Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER NORDBERG, District Judge. In these consolidated class actions, the plaintiffs sued General Motors Corporation (“GM”) for damages stemming from GM’s installation of THM 200 transmissions into automobiles which allegedly required a THM 350 transmission. The parties entered into a comprehensive settlement agreement, which this court has approved in a separate order entered on this date. The settlement order did not determine the appropriate award of attorneys’ fees for class counsel. The court has received fee petitions from nine law firms requesting attorneys’ fees in connection with this action. The class counsel seeks an aggregate “lodestar” amount of $3.3 million, and a 1.75 multiplier. The total fees and expenses requested amount to approximately $5.9 million. After consideration of all the facts and circumstances, including reviewing the very extensive briefs and petitions and conducting a hearing on November 10, 1986, the court finds that the amounts set forth below provide the appropriate compensation for class counsels’ efforts in this litigation. The court has reduced both the hours and attorney fee rates sought by all attorneys for the reasons set forth in this opinion. However, in this court’s opinion, the court has allowed reasonable hours and reasonable attorney fee rates so that all counsel shall be properly compensated for their legal efforts in the consolidated cases. The court’s determination of the reasonable hours and rates for each fee petitioner is set forth at the end of this opinion. Procedural History This litigation originated in the In re General Motors Engine Interchange Litigation, MDL No. 308 (N.D.Ill.), rev’d, 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870, 100 S.Ct. 146, 62 L.Ed.2d 95 (1979), aff’d after remand, 620 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir.1980) (the “Engines” case). In Engines, the plaintiffs alleged that GM violated the written warranty provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312, by substituting different engines and other automotive parts, including transmissions, into certain lines of GM automobiles. Specifically, the Engines plaintiffs complained that GM had installed Chevrolet engines in 1977 Oldsmobiles, and THM 200 transmissions in automobiles which were supposed to be equipped with a THM 350 transmission. See Engines, 594 F.2d at 1114, 1132, n. 44. On remand, Judge McGarr, who presided over the Engines litigation, separated the transmissions claims, and ruled that the case would proceed only on the engine interchange issues. In response to Judge McGarr’s decision, plaintiffs filed the Skelton action on March 29, 1979. An amended complaint was filed two months later. Although the Skelton complaint was patterned after the written warranty claims in the Engines litigation, it also contained allegations of deceptive warranties and breach of implied warranties. The Newton claims were filed approximately one year after Skelton, and alleged a different theory of liability stemming from GM’s substitution of the THM 200 transmission. These plaintiffs alleged that GM’s conduct in replacing the THM 350 transmission with a THM 200 transmission violated the implied warranty provisions contained in UCC § 2-314(2)(c) because the substituted transmissions were not “fit for their ordinary purpose.” During approximately the same time frame, two other groups of plaintiffs instituted similar litigation in New York. The Attard action was filed in New York state court in 1979, and the Morgan action was filed in the New York federal district court in 1981. These complaints alleged that GM’s conduct constituted a breach of its implied and express warranties in violation of the UCC and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. In 1979, GM moved to dismiss the Skelton complaint, which was then pending before Judge John Powers Crowley. The case was transferred to Judge Moran, and the parties rebriefed the pending motion to dismiss. On October 1, 1980, Judge Moran issued an opinion which upheld plaintiffs’ written warranty claim, and dismissed the implied warranty and defective warranty claims. Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 500 F.Supp. 1181, 1190-95 (N.D.Ill. 1980). GM filed an interlocutory appeal, which was accepted by the Seventh Circuit. While Skelton was on appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the Skelton plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the Newton merchantability claims, and GM filed a motion to dismiss all the remaining Skelton and Newton claims. In September of 1981, the Seventh Circuit issued its opinion in Skelton, reversing Judge Moran’s recognition of a written warranty claim based on GM’s substitution of the THM 200 transmissions for THM 350 transmissions. Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 660 F.2d 311 (7th Cir.1981). The Seventh Circuit denied plaintiffs’ request for a rehearing and rehearing en banc on December 11, 1981; and the Supreme Court subsequently denied plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari. Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 456 U.S. 974, 102 S.Ct. 2238, 72 L.Ed.2d 848 (1982). The Skelton and Newton plaintiffs filed a consolidated complaint under MagnusonMoss shortly after the Seventh Circuit issued its opinion. The cases were then transferred to Judge Getzendanner, who accepted supplemental briefs and heard oral argument on the motion to dismiss. The cases were transferred to this court a few months later. At the time of this transfer, the parties were still involved in the process of investigating and briefing issues regarding their class certification motions. This process included hiring experts, taking some depositions and responding to numerous inquiries regarding the class action. In addition, due to the continuous development of the law in this area, the parties were often required to supplement their certification briefs to address the most recent decisions regarding class certification in cases of this subject and magnitude. During this same time period, significant developments were taking place in New York and Washington, D.C. In New York, the Attard court denied GM’s motion to dismiss, and was affirmed by the New York appellate court. Counsel proceeded with class certification motions and discovery in both Attard and Morgan; and then agreed to informally stay these proceedings pending the outcome of the Skelton/Newton class certification motions before this court. In Washington, GM was involved in an administrative action conducted by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). The parties engaged in extensive discovery during the course of the FTC investigation, and subsequently entered into a consent decree settling the administrative action in November of 1983. This settlement, which was opposed by the Skelton/Newton plaintiffs, provided for the establishment of a Mediation and Arbitration program to resolve consumer complaints stemming from the operation of GM automobiles. In 1984, the Skelton/Newton plaintiffs suggested that the court proceed with an initial certification of a “failures” class. This court issued an interim order on December 20,1984, which revealed the court’s intent to certify a “failures” class under Count I of the complaint. The court declined to certify any other classes at that time. The court also held that state privity law was applicable to the Magnuson-Moss cause of action. Skelton