Full opinion text
LYNCH, Chief Judge. Paul A. DeCologero (“Paul A.”), his nephews Paul J. DeCologero (“Paul J.”) and John P. DeCologero, Jr. (“John Jr.”), and their friend Joseph F. Pavone appeal their assorted RICO, robbery, drug dealing, witness tampering, firearms, and related conspiracy convictions. After a thirty-nine day trial on eighteen counts, each defendant was found guilty on some and acquitted on other of the charges. Each now raises multiple claims on appeal regarding the management of the trial, evidentiary rulings, the sufficiency of the evidence against them, and other discrete matters. We affirm the convictions and also reject John Jr.’s sentencing appeal. I. Because three of the defendants question the sufficiency of the evidence behind their convictions, we relate the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict. United States v. Soto-Beníquez, 356 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.2004). We trace the general contours of the case here and leave further recounting for the analysis of particular arguments. Paul A. ran a criminal enterprise (the “DeCologero crew”) based out of a gym he operated in Woburn, Massachusetts. Paul J., John Jr., Pavone, and other associates assisted Paul A. in his efforts to control a portion of Boston’s drug trade. Part of the crew’s modus operandi was to beat up and to steal drugs and cash from other drug dealers. Aislin Silva, a young woman who was a friend of crew member Stephen DiCenso, was murdered and dismembered in an effort to protect the crew’s activities. Each defendant was convicted of conspiracy to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), as well as the substantive offense of engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). These convictions required that each defendant be found to have committed at least two predicate racketeering acts, which could be either state or federal crimes. A table of the counts and racketeering acts is provided in the appendix. We summarize the racketeering acts for which at least some of the defendants were convicted. A. Soccorso Robbery — 1995 In 1995, Paul A. sent John Jr. and Thomas Regan to the house of Philip Soccorso, a marijuana dealer, to steal drugs from him. Regan tricked Soccorso into leaving his house and then forced him into their car at gun point. When Soccorso refused to disclose the location of his drugs, Regan and John Jr. drove to Paul A. ’s house to pick him up and, as Regan recounted, Paul A. “read [Soccorso] the riot act” about dealing drugs in Paul A.’s territory. To add emphasis, John Jr. hit Soccorso with a handgun. Eventually Soccorso told them that his supplier, Gary Ramus, who was back at Soccorso’s house, might have some drugs. They returned to the house, and Regan forced Ramus into the car at gunpoint. After some more haranguing (also at gunpoint), Soccorso and Ramus agreed to give Paul A. the marijuana stashed at Soccorso’s house. Regan, Ramus, and Soccorso testified for the government at trial. The jury found that Paul A. and John Jr. had committed the racketeering acts of armed robbery, the kidnaping of Soccorso and Ramus, and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. B. Pesaturo Robbery — November 1995 Around November 1995, Paul A. agreed with Regan that Richie Pesaturo, another drug dealer, needed to be taught a lesson because he owed Regan money and had been “running his mouth” about the crew. On Paul A.’s orders, Regan, Paul J., and John Jr. went to Pesaturo’s apartment, where John Jr. and Regan beat Pesaturo and Regan “read[ ] him the riot act.” The three crew members then ransacked the apartment until they found Pesaturo’s cocaine supply and $11,000. Before leaving, the three men bound Pesaturo and his roommate Richard Bentley, who had returned home during the course of the robbery, with duct tape. They then went to Paul A.’s place to divide up the proceeds. Regan and Bentley testified at trial about this robbery and beating. The jury found that Paul A., John Jr., and Paul J. had committed the racketeering acts of robbery under the Hobbs Act, the kidnaping of Pesaturo and Bentley, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. C. Finethy Extortion — January/February 1996 In January or February 1996, Paul A. sent John Jr. and Pavone to the house of Shane Finethy, who sold marijuana on Paul A.’s behalf. Finethy had kept $8000 in proceeds from drug sales without Paul A.’s permission, using it for a down payment on a house, and had failed to pay Paul A. back. Upon arrival, John Jr. realized that Finethy had sold the house in question and was preparing to move. John Jr. became angry, and he and Pavone hit Finethy until his face was covered with blood; after Finethy’s wife and baby came into the room, Finethy left the house and John Jr. and Pavone followed. Out on the street, they attempted to force Finethy into their car, with John Jr. threatening Finethy at gunpoint. The arrival of a police cruiser broke up the scene, and Finethy returned to his house. Finethy and his wife testified at trial, and the jury found that Paul A., John Jr., and Pavone had committed the racketeering act of extortion. D. Sapochetti Robbery — October 1996 In the fall of 1996, Kevin Meuse and Derek Capozzi were released from jail and joined the DeCologero crew. That October, the crew planned to rob and kill Albert “Big Al” Sapochetti, a bookmaker and drug dealer. With Paul A.’s agreement, John Jr. and Meuse robbed Sapochetti at gunpoint and beat him, leaving him, his neighbor, and his girlfriend hog tied with duct tape and wires. John Jr. and Meuse threatened to return for more money and told Sapochetti they were sparing his life because of his girlfriend’s presence. Sapochetti’s girlfriend testified at trial. In addition to finding that Paul A. and John Jr. had committed the racketeering acts of kidnaping all three victims, the jury also convicted them of using or carrying a firearm, or aiding and abetting such use, during the commission of a violent crime. The government alleged that Paul J. participated in this robbery as well, but the jury found his participation not proved. E. Stevens Robbery — October 1996 Also in October 1996, the crew targeted Michael “Slim” Stevens, who was selling marijuana in Paul A.’s territory. Paul A. gave guns to Regan, Capozzi, and Meuse and sent them with Stephen DiCenso, another member of the DeCologero crew, to Stevens’s townhouse. Regan and Capozzi beat Stevens and threatened to cut off his ear with a knife. Stevens eventually turned over what money he had and led Regan and Capozzi to a stash of marijuana. Before leaving, Regan and Capozzi tied up Stevens, his girlfriend, and another friend of Stevens who had arrived during the robbery. Stevens, his girlfriend, Regan, and DiCenso testified about this incident at trial. The jury convicted Paul A. of robbery under the Hobbs Act, possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, and aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. These crimes, along with armed robbery and kidnaping, were also proved as to Paul A. as racketeering acts under RICO. F. North Burglary — October 1996 The crew also burgled the home of Jeffrey North, another marijuana dealer, that same October. When DiCenso told Paul A. that North was in jail pending bail, Paul A. sent DiCenso, Paul J., and Regan to burgle North’s apartment. DiCenso broke into the apartment and, with the help of the others, found a cache of weapons, two