HUSTEEL CO. v. United States (98 F. Supp. 3d 1315, 2015)

OPINION

RESTANI, Judge:

This action challenges the Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) final determination rendered in the antidumping (“AD”) duty investigation of certain oil country tubular goods (“OCTG”) from the Republic of Korea (“Korea”). See Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods From the Republic of Korea: Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Negative Final Determination of Critical Circumstances, 79 Fed.Reg. 41,983 (Dep’t Commerce July 18, 2014) (“Final Determination”). Before the court are the motions for judgment on the agency record of Korean producers Husteel Co., Ltd. (“Husteel”), NEXTEEL Co., Ltd. (“NEXTEEL”), ILJIN Steel Corporation (“IL-JIN”), AJU Besteel Co., Ltd. (“AJU Besteel”), and SeAH Steel Corp. (“SeAH”) (collectively, “plaintiffs”). See Br. of Pl. Husteel Co., Ltd. in Supp. of Its Mot. for J. on the Agency R., DE 95 (“Husteel Br.”); Mem. in Supp. of Consol. Pl. NEXTEEL’s Rule 56.2 Mot. for J. upon the Agency R., DE 106 (“NEXTEEL Br.”); Mem. in Supp. of Consol. Pl. HYSCO’s Rule 56.2 Mot. for J. upon the Agency R., DE 104 (“HYSCO Br.”); Br. of Pl. Intvnr. ILJIN Steel Corp. in Supp. of Its Mot. for J. on the Agency R., DE 89-1 (“ILJIN Br.”); Mot.' of Consol. Pl. AJU Besteel Co., Ltd. for J. upon the Agency R., DE 82-1 (“AJU Besteel Br.”); Br. of Pl. SeAH Steel Corp. in Supp. of Its Rule 56.2 Mot. for J. on the Agency R., DE 86 (“SeAH Br.”). Also before the court are the motions for judgment on the agency record of U.S. producers United States Steel Corporation (“U.S. Steel”) and Maverick Tube Corporation (“Maverick”) (collectively, “petitioners”). See Mot. of Pl. United States Steel Corp. for J. on the Agency R. Under Rule 56.2, DE 97 (“U.S. Steel Br.”); Pl.’s Maverick Tube Corp. Mem. in Supp. of Its Rule 56.2 Mot. for J. on the Agency R., DE 102 (“Maverick Br.”). For the reasons stated below, Commerce’s Final Determination is sustained in part and remanded in part.

BACKGROUND

Following the filing of a petition by U.S. Steel, Maverick, and other domestic producers of OCTG, Commerce initiated an AD investigation of OCTG from Korea on July 22, 2013. See Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from India, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Thailand, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,505, 45,506, 45,512 (Dep’t Commerce July 29, 2013) (“Initiation Notice ”). On August 26, 2013, Commerce limited the number of respondents for individual examination, selecting the two exporters or producers of OCTG that accounted for the largest volume of imports from Korea to the United States: NEXTEEL and HYS-CO. Respondent Selection Memorandum at 6-8, PD 80 (Aug. 27, 2013) (“Respondent Selection Memo”). Because the two mandatory respondents did not have viable home or third-country markets for OCTG, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4) (2012), Commerce used a constructed value (“CV”) to determine the appropriate normal value. Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Affirmative Determination in the Less than Fair Value Investigation of Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from the Republic of Korea at 3, A-580-870, (July 10, 2014), available at http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/ summary/korea-south/2014-16874-l.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2015) (“I & D Memo ”). In order to determine whether OCTG from Korea were sold in the United States at less than fair value, Commerce compared HYSCO’s constructed normal value to a constructed export price (“CEP”), because HYSCO reported that it sold the subject merchandise to a wholly-owned subsidiary in the United States that then sold the merchandise to an unaffiliated customer. Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Determination in the Less-Than Fair Value Investigation of Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from the Republic of Korea at 15, 19, PD 276 (Feb. 14, 2014) (“Preliminary I & D Memo ”). NEXTEEL’s constructed normal value was compared to NEXTEEL’s export price for certain sales that it made directly to unaffiliated customers, and CEP for sales made through an affiliated customer. See 1 & D Memo at 90.

In February 2014, Commerce issued a negative preliminary determination. Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods From the Republic of Korea: Negative Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, Negative Preliminary Determination of Critical Circumstances and Postponement of Final Determination, 79 Fed. Reg. 10,480 (Dep’t Commerce Feb. 25, 2014) (“Preliminary Determination ”). Commerce calculated weighted-average dumping margins of zero for both mandatory respondents. Id. at 10,481.

In July 2014, Commerce issued an affirmative final determination. Final Determination, 79 Fed.Reg. at 41,983. Commerce calculated a dumping margin of 9.89% for NEXTEEL and 15.75% for HYSCO. Id. at 41,984. Korean producers and exporters not individually examined, including Husteel, ILJIN, SeAH, and AJU Besteel, were assigned a margin of 12.82%, which was the weighted average of the mandatory respondents’ dumping margins. See id. The largest factor in the significant change in the dumping margin between the Preliminary Determination and the Final Determination was the profit figure used in the CV calculation. For NEXTEEL, Commerce preliminarily relied on the profit recorded in certain Korean OCTG producers’ financial statements, and for HYSCO, Commerce preliminarily used the profit HYSCO earned on its home market sales of non-OCTG pipe products. I & D Memo at 14. For the Final Determination, Commerce used the profit reflected in the financial statement of Tenaris S.A., a multinational corporation, to calculate CV profit for both mandatory respondents. Id. at 14, 16, The Tenaris financial statement was placed on the record after the Preliminary. Determination. See id. at 28-29.

The International Trade Commission reached an affirmative injury determination in September 2014. See Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from India, Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Vietnam, 79 Fed. Reg. 53,080 (ITC Sept. 5, 2014). Commerce issued the AD order effective September 10, 2014. See Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods From India, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, the Republic of Turkey, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Antidumping Duty Orders; and Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods From the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 79 Fed.Reg. 53,691 (Dep’t Commerce Sept. 10, 2014).

Korean producers NEXTEEL, HYSCO, Husteel, SeAH, AJU Besteel, and ILJIN, and domestic producers U.S. Steel and Maverick, challenge numerous aspects of Commerce’s Final Determination. Each issue will be discussed in turn.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c). The court will uphold Commerce’s final determination in an AD investigation, unless it is “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i).