v. General Motors Corp., No. 79 C 1243, Slip op. at 3 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 20, 1984). In addition, it denied GM’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ label and latent defect claims (Counts III and IV of the consolidated complaint). Id. The parties began discussing the possibility of settlement following the issuance of this interim order. These discussions extended throughout 1985, and included conferences both in and out of court. After extensive negotiations, the parties reached a general agreement in December of 1985. They expended considerable time negotiating and drafting the final provisions of this agreement, which were presented to the court on June 16, 1986. The Agreement encompasses the following class of plaintiffs: All original owners (other than solely for purposes of resale) of a General Motors 1976-1980 model year vehicle equipped with a THM 200 transmission purchased in the United States, its possessions and territories, or the District of Columbia, who incurred any transmission repair expense within the first 50,000 miles of use of that vehicle. In this settlement, GM agreed to establish a $17 million fund which will provide reimbursement for transmission service and repair costs incurred by plaintiffs in the “failures” class. The parties agreed that the fund would be the only source of any attorneys’ fees sought by plaintiffs’ counsel, and that plaintiffs’ counsel would not seek a fee award calculated on a percentage-of-recovery basis. In accordance with this agreement, plaintiffs’ counsel have submitted timesheets and expense reports which reflect the hours of work devoted to this litigation. Motion For Attorneys’ Fees Initially, the court must determine the source of its authority to award attorneys’ fees in this action. The class counsel argues that fees should be awarded under the “common fund” doctrine, which permits an award of attorneys fees where a litigant or his attorney recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client. See generally Boeing v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 100 S.Ct. 745, 62 L.Ed.2d 676 (1980); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 616, 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970). In contrast, GM argues that these fee petitions should be scrutinized under the attorneys’ fee provision set forth in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit caselaw pertaining to statutory fee awards. See generally Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 776 F.2d 646 (7th Cir.1985). In the court’s view, the plaintiffs have exaggerated the difference between calculating fees pursuant to the common fund doctrine as opposed to a statutory fee provision. An award of fees under the common fund doctrine is an equitable practice which “rests on the perception that persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to its cost are unjustly enriched at the successful litigant’s expense.” Boeing, 444 U.S. at 478, 100 S.Ct. at 749. The doctrine enables the court to offset this inequity “by assessing fees against the entire fund, thus spreading fees proportionately among those benefitted from the suit.” Id. In addition to this unjust enrichment rationale, the common fund doctrine also contains an “incentive” rationale: by permitting an award of fees in these cases, the doctrine operates to encourage attorneys to engage in litigation which benefits certain groups of people who could not otherwise obtain representation for their interests. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 245, 255, 262 (N.D.Ill.1979); Arenson v. Board of Trade, 372 F.Supp. 1349, 1356 (N.D.Ill.1974); Oppenlander v. Standard Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. 597, 614 (D.Colo.1974). See Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 Yale L.J. 473, 476 (1981). Although statutory fee awards are not based on an unjust enrichment principle, they contain the same “incentive” rationale as the common fund doctrine. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council, 106 S.Ct. at 2098 (“the aim of [fee-shifting] statutes [is] to enable private parties to obtain legal help in seeking redress for injuries resulting from the actual or threatened violation of specific federal laws.”). See Leubsdorf, supra, at 477. Given this commonality of purpose, this court finds that the standards for determining reasonable attorneys fees in common fund cases and statutory fee cases should not be significantly different. In the court’s view, the use of statutory fee guidelines to determine a proper fee award is especially relevant where the litigation is commenced and prosecuted under a federal statute which specifically provides for an award of attorneys’ fees. When parties settle a case involving statutory fees, the amount ultimately awarded should not be dependent upon whether the fees are assessed directly against the defendant, or against a fund created by the defendant. See Leubsdorf, supra, at 489. Thus, although there may be theoretical distinctions between the common fund doctrine and statutory fees, these distinctions are not so great that they justify the use of completely different standards when calculating an award of attorneys’ fees in a particular case. Furthermore, regardless of any theoretical distinctions between common fund and statutory fee cases, the courts in this circuit employ the same general standards to calculate attorneys’ fees in both types of cases. In Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997, 96 S.Ct. 2214, 48 L.Ed.2d 823 (1976), a Title VII case, the court adopted the guidelines for attorneys’ fees set forth in Rule 2-106 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: 1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly; 2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 3) Fees customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; 4) The amount involved and the results obtained; 5) Time limit imposed by the client or the circumstances; 6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; 7) The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and 8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. The courts in this circuit have reiterated these factors in both common fund and statutory fee cases. See, e.g., Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1249 (7th Cir.1982) (antitrust); Locate Corp. v. Fel-Pro, Inc., 667 F.2d 577, 585 (7th Cir.1981) (patent); Mills v. Eltra, 663 F.2d 760, 762 (7th Cir.1981) (common fund); Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577, 579 (7th Cir.1980) (42 U.S.C. § 1988); Gross v. Schweiker, 563 F.Supp. 260, 262 (N.D.Ind.1983) (EAJA 28 U.S.C. § 2412); Kennedy v. Nicastro, 546 F.Supp. 267, 270 (N.D.Ill.1982) (shareholders’ derivative action); Zilker v. Klein, 540 F.Supp. 1196, 1199 n. 8 (N.D.Ill.1982) (shareholders’ derivative action); United States v. Vague, 521 F.Supp. 147, 152 (N.D.Ill.1981) (criminal); Will v. United States, 90 F.R.D. 336, 338 (N.D.Ill.1981) (common fund); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D. 245, 255-56 (N.D.Ill.1979) (common fund). See also In re Warner Communications Securities Litigation, 618 F.Supp. 735, 746-47 (S.D.N.Y.1985); Phemister v. Harcourt-Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1984-2 Trade Cases 11 66,234 at 66,995 (N.D.Ill.1984); In re Cenco Inc. Securities Litigation, 519 F.Supp. 322, 325-26 (N.D.Ill.1981); In re Clark Oil Antitrust Litigation, 422 F.Supp. 503, 511 (E.D.Wis.1977); Liebman v. Peterson Coal & Oil Co., 63 F.R.D. 684 (N.D.Ill.1974) (discussing similar factors in determining fee awards from common fund). Not all factors apply in a given case, and no one factor is controlling. As the first factor indicates, the starting point in the court’s analysis involves a determination of the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation. This figure is then multiplied by the fees customarily charged in the locality for the services rendered to produce the “lodestar” figure. Waters, 502 F.2d at 1322. See also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); In re Cenco Inc. Securities Litigation, 519 F.Supp. 322, 325-26 (N.D.Ill.1981). After calculating the lodestar, the court may add an upward adjustment, or multiplier, to ensure that the fee award provides appropriate compensation to the plaintiffs’ counsel for the work performed and the results achieved. GM has filed specific objections to the nine sets of timesheets submitted by plaintiffs’ counsel. The court will discuss these objections in its review of the individual petitions, infra. Before launching into a discussion of the individual petitions, however, the court will address several recurring objections to the majority of the petitions. 1. Time Spent on Alleged “Lost” and “Abandoned” Claims GM argues that the hours claimed by plaintiffs’ attorneys should be reduced to account for the unsuccessful appeal to the Seventh Circuit in Skelton and the claims allegedly abandoned in the course of the settlement negotiations. In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1940, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), the Supreme Court held: work on an unsuccessful claim cannot be deemed to have been ‘expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved.’ Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 E.P.D. [¶ 9444], 5049 [C.D.Cal.1974]. The congressional intent to limit awards to prevailing parties requires that these unrelated claims be treated as if they had been raised in separate lawsuits, and therefore no fee may be awarded for services on the unsuccessful claim. Following this language in Hensley, GM asserts that plaintiffs’ attorneys Boyle, Harte, Goodman and Goldman are not entitled to any fees or expenditures in connection with the Skelton claims dismissed by the Seventh Circuit in Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 660 F.2d 311 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 974, 102 S.Ct. 2238, 72 L.Ed.2d 848 (1983), and urges this court to disallow any fees for the time spent briefing the motions to dismiss before Judge Moran, the appeal to the Seventh Circuit, and the subsequent petition for certiorari. Plaintiffs’ counsel assert that the Hensley standards are inapplicable to fee awards under the common fund doctrine, which permits reimbursement for all fees expended in the creation of a common fund. This position exaggerates the distinctions between statutory and common fund fee awards. As stated earlier, the courts in this circuit apply the same criteria when determining awards for statutory fees and fees from a common fund. The common fund doctrine, like the statutory fee provisions, also instructs the court to analyze the fee petition to determine whether the plaintiffs “prevailed” on certain claims, and whether the time expended contributed to the ultimate favorable resolution of the case. See e.g., Swanson v. American Consumer Industries, 517 F.2d 555, 563 (7th Cir.1975) (the fact that a plaintiff did not prevail on certain issues is entitled to weight in the determination of an appropriate fee award). Kennedy v. Nicastro, 546 F.Supp. 267 (N.D.Ill.1982); Zilker v. Klein, 540 F.Supp. 1196, 1198-99 (N.D.Ill.1982); In re Penn Central Securities Litigation, 416 F.Supp. 907, 917 (E.D.Pa.1976), rev’d on other grounds, 560 F.2d 1138 (3d Cir.1977). Accordingly, the court finds that the Hensley guidelines for assessing fees in statutory fee cases are equally relevant to a determination of fees under the common fund doctrine. Regardless of the analysis employed, however, the court finds that exclusion of all the time expended on the Skelton claims would be improper. The Seventh Circuit recently discussed Hensley’s limitation of fees to those reasonably expended on “prevailing” claims in Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 789 F.2d 540 (7th Cir.1986). In Zabkowiez, the plaintiff filed a sexual harassment suit under Title VII which also contained pendent tort claims stemming from the alleged discriminatory conduct. The district court found that the defendants had violated Title VII, but it denied plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees in its entirety because the hours were excessive and failed to distinguish between the time spent on the Title VII claim and the time spent on the state law claims. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court should consider the lawsuit as a whole, and take into account the interrelated nature of the various claims in the case when determining an appropriate fee award for a prevailing plaintiff. Zabkowicz, 789 F.2d at 551. The court instructed: Where several claims arise out of a common factual core or are based on related legal theories, separating ‘out the legal services rendered with respect to these overlapping claims would be an exercise in futility.’ In accordance with Hensley, we believe that prevailing plaintiffs may be entitled to compensation for time expended on such related claims. Id. (citation omitted). The Zabkowiez court explained that the next inquiry involves whether the plaintiff’s unsuccessful claims are sufficiently related to the successful claims to justify an award of attorneys’ fees. It held: Hensley provides no precise method for determining whether claims are related or unrelated. Nonetheless, a ‘useful tool for making this determination is to focus on whether the claims seek relief for essentially the same course of conduct.’ ... From this perspective, ‘an unsuccessful claim will be unrelated to a successful claim when the relief sought on the unsuccessful claim is intended to remedy a course of conduct entirely distinct and separate from the course of conduct that gave rise to the injury on which the relief granted is premised.' Id. (citations omitted). In order to determine whether the claims were sufficiently related, the court examined each claim separately. It found that, “although these claims are based on distinct legal theories, they undeniably involve a common core of facts. The tort claims sought to remedy the same course of conduct that gave rise to the Title VII claims.” Id. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit remanded the question of attorneys’ fees to the district court, finding that the plaintiff may be entitled to the entire amount of her fee claim, depending upon the “significance of the overall relief obtained ... in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Id. (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940). Following Zabkowicz, the court finds that wholesale exclusion of the time expended on the Seventh Circuit appeal and petition for certiorari is not warranted in this case. See Lenard v. Argento, 808 F.2d 1242, 1245 (7th Cir.1987) (rejecting defendant’s “mechanical claim-chopping approach” to attorneys’ fees). These claims alleged the same improper conduct and sought the same remedy ultimately provided in the settlement agreement. In Illinois Welfare Rights Organization v. Miller, 723 F.2d 564, 576 (7th Cir.1983), the court held: If, ... the plaintiff has asserted unsuccessful claims related to the successful claims by a ‘common core of facts’ or that are based on ‘related legal theories,’ ... time spent on these related but unsuccessful claims should not automatically be excluded in arriving at a reasonable attorney’s fees award. Instead, the court [should] focus on the overall results obtained to determine whether it should compensate the plaintiff for the hours spent on the related but unsuccessful claims. Generally, if the results obtained are excellent, the ‘[plaintiff’s] attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee,’ which will ‘[n]ormally ... encompass all hours reasonably expended on the litigation____’ If the plaintiff has achieved only partial success, however, compensating the plaintiff for all hours expended on the litigation may be excessive. In such a situation, the court may adjust the award either by identifying specific hours that should be eliminated or by simply reducing the overall award to reflect the plaintiff’s limited success, citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435,103 S.Ct. at 1940. Thus, although a reduction may be appropriate to reflect the reasonableness of this time in light of the relief ultimately obtained, the court rejects GM’s argument that all of this time must be excluded from consideration when determining the proper fee award. See also Lenard v. Argento, 808 F.2d 1242, 1245 (7th Cir.1987) (where a lawyer “presents a congeries of theories each factually and legally plausible, he is not penalized because some, or even all but one, are rejected, provided that the one or ones that succeed give him all that he reasonably could have asked for.”); Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 556 (10th Cir.1983) (reduction for lost claims may not be necessary if plaintiffs’ claims involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories); Monroe v. United Air Lines, Inc., 565 F.Supp. 274, 285-86 (N.D.Ill.1983) (allowing fees for an unsuccessful preliminary injunction where the plaintiffs ultimately prevailed in the litigation). GM also seeks a reduction in hours to reflect the fact that plaintiffs relinquished some claims during the course of the settlement agreement. The foregoing discussion applies with equal or greater force to these so-called “abandoned” claims. Basically, to oversimplify, all of these claims involve different theories to redress the same wrong — GM’s placement of THM 200 transmissions into automobiles requiring THM 350 transmissions. In Zabkowicz, the Seventh Circuit recognized that, when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a claim as part of a settlement vindicating his rights, a fee award based on all the plaintiffs’ claims may be appropriate. Zabkowicz, 789 F.2d at 552. In the present case, the court never ruled on the remainder of the plaintiffs’ petitions for class certification, and it denied GM’s motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs’ counsel should not be penalized just because they relinquished some claims in order to reach a comprehensive settlement agreement with GM. See Illinois Welfare Rights Organization v. Miller, 723 F.2d 564, 567 (7th Cir.1983). Accordingly, the court rejects GM’s assertion that the fee award should be decreased to reflect the plaintiffs’ dismissal of related claims in the course of the settlement negotiations. As a corollary to the arguments regarding the “lost” and “abandoned” claims, GM argues that the fee award should be reduced significantly to reflect the disparity between the relief sought and the recovery obtained in the settlement agreement. Although the plaintiffs did not obtain relief on behalf of all the classes originally designated in the complaints, this does not diminish the very significant recovery obtained by class counsel in their pursuit of this litigation. As with any claim involving an area of uncharted law, plaintiffs were required to develop alternate theories for GM’s liability. This involved formulating innovative arguments to convince the court of the viability of pursuing these claims as a class action, and presenting the court with sufficient authority to defeat GM’s vigorous and able efforts to dismiss the litigation. Counsel’s very substantial efforts in this regard have not gone unrewarded. Through their efforts, millions of consumers across the country will be able to obtain reimbursement for costs incurred in attempts to repair their THM 200 transmissions. GM seeks to diminish the nature of plaintiffs’ undertaking and the level of their success. The record in this case and the size of the settlement fund illustrate the substantial benefits that plaintiffs’ counsel have conferred on the class. They achieved class certification in a nationwide Magnuson-Moss warranty action, and successfully defeated GM’s repeated efforts to decertify the class and dismiss the case. Although they cannot claim direct credit for the settlement of the FTC action, it is a fair inference that the pendency of these cases had some effect on the willingness of GM to enter the consent decree with the FTC. This agreement provided relief to putative members of the class through the creation of a Mediation and Arbitration panel. Finally, the terms of the June 16, 1986 settlement agreement between GM and the plaintiffs clearly demonstrate the significant benefits that the class counsel achieved for many members of the class. In Illinois Welfare Rights Organization v. Miller, 723 F.2d 564, 567 (7th Cir.1983), the court recognized that Although some settlement agreements may be structured so that they dispose of the original claims in a way that allows the court to decide whether a particular claim has been ultimately successful or unsuccessful, this will not always be the case. Indeed, many settlements will be informally structured with an eye toward the achievement of overall objectives, rather than the disposition of discrete claims. With these more general settlements, the analysis in Hensley regarding successful and unsuccessful claims may be unworkable, although the central teaching of Hensley will still apply. That teaching is that in every case the court must explicitly consider whether the fee is a reasonable one in light of the level of the plaintiff’s success. This case clearly presents a situation where the settlement was “structured with an eye toward the achievement of overall objectives.” Following the Seventh Circuit’s instruction in Illinois Welfare Rights, this court will focus on the reasonableness of the fees, and will not reduce the award merely because the recovery obtained is less than that requested at the outset of the litigation. 