactory results in the eyes of the federal government for that year. (D. Exhibit 19, Arroyo’s Deposition, pg. 88, lines 3-9).

102. After the reorganization of the school districts, she was appointed “School Superintendent-Technical Assistant”, a position that supervised five (5) Auxiliary Superintendents. The Superintendent-Technical Assistant supervised and evaluated the Auxiliaries, among other duties. (D. Exhibit 18, Organizational Chart of Schools District; D. Exhibit 20, Arroyo’s DE-16 Superintendent-Technical Support-item # 11).

103. After the reorganization, the Auxiliary Superintendents under Arroyo’s leadership carried out activities grouped in ten (10) large areas which were subdivided into forty (40) smaller areas. (D. Exhibit 19, Arroyo’s Deposition, pg. 103, lines 3-11; pg. 106, lines 24-25; pg. 107, line 1; D. Exhibit 20, Arroyo’s DE-16-School Superintendent-Technical Assistance).

104. As part of Plaintiff Arroyo’s functions, she visited School Directors and supervised her Auxiliary Superintendents. (D. Exhibit 19, Arroyo’s Deposition, pg. 107, lines 20-23.; D. Exhibit 20, Arroyo’s DE-16-School Superintendent-Technical Assistance).

■105. From January to September 2013, Plaintiff Arroyo was appointed to a trust position as Special Assistant to the Undersecretary of Academic Affairs. (D. Exhibit 19, Arroyo’s Deposition, pg. 90, lines 14-21; pg. 91, lines 19-21).

106. Plaintiff Arroyo retired from the Department of Education in February, 2014. At that time, she was occupying the position of Superintendent of School-Technical Assistant at the Gurabo District. (D. Exhibit 19, Arroyo’s Deposition, pg. 90, lines 6-13).

107. Plaintiff Arroyo has participated in polling stations, motorcades, walkabouts and fund-raising activities for the PPD. She has never seen co-Defendants Rivera or Ro-mán in those activities. (D. Exhibit 19, Arroyo’s Deposition, pg. 100, lines 23-25, pg. 101, lines 1-16).

108. Arroyo met with Defendant Rivera on several occasions and spoke with him about professional issues. (D. Exhibit 19, Arroyo’s Deposition, pg. 118, lines 9-13).

109. Defendant Rivera never asked Plaintiff Arroyo about her political affiliation. (D. Exhibit 19, Arroyo’s Deposition, pg. 121, lines 24-25; pg. 122, lines 1-2).

110. Plaintiff Arroyo never told Defendant Román about her political affiliation. (D. Exhibit 19, Arroyo’s Deposition, pg. 124, lines 14-17).

Plaintiff Del Valle

111. Plaintiff Del Valle started working at the Department of Education on September 20,1999 as a School Social Worker. (D. Exhibit 92, Certification issued by Dept, of Education of Del Valle’s positions).

112. Plaintiff Del Valle was appointed to the career position of Auxiliary Superintendent on a probationary basis effective September 3, 2008 with a monthly salary of $2,835.00. Before that, he occupied a permanent position as a School Director in the San Juan School District. (D. Exhibit 62, Del Valle’s Deposition, pg. 22, lines 8-15; D. Exhibit 64, Del Valle’s Personnel File-Report Appointment and Changes).

113. Del Valle and Rodriguez were present at the July, 2009 meeting where Secretary Chardón informed the employees of the Bay-amón Region that they had to be sent to schools as directors to protect them from Law 7. (D. Exhibit 62, Del Valle’s Deposition, pg. 35, lines 24-25, pg. 36, lines 1-6, lines 21-23; pg. 37, lines 9-21; D. Exhibit 83, Román’s Response to Interrogatory # 6, pg. 5 lines 24-27, pg. 6, D. Exhibit 72, Rodriguez’ Deposition, pg. 22, lines 6-21, pg. 23, lines 9-11).

114. Plaintiff Del Valle did not have the years of service at the Department of Education or in any other government agency to remain unaffected by Law 7. He was sent to a school to be protected from Law 7. (D. Exhibit 62, Del Valle’s Deposition, pg. 38, lines 7-19; pg. 39, lines 16-20; D. Exhibit 92, Certification issued by Dept, of Education of Del Valle’s Positions).