DISCUSSION

I. Respondent Selection

A. Background

In the Initiation Notice, Commerce indicated that it would rely on U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) data for U.S. imports of OCTG to select mandatory respondents in the event that Commerce determined that the number of known exporters or producers was “large.” Initiation Notice, 78 Fed.Reg. at 45,511. Commerce explained that it would release the CBP data shortly following the Initiation Notice and invited interested parties to comment regarding the CBP data and respondent selection. Id.

Whereas the AD petition listed ten Korean producers or exporters of OCTG, Petition at Ex. 1-5, PD 1-3 (July 2, 2013), the CBP data released by Commerce listed twenty-two producers or exporters. CBP Data, CD 16-17 (July 26, 2013). Of the twenty-two companies listed, several of the companies had almost identical names, suggesting that these firms were double counted, and issues with others cast doubt on their suitábility as respondents. Id. The government states that even if some of the entries in the CBP data were redundant, there were at least twelve potential respondents, although the government maintains that twenty-two is the appropriate figure in determining the number of potential respondents. Def.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Mots, for J. upon the Administrative R. 67-70, ECF No. 144 (confidential version).

Commerce concluded that “[bjecause of the large number of known exporters or • producers involved in this investigation, and after careful consideration of [its] resources, ... it would not be practicable ... to examine all known exporters and producers of the subject merchandise as identified in the Petition and the CBP import data.” Respondent Selection Memo at 6. Rather than review each known exporter or producer, Commerce limited the mandatory respondents to the exporters or producers that accounted for the largest volume of imports of OCTG that reasonably could be examined, pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)(2)(B). See id. at 7. Commerce selected HYSCO and NEXTEEL, as they were the two largest exporters of OCTG. Id. at 8. Commerce indicated that it would consider requests to be treated as voluntary respondents at a future date. Id. at 9.

Husteel, SeAH, and ILJIN requested to be individually examined as voluntary respondents. Treatment of Voluntary Respondents Memorandum at 1, PD 194 (Dec. 30, 2013) (“Voluntary Respondent Memo”). On December 30, 2013, approximately four months after Commerce limited the number of mandatory respondents, Commerce determined that it could not examine any voluntary respondents “as this would be unduly burdensome to the Department, and inhibit the timely completion of this investigation.” Id. Commerce noted the complexities involved in its examination of the two mandatory respondents, the truncated timeline for investigations, the need to verify the responses of any additional respondents, its workload, including a number of AD and countervailing duty investigations on OCTG from other countries, and its limited resources as factors bearing on its decision. Id. at 5-7.

Husteel, SeAH, and ILJIN argue that they should have been examined either as either mandatory respondents or voluntary respondents.

B. Mandatory Respondent Selection

Husteel argues that Commerce impermissibly interpreted the statute that authorizes Commerce to limit the number of mandatory respondents “[i]f it is not practicable to make individual weighted average dumping margin determinations [for each known exporter or producer of the subject merchandise] because of the large number of exporters or producers involved in the investigation.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2). It argues that Commerce improperly relied on an assessment of its own resource constraints in defining “large number.” Husteel Br. at 39-42. Husteel further contends that the number of exporters or producers involved in the investigation was not “large.” Id. at 42-43.

ILJIN repeats the same arguments made by Husteel, but emphasizes Commerce should have predicted based on the CBP import data and the requests to be reviewed that only a handful of companies were willing to cooperate in the investigation. ILJIN Br. at 19-21. According to ILJIN, Commerce should have considered the number of respondents it in fact was likely to review (i.e., the companies that had indicated they would cooperate) in determining whether it could individually examine each respondent. Id. at 20-21. IL-JIN additionally argues that Commerce acted contrary to law, because it did not examine a “reasonable number” of respondents. Id. at 22-23. ILJIN also contends that Commerce erred by failing to take into account evidence showing that ILJIN was the only Korean producer of seamless OCTG and that any margin based solely on welded OCTG would not be representative. See id. at 23-30.

i. Reliance on Resources

The general rule in AD cases is that Commerce “shall determine the individual weighted average dumping margin for each known exporter and producer of the subject merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(1). The statute, however, provides an exception, which Commerce invoked in this case:

(2) Exception

If it is not practicable to make individual weighted average dumping margin determinations under paragraph (1) because of the large number of exporters or producers involved in th'e investigation or review, the administering authority may determine the weighted average dumping margins for a reasonable number of exporters or producers by limiting its examination to—

(A) a sample of exporters, producers, or types of products that is statistically valid based on the information available to the administering authority at the time of selection, or

(B) exporters and producers accounting for the largest volume of the subject merchandise from the exporting country that can be reasonably examined.

19 U.S.C. § 1677f — 1(c)(2). Husteel and ILJIN first argue that Commerce impermissibly determined whether there was a “large” number of potential respondents based upon its resource constraints. They cite several decisions of the court wherein Commerce was criticized for employing such reasoning. See Asahi Seiko Co. v. United States, 34 CIT 1443, 1449-50, 751 F.Supp.2d 1335, 1340-41 (2010) (concluding that Commerce had implicitly construed “large” to mean any number greater than three when Commerce stated in the issues and decision memorandum that “[b]ased upon our analysis of the workload required of this administrative review, we have determined that we can examine a maximum of three exporters/producers” and determining that this construction was unreasonable); Carpenter Tech. Corp. v. United States, 33 CIT 1721, 1726-29, 662 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1341-44 (2009) (concluding that Commerce had interpreted “large” to mean any number greater than two based upon Commerce’s explanation in the issues and decision memorandum that it could “examine a maximum of two exporters/producers” and holding that this interpretation was unreasonable); Zhejiang Native Produce & Animal By-Prods. Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United States, 33 CIT 1125, 1129, 637 F.Supp.2d 1260, 1263-64 (2009) (rejecting Commerce’s conclusion that four was a large number and explaining that “[t]he statute focuses solely on the practicability of determining individual dumping margins based on the large number of exporters or producers” and thus “Commerce may not rely upon its workload caused by other ... proceedings in assessing whether the number of exporters or producers is ‘large’ ”). This argument lacks merit.