safes, night vision goggles, and about ten pounds of marijuana. The burglars packed most of the goods into duffel bags and heaved the safes over the balcony of the apartment to the yard below. They then loaded “the bags, a box of grenades, and the safes” into a car and returned to Paul A.’s house. There Meuse pried open the safes in the presence of the others. The safes contained various firearms, in-eluding two MAC-1 Is (submachine gun/pistol), an Uzi (submachine gun), and another machine gun with a silencer, as well as money and more drugs. Paul A. gave most of the guns to DiCenso to store in the home of Aislin Silva, a nineteen-year-old woman who permitted her friend DiCenso to keep drugs in her apartment on behalf of the crew. In connection with this burglary, Paul A. and Paul J. were found guilty of conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, which the jury also found to be a racketeering act, and of being felons in possession of a firearm. G. Silva Witness Tampering and Murder — November 1996 Paul A. went to Silva’s apartment later that month with DiCenso and Vincent Marino (a.k.a. Gigi Portalla) to show Mari-no the guns. On November 5, when DiCenso and Paul J. returned to Silva’s apartment on Paul A.’s instructions to pick up some of the guns, they found the police, who had received a tip about the guns, already there. When DiCenso and Paul J. entered the apartment, the guns were in plain view on the floor and the police were questioning Silva; they questioned Paul J. and DiCenso as well and then allowed them to leave. DiCenso and Paul J. reported back to Paul A. and the crew — Pavone, Meuse, Regan, Capozzi, and John P. DeCologero, Sr. (“John Sr.”), the father of John Jr. and Paul J. — who were gathered at Pavone’s house. Paul A. instructed Pavone and Meuse to rent a motel room and sent DiCenso and Capozzi to pick up Silva. Also on Paul A.’s instructions, DiCenso stayed with Silva for the next two nights in different motel rooms. On November 7, another meeting was held at Pavone’s house with Silva present. DiCenso testified that he, Capozzi, Meuse, Pavone, and Paul A. were there, though he could not remember at what point Pavone arrived. Paul A. told Silva that their “attorneys were out of town, but they would take care of everything,” and that in the meantime, Paul A. would arrange for Silva to be taken on a shopping spree in New York City, accompanied by DiCenso. Pavone drove DiCenso and Silva to New York that night in a limousine that Paul A. had borrowed from an associate, Anthony (“Tony”) Bucci. Pavone returned to Boston while DiCenso and Silva spent five nights in New York City. When DiCenso and Silva returned to Boston on November 12, they went to Pavone’s house, where the others were gathered. There, DiCenso, Paul A., and Meuse spoke privately in the kitchen. DiCenso told Paul A. that he did not think Silva would “hold up” under police questioning, to which Paul A. responded, “She has to be killed.” Paul A.’s first plan was for DiCenso to give Silva some high-grade heroin, telling her it was “really good cocaine”; DiCenso was then to wait until Silva was dead before calling 911 to report the overdose. If Silva did not ingest sufficient heroin to cause a fatal overdose, Meuse was to blow more of it up her nose. To this end, Paul A. sent Paul J. to Antonio Centeno, a heroin dealer in Lowell. Centeno testified that Paul J. asked him for heroin “strong enough for an overdose” and that he sold Paul J. thirty bags of heroin. Although Silva did ingest some of this heroin, it did not have its intended effect. Moving to a new plan, Paul A. told Meuse to kill her. The morning of November 13, Meuse arrived at DiCenso’s apartment, where Silva was staying, and sent DiCenso to the hardware store to buy a hacksaw and sheet metal cutters. When DiCenso returned, Silva was dead, and Meuse told DiCenso he had broken her neck. Capozzi arrived to help, and the three men dismembered Silva’s body in the bathtub and packed her remains into trash bags. They drove north, stopping at a Home Depot to purchase lime and a shovel, and buried Silva’s remains in the woods along the North Shore. They then disposed of the remaining evidence in a dumpster in Danvers, washed the car, and stopped at a department store to buy three pairs of sneakers and three sweatsuits. DiCenso testified to the details of the murder described above at trial; his testimony was supported by physical evidence recovered by the police. Paul A., Paul J., and Pavone were all convicted of conspiracy to tamper with a witness and tampering with a witness by misleading conduct; Paul A. and Paul J. were also convicted of tampering with a witness by attempted murder, and Paul A. was convicted of tampering with a witness by murder. These crimes, along with the state-law crimes of murder, attempted murder, and conspiracy to murder, were also found as racketeering acts under the substantive RICO charge. II. Paul A., Paul J., John Jr., Pavone, John Sr., and Capozzi were indicted by a federal grand jury in the District of Massachusetts on October 17, 2001. Paul A. moved to dismiss the RICO charges against him on double jeopardy grounds, an argument based on an earlier trial. The motion was denied; the denial was appealed. In United States v. DeCologero, 364 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.2004), this court rejected that appeal. We explain the background. In an earlier trial, United States v. Carrozza, No. 4:97-cr-40009-NMG (D.Mass.1999), Paul A. was prosecuted for helping the Carrozza faction of the Patriarca crime family undertake a violent “war” between 1989 and 1994 in an attempt to wrest control of that criminal organization from Frank Salemme’s faction. See United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 19-21 (1st Cir.2002) (describing the factual background of the Carrozza case). Paul A. was acquitted of all charges in that case, and he argued in his pre-trial motion in this case that the present indictment violated his double jeopardy rights because it alleged the same conspiracy. DeCologero, 364 F.3d at 16-17. The district court disagreed, and on interlocutory appeal this court affirmed, holding that the two cases dealt with different patterns of racketeering activity. Id. at 19. That double jeopardy claim is renewed here based on the evidence actually introduced at trial. John Sr. pled guilty to a RICO charge on February 28, 2003, and testified for the government at trial. United States v. Capozzi (Capozzi II), 486 F.3d 711, 714 (1st Cir.2007). In July 2004, Capozzi moved to disqualify the attorneys for Paul A., Paul J., and John Jr., arguing they had conflicts of interests. Id. The attorneys for the three defendants then withdrew, and because of the delay required for the new attorneys to prepare for trial, the district court, on the government’s motion, severed Capozzi’s case so that his trial could begin as planned in September 2004. Id. The court gave the remaining four defendants fifteen months to prepare, with the present trial beginning on January 9, 2006. The jury returned its verdict on March 20, 2006. The district court sentenced Paul A. to life imprisonment, Paul J. to 25 years imprisonment, John Jr. to 210 months imprisonment, and Pavone to 72 months imprisonment. This appeal followed. III. Because Paul J., John Jr., and Pavone raise similar and overlapping issues on appeal, we consider their claims together. A. Severance and Mistrial Paul J., John Jr., and Pavone argue that the district court abused its discretion in denying their motions, based on several grounds, to sever their trial from that of Paul A. or to declare a mistrial. Those grounds include Paul A.’s alleged admission to being a gang leader, his odd behavior in the courtroom, his responsibility for the heinous act of the murder of Aislin Silva, and the risk of jury confusion. We find no abuse of discretion. 