115. Plaintiff Del Valle was sent on administrative detail as School Director to Cacique Agueybaná School in Bayamón from July 16, 2009 until June 30, 2010. There was no change in position classification or in his salary. (D. Exhibit 62, Del Valle’s Deposition, pg. 19, lines 10-14; pg. 44, lines 12-18; pg. 45, lines 2-4; D. Exhibit 65, Del Valle’s Personnel File-Report Appointments and Changes; D. Exhibit 66, Letter dated July 6, 2009 from Virella, Deputy Secretary of Human Resources, Department of Education).

116. Plaintiff Del Valle submitted a letter requesting a demotion to the position of School Director on October 6, 2009. (D. Exhibit 87, Demotion Letter dated October 6, 2009).

117. Del Valle was informed by Char-dón via a letter dated November 6, 2009 that the lay-off letter that had been notified on September 25, 2009, was being left without effect. His employment would not cease effective November 6, 2009, as previously notified. This determination was taken after the JREF authorized the exclusion of his job classification. (D. Exhibit 62, Del Valle’s Deposition, pg. 63, lines 3-20; D. Exhibit 69, Letter dated November 6, 2009 from Chardón, Secretary of the Department of Education).

118. Defendant Rivera authorized the formal appointment of Del Valle to the position of School Director of the Cacique Agueybaná School effective July 1, 2010 with a salary of $3,110. This salary included a $250.00 differential. (D. Exhibit 67, Del Valle’s Personnel File-Report Appointments and Changes; D. Exhibit 68, Letter dated June 30, 2010 from Rivera).

119. On February 10, 2011, Plaintiff Del Valle received a letter from Secretary of Education Rivera notifying him of the intention of commencing a disciplinary process against him that could entail sanctions that ranged from a written reprimand to dismissal. (D. Exhibit 70, Letter February 10, 2011 from Rivera; D. Exhibit 62, Del Valle’ Deposition, pg. 100, lines 8-12).

120. The letter of intent stated that the Monitoring and Compliance Unit of the Special Education Associate Secretariat had performed a compliance monitoring, where visits were made February 11, 12, and 13 of 2009 to the district where Plaintiff Del Valle worked. (Exhibit 70, Letter February 10, 2011 from Rivera).

121. The letter further stated that a report was issued on May 11, 2009 indicating the following findings: non-compliance with Indicators 1, 2, 13 and 14; lack of PEI with measurable goals and objectives for students in process of Secondary Transition; that procedural guarantees were not used for the transition; lack of class plans; non-compliance with Indicators 13 and 14; and non-compliance with Indicators 13 and 14 by 2 teachers, Maria Morales Negrón and Lourdes Core Vélez (Exhibit 70, Letter February 10, 2011 from Rivera).

122. The letter informed Del Valle that he had the right to request an informal administrative hearing, where he could challenge the charges that were being brought against him. (D. Exhibit 70, Letter February 10, 2011 from Rivera).

123. Plaintiff Del Valle requested the administrative hearing, where he was represented by attorney Vanessa Caraballo. (D. Exhibit 62, Del Valle’s Deposition, pg. 102, lines 17-24).

124. On December 12, 2012, the Department of Education closed the disciplinary proceeding initiated against Plaintiff Del Valle after the Official Examiner recommended the dismissal of the disciplinary proceedings. (D. Exhibit 71, Letter dated December 12, 2012 from Nilda Ortiz Rodriguez, Interim Secretary).

125. Plaintiff Del Valle and Defendant Román hardly ever spoke. When they did, they did not speak about politics, even if she was present in an interview in which Plaintiff Del Valle participated. (D. Exhibit 62, Del Valle’s Deposition, pg. 93, lines 18-22).

126. During the interactions that Plaintiff Del Valle had with Defendant Román, they did not speak about their respective political affiliations. (D. Exhibit 62, Del Valle’s Deposition, pg. 94, lines 9-15).

127. Plaintiff Del Valle never spoke with Defendant Rivera about his political affiliation. (D. Exhibit 62, Del Valle’s Deposition, pg. 109, lines 13-15).

128. Plaintiff Del Valle was appointed to the trust position of Special Aide II to the Secretary of Education effective January 3, 2013, with a salary of $6,250.00. (D. Exhibit 63, Del Valle’s Report Appointments and Changes; D. Exhibit 92, Certification issued by Dept, of Education of Del Valle’s Positions).

129. Effective March 12, 2014, Plaintiff Del Valle was appointed to the trust position of Regional Director for San Juan. (D. Exhibit 62, Del Valle’s Deposition, pg. 15, lines 24-25; pg. 16, lines 6-7).

Plaintiff Rodriguez

130. Plaintiff Rodriguez worked for the Treasury Department for a period of three (3) years and two (2) months.