Commerce apparently took account of its limited resources and the workload caused by other proceedings in deciding to limit the number of mandatory respondents. For example, Commerce stated that “[i]n considering what constitutes a large number of exporters and producers as part of selecting respondents for an antidumping duty investigation, the Department carefully considers its resources, including its current and anticipated workload and deadlines coinciding with the proceeding in question.” Respondent Selection Memo at 6. Commerce also stated that although it ideally would examine all potential respondents, “in instances where [Commerce is] forced to limit [its] examination due to the large number of potential respondents relative to [its] resource constraints,” Commerce examines as many exporters or producers as it is able. Id. Although Commerce referenced its resource constraints a number of times in the Respondent Selection Memo, these references do not fatally undermine Commerce’s conclusion that there was a “large” number of exporters or producers involved in the investigation.

This case distinguishable in a number of material respects from Asahi, Carpenter, and Zhejiang. Unlike Commerce’s determinations in Asahi and Carpenter, Commerce’s determination here did not rest on an interpretation that any number greater than two or three is large. Rather, Commerce determined that a large number of potential respondents was involved in the investigation and then limited its examination to two. And the situation faced by Commerce in Zhejiang was materially different, in that the number of respondents initially involved in that case was four, the two respondents initially selected for review refused to cooperate, and the plaintiff was the only company still seeking review. 33 CIT at 1130, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1264. Thus, Commerce determined in that case that between one and four respondents was a large number. See id. Here, Commerce was determining whether twelve constituted a large number of exporters or producers, which is a much larger number. The court recognizes that Zhejiang did state that “Commerce may not rely upon its workload caused by other anti-dumping proceedings in assessing whether the number of exporters or producers is ‘large,’ and thus deciding that individual determinations are impracticable.” Id. at 1129, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1263-64. The court urges Commerce to focus solely on the number of exporters or producers involved in the investigation or review, rather than its workload caused by other proceedings, in determining whether there is a large number of potential respondents. The statement in Zhejiang, however, should be read within its context. The very next sentence stated that “Commerce cannot rewrite the statute based on its staffing issues.” Id. at 1129, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1264. The problem in Zhejiang was that Commerce used its resource constraints to interpret the statute to mean that even numbers that appear to be objectively small, such as one or four, were defined as “large.” Commerce here has not written “large” completely out of the statute, and the court will not reject Commerce’s conclusion that twelve is a large enough number that examining each producer or exporter would be impracticable, solely because Commerce referenced its heavy workload.

ii. Whether Twelve is a Large Number

Husteel and ILJIN next argue that Commerce erred in concluding that there were a “large” number of respondents involved in the investigation. The statute does not define the term “large” and Commerce is afforded some discretion in interpreting that term. Cf. Carpenter, 33 CIT at 1727-28, 662 F.Supp.2d at 1342 (noting that Congress did not define the term “large number of exporters or producers involved in the [administrative proceedings]” and acknowledging that “the term might be seen as inherently ambiguous in some contexts”). The court has suggested that numbers ranging from three, see id. at 1726-29, 662 F.Supp.2d at 1341-44, to eight, see id. at 1730, 662 F.Supp.2d at 1344, do not constitute “large” numbers. The number of exporters or producers involved in this case, twelve, exceeds the number of potential respondents involved in the cases cited by Husteel and ILJIN. In addition to the fact that the number of potential respondents involved in this case is larger than the cases cited, the court notes that this case involves an investigation. As explained in greater detail regarding Commerce’s refusal to examine any voluntary respondents, the statutory deadlines for completing an investigation are shorter than the deadlines for completing a review, and Commerce is required to conduct a verification of respondents’ submissions. As a general matter, “Commerce has more work to do in less time” when conducting an investigation. Mem. in Opp’n to Pis.’ and Pl.-Intvnrs.’ Mot. for J. on the Agency R. Filed by Def.-Intvnr. United States Steel Corp. 91, ECF No. 149 (“U.S. Steel Resp.”). Although Commerce’s shifting resource allocations do not define “large,” “large” may mean something different in investigations. The court concludes that Commerce’s determination that there was a “large” number of known exporters or producers involved in this investigation was reasonable.

Husteel and ILJIN allude to fact that only five companies requested to be examined, and suggest that Commerce should have considered the fact that its investigation likely would have consisted of only those companies. The statute states that Commerce “shall determine the individual weighted average dumping margin for each known exporter and producer of the subject merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(1). The Statement of Administrative Action indicates that Commerce’s practice is to attempt to calculate margins “for all producers and exporters of merchandise who are subject to an antidumping investigation.” Statement of Administrative Action Accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, vol. 1, at 872 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4200 (“SAA”). The statute does not limit Commerce’s duty to investigate only respondents that specifically ask to be reviewed. Furthermore, ILJIN’s apparent assumption that the other companies listed in the CBP data would not have cooperated in any investigation is based on nothing more than speculation. The court therefore rejects this contention.

Hi “Reasonable Number” of Respondents

ILJIN next cursorily argues that Commerce’s decision to limit the number of mandatory respondents to only two was unreasonable. See ILJIN Br. at 22-23. ILJIN contends that “if the exception can legally be invoked, it provides that the ‘administering authority may determine the weighted average dumping margins for a reasonable number of exporters or producers by limiting its examination to ... [the selected subset identified in subparts (A) and (B) ].’ ” Id. at 22-23 (alterations in original) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)). According to ILJIN, two out of ten is not a “reasonable number.” Id. at 23. In support of this argument, ILJIN cites Zhejiang, Carpenter, and Asahi as establishing a minimum number of respondents that must be reviewed. This argument lacks merit.

