Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docs. 112 & 120) LAWRENCE J. O’NEILL, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION This case concerns the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s (“Reclamation” or “the Bureau”) decision to make certain “Flow Augmentation” releases (“FARs”) of water beginning on August 13, 2013 from Lewi-ston Dam, a feature of the Trinity River Division (“TRD”) of the Central Valley Project (“CVP”). The stated purpose of the releases was to “reduce the likelihood, and potentially reduce the severity, of any Ich epizootic event that could lead to associated fish die off in 2013” in the lower Klamath River. Administrative Record (“AR”) at 00016-17. Plaintiffs, the San Luis & Delta Mendota Water Authority (“Authority”) and Westlands Water District (“Westlands”), allege that by approving and implementing the 2013 FARs, Reclamation and its parent agency, the U.S. Department of the Interior (“Interior”) (collectively, “Federal Defendants”), violated various provisions of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (“CVPIA”), Pub.L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4700 (1992), and the Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 383. Doc. 95, First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) at ¶¶ 77-91. In addition, Plaintiffs allege Federal Defendants acted unlawfully by approving and implementing the 2013 FARs without first preparing an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., or engaging in consultation pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq. FAC ¶¶ 92-104. Plaintiffs filed suit in this Court on August 7, 2013, Doc. 1, and on August 9, 2013 filed a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Doc. 14. The parties stipulated to and the Court approved the intervention of the Hoopa Valley Tribe (“the Hoopa”), the Yurok Tribe (“the Yurok”), and the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen ‘s Associations and Institute for Fisheries Resources as defendants. Docs. 38 & 70. On August 13, 2013, the Court issued a .temporary restraining order, restraining and enjoining Federal Defendants from making releases from Lewiston Dam to the Trinity River in excess of 450 cubic feet per second (“cfs”) for fishery purposes through and including August 16, 2013. Doc. 57. Following a preliminary injunction hearing on August 21-22, 2013, the Court lifted the temporary restraining order and denied the associated motion for preliminary injunction. Doc. 91. The FAC, filed October 4, 2013, alleges Federal Defendants violated: (1) CVPIA § 3406(b)(23) because, including the 2013 FARs, the total releases for fisheries purposes in 2013 exceeded the volume limit set in the Trinity River Record of Decision (“TRROD”), which adopted a plan for restoring the Trinity River mainstem fisheries pursuant to CVPIA § 3406(b)(23); (2) CVPIA § 3411(A) and 43 U.S.C. § 383 because the 2013 FARs are a use of water outside the state permitted place of use; (3) NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS in connection with the 2013 FARs; and (4) the ESA by failing to engage in formal consultation prior to implementing the FARs. Doc. 95. Federal Defendants filed the AR on December 20, 2013, Doc. 109, and supplemented the record on January 29, 2014. Doc. 110. Before the Court for decision are cross motions for summary judgment on all of the claims asserted in the FAC. Docs. 112 & 120. The Court has thoroughly reviewed more than 250 pages of briefs, in-eluding eight pages of an amicus brief submitted by the California Department of Fish and Game (“CDFG”), Docs. 122 & 124, along with thousands of pages of associated exhibits, attachments, and declarations. While the cross motions were still pending, Federal Defendants authorized yet another set of flow augmentation releases, which began on August 25, 2014 (“2014 FARs”). See Doc. 151. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction against the 2014 FARs. Docs. 142-43. The Court, while indicating that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on at least one claim,'denied the motions for injunctive relief based upon an analysis of the balance of the harms. See Doc. 175. II. STANDARD OF DECISION All of the claims in this case arise under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, pursuant to which “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitléd to judicial review thereof.” Id. § 702. Under the APA, a reviewing court shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be”: (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; * * * (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; [and/or] (D) without observance of procedure required by law[.] Id. § 706(A). A reviewing court “must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), abrogated in part on other grounds as recognized in Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). Although a court’s inquiry must be thorough, the standard of review is highly deferential; the agency’s decision is “entitled to a presumption of regularity,” and a court may not substitute our judgment for that of the agency. Id. at 415-16, 91 S.Ct. 814. Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and the record demonstrate that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(a). A court conducting APA judicial review may not resolve factual questions, but instead determines “whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did.” Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F.Supp.2d 76, 90 (D.D.C.2006) (quoting Occidental Eng’g Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir.1985)). “[I]n a case involving review of a final agency action under the [APA] ... the standard set forth in Rule 56[ (a) ] does not apply because of the limited role of a court in reviewing the administrative record.” Id. at 89. In this context, summary judgment becomes the “mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.” Id. at 90. Eastern District of California Local Rule 260(a) directs that each motion for summary judgment shall be accompanied by a “Statement of Undisputed Facts” that shall enumerate each of the specific material facts on which the motion is based and cite the particular portions of any document relied upon to establish that fact. In APA cases, such statements are generally redundant because all relevant facts are contained in the agency’s administrative record. See San Joaquin River Grp. Auth. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 819 F.Supp.2d 1077, 1083-84 (E.D.Cal.2011). III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. The Trinity River. The Trinity and Klamath River Basins drain a large area of Northern California and Southern Oregon. The Trinity River is the largest tributary to the Klamath River, with their confluence lying at Weitchpec, approximately 44 miles upstream of the mouth of the Klamath River. See Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 860-61 (9th Cir.2004). The stretch of the Klamath below the confluence has been referenced- by the parties as the “lower Klamath.” The Trinity River flows through the Hoopa Indian Reservation, which also encompasses a small stretch of the upper Klamath River as the Klamath flows west toward its confluence with the Trinity. The confluence is just north of the Hoopa Reservation and within the boundary of the adjoining Yurok Reservation. The Yu-rok Reservation surrounds the lower Kla-math for one mile on either side of the lower Klamath, stretching roughly from the ocean to the confluence with the Trinity. Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906, 908 (9th Cir.1981); Westlands, 376 F.3d at 860-61; see also AR 03844 (map showing Hoopa and Yurok Reservations relative to Trinity and Klamath Rivers). B. The Trinity River Division. The TRD is a component of the CVP, which is, in turn, one of the largest and most complex water distribution systems in the world, consisting of “an extensive system of dams, tunnels, canals, and reservoirs that stores and regulates water for California’s Central Valley.” Westlands, 376 F.3d at 861. The Bureau operates the TRD pursuant to state water rights permits issued by the State Water Resources Control Board (“SWRCB”). See Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 153 F.Supp.2d 1133, 1144 (E.D.Cal.2001), aff'd, 337 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir.2003). The TRD impounds the mainstem of the Trinity River initially at Trinity Dam, behind which water accumulates to form the approximately 2,448,000 acre-foot (“AF”) Trinity Reservoir. Westlands, 376 F.3d at 861; see also AR 00024. A second reservoir and dam, Lewiston, which sits slightly downstream of Trinity Reservoir, regulates water releases to the Trinity River. Id. Water can also be diverted into the Sacramento River Basin through a tunnel at Clear Creek. Id. Water diverted through Clear Creek tunnel may be made available for delivery to CVP contractors, including Plaintiffs. Id. C. Trinity River Fishery. The Klamath River and its tributaries provide spawning and rearing habitat to substantial runs of anadromous fish, including Chinook salmon, Coho salmon, and steelhead. Westlands, 376 F.3d at 860-61. Each of these species requires varied water conditions, including depth, velocity, and temperature, at different stages throughout their lives. Id. at 862. Depending on the species, a juvenile fish will remain in the river for a few months to a few years before its size, water temperature, flow, and the daylight period trigger its migration downriver to the ocean. Id. After three to six years in the ocean, depending on the species, the fish will return to the mouth of the Klamath, and begin its migration back upriver to its spawning grounds, either on the mainstem of the Klamath or in other tributaries including the Trinity River. AR 03763-64. Construction and operation of the TRD “radically altered” the Trinity River environment, “destroying or degrading river habitats that supported once-abundant fish populations.” Westlands, 376 F.3d at 862. Habitat for fish has also been degraded by Klamath Project water diversions. See, e.g., Kandra v. United States, 145 F.Supp.2d 1192, 1197 (D.Or.2001). D. The Hoopa Valley Tribe. The Hoopa Valley Tribe is a federally recognized Indian tribe. 77 Fed.Reg. 47,-868-1, 47,869 (Aug. 10, 2012). The Hoopa Reservation was established for the Tribe by the United States in 1864. See Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539, 542 (9th Cir.1995). The lower twelve miles of the Trinity River, and a stretch of the Kla-math River near the Trinity confluence, flow through the Reservation. The principal purpose of the Tribe’s Reservation was to set aside sufficient resources of these rivers for the Indians to be self-sufficient and achieve a moderate living based on fish. See Doc. 44, Ex. 1 (Memorandum from John D. Leshy (M-36979), Solicitor of the Department of the Interior to the Secretary of the Interior (Oct. 4, 1993), pp. 3, 15, 18, 21, cited with approval, Parravano, 70 F.3d at 542). For generations, the fishery resources of the Klamath and Trinity Rivers have been the mainstay of the life, culture, and economic livelihood of the Hoopa and Yurok. See Parravano, 70 F.3d at 542. When the Hoopa Reservation was created, the fishery was “not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed.” Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir.1981) (quoting United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381, 25 S.Ct. 662, 49 L.Ed. 1089 (1905)). The Tribe holds federally-reserved fishing rights in the Klamath and Trinity Rivers, and federally-reserved water rights to support the fishery. Parravano, 70 F.3d at 544-46; United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1411 (9th Cir.1984). The 2002 fish die off effectively halted tribal harvest of fish that year and impacted harvests in subsequent years. See AR 02372. E. The Yurok Tribe. The Yurok is also a federally recognized Indian Tribe. 77 Fed.Reg. at 47872. The Klamath River fishery is a “vital component of the Tribe’s culture! ], traditions, and economic vitality.” Kandra, 145 F.Supp.2d at 1201. For generations, the Yurok have “depended on the Klamath [C]hinook salmon for their nourishment and economic livelihood.” Parravano, 70 F.3d at 542. The Yurok Reservation “was ideally selected for the Yuroks.” Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 487, 93 S.Ct. 2245, 37 L.Ed.2d 92 (1973). It encompasses the lower 44 miles of the Klamath River, including the confluence of the Klamath and Trinity Rivers. 25 U.S.C. 1300i-l(c). “The Yurok people have always lived on this land on the Klamath River ... and prudently harvest and manage the great salmon runs.” Yurok Constitution, Preamble. Establishment of the Yurok Reservation vested the Yurok with federally reserved fishing rights. Parravano, 70 F.3d at 541, 545-46. These federally reserved fishing rights guarantee the Yurok a corresponding water right. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1410-11. The 2002 fish die off had a profound spiritual and economic effect on the Yurok people. F. 1955 Trinity River Division Central Valley Project Act. The 1955 Trinity River Division Central Valley Project Act (“1955 Act”), Pub.L. No. 84-386, 69 Stat. 719, provides general authorization to integrate the TRD with other features of the CVP. Section 2 of the 1955 Act contains a proviso authorizing the Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”) “to adopt appropriate measures to insure the preservation and propagation of fish and wildlife,. including, but not limited to the maintenance of the flow of the Trinity River below the diversion point at not less than one hundred and fifty cubic feet per second.” G.1981 Initiation of the Trinity River Flow Evaluation Study. In 1981, the Secretary issued a decision initiating the Trinity River Flow Evaluation Study (“TRFES”) to determine appropriate flows and other measures to restore the Trinity River’s fishery. Doc. 51-4, Secretarial Issue Document, Trinity River Fishery Mitigation (Jan. 14, 1981) (“1981 SID”). The 1981 SID explained that impacts to the Trinity and Klamath fisheries caused by diversion of water