1. Standard of Review Trial judges’ decisions regarding severance and mistrial are treated with a considerable amount of deference because appellate courts lack the “first-hand exposure to a case” that better enables trial judges to “strike the delicate balance between fending off prejudice, on the one hand, and husbanding judicial resources, on the other hand.” United States v. O’Bryant, 998 F.2d 21, 25-26 (1st Cir.1993). Thus we review a district court’s denial of a motion for severance or motion for mistrial under the same standard: manifest abuse of discretion. United States v. Tejeda, 481 F.3d 44, 54 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 612, 169 L.Ed.2d 393 (2007); United States v. Glenn, 389 F.3d 283, 287 (1st Cir.2004). The risks of prejudice and jury confusion in this case were not negligible, but they were not uncommon either. By their nature, RICO cases involve many defendants, sometimes with family relationships, and often include multiple repulsive acts. There are ways, with skillful trial management and diligent counsel, to prevent these risks from growing into actual harm. Trial judges “have broad power to cope with the complexities and contingencies inherent in the adversary process.” Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976). The trial judge in this case was particularly aware of and sensitive to the complexity of this case and the possibility of jury confusion. DeCologero, 364 F.3d at 20. (An earlier case management order splitting off some of the charges into a separate trial was vacated by this court to avoid double jeopardy problems. Id. at 21-25.) As to severance, “the general rule is that those indicted together are tried together to prevent inconsistent verdicts and to conserve judicial and prosecutorial resources.” Soto-Beníquez, 356 F.3d at 29. The district court can, however, sever defendants’ trials or provide other relief if “there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993); see also Fed R.Crim. P. 14(a). If the district court decides not to sever the trial, the defendant bears the burden of making a strong showing that prejudice resulted from the denial of severance, and prejudice in this context “means more than just a better chance of acquittal at a separate trial.” United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 246 (1st Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Martinez, 479 F.2d 824, 828 (1st Cir.1973)) (internal quotation mark omitted); accord Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540, 113 S.Ct. 933. “This is a difficult battle for a defendant to win.” Boylan, 898 F.2d at 246. 2. Severance Based on Antagonistic Defenses Paul J., John Jr., and Pavone argue strenuously that as the trial went on it became clear that Paul A.’s defense was antagonistic to theirs. Antagonistic defenses can require severance when they are truly irreconcilable, or at least substantially incompatible. Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 55; United States v. Peña-Lora, 225 F.3d 17, 34 (1st Cir.2000). “[WJhere there is merely some dissonance,” however, “we will usually not reverse a trial court’s denial of severance.” Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 55. Here, the defenses were not truly irreconcilable, nor were they substantially incompatible. The other defendants characterize Paul A.’s testimony as admitting that he ran a criminal enterprise during the time in question. This, they say, was incompatible with their defense of non-criminality. The record does not support their characterization. Paul A. testified that he had originally, back in the 1980s, delivered drugs on behalf of Whitey Bulger and Stephen Flemmi, two infamous Boston-area organized crime bosses, but he described his connection with them as minimal and explained that he had refused to continue even in this minimal role after he served his first term in prison (from 1984 to 1992). Paul A. asserted that his refusal irked the mob leaders. His primary defense was that Regan worked for what had become the Salemme faction of the Patriarca Family and was thus motivated to testify falsely against Paul A., setting him up to take the fall for crimes in fact committed by Regan and other followers of Salemme. In developing this defense, Paul A. did bring up his prior indictment in the Carrozza case, as well as the allegation that the Carrozza and Salemme factions were at odds. In Paul A.’s cross-examination of Regan, there were also some references to “the DeCologero crew,” but these were references to what others had alleged, such as the language of the indictment. While this tack might have muddied the waters for the jury, it did not (contrary to his co-defendants’ arguments) set Paul A. up before the jury as “an open and notorious underworld figure.” Instead, the jury heard Paul A. flatly deny running a criminal enterprise (the alleged DeCologero crew), insist that he was not affiliated with any organized criminals, and explain repeatedly that only his son (and, on rare occasion, his brother John Sr.) assisted him in his drug deals after his release from prison. While Paul A. admitted that he had continued some limited drug dealing in the mid-1990s, he explained that he stopped such activity once his side business selling high-protein muffins to other gyms started doing well enough to meet his gym’s operating deficit. Paul A. admitted knowing Regan, DiCenso, and Meuse, but he denied ever asking them for assistance in any criminal conduct. The jury could accept Paul A.’s testimony that he was an occasional drug dealer, and even that he was disliked and targeted by mob leaders, while also accepting the other defendants’ claims that they had engaged in no criminal wrongdoing. Paul A. did not implicate the others, nor did his defense as presented to the jury, if accepted, preclude acquittal of the others. There was no substantial incompatibility. 3. Severance Based on “Spillover” Effects and Mistrial Based on Paul A. ’s Courtroom Antics At the core, these three defendants argue that Paul A.’s admitted criminality, the more severe crimes with which he was charged, and his inappropriate courtroom behavior cast a pall over all four defendants, prejudicing his co-defendants before the jury. This tack also fails. As Justice Jackson famously noted, co-defendants in a conspiracy trial like this one occupy “an uneasy seat. There generally will be evidence of wrongdoing by somebody. It is difficult for the individual to make his own case stand on its own merits in the minds of jurors who are ready to believe that birds of a feather are flocked together.” Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454, 69 S.Ct. 716, 93 L.Ed. 790 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). Such uneasiness is inherent in joint RICO trials, and the unsavoriness of one’s co-defendant (including past criminal conduct) is not enough, by itself, to mandate severance. Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 56. Defendants must still make a strong showing of prejudice to overturn the trial court’s decision not to sever. Paul J., John Jr., and Pavone have also not met that burden with their argument that they suffered from a “spillover” effect due to Paul A.’s prosecution for Aislin Silva’s gruesome murder. While only Paul A. was on trial for the actual murder of Silva, Paul J. and Pavone were charged with closely related crimes (attempted murder and tampering with a witness) involving the same victim. Further, all four men were convicted of RICO conspiracy, and the scope of that conspiracy included protecting their criminal enterprise by silencing witnesses like Silva. Thus even if some of the defendants were not directly charged with Silva’s murder, the murder was still relevant to the RICO counts as it tended to prove the existence and nature of the RICO enterprise and conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 103 (2d Cir.1999). As a result, even if the defendants had received separate trials, evidence of the murder would have been independently admissible against each, and. it is far from clear that the potentially prejudicial impact of that evidence would have rendered it inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Soto-Beníquez, 356 F.3d at 29-30. This is why, “[i]n the context of conspiracy, severance will rarely, if ever, be required” due to evidentiary spillover. United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 36 (1st Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 325 (1st Cir.1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendants’ fear of being found guilty by association with Paul A. has a third aspect: his distracting courtroom behavior. Paul A.’s testimony was often unresponsive or tangential, provoking repeated objections from the prosecution and rebukes from the bench. During the prosecution’s case, the judge admonished Paul A. for interfering with the work of his defense counsel, warning that his disruptive behavior was hurting rather than helping him in the eyes of the jury. Generally, however, if “a defendant misbehaves in the jury’s presence, the misbehavior usually will not compel a separate trial for his codefendants”; rather, the co-defendant seeking severance or mistrial must “demonstrate the existence of some special prejudice” that the court could not remedy through other means. United States v. Pierro, 32 F.3d 611, 616 (1st Cir.1994). If the rule were otherwise, co-defendants could provoke mistrials at will. United States v. Tashjian, 660 F.2d 829, 838 (1st Cir.1981). Paul A.’s co-defendants do not point to any specific prejudice, asserting more generally that they “were prejudiced by his conduct and the court’s inability to rein him in.” Nor do they provide any case law to support their argument that such behavior warrants a mistrial. Rather, under the case law, Paul A.’s conduct is not comparable to the severity of other co-defendant outbursts analyzed in prior cases in which we upheld denials of severance motions. See United States v. Mazza, 792 F.2d 1210, 1224 (1st Cir.1986) (no abuse of discretion in refusal to sever even though co-defendant shouted in middle of witness testimony, “He is lying. I got shot for you, you mother piece of shit. This is my pay back.”); Tashjian, 660 F.2d at 837 (no abuse of discretion in denial of mistrial even though defendant threatened a witness in front of the jury and yelled that his co-defendants were in the mafia). Paul A.’s unruly behavior in the courtroom was unfortunate, but his co-defendants have not made a sufficient showing of prejudice. Paul A.’s conduct also did not go unchecked by the district court. The court, outside the presence of the jury, told Paul A. to change his behavior, and this had at least some effect on him. For example, before Paul A. began his second day of testimony, the court warned him — again outside the presence of the jury — that: [T]his is not fun and games----This is a court of law, and there are rules.... [Y]ou will answer only the questions that are put to you and not blurt out a whole bunch of other stuff. I do believe that you are doing that on purpose. Number one, it doesn’t help you. You may wish to look at the jury at times, and you will see that they are not buying it; and, number two, it is improper and inappropriate for you to do that. It is important for you that the story be told in some reasonably coherent fashion, and you’re making it impossible for the story to be told in a coherent fashion; apart from which you are violating the orders of the Court every time you go off on a frolic of your own. So stop doing that. If you don’t stop doing it, I will need to take further steps. Paul A.’s subsequent testimony, though still subject to objections and occasional reprimands, was more restrained. 4. Severance Based on Jury Confusion In another line of arguments, Paul J., John Jr., and Pavone assert that severance was warranted because of Paul A.’s much greater degree of culpability, the number of crimes for which only Paul A. was on trial, and the similarity of the defendants’ names. All of these factors, defendants argue, could easily lead to jury confusion, a type of prejudice that can be grounds for severance. See United States v. Rodriguez-Marrero, 390 F.3d 1, 26 (1st Cir.2004). Again, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion. It is true that “markedly different degrees of culpability” among co-defendants can “heighten[]” the risk of prejudice. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539, 113 S.Ct. 933. But again, disparity between the relative culpability of co-defendants does not entitle a defendant to severance. Soto-Beníquez, 356 F.3d at 30; United States v. Welch, 15 F.3d 1202, 1210 (1st Cir.1993). Prejudice must be shown, and “[e]ven where large amounts of testimony are irrelevant to one defendant, or where one defendant’s involvement ... is far less than the involvement of others, we have been reluctant to secondguess severance denials.” Boylan, 898 F.2d at 246. Further, such disparity is not uncommon in RICO cases, nor is it unusual in such cases for a co-defendant to be charged with only a subset of the crimes alleged in the indictment. In Flores-Rivera, for example, this court found no abuse of discretion in the denial of severance for a defendant “named in less than ten percent of all overt acts charged in the indictment.” 