First, ILJIN did not exhaust its administrative remedies on this issue. Nowhere in its case brief did ILJIN argue that two was not a “reasonable number” of respondents. See ILJIN Case Brief, PD 446 (June 8, 2014); Pakfood Pub. Co. v. United States, 34 CIT 1122, 1143-44, 724 F.Supp.2d 1327, 1349-50 (2010) (discussing general rule that a party must present all of its arguments in its case brief in order to exhaust its administrative remedies). Second, whether a certain number of mandatory respondents is “reasonable” in any particular case is likely to depend on the facts of that case, such as the subject merchandise at issue, the respondents chosen, the mandatory respondents’ share of the total volume of imports, and other factors. There is no magic number of respondents that must be chosen for the number to be “reasonable,” and the cases cited by ILJIN do not create any such bright line. None of those cases discussed whether the number of respondents selected was a “reasonable number” once the authority to limit the number of respondents was invoked properly. The court therefore rejects this argument.

iv. Representativeness

ILJIN also argues that Commerce failed to take account of information it submitted showing that the other potential respondents in the investigation, including the two respondents that were selected for individual examination, were' not representative of ILJIN. See ILJIN Br. at 23-31. ILJIN notes that it produces only seamless OCTG, whereas each of the other Korean companies produce only welded OCTG. Seamless OCTG requires different manufacturing processes. See ILJIN’s Comments on Respondent Selection at 2-5, PD 56 (Aug. 5, 2013). ILJIN submitted information to Commerce showing that because of the specialized nature of seamless OCTG, the sales price of seamless OCTG was significantly higher than the sales prices for welded OCTG. Id. ILJIN contends that it is “fundamentally unfair to burden ILJIN’s sales of seamless OCTG with the margins calculated on much lower-priced welded OCTG.” ILJIN Br. at 24. This argument has merit.

“[A]n overriding purpose of Commerce’s administration of antidumping laws is to calculate dumping margins as accurately as possible.” Parkdale Int'l v. United States, 475 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2007) (citing Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1185, 1191 (Fed.Cir. 1990)). The statute expresses a general preference that each exporter or producer receive its own margin. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c); see also Carpenter, 33 CIT at 1731, 662 F.Supp.2d at 1345 (construing that the statute should be construed such that “limiting the number of individually examined respondents is intended to be the exceptional circumstance, not the norm”). By individually examining each exporter or producer, Commerce bases dumping margins on each company’s own commercial behavior, which presumably supports the overall goal of calculating dumping margins as accurately as possibly. As explained, in certain circumstances, Commerce is authorized to limit its examination to a “reasonable number” of respondents by using “(A) a sample of exporters, producers, or types of products that is statistically valid based on the information available to the administering authority at the time of selection, or (B) exporters and producers accounting for the largest volume of the subject merchandise from the exporting country that can be reasonably examined.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)(2). It is not unreasonable to assume that the goals of these provisions are to capture a broadly representative sample of the export market, whether through the use of a statistically valid sample based on factors pertinent to the case or by the fact that capturing a large percentage of the imported merchandise generally will reflect the various commercial realities in the home market. This assumption is at the heart of ILJIN’s argument.

As explained, ILJIN submitted information to Commerce showing that it was the sole producer of seamless OCTG, which for a number of reasons markedly differs from welded OCTG. Petitioners submitted similar information to Commerce and argued that “the Department should select Ujin as a mandatory respondent to ensure that the investigation covers a representative sample of Korean OCTG producers.” Petitioners’ Comments on Respondent Selection at 5, PD 57 (Aug. 6, 2013). ILJIN noted that Commerce had the authority to consider differences in product type and that using the sampling methodology under § 1677f-1(c)(2)(A) would allow Commerce to select producers of seamless and welded OCTG. ILJIN’s Comments on Respondent Selection at 5; ILJIN Case Brief at 6-7. IL-JIN also argued that Commerce could satisfy both statutory provisions by selecting ILJIN under subsection (A) to ensure that producers of both kinds of OCTG were represented and then choosing the largest producers or exporters under subsection (B). ILJIN Case Brief at 7.

Commerce provided the following explanation in the Respondent Selection Memo for its choice of mandatory respondents:

[T]he Department has the statutory discretion to choose respondents by either sampling or selecting the exporters or producers that account for the largest volume of exports of subject merchandise. In selecting respondents in this antidumping duty investigation, the Department finds that, given its limited resources, it is most appropriate to select the exporters or producers accounting for the largest volume of the subject merchandise that can reasonably be examined, pursuant to section 777A(c)(2)(B) of the Act.

Respondent Selection Memo at 7. Regarding the arguments raised by ILJIN and the petitioners, Commerce stated in a footnote that

[w]ith respect to ... ILJIN’s argument that we should select it because it is allegedly the only Korean producer of seamless OCTG, and petitioners’ proposed respondent selection methodology, we note that none of these suggestions for respondent selection are pertinent to the factors that we normally consider in selecting respondents under the two methodologies (ie., choosing a statistically valid sample or selecting the largest volume exporters and producers) permitted by the statute.

Id. at 7-8 n. 49. Commerce also stated that “[wjhile petitioner argues that ILJIN’s sales would be more representative, the statute allows for selection based upon the largest exporters.” Id. at 8. Later in the proceedings, when Commerce declined to investigate any voluntary , respondents, Commerce explained that

[i]n making our determination regarding mandatory respondent selection, the Department already took into account IL-JIN’s argument that it was the only producer of seamless OCTG in Korea. The scope of this investigation covers both welded and seamless OCTG, and, thus, seamless OCTG is of the same class or kind as welded OCTG.

Voluntary Respondent Memo at 5 n. 31. The I & D Memo did not address ILJIN’s representativeness argument at all.

Commerce has a general duty to explain the basis for its decisions. NMB Sing. Ltd. v. United States, 557 F.3d 1316, 1319-20 (Fed.Cir.2009). This includes addressing relevant arguments made by interested parties. Id. Even when an agency has discretion, “[a]n agency ‘must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner.’” Changzhou Hawd Flooring Co. v. United States, 44 F.Supp.3d 1376, 1390 (CIT 2015) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983)). Commerce failed to provide adequate reasoning for refusing to examine ILJIN as a mandatory respondent.

As is apparent from the quoted passages, Commerce essentially ignored ILJIN’s arguments regarding whether its participation was required in order for the examined respondents to be representative of the Korean market and that dumping margins based on producers who manufacture only welded OCTG would be unfair to ILJIN, which produces only seamless OCTG. Commerce similarly ignored the argument by petitioners that examination of ILJIN was necessary to ensure that the experiences of Korean seamless OCTG producers were included in the investigation, leaving an important type of subject merchandise, which petitioners successfully sought to have included in the investigation, completely unexamined. Commerce’s reasoning appears to be little more than it has discretion in choosing between the respondent selection methodologies. That is insufficient. See id. Nowhere in the agency record is there evidence that it exercised that discretion in a lawful way.