2. Time Spent on Class Certification Motions GM objects to the time expended on the motions for class certification, which, by GM’s calculation, surpasses 3200 billable hours. According to GM, this figure is comprised of excessive “read and review time” and “conference” time between the various sets of plaintiffs’ counsel. Although this 3200 figure appears excessive when considered in the abstract, the court finds that the procedural history of this case and the complex nature of this suit justifies the great majority of the hours claimed on the class certification motions (the court has made some reduction in hours for excessive review and conference time and other time of little benefit to the result achieved). By operation of the local rules of court, five district court judges presided over this litigation between 1978 and 1982. The necessary process of familiarization which accompanied each transfer to a new judge required some duplication of effort beyond the control of the class counsel. Each transfer necessitated some new briefing and updating of the class certification motions. The class counsel should not be penalized for the so-called “duplicative” hours spent familiarizing transfer judges with the background of a case and its pending motions. The complicated nature of this lawsuit, the extraordinary size of the class, and the uncertainty and continuing evolution of the law in this area also demanded a significant expenditure of time. Most of the time spent briefing and updating these motions was necessary and well-invested, and ultimately persuaded the court to certify at least one class of plaintiffs and to deny GM’s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court finds that an overall general reduction in fees for excessive briefing is not warranted in this case. 3. Staffing at Court Appearances GM also accuses plaintiffs’ counsel of overstaffing at court appearances by providing several lawyers at some hearings where one or two lawyers would suffice. GM refers to several hearings to illustrate this objection. In general, the courts are reluctant to allow compensation for an abundance of attorneys appearing on a routine matter. See, e.g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 751 F.2d 562, 579 (3d Cir.1984); In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1296, 1307 (E.D.N.Y.1985); In re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 572 F.Supp. 931, 933 (N.D.Ill.1983); United States v. Allen, 578 F.Supp. 468, 483 (W.D.Wis.1982). Where an attorney appears at a hearing as a “spectator” rather than a participant, he should not be compensated for his time in court because his presence does not materially advance the progress of the litigation. See In re Fine Paper, 751 F.2d at 579. If the circumstances of the hearing require the presence of more than one attorney, however, then the court should allow attorneys’ fees to all necessary participants in the hearing. Although this court has presided over these cases only since May, 1982, it disagrees with GM’s characterization of plaintiffs’ alleged “overstaffing” at court appearances. These cases were not consolidated until late 1981. Prior to the consolidation, the counsel for Skelton and Newton had to appear separately because they had separate clients and were advancing different theories of recovery. Each transfer of the case necessitates an appearance by group counsel before the new transferee judge to familiarize the judge with the attorneys and the issues in the case. The number of attorneys which have appeared before this court between 1982 and 1986 has never seemed excessive to this court. For the most part, the attorneys who have appeared in the last four years actively participated in the hearings and contributed to the advancement of the litigation. (The defendant has routinely been represented by two lawyers at court appearances.) This court has not observed excessive attendance by counsel which would justify a decrease in the hours allowed. Accordingly, the court finds that the requested reduction for overstaffed court appearances is not warranted in this case. 4. Travel Time GM also objects to class counsel billing full rates for time spent travelling to other cities in pursuit of this litigation. With the exception of the Zwerling and Goodkind petitions, the fee petitions do not clearly delineate the hours that they seek to charge the fund for time spent on a plane or some other means of transportation. When questioned about the amount of in-flight time charged, plaintiffs’ counsel admitted that they charged for time spent in transit, but only if that time was actually spent working on the case. However, they did indicate that they were usually working on the case while in transit. It is this court’s experience that cramped working conditions, limited access to materials, frequent interruptions, and inevitable distractions render travel time much less productive than other time spent on a case. Accordingly, the court has reduced the hours claimed for travel to and from a given destination by 50%. See Orshan v. Macchiarola, 629 F.Supp. 1014, 1020 n. 3 (E.D.N.Y.1986); In re “Agent Orange”Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1296, 1349 (E.D.N.Y.1985); Society for Goodwill to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 574 F.Supp. 994, 998 (E.D.N.Y.1983). 5. Attorney Fee Rate When attorneys undertake to represent a class, their fees are usually contingent on the success of the class action, and they may not be paid for their efforts until several years after the action is commenced. This results in the loss of both the use and some of the value of money, thus prompting counsel to seek an adjustment for interest and inflation. In order to account for the effects of this delay in payment, the courts in this circuit generally allow an attorney to submit his entire fee request calculated in accordance with his current rate, which provides a rough approximation for the effects of delay. See, e.g., Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 764 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 956, 103 S.Ct. 2428, 77 L.Ed.2d 1315 (1983); Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 601, 612 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961, 103 S.Ct. 2438, 77 L.Ed.2d 1322 (1983); Coleman v. Frierson, 607 F.Supp. 1578, 1581 (N.D.Ill.1985); Phemister v. Harcourt Brace Jovanivich, Inc., 1984-2 Trade Cases ¶ 66,234 at ¶ 66,996 (N.D.Ill.1984). See also Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th Cir.1983); In re “Agent Orange”Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1296, 1310 (E.D.N.Y.1985). In the present case, seven of the nine petitioners have requested fees at their current rates. The Sachnoff, Weaver firm and the firm of Charles A. Boyle seek fees at their historic rates, plus interest calculated at the prime rate for a given time period. Calculation of fees pursuant to this method produces significantly higher fees than those obtained by using the firms’ current rates. Following the procedure generally accepted in this Circuit, the court finds that in this case the calculation of reasonable fees on a current basis properly compensates all petitioning attorneys for the delay in payment in this case. In calculating on a current basis the reasonable fee rate to be allowed each attorney in this case, the court took into account all relevant factors, including the benefit to the class, the skill and the difficulty of the legal work completed, time reasonably required and duplication of efforts, current fee rates charged by the lawyer for similar services, current fee rates customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services, the amount involved and results obtained, the experience, reputation, and legal ability of each lawyer, the difficulties in dealing with such a large class of claimants, and the contingency of the fee. The court is mindful of the chilling effect on future consumer class actions that might result from failure to adequately compensate counsel for their efforts in this litigation. The Individual Petitioners Charles A. Boyle & Associates Ltd. Boyle requests compensation for 1764.80 hours at $200/hr. GM has four basic objections to Boyle’s petition for fees. First, it argues that the time spent on the losing Skelton appeal should be eliminated in its entirety. As this court explained above, however, plaintiffs may still seek compensation for the time spent on the Skelton claims because they are related to the claims on which plaintiffs ultimately prevailed. However, the court finds that, since the pursuit of these claims did not fully contribute to the creation of the settlement fund, these hours should be reduced by 33%. The court’s review of Boyle’s petition reveals that he expended approximately 475 hours pursuing the Skelton claims in the district court, the appeal and the petition for certiorari. The court will permit compensation for 67% of those hours, or 318.25. Second, GM accuses Boyle of excessive “read and review” time. Although every class action staffed by several groups of plaintiffs’ lawyers generates some necessary “read and review” time, it is this court’s role to ensure that the attorneys do not engage in excessive reviews of each others’ work. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 751 F.2d 562 (3rd Cir.1984); Lackey v. Bowling, 476 F.Supp. 1111, 1118 (N.D.Ill.1979); Manual for Complex Litigation, § 24.22 at 189. The court has reviewed all of Boyle’s entries, and finds that, given his role in this litigation, his review time is, for the most part, sufficiently well-documented and within reason. GM’s third objection is closely related to the second one. GM accuses Boyle of engaging in too much “conference” time with the other plaintiffs’ attorneys. Boyle’s fee petition contains references to a number of conferences, phone calls and meetings with the other members of class counsel. The court finds that Boyle’s conference time, like his “review” time, is not greatly excessive in light of the history and demands posed by this litigation (i.e., consolidation of two separate actions, transfer to several judges, and the protracted settlement negotiations). However, the court finds that the timesheets do reflect some duplication of effort and extensive reviewing and conferring with limited benefit to the class. Therefore, the court has reduced the requested hours by 10% to reflect this. Finally, GM asserts that Boyle charged premium rates for tasks which could be performed by paralegals. For the most part, these tasks included review of the case file and communication with class members. Generally, a senior attorney is not entitled to premium rates for services which could be performed by a paralegal or less experienced attorney. See Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 767 n. 16 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 956, 103 S.Ct. 2428, 77 L.Ed.2d 1315 (1983); Daggett v. Kimmelman, 617 F.Supp. 1269, 1282 (D.N.J.1985). After reviewing Boyle’s petition, the court finds that some of the hours claimed for senior attorney time should have been delegated to paralegals. The court has reduced Boyle’s time accordingly. See Daggett, 617 F.Supp. at 1282 (“it was the fee applicant’s prerogative to staff every task involved in this case with partners, but that does not automatically entitle the law firm to recover ‘partner rates’ for everything”). The court notes that Boyle also seeks to charge fees for the time spend talking to the press. In the court’s view, this time should be compensated at 33% of the hourly rate because it involves minimum benefit to the class and does not involve a task which justifies full compensation for senior attorney time. Cf. Society for Goodwill to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 574 F.Supp. 994, 998-99 (E.D.N.Y.1983) (disallowing all time spent with media). GM also objects to Boyle’s list of expenses, which GM characterizes as overhead charges subsumed in Boyle’s hourly rate. See Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 557, 559 (10th Cir.1983); Roe v. City of Chicago, 586 F.Supp. 513, 516 (N.D.Ill.1984). If a case involves unusual expenditures over and above the expenses necessary for the operation of a law firm, then these expenses are properly chargeable to the fund. Ramos, 713 F.2d at 559; In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1296, 1322 (E.D.N.Y.1985) . The criticized charges in Boyle’s petition include automated answering machine services, storage space and office supplies. Given the magnitude of the litigation and the necessity of establishing adequate facilities and support systems to respond to class inquiries and store class information, these expenses cannot be characterized as mere overhead expenses which should be included in Boyle’s hourly rate. Corinblit & Seltzer The two principals of this firm seek compensation for a total of 100 hours that the firm expended on this litigation. Jack Corinblit logged 41 hours at a claimed rate of $250/hr., and Marc Seltzer logged 59 hours at a claimed rate of $225/hr. These attorneys never appeared before the court on the case. From the timesheets, it appears that their primary involvement in this case was their participation in a deposition in December of 1980. GM argues that the requested fees should be reduced because nearly all of their time was spent “conferring and reviewing” the work of other attorneys. After analyzing these timesheets, the court concludes that their conference and review time is excessive, and has been reduced accordingly. Corinblit’s timesheets reveal that over 23 of his 41 requested hours were spent in conferences with other class counsel. Over 16.5 hours of this conference time included Marc Seltzer, his partner. Seltzer logged 34 hours of conference time, and 13.25 hours of these conferences included Corinblit. The firm has not provided the court with any justification for its double-staffing at these conferences. In In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1296, 1325 (D.N.J.1985), the court disallowed all time spent in conferences between partners and associates of the same firm. Although a wholesale elimination of conference time between members of the Corinblit firm is not warranted under the facts of this case, the court finds that a reduction in these hours is appropriate. In order to offset what might otherwise constitute doublebilling, the court has reduced Corinblit’s request by 8.25 hours and Seltzer’s request by 6.5 hours. In addition, because the court finds that there has been little benefit resulting from excessive reviewing and conferring with other counsel, the court has reduced the requested hours by 20%. Abraham N. Goldman & Associates, Ltd. GM objects to Goldman’s request for compensation in connection with the losing Skelton appeal. In accordance with the procedure employed in the Boyle petition, this court has determined Goldman is entitled to fees for 66% of the time expended on the Skelton appeal, and his time spent travelling to Washington, D.C. has been reduced 50%. GM also asserts that Goldman’s hourly rates are excessive in light of his experience. Mr. Goldman started practicing shortly before these cases were commenced. The court has taken his experience into account when setting the appropriate hourly rate. Finally, GM objects to Goldman’s request for premium compensation for so-called “clerical tasks.” The statutory prerequisites of Magnuson-Moss class actions necessitated many communications with class members. Goldman’s responsibilities in this litigation involved substantial communication and interaction with individual members of the plaintiff class. His staff included several paralegals who were given significant