from the TRD raised issues of concern to the Hoopa and Yurok. Since completion of the Division, over 80% of the mean runoff of the Trinity watershed above Lewiston Dam has been diverted to the Sacramento watershed for agricultural, hydroelectric, and other uses. This diversion has been accompanied by a severe decline in ana-dromous fish runs in the Trinity and Klamath Rivers. At issue are the quantity of water' to be diverted and the quantity to be allowed to flow through its natural course for preservation and enhancement of anadromous fish runs on the Trinity and Klamath Rivers. Lead Assistant Secretary for this SID is the Assistant Secretary—Indian Affairs because of the federal trust responsibility to protect the fishing rights of the Hupa and Yurok tribes of the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation. Id. at A-4. The 1981 SID concluded that the Secretary’s trust responsibility to the Hoopas and Yuroks, combined with applicable federal laws, required the “restoration' of the river’s salmon and steel-head resources to pre-project levels.” Id. atA-17. H. 1984 Trinity River Basin Fish and Wildlife Management Act. In 1984, Congress passed the Trinity River Basin Fish and Wildlife Management Act (“1984 Act”), Pub.L. No. 98-541, 98 Stat. 2721, which directed the Secretary to implement a management program “for the Trinity River Basin designed to restore the fish and wildlife populations in such basin to the levels approximating those which existed immediately before the start of construction [of the Trinity River Division] and to maintain such levels.” Id. at § 2. The 1984 Act called for rehabilitation of fish habitat in both the “Trinity River between Lewiston Dam and Weiteh-pee,” as well as “in tributaries of such river below Lewiston Dam and in the south fork of such river.” Id. I. 1992 Central Valley Project Improvement Act. In 1992, Congress passed the CVPIA, which lists among its purposes “to protect, restore, and enhance fish, wildlife, and associated habitats in the Central Valley and Trinity River Basins.” CVPIA § 3402(a). Among other things, CVPIA § 3406(b)(23) directs the Secretary of the Interior to maintain certain minimum instream flows in the Trinity River “to meet Federal trust responsibilities to protect the fishery resources of the Hoopa, and to meet the fishery restoration goals of the Act of October 24, 1984, Pub.L. 98-541.” From 1992-1996, CVPIA § 3406(b)(23) set a default minimum instream flow at “not less than 340,000 acre-feet per year,” with the further instruction that this default minimum flow could be increased based upon a flow evaluation study and with the concurrence of the Hoopa. CVPIA § 3406(b)(23) also called for completion of the TRFES by a date certain and required the Secretary to implement any recommended increases to the default minimum flows so long as the Hoopa concurred in those recommendations. J. 1996 Reauthorization of the Trinity River Basin Fish and Wildlife Management Act. In 1996, Congress reauthorized and amended the 1984 Trinity River Basin Fish and Wildlife Management Act. Pub.L. 104-143, 110 Stat. 1338 (“1996 Reauthori-zation”). The 1996 Reauthorization expanded the scope of the 1984 Act’s rehabilitation mandate to include “the Klamath River downstream of the confluence with the Trinity River.” See id. at § 3. K. 1999 Trinity River Flow Evaluation Study. In 1999, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) and the Hoopa released a Final Report on the TRFES, representing the completion of the flow evaluation study called for in the 1981 SID. AR 03710-04222. The TRFES recommended that “[r]ehabilitiation of the mainstem Trinity River can best be achieved by restoring processes that provided abundant complex instream habitat prior to construction and operation of TRD.” AR 03738. Specifically, the TRFES recommended varying inter-annual flows unique to each water year class, ranging from 368,800 AF in Critically Dry years to 815,200 AF in Extremely Wet years. AR 03739. It was further recommended that these inter-annual variations be complemented by within-year (i.e., seasonal) flow variability, including the implementation of short, peak releases during all water year classes (except Critically Dry), followed by “bench” flow periods designed to transport fine sediment flows mobilized by the peak flows. Id. Recommended releases were also designed to provide appropriate temperature conditions for outmigrating salmonids. AR 03740. Activities to rehabilitate physical “channel” conditions along the mainstem of the Trinity River were also planned, including mechanical removal of “vegetation at strategic locations to promote alluvial process necessary for the restoration and maintenance of salmonid populations,” and sediment management activities designed to supplement coarse sediment and prevent the buildup of fine sediment in riparian areas below Lewiston Dam. AR 03740-41. Finally, the TRFES recommended implementation of an “Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management Program” to guide future restoration activities and adjust efforts in light of “uncertainty over how the river and the fishery resources will react to the proposed recommendations.” AR 03744. L. Record of Decision for Trinity River Mainstem Fishery Restoration. Following completion of the TRFES, the Department of the Interior initiated an environmental review process to develop and assess alternatives to restore the Trinity River. See 57 Fed.Reg. 27,060-02 (June 17, 1992). As part of this process, the Secretary issued a draft EIS pursuant to NEPA. 64 Fed.Reg. 57,451-01 (Oct. 25, 1999). Following public comment, the Secretary issued the TRROD in December 2000, which adopted the preferred alternative set forth in the EIS. AR 03003-03045. Among other things, the TRROD sets forth the volume of water to be released to provide instream flows below Lewiston Dam on the Trinity River in various water year types. AR 03014 at 12. It also clearly indicates that while “the 'schedule for releasing water on a daily basis ... may be adjusted ... the annual flow volumes ... may not be changed.” Id. M. History of the Challenyed FARs. In the fall of 2002, a fish die-off occurred in the lower Klamath River and within the Yurok Reservation. AR 00016. Federal, tribal, and state biologists concluded that pathogens were the primary cause and that warm water and low flow conditions, combined with high fish density, contributed to the outbreak. Id. FWS estimated that over 34,000 fish, mainly fall run Chinook, died from the disease outbreak, but noted that its estimate was a conservative one. AR 02895, 02896. Actual losses may have been more than double that number. AR 02535. Following the 2002 fish die-off, Reclamation released TRD flows in excess of the TRROD limits in 2003 (34,000 AF) and in 2004 (36,200 AF) in an effort to avoid a repeat of 2002 conditions. AR 01367. In those years, Reclamation took action to ensure that Plaintiffs and other CVP contractors would not suffer water supply losses as a result of the leases. AR 00551. Low flow conditions and projected high fish densities