56 F.3d at 325; see also United States v. Welch, 97 F.3d 142, 147 (6th Cir.1996) (no abuse of discretion in denial of severance even though defendant was only charged with three of the twenty-nine counts of the indictment). The RICO counts, of which all defendants were charged and all were convicted, provided the logical scope and overarching unity for the indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 656 F.2d 5, 9 (1st Cir.1981). As for the defendants’ similar names, defendants appear to assume that the similarities resulted in jury confusion. We cannot make such an assumption, especially as the jury spent two months in the same room with these defendants and their distinct personalities. See United States v. Castillo, 77 F.3d 1480, 1491 n. 20 (5th Cir.1996) (dismissing defendants’ arguments of jury confusion in trial involving a Thomas Brown, Sr., and a Thomas Brown, Jr., in addition to three other defendants who shared the last name of Castillo). The defendants here have failed to demonstrate any prejudice greater than the “possible risk of prejudice that almost always exists when multiple defendants with different roles are tried together.” United States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d 538, 554-55 (1st Cir.1987). Two additional factors cut against the defendants’ jury confusion argument. First, the district court noted to the jury at the outset of the trial that the jury must be careful to consider each defendant separately, a point repeated several times during the jury instructions at the trial’s close. See, e.g., Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540-41, 113 S.Ct. 933 (noting that proper jury instructions can alleviate risk of prejudice). Second, and more tellingly, the jury returned highly individualized verdicts: there were some charges for which the jury acquitted all defendants, and others for which the jury convicted some defendants while acquitting others. Even within some of the charged racketeering acts under the substantive RICO count, the jury found some but not all of the individual, closely related predicate acts proved. See Appendix. These were not the verdicts of a jury confused about the identity and culpability of the individual defendants. See United States v. Houle, 237 F.3d 71, 75 (1st Cir.2001) (“With regard to the jury’s ability to segregate the evidence and understand the judge’s instructions, the verdict itself is often quite telling.... This discriminating verdict shows that the jury was able to compartmentalize evidence and apply it to each defendant....”); Boylan, 898 F.2d at 246; Turkette, 656 F.2d at 9. Given the considerable discretion a district court has to decide a motion for severance or mistrial, these additional factors further indicate that the district court did not abuse that discretion. In sum, we will not second guess the court’s decision without a greater showing of prejudice. See United States v. DeLeon, 187 F.3d 60, 63-64 (1st Cir.1999). B. Judge’s Trial Demeanor Paul J., John Jr., and Pavone next argue that the district court judge’s criticisms of their counsel in the presence of the jury deprived them of a fair trial. With allegations of judicial bias, we consider whether the comments were improper and, if so, whether the complaining party can show serious prejudice. Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 66 (1st Cir.2007). “Charges of partiality should be judged not on an isolated comment or two, but on the record as a whole.” United States v. Polito, 856 F.2d 414, 418 (1st Cir.1988); accord United States v. Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d 19, 35 (1st Cir.1999). As the Supreme Court has noted in the context of the recusal of judges, “judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.... A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration — • even a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration — remain immune.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). This was a complex and lengthy trial, handled with skill by a seasoned trial judge who did not let things get out of control. The defendants have exaggerated; the record does not support their claims. The comments of which defendants complain were few (eleven comments spread over thirty-six days of testimony), balanced, and reasonable in context. Defendants first argue that the judge referred to their objections as “picky” in front of the jury. During the government’s direct examination of DiCenso, defense counsel repeatedly objected to leading questions, objections which the court sustained. After the fourth sustained defense objection in a brief stretch of questioning, the judge addressed the jury: Let me explain, members of the jury. I told you yesterday that leading questions in general are a no-no when counsel conducted direct examination, but you can also be too picky about that. So, part of the reason that I have not always sustained the objection is because I thought at times it was a bit too picky. There is a certain judgment call that one has to make. However, at the moment, [the prosecutor] is leading [DiCenso] rather too much. Immediately thereafter, the court ruled sua sponte that the government was asking another leading question. The court’s “picky” comment had very little to do with the defense; if anything, the court was reprimanding the government. Defendants also accuse the court of unfair, sua sponte rulings that defense questions were argumentative. The court was even-handed: at times it raised sua sponte concerns about the government’s questioning. There was no preferential treatment. Further, the rulings were correct. The court was trying, in this difficult case, to keep the focus on the evidence. We do not address additional exchanges regarding objections, but we do note that the court emphasized in its final instructions to the jury that it should not take into account the exchanges between counsel and the bench regarding evidentiary matters: In the course of the trial, you have heard many times when counsel rose to object. You should not hold that against them or their clients. It is their right to do that. Indeed, it is their duty to do it. It’s the way in which counsel bring to the attention of the Court when they think one or another of what you now know are very complicated rules are not being adhered to. See Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d at 36 (“Assuming arguendo that the trial court exhibited frustration from time to time during this rather lengthy, heated trial, the strong instructions given by the trial court ... should have eliminated any conceivable prejudice.”); Logue v. Dore, 103 F.3d 1040, 1046-47 (1st Cir.1997) (“jury instructions can be a means of allaying potential prejudice” in this context). In sum, the court’s treatment of objections raised by both sides was even-handed and not unfair. The three defendants also take issue with comments by the court that, they argue, suggested they curtail their cross-examination of witnesses. These comments, too, when taken in context, were appropriate. Defendants do not argue, nor could they, that the district court cut their cross-examination short at any point. Instead, the court at times encouraged counsel to move more rapidly after lengthy questioning about minimally relevant information. We read a comment that counsel should limit his cross-examination to “thirty seconds” as a reflection of the late hour; the court dismissed the jury shortly thereafter, and when questioning resumed the next day, the attorney — who indeed had very few questions — was given all the time he needed, without further comment. The same explanation holds for a similar incident earlier in the trial, when the court asked defense counsel to try to conclude cross-examination of a witness that day: the judge’s comment that some defense counsel might skip cross-examination altogether might have been a light quip, a reference to the imminent end of the trial day, or an acknowledgment that the remaining counsel might have few or no questions for the witness — indeed, one counsel did not have any questions, the other two had very few, and no one’s questioning was curtailed by the judge. “Trial judges are justifiably accorded broad latitude to ensure proper courtroom behavior.” United States v. Rodríguez-Rivera, 473 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Gomes, 177 F.3d 76, 80 (1st Cir.1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if such comments could be read as rebukes, a judge, in managing a trial, may rebuke counsel for