responsibilities in organizing and maintaining the records of the plaintiff class members. His ability to delegate is reflected in the fact that he claims approximately 2,000 attorney hours and over 5,500 paralegal/data entry hours. See Phemister v. Harcourt-Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1984-2 Trade Cases II 66,234 at 66,996 (N.D.Ill.1984). However, the nature of Mr. Goldman’s involvement in this case was primarily administrative. The court has reduced his time by 10% to reflect the fact that the tasks he undertook toward the end of the litigation were primarily administrative in nature, as well as to adjust for the extensive time spent on conferences, reading and reviewing, with limited benefit to the substantive legal issues in the case. Goodkind, Weschler, Labaton & Rudoff The Goodkind, Weschler firm filed the Morgan and Attard actions in New York, which were transferred to this court in conjunction with the settlement. These actions were informally stayed in 1983 pending this court’s ruling on the class certification motions. Before this stay, these attorneys successfully defeated GM’s motion to dismiss, and commenced discovery in these actions. The firm seeks a total of $378,-207.07 in fees for over 1600 hours of work. GM’s major objection to this firm’s fee petition is that it is too vague to permit any meaningful review. The firm’s timesheets are on a computer printout, and are admittedly brief. The firm has supplemented its petition in its reply brief, however, and the entries are not so cursory that they preclude this court from determining their accuracy. See Berberena v. Coler, 753 F.2d 629, 634 (7th Cir.1985) (entries are sufficient if they identify the substance of the work performed). The firm delegated a great deal of the responsibility for the prosecution of the actions to lower-level associates and paralegals. However, there was an extensive amount of time spent on conferences, reading and review with some duplication. Therefore, the court has reduced the requested legal hours by 10% and paralegal time by 5%. In accordance with the court’s guidelines for travel time set forth above, the court has reduced the time claimed for work while travelling to and from Chicago by 50%. Francis E. Goodman, P.C. Goodman’s fee petition seeks compensation for 451.70 hours of time at a rate of $150/hr. GM asserts that this petition should be substantially reduced or denied in its entirety because Goodman contributed very little in the case, and he spent most of his time reviewing the work of other attorneys. Goodman’s petition is replete with entries seeking compensation for his review time. Although this court was not able to observe Mr. Goodman’s role in the early stages of the litigation, he has not been a primary player since these cases were transferred to this court in 1982. Given his limited role since that time, the court finds that he is not entitled to compensation for all of his time spent in conferring and reviewing the work of the other attorneys more heavily involved in the litigation. The court disagrees with GM’s argument that all this review time must be disallowed, however. The court has determined that a 25% reduction in the hours claimed is appropriate to reflect the limited benefit from Goodman’s hours expended in this litigation. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 751 F.2d 562, 579 (3d Cir.1984); In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1296, 1325 (D.N.J.1985); United States v. Allen, 578 F.Supp. 468, 483 (W.D.Wisc.1982). GM also requests a reduction in Goodman’s hours to reflect time spent on the losing Skelton claims. Consistent with the procedure adopted for these claims in the Boyle and Goldman petitions, the court has determined that Goodman’s time spent on these claims should be reduced by 33%. William J. Harte, Ltd. Harte requests attorneys’ fees and costs totalling $438,456.94. GM argues that his request should be diminished to reflect the time spent on the losing Skelton appeal. The court finds that, for the reasons set forth on pages 10-13, supra, a complete elimination of this time is unwarranted. Although the court will allow compensation for time spent on these claims, the attorney and paralegal time will be reduced 33% to reflect its contribution to the ultimate settlement of this action. GM also accuses Harte of poor record-keeping and vague entries. Although several entries are somewhat cursory, this court is sufficiently familiar with Harte’s important role in the litigation to permit these entries without a request for clarification. Berberena v. Coler, 753 F.2d 629, 634 (7th Cir.1985). However, because of the extensive amount of time spent on conferences, reading, and review with limited benefit to substantive legal presentation, the court has reduced the requested hours of Mr. Harte by 10% and for similar reasons the paralegal time by 5%. Law Offices of Beverly C. Moore, Jr. Moore’s petition requests compensation for nearly 4,000 hours of attorney time and over 1,400 hours of paralegal time. GM raises several objections to Moore’s request for fees and expenses. First, GM disputes Moore’s requested hourly rate of $175/hour, and argues that Moore has insufficient experience to justify such a high fee. Taking into account all the relevant factors previously referred to, the court finds that Moore is entitled to compensation at a rate of $140/hr. Although Moore provided research for the class certification briefs, and demonstrated some expertise in addressing problems posed by this class action, his rate should reflect, among other things, the fact that he does not have a great deal of litigation experience. Second, GM challenges Moore’s request for fees in connection with the Fritz action. Moore filed this action in the federal district court for the District of Columbia in 1984, shortly before this court issued its interim ruling. After the interim ruling, Moore secured an order transferring the case to this court. The court agrees with GM that the filing of this case did nothing to advance the progress of this litigation or achieve the ultimate settlement of the case. In In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1296, 1307 (E.D.N.Y.1985), the court noted: One instance of duplicative work arising from the nature of a class action, ... concerns the filing of individual lawsuits by class members. Attorneys who file individual suits on the same claims involved in the class action do not substantially aid the prosecution of the class action. These collateral cases ultimately are dismissed as duplicative. An award of fees for such ‘me too’ litigation would encourage fruitless and unnecessary work. Moore’s filing of the Fritz action in Washington, D.C. is a perfect example of “me too” filing of duplicative litigation criticized in Agent Orange. It is significant that none of the other class counsel joined Moore in the filing of this action, nor do they seek any fees in connection with it: The court finds that Moore is not entitled to any fees or expenses in connection with the Fritz case because this action involved unnecessary expenditures of time and money which bear no relation to the favorable settlement in this case or the creation of the settlement fund. Moore did not join the other plaintiffs’ counsel in the settlement agreement. In fact, he strongly resisted the settlement which created the common fund. GM argues that Moore should not be compensated for the time spent resisting the settlement, because