again coincided in 2012. AR 00016. In April 2012, a subgroup of the Trinity River Restoration Program’s (“TRRP”) Flow Work Group developed recommendations to establish thresholds for actions aimed at preventing any fish die-off and provide recommendations for preventative actions. AR 01179. Based on those flow recommendations, in early July 2012, Reclamation issued a Draft Environmental Assessment (“EA”) and Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”) for a 2012 Lower Klamath River Late Summer Flow Augmentation. AR 01312, AR 01319. On July 27, 2012, then-Regional Director Don Glaser sent a letter to Plaintiffs in which Reclamation made three commitments regarding the proposed TRD releases. First, Reclamation promised that if Plaintiffs did not dispute the proposed action, Reclamation would not assert that Plaintiffs had waived any claims that Reclamation lacked statutory authority to carry out the proposed action. AR 01204. Second, Reclamation indicated it would “identify and implement mitigation measures to ensure that this action does not have a water supply impact to [CVP] water contractors in the 2013-14 contract year, subject to provisions of Federal and State Law.” Id. Finally, Reclamation indicated it “will be developing a long-term strategy for addressing fall fish needs on the Lower Klamath River.” Id. Reclamation issued a final EA and FONSI regarding the 2012 FARs on August 10, 2012. AR 01174, AR 10167. In August and September 2012, Federal Defendants made releases from the TRD of 39,000 AF for the purpose of “reducing] the likelihood, and potentially reducing] the severity, of any fish die-off in 2012.” AR 00016, 01179. The 2012 releases were in excess of the 647,000 AF volume limit for “normal” water years set by the TRROD by 39,000 AF. Doc. 103 (Fed. Defs’ Answer) at 106. In April 2013, the Pacific Fishery Management Council recommended actions aimed at preventing a fish die-off in 2013, including FARs. AR 00564-67. In mid-July 2013, Reclamation issued a Draft EA/FONSI regarding FARs for late summer 2013. AR 00371-401; AR 00361-370. Plaintiffs and others provided substantial comments on the draft environmental documents by July 31, 2013, arguing, among other things, that an EIS was required. AR 00057-352. The final 2013 EA/FONSI issued on August 6, 2013. AR 00001, 00012. The 2013 EA estimated that the 2013 FARs would include the release of 62,000 AF of TRD stored water, plus an additional 8,000 AF if Federal Defendants extended the release period to September 30, 2013. AR 00020-21. In addition, the 2013 EA estimated the release of up to another 39,000 AF of TRD storage if the Yurok Indian Tribe detected an outbreak of disease, for a total of up to 109,000 AF in excess of the volume set by the TRROD for a dry year. Id. As with the 2012 FARs, the stated purpose of the 2013 releases was to “reduce the likelihood, and potentially reduce the severity, of any Ich epizootic event that could lead to associated fish die off in 2013” in the lower Klamath River. AR 00016-17. Reclamation offered the following as “Legal and Statutory Authorities and Jurisdiction Relevant to the Proposed Federal Action”: The TRD Central Valley Project Act of 1955 (P.L. 84-386) provides the principal authorization for implementing the Proposed Action. Specifically, Section 2 of the Act limits the integration of the Trinity River Division with the rest of the Central Valley Project and gives precedence to in-basin needs, including that “the Secretary is authorized and directed to adopt appropriate measures to insure preservation and propagation of fish and wildlife(C)” AR 00017. Reclamation also indicated that the proposed action would protect Indian trust assets: Under the No Action Alternative, any affects to ITA have been previously described in the TRMFR EIS/EIR. As previously mentioned, the inherent uncertainties of events of this nature make it difficult to accurately quantify the risk of an epizootic outbreak to the large run of returning fall Chinook salmon associated with implementation of the No Action Alternative. However, if a large scale fish die-off similar to 2002 were to occur in late summer 2013, regardless of apparent causes, it would be devastating for the tribal trust fisheries in the Kla-math and Trinity Rivers. Under the Proposed Action, it is expected that the risk of disease vulnerability to the large returning run of fall Chinook salmon to the lower Klamath River in the late summer would be decreased, relative to the No Action Alternative. In turn, the risk to the tribal trust fishery would be expected to decrease. In 2003, 2004 and 2012, supplemental flows were implemented, and general observations were that the sustained higher releases from mid—August to mid-September in each year coincided with no significant disease or adult mortalities. However, as previously mentioned, the expected decrease in risk associated with the Proposed Action cannot be accurately quantified. AR 00036. Reclamation also evaluated the effects of the proposed 2013 FARs on ESA-listed species under the jurisdiction of the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”), including the Southern Oregon/Northern Sacramento California Coasts (“SONCC”) coho salmon in the Klamath River Basin, and Sacramento River winter-run Chinook salmon, Central Valley spring-run Chinook salmon, Central Valley steelhead, and Southern Distinct Population Segment of North American Green Sturgeon. AR 00053. Although the EA estimated that up to 62,000 AF of water would be needed to maintain the minimum target flow from August 15-September 21, 2013, AR 00020, due to a delay in the action by court order as well as actual hydrologic conditions, only approximately 17,500 AF was released as part of the 2013 FARs. Fed. Defs.’ Answer at 51. IV. DISCUSSION A. Standing. Federal Defendants challenge Plaintiffs’ standing to bring any of the claims in this case. Doc. 120 at 15-19. 1. General Standard. Standing is a judicially created doctrine that is an essential part of the case- or-controversy requirement of Article III. Pritikin v. Dep’t of Energy, 254 F.3d 791, 796 (9th Cir.2001) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). “To satisfy the Article III case or controversy requirement, a litigant must have suffered some actual injury that can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Iron Arrow Honor Soc. v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70, 104 S.Ct. 373, 78 L.Ed.2d 58 (1983). “In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). To have standing, a plaintiff must show three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the'defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Supreme Court has described a plaintiffs burden of proving standing at various stages of a case as follows: Since [the standing elements] are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiffs case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation. At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim. In response to a summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on such “mere allegations,” but must “set forth” by affidavit or other evidence “specific facts,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e), which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true. And at the final stage, those facts (if controverted) must be supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial. Id. at 561,112 S.Ct. 2130. A plaintiff is not required to prove that he would succeed on the merits to summarily adjudicate his standing to sue. Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 590 F.3d 989, 1001 (9th Cir.2010) (granting summary judgment and noting that “[w]hether Plaintiffs can succeed on their . [] claim is irrelevant to the question whether they are entitled to bring that claim in the first place”), rev’d on other grounds, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir.2010). Standing is evaluated on a claim-by-claim basis. “A plaintiff must demonstrate standing ‘for each claim he seeks to press’ and for ‘each form of relief sought.’” Oregon v. Legal Servs. Corp., 552 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006)). “[Standing is not dispensed in gross.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358, n. 6, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). The actual—injury requirement would hardly serve the purpose ... of preventing courts from undertaking tasks assigned to the political branches[,] if once a plaintiff demonstrated harm from one particular inadequacy in government administration, the court were authorized to' remedy all inadequacies in that administration. Id. at 357, 116 S.Ct. 2174. Standing is determined by the facts in existence at the time the complaint is filed. Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir.2001). 2. Substantive Claims. The First Claim for Relief alleges that the FARs violated CVPIA § 3406(b)(23) because the releases exceeded the 453,000 AF volume limit set forth in the TRROD. FAC 77-83. The Second Claim for Relief alleges that Federal Defendants violated CVPIA § 3411(A) and 43 U.S.C. § 383 by implementing the 2013 FARs without first obtaining a modification of the permitted place of use under the State water rights permits applicable to the TRD. Id. at 84-91. a. Injury-in-Fact. When Plaintiffs filed this action on August 7, 2013, the proposed 2013 FARs included plans to release of up to 109,000 AF of water above and beyond the 453,000 AF upper limit for the relevant water year type in the TRROD. See AR 00004. The FARs thus threatened to create a “hole” in water storage at Trinity Reservoir of up to 109,000 AF. During the TRO/PI proceedings, Ronald Milligan, the manager of the Bureau’s Central Valley Operations Office, confirmed that there was “about a 50% chance that the entire combined storage deficit of the 2012 and 2013 flow augmentation actions will remain in the spring of 2014 at Trinity and Shasta Reservoirs.” Doc. 52, Declaration of Ronald Milligan (“Milligan Decl.”), at ¶ 10. Relatedly, Mr. Milligan also indicated that there was only “a 10% chance that there [would] be no cumulative effect on the combined storage of Trinity and Shasta Reservoirs.” Id. While admitting it was “difficult to predict definitively if or how the combination of the augmentation releases in 2012 and 2013 will impact 2014 CVP allocations ... there [was] about a 10% chance that there [would] be no impact to CVP allocations or supplies in 2014, [while there was] a 50% chance ... [that the loss in storage] could result in the loss of about 70,000-80,000 [AF] of potential supply to the CVP as a whole.” Id. at 11. According to Mr. Milli-gan, “identifying how any particular CVP contractors ... would be affected by this loss would depend on actual operating conditions in 2014.” Id. James Snow, a civil engineer and part-time employee of West-lands, indicated that, absent “very unusually wet conditions,” Trinity Reservoir would not refill by the end of May 2014. Declaration of James Snow (“Snow Decl.”), Doc. 26, at 42. Mr. Snow further estimated that then-projected storage conditions would likely result in lower initial allocations to south-of-Delta CVP contractors. Id. at 47. Federal Defendants correctly point out that, despite the FARs, Reclamation retained sufficient operational flexibility to satisfy all temperature and flow requirements for Central Valley species. Doc. 120-1 at 17 (citing AR 00053-54). While this may be true, this has nothing to do with Plaintiffs’ asserted primary injury: the loss of water supply. The Ninth Circuit recognizes that “the loss of affordable irrigation water for ... agricultural lands” is an injury-in-fact, San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. United States, 672 F.3d 676, 701 (9th Cir.2012), and that “the adverse consequences flowing from a reduction in water delivery are concrete and particularized and actual or imminent.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). The water loss need not be enormous to qualify. Id. at 701-02.(find-ing standing when Reclamation withheld 9,000 AF of water pursuant to its authority under CVPIA § 3406(b)(2)). The impacts to Plaintiffs ‘ members from reduced water supply allocations, including land fallowing, increased groundwater pumping and its attendant effects, increased soil salinity, increased energy use, permanent crop damage, unemployment, and reduced air quality, have been well-documented in multiple cases in this Court. Declaration of Russ Freeman (“Freeman Decl.”), Doc. 22 at ¶¶ 11-26; Declaration of Daniel G. Nelson (“Nelson Decl.”), Doc. 24 at 18, 22-24; see also Consol. Salmonid Cases, 713 F.Supp.2d 1116, 1151-53 (E.D.Cal.2010). The injury-in-fact requirement is satisfied as to Plaintiffs’ substantive claims, for which standing is grounded upon loss of irrigation water. b. Causation. The causation element requires that the injury be “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant” and not “the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.” San Luis, 672 F.3d at 702. Plaintiffs need not demonstrate that Federal Defendants’ actions are the “proximate cause” of Plaintiffs’ injuries. Rather, “plaintiffs must establish a line of causation between defendants’ action and their alleged harm that is more than attenuated.” Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir.2011). A causal chain does not fail simply because it has several “links,” provided those links are “not hypothetical or tenuous” and remain “plausibi[le].” Nat’l Audubon Soc., Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 849 (9th Cir.2002) (citing with approval Autolog Corp. v. Regan, 731 F.2d 25, 31 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“What matters is not the ‘length of the chain of causation,’ but rather the ‘plausibility of the links that comprise the chain.’ ”)). In cases where a chain of causation “involves numerous third parties” whose “independent decisions” collectively have a “significant effect” on plaintiffs’ injuries, the Supreme Court and this court have found the causal chain too weak to support standing at the pleading stage. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. [737,] 759, 104 S.Ct. 3315 [82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984) (abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 1377, 188 L.Ed.2d 392 (2014)).]; [citation]. Id. In sum, Plaintiffs may not “ ‘engage in an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable’ to explain how defendants actions caused his injury.” Id. at 1068 (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689-90, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973)). At the summary judgment stage, “[t]he causal connection put forward for standing purposes cannot be too speculative, or rely on conjecture about the behavior of other parties, but need not be so airtight .... as to demonstrate that the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits.” Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 361 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir.2004), opinion amended and superseded on other grounds, 402 F.3d 846 (9th Cir.2005). The district court in Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 345 F.Supp.2d 1151 (W.D.Wash.2004), succinctly reviewed the spectrum of Ninth Circuit rulings on the issue: In Ocean Advocates, the link between a dock extension and increased tanker traffic and, as a result, the risk of an oil spill was “not tenuous or abstract” either considered alone or in tandem with other industrial projects where the parties agreed that the dock extension would lead to increased traffic over time, even though other factors would also cause additional tanker traffic and would increase the risk of an oil spill. 361 F.3d at 1120. In Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Davis, the injury to birds was held to be “fairly traceable” to a ban on the use of leg-hold traps because the removal of the traps would likely lead to a larger population of predators, which in turn would decrease the number of birds. 307 F.3d at 849. However, in Bell v. Bonneville Power Admin. (“BPA”), a payment made by BPA to third parties to amend a contract to reduce the amount of power BPA was required to supply was not sufficient to prove that the contract enabled the third parties to stay in business when no facts other than the fact of payment were given to demonstrate causation. 340 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir.2003). Id. at 1163. In San Luis v. U.S. Dept. of Interior (“San Luis v. DOI II”), causation was present because the Bureau’s decision to release water for environmental purposes resulted in a “hole” in storage at San Luis Reservoir, which in turn increased the risk of reduced water allocations the following year. 905 F.Supp.2d 1158, 1172 (E.D.Cal. 2012). Federal Defendants argue the present circumstances are distinguishable from those in San Luis v. DOI II where “hydrologic conditions likely to alleviate any such harm were in fact both unpredictable and quite unusual.” Id. at 1171 (internal quotation and citation omitted). In San Luis v. DOI II, causation was established because evidence showed it was more likely than not that the “hole” in storage would fill and federal defendants produced no evidence to the contrary. Id. at 1172. Here, Federal Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations of harm “amount[) to [] vauge allusion[s] to the possibility of more water for allocations without the augmentation release.” Doc. 120-1 at 18. But, as discussed above in the context of injury-in-fact, Plaintiffs’ allegations are more than just vague allusions. The record demonstrates that, at least as of the time of filing this suit, absent very unusual hydrologic conditions, Trinity Reservoir would not refill, the “hole” in storage caused by the 2013 FARs would remain, and there would be a 50% chance that the loss in storage would result in the loss of potential water supply to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have satisfied the causation requirement with respect to their substantive claims. c. Redress. Plaintiffs also bear the burden of proving that it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). When Plaintiffs filed this action, an injunction could provide relief. Moreover, declaratory relief prohibiting future instances of the challenged conduct would redress the possibility of future injury. See San Luis v. DOI II, 905 F.Supp.2d at 1173. d. Organizational Standing I Standing Declarations. An organization can establish standing to sue on behalf of its individual members if: (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (ii) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (iii) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977); see also Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 181, 120 S.Ct. 693; United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers, and Allied Trades No. 40 v. Ins. Corp. of Am., 919 F.2d 1398, 1400 (9th Cir.1990). Federal Defendants object to Plaintiffs’ reliance on certain declarations to establish their organizational standing. Doc. 120-1 at 16. Of the nine declarations cited in Plaintiffs’ opening brief, six were submitted by individual farmers and a seventh from an elementary school principal. Docs. 17-21 & 23 (cited in Doc. 113 at 8 n. 1). While there is no basis upon which the Court could consider the declaration submitted by Baldomero Hernandez, the Principal and Superintendent for Westside Elementary School District, to establish Plaintiffs’ standing, the other challenged declarations are unquestionably admissible for that purpose. Rod Cardella owns and operates Cardella Ranch, a farm located within the Westlands service area (Doc. 18 at 2); Todd Allen is a farmer who relies on Westlands as. his sole source of water supply (Doc. 21 at 1-2); James Anderson is a farmer, and a partner in Condor Farms located within the Westlands service area (Doc. 23 at 1); Marty Aequistapace is the farm manager of Blackburn Farming Co., which farms within the Westlands service area (Doc. 17 at 2); and William Bourdeau is the Executive Vice President of Harris Farms, Inc., which farms in the Westlands service area (Doc. 20 at 2). Westlands is a California water district formed pursuant to California Water Code section 34000 et seq. See Cal. Water Code § 37850 (discussing operation of Westlands as. provided by law for California water districts generally). Based upon the analysis of the elements of Article III standing provided above, the individual farmer declarants would have standing to sue in their own right, as they ultimately would suffer direct injury through loss of water supply. While the individual farmer declarants are not “members” in a traditional sense of Plaintiffs’ organizations, the Ninth Circuit has previously permitted California agencies to represent the water users they serve. In Central Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 951 (9th Cir.2002), for example, the Central Delta Water Agency and South Delta Water Agency were permitted organizational standing based upon the standing of individual plaintiffs served by those Agencies in part because each Agency was charged by California law to ensure that the lands within their boundaries and their constituent users had a dependable, quality water supply. Id. Similar provisions empower West-lands to secure irrigation water for property owners within its boundaries. See Cal. Water. Code §§ 37801, 37803. Westlands, in turn, is a member of the Authority, which was formed to “supply water for reasonable and beneficial uses such as municipal, industrial, agricultural, and environmental uses to cities, farms, municipal water retailers, and other residents and landowners within their service areas.” See Nelson Decl. at ¶ 4. Plaintiffs’ participation in this lawsuit is germane to the interests those entities were formed to serve, satisfying Hunt’s second prong. Finally, there is no suggestion that the claim asserted or the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit, satisfying Hunt’s third prong. Plaintiffs have organizational standing. 