inappropriate behavior and may reasonably limit cross-examination. Id.; see also Boylan, 898 F.2d at 254. The comments of concern here were appropriate exercises of the court’s responsibilities to manage the trial. As the comments were not improper, we do not reach the question of prejudice. C. Evidentiary Rulings 1. Testimonial Exclusions Paul J., John Jr., and Pavone argue that several of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings were in error and were prejudicial. We review the district court’s interpretation of the rules of evidence de novo, but we review the court’s application of those rules for abuse of discretion. United States v. Muñoz-Franco, 487 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir.2007). We start with then-objections to the court’s exclusion of certain testimony. a. Hearsay. Defendants object that the court excluded as hearsay statements which were not. The hearsay rule applies to out-of-court statements “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). However, “[i]f the significance of an offered statement lies solely in the fact that it was made, no issue is raised as to the truth of anything asserted, and the statement is not hearsay.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(c) advisory committee’s note. Defendants argue that two conversations that allegedly occurred at Paul A.’s gym fall into this latter category. The district court’s rulings to the contrary were not an abuse of discretion. Paul A. attempted to introduce these gym conversations through his own testimony and the testimony of his sister JoAnne and a gym employee named Peter Ippolito. We summarize the testimony that defendants desired to introduce. In the first conversation, DiCenso and Silva allegedly came to Paul A. at his gym to seek his help because the guns had been discovered in Silva’s apartment and because DiCenso was afraid of how Regan would respond. Paul A., who claimed the guns were not his, asserted that he got angry when he learned that DiCenso was storing the guns for Bobby Luisi, a member of the Salemme faction; Paul A. yelled out Luisi’s name and told them, “Get out of here. Those people are trying to kill me.” In the end, Paul A. agreed to help DiCenso get a lawyer and called Tony Bucci to request a limousine on their behalf. In the second conversation, Meuse and Regan came to Paul A. and, in a heated argument, told him to “stay out of their business, that that business with Stephen DiCenso and Aislin Silva was their business and had nothing to do with [Paul A.].” The court allowed Ippolito to testify that DiCenso and Silva came to the gym, that Paul A. got angry, and that Paul A. yelled out someone’s name. But the court did not allow testimony as to the name he yelled out (allegedly “Bobby Luisi”). Ippolito was also allowed to testify that the conversation between Meuse, Regan, and Paul A. took place and that they were “very, very angry,” but not to the content of that conversation. Paul A. testified that the conversation with DiCenso and Silva took place, that he tried calling an attorney for them, and that he called Bucci to order the limousine for DiCenso. JoAnne was allowed to testify to much more regarding the first conversation: that the three of them were talking about guns, that Paul A. yelled at DiCenso, “Well, why are you coming to me” because “these are people who are after us,” that Paul A. told them to leave the gym, and that he then tried to help DiCenso get in touch with an attorney and called for a limousine. The rest of the conversations the court excluded on hearsay grounds. Further details from the first conversation, it ruled, were only offered for “the truth that DiCenso had another agenda”: that is, to establish that the guns were not Paul A.’s and that DiCenso was not working for Paul A. As for the second conversation, Paul A. argued it was relevant because it showed he “was not in a conspiracy with Regan and Meuse. He was not the leader of an organization where he gave them orders, that they had their own thing going.” The court reasoned, however, that this proffered relevance required the content of the statements — that the guns and Silva had nothing to do with Paul A. — to be true. These exclusion rulings were correct. Defendants argue that the statements should have been admitted as verbal acts, but that label applies to statements which “affect[] the legal rights of the parties.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(c) advisory committee’s note; see also United States v. Stover, 329 F.3d 859, 870 (D.C.Cir.2003) (“[Verbal] acts are limited to statements that have independent legal significance, such as contractual offers or inter vivos gifts.”). The defendants perhaps mean to refer more broadly to the category of statements that are not hearsay because they are not offered for their truth. See Stover, 329 F.3d at 870. At trial, Paul A. argued that the conversations were offered to provide context for other actions and events, not to prove the truth of the statements. See United States v. Page, 521 F.3d 101, 106-07 (1st Cir.2008); United States v. Meserve, 271 F.3d 314, 319 (1st Cir.2001). Statements that provide “context” only if they are true, however, are still considered hearsay. See Stover, 329 F.3d at 870. The only relevant context the defendants could point to here was the need to explain why Paul A. called a lawyer for DiCenso. Based on this argument, the court allowed into evidence testimony to the effect that Paul A. called a lawyer for DiCenso, not because DiCenso worked for him, but as a favor when DiCenso came to him with legal troubles. Defendants have put forward no further argument as to what other contextual background the remaining, excluded statements might provide without relying on the truth of those statements. Contrary to defendants’ assertion, the court did not make broad rulings regarding hearsay, but carefully parsed each proffer, often ruling in defendants’ favor in unclear situations. There was no abuse of discretion. b. Impeachment. In arguments that overlap with their hearsay arguments, defendants assert that the district court improperly excluded testimony meant to challenge the credibility of government witnesses. The ability to use extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness by contradiction is linked to the question of hearsay. Generally, extrinsic evidence (such as the testimony of another witness) cannot be used to impeach a witness if it relates only to a collateral matter. Marino, 277 F.3d at 24. This common law rule is a manifestation of the district court’s general discretion to exclude otherwise relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, ... or by considerations of undue delay [or] waste of time.” Fed.R.Evid. 403; see also United States v. Beauchamp, 986 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1993) (citing United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1409 (D.C.Cir.1988)). Evidence is collateral if it is relevant only because it contradicts the in-court testimony of another witness. Marino, 277 F.3d at 24. If what makes the statement otherwise relevant and thus not collateral relies on the truth of the statement, then the statement is hearsay and inadmissable on that ground. See 28 Wright & Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6206, at 537 n. 14 (1993). The decision on whether a matter is collateral or material is within the district court’s discretion. Marino, 277 F.3d at 24. Defendants take issue with the court’s refusal to let a defense witness recount a conversation in which Agent John Mercer allegedly tried to coerce him into testifying for the government. The court ruled that the testimony was only relevant to the extent it bore on Mercer’s credibility and was thus collateral. Defendants note that “a witness’s self-interest or motive to testify falsely is generally considered to be a non-collateral issue.” Beauchamp, 986 F.2d at 4. If the argument is that the defendants were attempting to impeach Mercer not through contradiction but by establishing his bias against defendants and his motive to lie, this argument was not fully developed on appeal and is thus waived. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990) (“[Issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner [on appeal], unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.”). Further, while extrinsic evidence is admissible to show bias, the trial judge still has discretion under Rule 403 to exclude such evidence if it would distract from the main issues of the case. Gomes, 177 F.3d at 81. This ruling was well within the court’s discretion given the court’s interest in avoiding a mini-trial on Mercer’s conduct, which could distract the jury in an already complex case. See Beauchamp, 986 F.2d at 4. Defendants also argue that the district court should have issued bench warrants for three witnesses. The court refused to do so because the witnesses would only testify to collateral matters in order to contradict government witnesses, such as DiCenso and Regan. The court was correct that the witnesses would not be allowed, under the rules of evidence, to testify on those collateral matters. Further, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the proposed testimony of the witnesses, as proffered by Paul A., regarded only collateral matters. 2. Pre-Trial Identification John Jr. appeals the denial of his motions to suppress pre-trial identifications made by Soccorso and Bentley, which he argues were based on an impermissibly suggestive photo array. There was no violation of John Jr.’s due process rights in the presentation of this identification evidence to the jury. Our review of a district court’s decision to deny a suppression motion as to identification is plenary, but with the usual deference to any findings of fact. United States v. Brennick, 405 F.3d 96, 99-100 (1st Cir.2005). A court should exclude an out-of-court identification based on a photo array only in those “extraordinary cases” where there is “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,” a situation which could result in an unfair trial in violation of the defendant’s due process rights. United States v. Henderson, 320 F.3d 92, 100 (1st Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. de Jesus-Rios, 990 F.2d 672, 677 (1st Cir.1993)); see also United States v. Holliday, 457 F.3d 121, 125 (1st Cir.2006). “Short of that point, such evidence is for the jury to weigh ..., for evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some questionable feature.” Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977). John Jr. moved before trial to suppress the Bentley and Soccorso pretrial identifications, but the district court denied both motions, holding that “these matters are properly addressed through cross-examination.” The district court did not explicitly go through the two-step analysis described below. At trial, Soccorso and Bentley both testified that they picked John Jr. out of a six-photo array, more than three years after the robbery in Soccorso’s case and over two years later for Bentley. That photo array was provided for the jury. John Jr.’s counsel cross-examined both witnesses extensively. He walked each of them through the characteristics of the six photographed men, arguing that four of them clearly did not match the age or hairstyle descriptions that the witnesses had provided the police. Under defense counsel’s questioning, Soccorso acknowledged that it was dark at the time of his abduction and that John Jr. was sitting behind him for much of their encounter; from Bentley, counsel drew a description of the pain medications Bentley had been taking at the time he made the identification as well as during the trial, and Bentley acknowledged that his doctor had written a letter to the effect that Bentley should not testify because the medications severely affected his recall. John Jr. also produced an expert witness, Dr. Steven Penrod, to testify about factors that decrease the reliability of witness identifications, many of which factors John Jr. argued to the jury were present in this case. Neither Bentley nor Soccorso made an in-court identification. John Jr. renewed his motion to suppress before the court charged the jury; that motion was also denied. John Jr.’s counsel then argued repeatedly and at length during his closing that the identifications were unreliable and should be discredited. The court, during its charge, instructed the jury that “if the government’s theory is that a particular defendant was a principal, ... then you need to decide whether the evidence shows he was there, and if so, was he identified by the victim, was it a good or a questionable identification.” We use a two-step analysis when considering whether a pretrial identification procedure raises a “very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification”: we first determine whether the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, and if it was, we then look to the totality of the circumstances to decide whether the identification was still reliable. Henderson, 320 F.3d at 100; see also Holliday, 457 F.3d at 125. At the first step, we consider whether the photo array included, as far as was practicable, a reasonable number of persons similar in appearance to the suspect. Holliday, 457 F.3d at 125-26. “The police authorities are required to make every effort reasonable under the circumstances to conduct a fair and balanced presentation of alternative possibilities for identification. The police are not required to search for identical twins----” Id. at 126 n. 5 (quoting Wright v. State, 46 Wis.2d 75, 175 N.W.2d 646, 652 (1970)) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). As for the second step’s totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, the Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), enumerated five factors for consideration: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention to the crime; (3) the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the defendant; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and confrontation. Henderson, 320 F.3d at 100 (summarizing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375). Starting with the first step, the photo array for John Jr. was impermissibly suggestive. John Jr. has no unusual features that might complicate the search for others with similar appearances, yet the other photos in the array were not of men who looked similar to John Jr. beyond being white men with short hair. Comparison with the eight-photo array used for the identification of Paul J. is informative. In that array, the eight men appear to be of the same age group, seven of the eight have fairly similar hair, and the overall impression is one of resemblance. The array used for John Jr., however, included only six photos, two of which are of men who appear younger than John Jr. and two of which are of men clearly older; one of the latter has a noticeably receding hairline. Two of the men appear more heavyset than John Jr., and at least two have hair that is markedly different and not interchangeable with that of the defendant. In all, only one of the five photos depicts a man as similar to John Jr. as the photos in Paul J.’s array are to Paul J. Further, given the familial resemblance between the brothers, the existence of the other photos in Paul J.’s array makes all the more clear that the police should not have had trouble locating men who resembled John Jr. more closely. However, given the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the array did not raise a substantial likelihood of misidentification and that the remaining question of reliability was appropriately left to the jury. Cf. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 200-01, 93 S.Ct. 375. Soccorso spent a substantial amount of time in the car with his assailant; Bentley watched as the crew ransacked his apartment and tied him up. Both witnesses were victims of the crimes and not accidental eyewitnesses whose attention might have been distracted. On cross-examination, despite thorough questioning, both witnesses stood by their identifications. Some of the Biggers factors cut in defendant’s favor — Bentley did incorrectly describe two of the robbers as being the same height, and (more significantly) there was a lengthy time delay between the crimes and the identifications — but not all the Biggers factors must point in one direction for an identification to be upheld. See Henderson, 320 F.3d at 100. “[I]t is only in extraordinary cases that identification evidence should be withheld from the jury,” id. (quoting de Jesus-Rios, 990 F.2d at 677), and this is not one of them. The weighing of the factors in this case, however, is a close question, so we also note that the jury was provided with extensive information about the identifications with which to make its own reliability determination. The defendant’s counsel did a highly competent examination, eliciting testimony from multiple witnesses that cast doubt on the identifications of John Jr., especially in terms of the Biggers factors. The jury was clearly and properly instructed on the question and had before it a thorough record of why the identification might be untrustworthy. We are thus further reassured that John Jr.’s due process rights were not violated by the submission of the identification evidence, with all of defendant’s caveats, to the jury. 3. Pavone’s Claim of Prosecutorial Misconduct Pavone argues that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated by prosecutorial misconduct. We start by describing the underlying dispute. Pavone alleges that an old acquaintance, John Dana, and his colleague Wayne David Collins approached him around the time of his indictment and offered to hire an attorney on his behalf. That attorney, John Cicilline, did briefly take over Pavone’s case. According to Pavone, Collins claimed to have a special, preferential relationship with the FBI, and Dana and Cicilline repeatedly asked Pavone to cooperate with the government. After his initial detention hearing, Pavone was approached by another inmate, Arlindo Dossantos, who warned Pavone that Collins and Dana were FBI informants who hired attorneys for criminal defendants in order to obtain confidential information that they could then pass on to the government. Pavone confronted Cicilline, Cicilline withdrew as counsel, and Pavone’s former counsel was reappointed. Pavone moved to dismiss the indictment against him. He asserted that he had shared confidential information with Cicilline, that Cicilline transmitted that information to Collins and Dana, and that all three “acted with the knowledge and approval of the government.” He supported this motion with his own affidavit and that of his mother, who had spoken with Dana on multiple occasions during the time in question. Pavone also moved for discovery of sealed documents filed in Dossantos’s prosecution regarding similar accusations against Collins, Dana, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office. In response, the government submitted affidavits from the three Assistant U.S. Attorneys who prosecuted this case. They denied having ever met or communicated with Dana or Collins and asserted that, to the best of their knowledge, no one involved in the investigation had obtained any information from Dana, Collins, or Cicilline. One of them also explained that the case was investigated not by the FBI, but by the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives (“ATF”), and the Massachusetts State Police. The lead investigators from the ATF (Mercer) and the Massachusetts State Police (Irwin) also submitted affidavits, stating that neither they nor, to the best of their knowledge, anyone else working on the investigation had ever sought or received information from Dana, Collins, or Cicilline. The district court denied Pavone’s motions to dismiss the indictment. Based on the government’s affidavits “and in the absence of any contradictory factual support,” the court was “not persuaded” that Pavone could show that the government received any confidential information, even if he were allowed access to documents in the Dossantos case. It is this denial that Pavone appeals. “[T]he government’s intrusion into the attorney-client relationship” is not a per se Sixth Amendment violation; there must also be some demonstration of resulting prejudice. United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 907 (1st Cir.1984). Because such intrusions pose a serious risk to defendants’ constitutional rights, and because it would be unreasonably difficult for most defendants to prove prejudice, we only require defendants to make a prima facie showing of prejudice by “prov[ing] that confidential communications were conveyed as a result” of the government intrusion into the attorney-client relationship. Id. at 907-08. The burden then shifts to the government to show that the defendant was not prejudiced; that burden is a demanding one. Id. at 908. Even taking all his allegations as true, Pavone did not show or even allege that Collins and Dana passed any confidential information they received from Cicilline on to the government. “[U]nless [the informant] communicated the substance of the [attorney-client] conversations [to the government] and thereby created at least a realistic possibility of injury to [the defendant] or benefit to the State, there can be no Sixth Amendment violation.” Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 558, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977); see also Greater Newburyport Clamshell Alliance v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 838 F.2d 13, 20 (1st Cir.1988) (“Only information communicated to the prosecutor is capable of prejudicing a criminal defendant’s sixth amendment rights at trial.”); United States v. Dyer, 821 F.2d 35, 38 (1st Cir.1987) (where “no confidential attorney-client information was relayed to, or obtained by, the prosecution,” “[t]he defense suffered no prejudice” and thus no Sixth Amendment violation). We affirm the denial of Pavone’s motion to dismiss. Pavone also makes a related argument that the government improperly withheld Brady material (the Dossantos files) which he claims “contain[] certain and definitive exculpatory material,” pre