these efforts hindered the settlement negotiations instead of helping them. The court agrees with GM that Moore is not entitled to full compensation for the time spent objecting to the settle: ment. The fund does not have to pay attorneys’ fees for the time spent objecting to its creation. Although Moore’s time spent on the settlement is not fully compensable, the court finds that he is entitled to some remuneration for his participation in the settlement processes. An objector to a settlement process often sharpens the issues and may achieve additional benefits for the class. Although he opposed the settlement, Moore’s participation in the settlement negotiations cannot be dismissed in its entirety. Therefore, the court has determined that he is entitled to 50% of his time in the settlement stage of the case. Moore took one trip to Reading, Pennsylvania and approximately seventeen trips to Chicago. Consistent with the guidelines set forth supra on page 1381, the court has reduced his work travel time by 50%. The court has also reduced Moore’s time spent talking with the media to 33%. See Society for Goodwill to Retarded Children, 574 F.Supp. 994, 998-99 (E.D.N.Y.1983). Because of the very extensive amount of time spent on conferences, reading and review, and especially preliminary matters long before litigation commenced, with the very limited benefit to the success of the case, the court has reduced the requested hours of Mr. Moore by 40% and paralegal time by 11%. Moore requests expenses totalling $43,206.98. GM argues that some of these expenses are not compensable because they should be considered part of overhead. See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, supra. In particular, GM argues that the charges for overtime word processing should have been subsumed in Moore’s hourly rate. The court disagrees. Given Moore’s role in the briefwriting process, the resort to overtime staff to complete the pleadings in this case was sufficiently necessary and predictable. The court does not view these charges as unreasonable. Sachnoff, Weaver & Rubenstein, Ltd. GM’s major objection to Sachnoff’s entries revolves around the firm’s request for computation of fees at historic rates with an upward adjustment to reflect interest calculated at the prime rate. The court’s has decided that it is in the interests of justice to award all fees on a current basis, regardless of when the work was performed. GM also accuses the Sachnoff firm of overbilling and vague time keeping. The overbilling charge stems from GM’s assertion that the hours spent on “abandoned claims” and the time spent briefing the class certification motions must be reduced to reflect the limited nature of the relief obtained. These objections have been addressed in earlier portions of the opinion. Suffice it to say that this firm has been at the forefront of this litigation and has played a major role in achieving the creation of the settlement fund. The Sachnoff firm has fulfilled a lead role and has submitted high quality work throughout this litigation. Because of the extensive amount of time spent on conferences (including intra-firm conferences), reading and review, with a limited benefit for same, the court has reduced the requested hours by 5% and paralegal time by 5%. Zwerling, Schacter & Zwerling Zwerling, Schacter is a New York-based firm which was formed in January of 1985, after its partners left the Goodkind, Weschler firm. The firm has acted as co-counsel with Goodkind in the Morgan and Attar d, actions from January of 1985 to the present. It requests compensation for 90.-30 hours of attorney and paralegal time. The court has reviewed the firm’s timesheets, and has reduced travel time by 50% for the reasons previously indicated. Because of the very extensive time spent on conferences and review, again the court has reduced the requested hours by 20%. Request for a Multiplier Having calculated the proper lodestar amount for plaintiffs’ attorneys, the court now turns to plaintiffs’ request for an upward adjustment of .75 to be added to the lodestar. The class counsel argues that this multiplier of 1.75 is necessary to compensate them for the contingent nature of the lawsuit and the significant risks undertaken by them in this case. General Motors disputes the propriety of a multiplier on two grounds. First, it asserts that multipliers are never available under the statutory fee provision in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2). Second, it maintains that, even if a multiplier were available, the facts of this case do not warrant any upward adjustment of the basic lodestar amount. These actions were commenced and prosecuted under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. A significant portion of the class counsels’ time was expended investigating the individual claims to ensure that the Act’s 100-plaintiff requirement [See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(C)] was fulfilled {See Joint Memorandum in Support of Class Counsels’ Fee Petitions at 6, 12 n. 1, 14 n. 2). Plaintiffs sought, and ultimately obtained, class certification under the Magnuson-Moss Act. See Interim Order, Skelton v. General Motors Corp., No. 79 C 1243 (N.D.Ill. December 20, 1984). Under these circumstances, even if the fee award is based on the common fund doctrine, any limitation contained in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is a relevant consideration in determining whether to award a “risk” multiplier in this case. The structure of the settlement agreement should not divert the court from the Congressional intent underlying the passage of this Act. Magnuson-Moss permits a court to award a successful plaintiff a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses (including attorneys’ fees based on actual time expended) determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the plaintiff for or in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action____ 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (emphasis supplied). GM argues that the language underscored above precludes this court from awarding a multiplier in a Magnuson-Moss case. Unlike most fee-shifting statutes, which permit awards of “reasonable” attorneys’ fees, this Act appears to place a ceiling on the fees that a court may award a successful plaintiff. The plain language of the statute would seem to preclude any upward multiplier adjustment of the attorneys’ fees awarded to a successful plaintiff. In Ventura v. Ford Motor Co., 173 N.J.Super. 501, 414 A.2d 611, 612 (1980), aff'd, 180 N.J.Super. 45, 433 A.2d 801 (1981), the court denied a request for a multiplier of four, concluding that, “[a]n attorneys’ fee allowance under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is limited to ‘actual time expended’ but may exceed actual billings to a prevailing party if ‘reasonably incurred.’ ” The court agrees with GM and the Ventura court that Section 2310(d)(2) evinces a Congressional intent to limit the fee award to the time actually expended in pursuit of a plaintiff’s claim. Accordingly, the court concludes that a plaintiff in a MagnusonMoss case is not entitled to an upward multiplier adjustment of the fees awarded. However, even if § 2310(d)(2) does not prohibit a fee award which includes a multiplier, the court finds that the background of this litigation does not justify an increase in the lodestar figures set forth in this opinion. This lawsuit was settled at a relatively early stage of the litigation. In view