In its brief before the court, the government cites to Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 949 F.Supp.2d 1247 (CIT 2013), as supporting Commerce’s conclusion. Def.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Mots, for J. upon the Administrative R. 72-74, ECF No. 146 (“Gov. Br.”). The court in that case noted that “[njothing in the language of [19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(e)(2)(B) ] even hints that the exporters and producers selected for individual review must be ‘representative’ ” and that nothing in the SAA suggests that Commerce’s selection of respondents based on volume is constrained by concerns about representativeness. 949 F.Supp.2d at 1271-72. The court did suggest, however, that representativeness was a concern when employing the sampling method in § 1677Í-1 (c)(2)(A). Id. at 1272. The government’s reliance on this case is unavailing. First, the court in Mid Continent Nail determined that the plaintiff in that case had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, and thus this claim was barred. Id. at 1263. Thus, the discussion cited by the government likely is nothing more than dicta. Second, the plaintiff in that case did not challenge the government’s decision to rely solely on § 1677f-l(c)(2)(B) as the appropriate method for choosing respondents. The court specifically stated that

[n]othing herein should be understood to suggest that Commerce’s discretion to choose between the two methodologies specified in 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c)(2) is wholly unfettered, or that “representativeness” could never constrain Commerce’s ability to rely on 19 U.S.C. § -1677f — 1(c)(2)(B) or affect a determination as to whether a specific number of exporters and producers is “reasonable” given the facts of a particular case. Those issues are not presented here.

Id. at 1274 n. 25. This is exactly the situation presented here. ILJIN argued that Commerce’s selection of mandatory respondents failed to consider that the two producers of welded OCTG that were selected were not representative of producers of seamless OCTG such as ILJIN, and Commerce failed to deal with the issue.

Accordingly, the court remands this issue for reconsideration. In making its decision on remand, Commerce must consider record evidence that is probative of the difference between welded and seamless OCTG, including costs and pricing.

C. Voluntary Respondent Selection

Even when Commerce lawfully limits the number of respondents selected as mandatory respondents, the statute contemplates that exporters or producers can still obtain their own margin as a voluntary respondent. 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(a) provides:

In any investigation ... or a review ... in which the administering authority has, under section 1677f — 1(c)(2) of this title ..., limited the number of exporters or producers examined, or determined a single country-wide rate, the administering authority shall establish ... an individual weighted average dumping margin for any exporter or producer not initially selected for individual examination under such sections who submits to the administering authority the information requested from exporters or producers selected for examination, if—

(1) such information is so submitted by the date specified—

(A) for exporters and producers that were initially selected for examination, [and] ...

(2) the number of exporters or producers who have submitted such information is not so large that individual examination of such exporters or producers would be unduly burdensome and inhibit the timely completion of the investigation.

Commerce declined to accept any voluntary respondents, claiming that doing so would be unduly burdensome and inhibit the timely completion of the review.

Husteel and ILJIN argue that Commerce has not shown that examination of additional respondents would have been “unduly burdensome.” Husteel Br. at 44-49; ILJIN Br. at 32-33. They argue that Commerce failed to cite any burden that would result from investigating the additional respondents that is different from the typical burdens of a thorough investigation, which they claim is insufficient to create an “undue burden.” See Husteel Br. at 45-47; ILJIN Br. at 33-35. They note that only three companies asked to be voluntarily reviewed and also argue that the investigation of each company would have been relatively straight-forward. Husteel Br. 47-49; ILJIN Br. 33. ILJIN also argues that Commerce could have chosen to review just a single additional company, rather than all three, and reemphasizes that it should have been examined because it was the only producer of seamless OCTG, which has different costs and sells at a higher price than welded OCTG. ILJIN Br. at 34-35.

The government argues that Commerce properly considered its limited resources, current and anticipated workload, and the complexities of the investigation, and reasonably limited its investigation to only the two mandatory respondents. Gov. Br. at 75-78. The government and U.S. Steel note that the investigations into just the two mandatory respondents was extensive and complex and that investigating additional companies would have required additional verifications, which are mandatory in investigations. Id.; U.S. Steel Resp. at 89-91. The government and U.S. Steel additionally highlight the shorter statutory deadlines in investigations compared to reviews, explaining that “Commerce has more work to do in less time.” U.S. Steel Resp. at 91; see also Gov. Br. at 76-77. On the facts of this case, the court agrees with the government.

Husteel and ILJIN rely heavily on Grobest & I-Mei Industrial (Vietnam) Co. v. United States, 815 F.Supp.2d 1342 (CIT 2012) (“Grobest I ”), and Grobest & I-Mei Industrial (Vietnam) Co. v. United States, 853 F.Supp.2d 1352 (CIT 2012) (“Grobest II”). The Grobest plaintiff challenged Commerce’s decision to limit individual examinations in the administrative review to only the two mandatory respondents initially chosen. See Grobest I, 815 F.Supp.2d at 1360-61 & n. 25. In Grobest I, the court remanded Commerce’s refusal to accept the plaintiffs request for review as a voluntary respondent because Commerce had.unlawfully treated its decision to limit the number of mandatory respondents under 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-l(c) as dis-positive of the issue as to whether it needed to review any voluntary respondents. Id. at 1362-64. The court noted that the two distinct standards listed in § 1677f-1(c)(2) and § 1677m(a) require two separate determinations, and concluded that § 1677m(a) “sets a higher threshold of agency burden before the requirement of individual review can be avoided.” Id. at 1363.

On remand, Commerce again refused to examine the plaintiff as a voluntary respondent. The court rejected the plaintiffs claim that Commerce’s determination violated the unambiguous language of the statute pursuant to step one of the Chevron analysis. Grobest II, 853 F.Supp.2d at 1363. The court noted that “the statute conditions consideration of ‘a number so large’ on whether review of such a number of respondents would be unduly burdensome and inhibit the timely completion of the review” and thus concluded that the statute does not require the number of voluntary respondents to reach “some arbitrary threshold of largeness,” as such an interpretation would fail to consider the relative burdens that may be caused by reviewing any one respondent. Id. The court concluded, however, that Commerce had failed to show an undue burden. Id. at 1364. The court determined that

the facts that Commerce put forward to support that conclusion do not distinguish this case from the paradigmatic review of an antidumping or countervailing duty order. Rather, the burdens Commerce names in the Remand Results are the same burdens that occur in every review. In this regard, Commerce’s decision that the burden in this case is undue sets the bar for undue burden too low because it would make individual review of voluntary respondents in any typical antidumping or countervailing duty review unduly burdensome, and such a determination renders § 1677m(a) meaningless.