3. Procedural Claims. The Third Claim for Relief alleges that Federal Defendants violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS prior to making the Flow Augmentation Releases. FAC ¶¶ 92-95. The Fourth Claim for Relief alleges that Federal Defendants failed to satisfy their ESA § 7 obligations to consult with NMFS and/or FWS regarding the FARs. Id. at ¶ 102. Standing jurisprudence draws a distinction between “substantive” and “procedural” claims. “One who challenges the violation of ‘a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards’ for traceability and redressibility.” Natural Res. Def. Council v. Jewell, 749 F.3d 776, 782-83 (9th Cir.2014) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n. 7, 112 S.Ct. 2130). NEPA claims are subject to this relaxed “procedural injury” standard, see Sierra Forest Legacy v. Sherman, 646 F.3d 1161, 1178 (9th Cir.2011), as are alleged violations of ESA § 7(a)(2)’s consultation requirement. Jewell, 749 F.3d at 783. To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement with respect to a procedural injury claim, a plaintiff “must show that the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing.” Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768, 779 (9th Cir.2006). In other words, Plaintiffs must establish that their interests “fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute at issue.” Jewell, 749 F.3d at 783. [Deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation—a procedural right in vacuo—is insufficient to create Article III standing. Only “a person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n. 7, 112 S.Ct. 2130). If a plaintiff is able to demonstrate injury in fact, the litigant “need only demonstrate that he has a procedural right that, if exercised, could protect his concrete interests.” Jewell, 749 F.3d at 783. a. NEPA Claim. With respect to NEPA, the procedures in question, namely those requiring preparation of an EIS whenever a federal agency undertakes a “major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), are designed to “protect some threatened concrete interest ... that is the ultimate basis of his standing.” Pit River Tribe, 469 F.3d at 779. As discussed above, the record establishes that at the time Plaintiffs file their suit, there was a significant possibility that implementation of the FARs in 2013 would cause reduced deliveries in 2014. Assuming the FARs had resulted in reduced deliveries to Plaintiffs, it is well established that such reductions could have resulted in harm to the environment in which Plaintiffs’ members operate., See generally San Luis & Delta—Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 686 F.Supp.2d 1026, 1050 (E.D.Cal.2009). For example, reduced water deliveries can result in increased groundwater usage, which, in turn, can result in subsidence problems. Nelson Decl. ¶ 18. In addition, available groundwater may be so saline that its use can contribute to salt buildup in the soil. Id. NEPA’s stated purposes include broad goals that readily encompass Plaintiffs’ interests in preventing the environmental harms associated with reduced water deliveries. Among other things, NEPA calls for federal agencies to use all practicable means ... to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may— (1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations; (2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings; (3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences; (4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice; (5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life’s amenities; and (6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b). Federal Defendants do suggest that Plaintiffs cannot meet the relaxed causation/redress standards applicable to their NEPA claim because Plaintiffs cannot show Federal Defendants’ actions actually resulted in harm to Plaintiffs: Plaintiffs here fail to show that the alleged failure of Reclamation to prepare an EIS or engage in more ESA consultation actually resulted in its being able to supply a lesser amount of water. Nor do they suggest, let alone demonstrate, that more NEPA analysis or more ESA consultation would have resulted in a lesser amount of water for the releases or the realization that the releases were not needed. Plaintiffs cannot make any such showings. The record shows that after considering its authority to make releases and the potential environmental impacts, and after coordination with NMFS to develop the action and fully considering its effects on listed coho salmon and Central Valley salmonids and green sturgeon, Reclamation determined that this volume of water was needed to prevent a massive die-off of fall-run Chinook and other salmonids in the lower Klamath River. Reclamation’s substantive conclusions about the need for this amount of water and the environmental impacts of that release and impacts to listed fish were reasonable and undisputed. Doc. 120-1 at 19. While it is true that the scientific basis for the FARs is undisputed, Federal Defendants apply the incorrect standard. For standing purposes, a litigant seeking to vindicate a procedural right “need only demonstrate that he has ‘a procedural right that, if exercised, could protect his concrete interests.’ ” Jewell, 749 F.3d at 783 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Contrary to Federal Defendants’ argument, the Court believes a procedural remedy could protect Plaintiffs’ concrete interests. For example, an alternatives analysis could have caused Reclamation to consider means by which replacement water could have been delivered to Plaintiffs, as was the case in 2003. Plaintiffs have standing to pursue their NEPA claim. b. ESA § 7 Claim. As noted above, Plaintiffs may satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement by showing “that the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of [theirs] that is the ultimate basis of [their] standing.” Pit River Tribe, 469 F.3d at 779. Plaintiffs maintain they have a concrete interest in ensuring Reclamation consults regarding the impacts of the FARs on ESA-listed species “because deterioration in the condition of those species results in more stringent regulation and reduction of CVP water supply.” Doc. 125 at 6. This is a clear admission that their direct interest is in ensuring the continued delivery of water to their members, not in species protection. The ESA § 7 consultation procedures at issue directly promote the goal of species protection. See Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220, 1225-26 (9th Cir.2008). Therefore, a plaintiff organization with the stated purpose of preserving an endangered species may invoke ESA § 7 procedural protections to achieve standing. Id. But, Plaintiffs do not even argue that the text of ESA § 7 could support a finding that its procedures are designed to protect Plaintiffs’ ultimate interest in avoiding additional restrictions to their water supply. But, even if Plaintiffs were able to demonstrate that the procedures set forth in ESA § 7 were designed to protect the type of concrete interest, asserted, they have failed to “establish the reasonable probability of the challenged action’s threat to [their] concrete interest.” Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir.2001). This is a causation requirement that applies even under the relaxed standard applicable to procedural injury claims. Id. at 976 (indicating that Hall was analyzing a procedural claim); see also Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1171 n. 6 (9th Cir.2011) (explaining that the “reasonable probability” standard for procedural injury cases survived the Supreme Court’s decision in Summers). Plaintiffs argue that the FARs “threatened to impair the status and recovery of listed fish” because the FARs “reduce the total volume of TRD water available to maintain cold temperatures for ESA-listed salmonids in the Sacramento River.” Doc. 125 at 6. However, the record does not support this assertion. The declarations of Daniel G. Nelson, cited by Plaintiffs, serve only to establish the general proposition that Plaintiffs have on other occasions been subjected to water supply reductions as a result of regulatory activity to protect listed species. See Doc. 126, Second Declaration of Daniel G Nelson (“Second Nelson Decl.”) at ¶¶ 3-4; Nelson Decl. at 6, 8, 9. Plaintiffs next cite their own letter to the Bureau in response to the issuance of the Draft FONSI/EA for the 2013 FARs, in which Plaintiffs assert that “low reservoir inflow and increased storage withdrawal is depleting the cold water pool in the reservoirs that is important to provide adequate instream fishery habitat for ana-dromous fish in the rivers through the summer and fall.” AR 00074. But, even if this unsupported argument is true, that the cold water pool is “important” and that várious conditions in 2013 were “depleting” that cold water pool does not establish that it is “reasonably probable” that the FARs will harm listed species. Plaintiffs also cite pages 5373 and 5374 of the Supplemental Administrative Record (“SAR”), a May 24, 2013 letter from the Bureau and California’s Department of Water Resources (“DWR”), which operates the State Water Project, to the SWRCB, requesting that the SWRCB “acknowledge that the water year classification for the Sacramento Valley [calculated as “Dry” based upon a formula contained in] Revised Water Rights Decision 1641 (D-1641) does not accurately reflect the unprecedented dry conditions experienced in 2013.” Instead of requiring the CVP and SWP to meet “Dry” year objectives, the Bureau and DWR requested that the SWRCB permit operations to meet “Critical” water year objectives, a modification the Bureau and DWR indicated was “important to provide adequate instream fishery habitat for anadromous fish in the rivers through the summer and fall.” Id. But, Plaintiffs do not explain how this request relates to the likelihood that cold water pool resources would be insufficient as a result of the FARs. Federal Defendants have consistently maintained that the FARs would not change Reclamation’s ability to meet all flow and temperature requirements. AR 00053-54. Plaintiffs have not met their burden to establish to that the FARs were likely to harm their protected interests to any degree of probability, let alone to a “reasonably probable” degree. Therefore, Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their ESA § 7 claim. In sum, Federal Defendants’ motion for summary judgment that Plaintiffs lack standing to sue is GRANTED as to the ESA claim and DENIED as to all other claims; Plaintiffs’ cross motion that Plaintiffs have standing is DENIED as to the ESA claim and GRANTED as to all other claims. B. Mootness. 1. General Standard. An issue is moot “when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000). “The underlying concern is that, when the challenged conduct ceases such that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated, then it becomes impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). If the parties cannot obtain any effective relief, any opinion about the legality of a challenged action is advisory. Id. “Mootness has been described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n. 22, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (internal citation and quotation omitted). “[A]n actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Id. at 67, 117 S.Ct. 1055. Even if a case is technically moot, a case may nevertheless be judiciable if one of three exceptions to the mootness doctrine applies: (1) where a plaintiff “would suffer collateral legal consequences if the actions being appealed were allowed to stand”; (2) where defendant voluntarily ceased the challenged practice; or (3) for “wrongs capable of repetition yet evading review.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lohn, 511 F.3d 960, 964-66 (9th Cir.2007). “The party asserting mootness has a heavy burden to establish that there is no effective relief remaining for a court to provide.” In re Palmdale Hills Property, LLC, 654 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir.2011). Having found Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their ESA claim, the Court organizes the remaining claims into two groups for purposes of analyzing mootness. First, the Court evaluates mootness as to the “substantive” claims arising under the CVPIA and various other provisions of Reclamation law. Next the Court evaluates whether the NEPA claim is moot. 2. Mootness of Substantive Claims. a. Continuing Practice. Plaintiffs claim that this case is not moot because the complaint challenges a “continuing practice.” Doc. 113 at 10. In support of this argument, Plaintiffs cite Forest Guardians v. Johanns, 450 F.3d 455 (9th Cir.2006), which addressed a challenge to the U.S. Forest Service’s failure to re-initiate ESA consultation on the impact of cattle grazing pursuant to Forest Service-issued grazing permits. Each challenged grazing permit had a ten-year term and required the Forest Service annually to obtain concurrence from FWS that certain criteria governing a prior “not likely to adversely affect” finding have been met. Id. at 462. After the lawsuit was filed, the Forest Service did re-initiate consultation on the permits and thereafter argued that the case was moot. Id. at 461. The Ni