Id. at 1364-65 (footnote omitted).

Husteel and ILJIN assert that because § 1677m(a) sets a higher bar than § 1677f-l(c)(2), Commerce could not limit its review to solely the two mandatory respondents. They reason that cases interpreting § 1677f-l(c)(2) as requiring individual examination of numbers as large as eight, see, e.g., Carpenter, 33 CIT at 1730, 662 F.Supp.2d at 1344, set the baseline for the total number of respondents that Commerce must review. They also note that many of the burdens cited by Commerce in this case, including the need to issue supplemental questionnaires, issues regarding affiliation, unfamiliarity with the respondents, and high workloads throughout Commerce, reflect the “typical” burdens cited by Commerce in Grobest II and rejected by the court. Compare Grobest II, 853 F.Supp.2d at 1365 n. 12, with Voluntary Respondent Memo at 4-7. Accordingly, they argue Commerce failed to show that reviewing any and/or all of the three firms that requested voluntary status would be unduly burdensome.

The court agrees with the analysis in Grobest II that § 1677m(a) does not set an arbitrary threshold as to the number of exporters or producers that must submit a request for voluntary review before Commerce may decline to individually examine each such exporter or producer. The court also agrees with the implicit conclusion in Grobest II that Commerce may in some cases refuse to review any voluntary respondents. As the court noted in that case, the term “not so large” is defined in relation to the burden additional examinations would place on the agency and its ability to timely complete the investigation. 853 F.Supp.2d at 1363. The SAA also contemplates that in certain eases, Commerce may decline to analyze such responses. See SAA, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, vol. 1, at 873, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4201 (“Although Commerce ... will not discourage voluntary responses and will endeavor to investigate all firms that voluntarily provide timely responses in the form required, in certain cases (including cases involving the same product from multiple countries) where the number of exporters or producers is particularly high, Commerce may decline to analyze voluntary responses because it would be unduly burdensome and would preclude the completion of timely investigations or reviews”).

The court does not agree, however, with Husteel and ILJIN’s interpretation of Grobest that § 1677m(a)’s “higher threshold” means that cases interpreting “large” in § 1677f — 1(c)(2) essentially set a minimum number of total respondents that must be examined, either as mandatory or voluntary respondents. The court notes that the analysis in § 1677f — 1 (c) (2) should be made without considering the resources available to Commerce, whereas the concept of “undue burden” contained in § 1677m(a) is predicated on Commerce’s ability to complete the investigation on time, which would seem to invite consideration of Commerce’s resources. Additionally, if the court were to conclude that § 1677m(a) sets a bar higher than § 1677f-l(c)(2), in the manner suggested by Husteel and ILJIN, then the court’s cases interpreting § 1677f-l(c)(2) essentially would set a baseline as to the number of respondents that Commerce must review in each case, which appears contrary to other parts of the analysis in Grobest II.

The court understands the problem in Grobest to be a concern that Commerce was interpreting § 1677m(a) in a manner that rendered that provision a nullity. See Grobest I, 815 F.Supp.2d at 1362 (concluding that Commerce’s interpretation “would mean that § 1677m(a) review of voluntary respondents is already curtailed once a § 1677f-l(c)(2) decision to limit the number of respondents is made” and would render § 1677m(a) “meaningless”); Grobest II, 853 F.Supp.2d at 1365 (holding that Commerce’s failure to show that the burden of reviewing a voluntary respondent would exceed that presented in a typical review rendered § 1677m(a) “meaningless” and thus its decision was an abuse of discretion). Commerce initially had treated its decision to limit the number of mandatory respondents as allowing it to ignore voluntary respondent requests, and then on remand relied on burdens that are present in almost every single case to justify its decision to limit the review to only two respondents. Thus, whether by accepting Commerce’s interpretation of the statute or its explanation of its burdens, respondents that were not chosen as mandatory respondents would have no hope of receiving an individual margin via § 1677m(a), which defeats the congressional intent reflected in the inclusion of that provision in the statute.

Viewed in this context, the “higher threshold” referenced in Grobest is better understood as a requirement that Commerce rely on something other than its initial decision to limit the number of mandatory respondents when analyzing requests for voluntary respondents. Commerce has the authority to limit the number of mandatory respondents to a “reasonable number.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2). • Once Commerce does that, it must show that it actually would be burdened by individually examining exporters or producers that request to be treated as voluntary respondents. 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(a). It cannot simply rely on the fact that it already chose to limit the number of respondents to a “reasonable number” pursuant to § 1677f-l(c)(2).' Commerce in this ease did not simply rely on the fact that it limited the number of mandatory respondents pursuant to § 1677f-1(c)(2) in declining to review any voluntary respondents. Rather, it gave specific reasons for why examining any additional respondents “would be unduly burdensome and inhibit the timely completion of the investigation.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(a). The court therefore rejects the arguments that any baselines supposedly created in cases interpreting § 1677f-l(c)(2) should be transported into the 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(a) analysis on the basis that § 1677m(a) requires a “higher threshold” before Commerce may refuse to perform an individual examination.

The court’s understanding of the problem addressed by Grobest, namely the risk that Commerce effectively was eliminating 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(a) from the statute (either as a legal matter or a practical matter), similarly informs its analysis of the argument that the burdens cited by the agency in this case largely mirror the burdens rejected in Grobest II. Had the court accepted the agency’s arguments in Grobest II,' the standard for declining to review voluntary respondents would have been so low that Commerce would be able to justify its refusal to consider voluntary requests in nearly every single case. That is not the case here. Although many of the burdens cited by Commerce in this case mirror the burdens cited in Grobest II, there are two key distinctions.

First, this case involves an investigation. In investigations, Commerce’s statutory deadlines for completing the administrative proceedings are shortened. Compare 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673b, 1673d, with 19 U.S.C. § 1675. Commerce must initially familiarize itself with the product and respondents, and verification of all information relied upon is required, whereas verification in reviews is needed only under certain circumstances. 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(i). Commerce noted that accepting additional respondents would require additional on-site verifications in Korea and possibly the United States. See Voluntary Respondent Memo at 7. As Commerce explained, “[i]n investigations, we have less time in which to complete more work when considering the vast quantity of previously unknown information submitted to us.” Id. at 5. Thus, the burden placed on Commerce in this case is not typical of every administrative proceeding, although it may be typical of many investigations.

Second, this case was part of a number of investigations concurrently initiated regarding OCTG. Commerce noted that “the Department is currently handling 11 concurrent AD and CVD investigations on OCTG from various countries.” Id. at 6. The SAA specifically notes that

[although Commerce ... will not discourage voluntary responses and will endeavor to investigate all firms that voluntarily provide timely responses in the form required, in certain cases (including cases involving the same product from multiple countries) where the number of exporters or producers is particularly high, Commerce may decline to analyze voluntary responses because it would be unduly burdensome and would preclude the completion of timely investigations or reviews.

H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, vol. 1, at 873, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4201 (emphasis added). The fact that Commerce was handling numerous OCTG investigations is a pertinent factor the court takes into consideration. Although Commerce limited the number of respondents examined in each case, the total number of respondents examined was large. There is no indication that Commerce faced a similar situation in Grobest.

Because of the concurrent investigations into the same product and the fact that Commerce is required to do more work in less time when conducting such investigations, Commerce has shown that the burden of reviewing a voluntary respondent in this case would exceed the typical burden Commerce faces in other administrative proceedings. On the facts of this case, Commerce’s determination that it would be unduly burdensome to examine any additional respondents was supported by substantial evidence, and was otherwise in accordance with law. See Grobest II, 853 F.Supp.2d at 1365 (“When Commerce can show that the burden of reviewing a voluntary respondent would exceed that presented in the typical antidumping or countervailing duty review, the court will not second 'guess Commerce’s decision on how to allocate its resources.”).

II. Constructed Value Profit

Plaintiffs argue that Commerce committed a multitude of errors regarding Commerce’s calculation of CV profit, which can be distilled down to two general arguments. First, Commerce should not have used the financial statement of Tenaris to calculate CV profit. See HYSCO Br. at 12-46; NEXTEEL Br. at 13-44; Husteel Br. at 16-33, 36-38. Second, assuming that Commerce could use Tenaris’s financial statement for the purposes of CV profit, Commerce erred in failing to apply a profit cap. See HYSCO Br. at 46-50; NEXTEEL Br. at 44 — 49; Husteel Br. at 33-36. These arguments have merit.

A. Background

When using constructed value to calculate the normal value, the constructed value is to include “the actual amounts incurred and realized by the specific exporter or producer being examined ... for selling, general, and administrative expenses, and for profits, in connection with the production and sale of a foreign like product, in the ordinary course of trade, for consumption in the foreign country.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(2)(A). If such data is unavailable, however, Commerce must resort to one of three alternatives for calculating an appropriate amount for selling, general, and administrative expenses, and profits:

(i) the actual amounts incurred and realized by the specific exporter or producer being examined in the investigation or review for selling, general, and administrative expenses, and for profits, in connection with the production and sale, for consumption in the foreign country, of merchandise that is in the same general category of products as the subject merchandise,

(ii) the weighted average of the actual amounts incurred and realized by exporters or producers that are subject to the investigation or review (other than the exporter or producer described in clause (i)) for selling, general, and administrative expenses, and for profits, in connection with the production and sale of a foreign like product, in the ordinary course of trade, for consumption in the foreign country, or

(Hi) the amounts incurred and realized for selling, general, and administrative expenses, and for profits, based on any other reasonable method, except that the amount allowed for profit may not exceed the amount normally realized by exporters or producers (other than the exporter or producer described in clause (i)) in connection with the sale, for consumption in the foreign country, of merchandise that is in the same general category of products as the subject merchandise, [i.e., what is commonly referred to as the “profit cap.”]

19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(2)(B). The court will refer to these alternatives as “alternative (i),” “alternative (ii),” and “alternative (iii),” respectively. In this case, Commerce determined that the data to calculate a profit figure under § 1677b(e)(2)(A) was unavailable and therefore it had to rely on one of the alternatives listed in § 1677b(e)(2)(B). I & D Memo at 14.

For the Preliminary Determination, Commerce considered three possible options for CV profit: “[ (1) ] the profit reflected in the audited financial statements for seven Korean OCTG producers, [ (2) ] the profit earned by HYSCO on its home market sales of non-OCTG pipe products, and [ (3) ] the profit for Tenaris, SA (Tenaris), an Argentinian global producer and seller of OCTG,” as described in a research paper prepared by a student at the University of Iowa School of Management. Preliminary I & D Memo at 22. Commerce noted that “all three options have their limitations.” Id. For the profit on HYSCO’s home market sales of non-OCTG pipes, Commerce noted that this profit “reflect[ed] the profit on pipe products typically used in the construction industry, as opposed to the OCTG products used in the specialized oil and gas industry.” Id. “Likewise, the profit reflected in the Korean OCTG producers’ financial statements reflect the profits on the same non-OCTG pipe products, as well as the profits on OCTG sales predominantly to the United States.” Id. Regarding the Tenaris profit information, Commerce explained that although the information reflected predominantly OCTG sales, “it represents neither production nor sales in the market under consideration” and “is based on a research paper containing a disclaimer statement regarding its accuracy.” Id.

After considering the relative strengths and weaknesses of the various profit sources, Commerce preliminarily decided to base HYSCO’s CV profit on HYSCO’s profit on home market sales of non-OCTG pipe, pursuant to alternative (i). Id. For NEXTEEL, Commerce preliminarily decided to base CV profit on the profit earned by six Korean OCTG producers that earned a profit, pursuant to alternative (iii). Id. Commerce noted that “after the preliminary determination, we intend to continue to explore other possible options for CV profit for both respondents.” Id.

Following the Preliminary Determination, Commerce issued a supplemental questionnaire to NEXTEEL, requesting a breakdown of its costs and sales figures by product type (e.g., standard pipe, line pipe, OCTG) and by country to which it sold its products (e.g., U.S., Korea, Canada). See NEXTEEL’s Third Suppl. Section D Questionnaire Resp., CD 264 (Mar. 6, 2014). On March 21, 2014, U.S. Steel submitted a large amount of new factual information under 19 C.F.R. § 351.301(c)(l)(v), purporting to “rebut, clarify, or correct” evidence that was submitted by NEXTEEL in response to Commerce’s questionnaire. See U.S. Steel’s Comments re: NEXTEEL’s Third Suppl. Section D Questionnaire Resp., CD 303 (Mar. 21, 2014); U.S. Steel Resp. to Obj. of NEXTEEL at 1-2 & n. 1, PD 366 (Apr. 2, 2014). Included in U.S. Steel’s submission was Tenaris’s 2012 financial statement. See id. at Ex. P. NEXTEEL promptly requested that Commerce reject the information as untimely on the grounds that the information did not rebut, clarify, or correct the information contained in NEXTEEL’s response. NEXTEEL’s Req. to Reject Untimely New Factual Information at 1-2, PD 354 (Mar. 27, 2014) (“Req. to Reject Untimely Information”).

For the Final Determination, Commerce relied on the profit contained in Tenaris’s 2012 financial statement to calculate CV profit for both NEXTEEL and HYSCO pursuant to alternative (iii). I & D Memo at 14. Commerce rejected NEXTEEL’s claim that the information was untimely new factual information rather than rebuttal information. Id. at 29. Commerce concluded that U.S. Steel’s submission was rebuttal evidence, because NEXTEEL’s data could be used for purposes of calculating CV profit, and the information submitted by U.S. Steel was for the same purpose. Id. Commerce also explained that it has discretion to relax its regulations regarding the timely submission of information as long as parties are not substantially prejudiced, and it concluded that there was no prejudice because “NEXTEEL and HYSCO had an opportunity to submit rebuttal information ... had they chosen to do so.” Id. at 29-30.

Commerce determined that it could not rely upon alternative (i) for HYSCO, as it had in the Preliminary Determination, because HYSCO’s non-OCTG pipe products, such as line pipe and standard pipe, did not fall within the “same general category of products” as required to apply alternative (i). See I & D Memo at 18-19. Commerce highlighted the fact that OCTG are used in down-hole applications requiring that they withstand harsh conditions and are sold to the oil and gas exploration industry, which had seen an uptick in activity and demand. Id. at 17-19. Line pipe and standard pipe, however, are not used in down-hole applications, and the Korean producers sold their non-OCTG pipe products primarily to the Korean construction industry, which generally is unable and unwilling to pay the price premium paid in the oil and gas industry and which had seen sluggish activity during the period of investigation (“POI”). Id. at 17-18. Commerce also noted that OCTG require different grades of steel, are subjected to different testing and certification requirements, and are generally connected in ways that are different from non-OCTG products. See id. Commerce therefore had to resort to alternative (iii) for calculating a CV profit for both mandatory respondents.

In considering the various alternatives for calculating CV profit pursuant to alternative (iii), Commerce determined that the profit reflected in Tenaris’s financial statement represented the best information available. See id. at 23. Commerce rejected the respondents’ arguments that it should rely on the profit reflected in the financial statements of the various Korean OCTG producers, because the majority of their sales were of non-OCTG pipe outside of the same general category of products and the sales of OCTG imbedded in those statements were primarily the allegedly dumped sales,to the United States. See id. at 20. Commercé explained that “[a]s OCTG is a very specialized premium product used exclusively in the oil and gas exploration industry with significant quality differences, different end uses, different end customers, and different demand patterns than those of non-OCTG pipe, it is important that we rely on a source that closely reflects such product.” Id. at 20-21 (footnote omitted). Commerce preferred the financial statement of Tenaris, because its sales consisted primarily of OCTG and the majority of its OCTG sales were to non-U.S. customers. Id. at 19, 21. Commerce further reasoned that “[b]e-cause Tenaris is an OCTG producer that sells OCTG in significant quantities, and in virtually every market in which OCTG is sold, we find its average profit experience is representative of sales of OCTG across a broad range of different geographic markets.” Id. at 21.

Commerce also determined that it was unable to calculate and apply a profit cap under alternative (iii), because Commerce did “not have home market profit data for other exporters and producers in Korea of the same general category of products.” Id. Whereas the six Korean OCTG producers used to calculate NEXTEEL’s CV profit for the Preliminary Determination had an average profit margin of 5.30% and the revised CV profit rates calculated by the petitioners for the petition were between 7.19% and 7.22%, Tenaris’s profit .rate was 26.11%. Compare Preliminary 'Constructed Value Calculation Adjustments for NEXTEEL at 2-3, CD 234 (Feb. 14, 2014), and Petitioner’s Resp. to July 8, 2013 Questionnaire re: Volume IV of the Petition at Ex. IV-34, Attach. Suppl. F, PD 14-16 (July 12, 2013), with I & D Memo at 7.

B. Use of Tenaris’s Financial Statement Under Alternative (iii)

HYSCO, NEXTEEL, and Husteel argue that Commerce’s use of Tenaris’s profit to calculate CV profit was unsupported by substantial evidence and unlawful. They contend that the profit data used by Commerce was untimely and should have been rejected. . See HYSCO Br. at 43-46; NEXTEEL Br. at 44; Husteel Br. at 11, 18 n. 5. They further contend that even if it was properly allowed on the record, Commerce should have used either the profit earned by the mandatory respondents’ on their home market sales of OCTG and/or non-OCTG pipe products or the average profit earned by the Korean OCTG producers. They assert that Commerce’s reasoning for declining to use this data, namely that the line pipe and standard pipe sold by the Korean producers in the Korean market were not in the same general category of products as OCTG, was unsupported by substantial evidence and contrary to prior Commerce decisions. See HYSCO Br. at 16-28; NEXTEEL Br. at 17-29; Husteel Br. at 20-24. They also argue that Commerce was required to use this data, which was based on production and sales in Korea, over the Tenaris profit data, which