Full opinion text
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge KING wrote the opinion, in which Judge WILKINSON and Judge WILSON joined. KING, Circuit Judge: The appellants in these consolidated proceedings, Mohammad Omar Aly Has-san, Ziyad Yaghi, and Hysen Sheriff, were tried jointly in the Eastern District of North Carolina and convicted of several offenses arising from terrorism activities. On appeal, the trio presents myriad challenges to their convictions and sentences. As explained below, we reject the appellants’ various contentions of error and affirm. I. A. On July 22, 2009, the federal grand jury in eastern North Carolina returned an indictment against the appellants and five others, alleging multiple terrorism conspiracies and related offenses. Bench warrants were issued for all eight defendants on July 23, 2009, and, four days later, seven were arrested. In September 2009, a superseding indictment was returned, followed on November 24, 2010, by the operative second superseding indictment (the “Indictment”). The Indictment alleged the following offenses that are particularly relevant to these appeals: • Count One charged the eight defendants with conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, that is, to provide material support and resources for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 956 (the “Count One conspiracy”); • Count Two charged the eight defendants with the conspiracy offense of violating 18 U.S.C. § 956(a), i.e., to commit outside the United States acts that would constitute murder, kidnapping, and maiming if committed within the United States (the “Count Two conspiracy”); • Counts Four and Eight charged conspiracy ringleader Daniel Boyd (“Boyd”), his son Zakariya, and appellant Hysen Sherifi with possessing firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence — particularly, the Count Two conspiracy — in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and • Count Eleven charged Boyd and Sher-ifi with conspiring to kill members of the uniformed services of the United States in attacks on military personnel and installations in Virginia and elsewhere, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1117 (the “Count Eleven conspiracy”). None of the other charges in the Indictment were lodged against any of the appellants. Count Three charged Boyd with receiving a firearm and ammunition in interstate commerce, with knowledge that the offenses set forth in Counts One and Two would be committed therewith, in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 924(b). Counts Five, Nine, and Ten charged Boyd (and in Count Five, Boyd’s son Dylan) with knowingly selling firearms and ammunition to a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(1) and 924. Counts Six and Seven charged Boyd with making false statements to the government by misrepresenting his plans to meet others — including appellants Mohammad Omar Aly Hassan and Ziyad Ya-ghi — when Boyd travelled to the Middle East in 2007, in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). In Counts Twelve and Thirteen, defendant Anes Subasic was charged with knowingly making false statements to procure his naturalization as a citizen, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a). On February 9, 2011, Boyd pleaded guilty to the Count One and Count Two conspiracies, and, pursuant to his plea agreement with the government, Counts Three through Eleven were dismissed as to him. Dylan and Zakariya Boyd each pleaded guilty to the Count One conspiracy, and, in exchange, the other charges against them were dismissed. Boyd was sentenced to 216 months in prison, and his sons Dylan and Zakariya were sentenced to 84 months and 93 months, respectively. Subasic was tried separately from the appellants, convicted of the four offenses alleged against him, and sentenced to 360 months. As for the appellants, Hassan was convicted of the Count One conspiracy and sentenced to 180 months; Yaghi was convicted of the Count One and Count Two conspiracies and sentenced to 380 months; and Sherifi was convicted of the Count One, Count Two, and Count Eleven conspiracies, plus Counts Four and Eight, and he was sentenced to 540 months. B. The parties and the trial court were in substantial agreement on the essential elements of the offenses tried before the jury. First, to obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A for the Count One conspiracy, the government was required to prove as to each appellant: (1) that he entered into a conspiracy; (2) that the objective of the conspiracy was to provide material support or resources; and (3) that he then knew and intended that the provision of such material support or resources would be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 956. See United States v. Chandia, 675 F.3d 329, 332 n. 1 (4th Cir.2012). “Material support or resources,” as used in § 2339A, includes currency and other property, training, weapons, expert advice or assistance and personnel. See § 2339A(b)(l). To prove the Count Two conspiracy alleged under 18 U.S.C. § 956(a), the government was obliged to show as to each appellant: (1) that he entered into a conspiracy; (2) knowing and intending that the objective of the conspiracy was murder, kidnapping, or maiming outside the United' States; (3) that the conspiracy was entered into within the United States; and (4) that a conspirator, not necessarily a defendant or an appellant, committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Indictment identified the purposes and objects of the Count One and Count Two conspiracies, which were generally to advance violent jihad, support and participate in terrorist activities outside the United States, and commit acts of murder, kidnapping, and maiming outside the United States. The manner and means by which the conspiratorial objects were to be accomplished by the defendants and their conspirators included the following: • To prepare to become “mujahideen” and die “shahid” — that is, as martyrs in furtherance of violent jihad; • To radicalize others, mostly young Muslims or converts to Islam, to believe in “fard’ayn,” the idea that violent jihad is a personal obligation on the part of every good Muslim; • To offer financing and training in weapons, and to assist in arranging overseas travel and contacts so that others could wage violent jihad; • To raise money to support efforts in training and equipping personnel, and to disguise the destination of such monies irom the donors; and • To obtain assault weapons such as the AK-47, and to develop familiarity and skills with the weapons of choice used by mujahideen in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Multiple overt acts were specifically alleged in the Indictment that relate to the Count One and Count Two conspiracies, including, inter alia: • In late 2006, Yaghi travelled to Jordan to engage in violent jihad; • In late 2006, Boyd purchased a Bushmaster carbine rifle and magazine; • In early 2007, Boyd purchased a Rug-er mini 14 long gun; • In early 2007, Boyd purchased airline tickets to Israel from the United States for himself and his sons; • In early 2007, plane tickets were purchased for Yaghi and Hassan to travel from the United States to Israel; • In June 2007, Boyd, his son Zakariya, Yaghi, and Hassan departed Raleigh, North Carolina, for Israel. Having failed in their attempts to engage in violent jihad, the four men returned to the United States in late July 2007; • Upon his arrival back in the United States, Boyd lied to federal agents by denying that he had intended to meet Hassan and Yaghi in Israel; • In February 2008, Boyd solicited money to fund the travel of “brothers” overseas to engage in violent jihad; • In June 2008, Boyd accepted $500 in cash from Sherifi to help fund violent jihad; • In June 2008, Boyd showed Sherifi how to use a Kalashnikov AK-47; • In June 2008, Sherifi departed North Carolina for Kosovo to engage in violent jihad; • In November 2008, Boyd purchased a Mossburg rifle, a .357 revolver, and a Century Arms rifle; • In early 2009, Boyd purchased an Ish-mash SAGA .308 rifle, three Century Arms rifles, a Ruger 5.56 rifle, and a Smith & Wesson .223 rifle; • In April 2009, Sherifi returned from Kosovo to the United States for the purpose of soliciting funds and personnel to support the mujahideen; and • In June and July 2009, Boyd, Sherifi, and Zakariya Boyd trained in military tactics and the use of weapons in Cas-well County, North Carolina. With respect to the essential elements of Counts Four and Eight — which were tried against Sherifi alone — the government was required to establish: (1) that Sherifi knowingly possessed a firearm on or about June 10, 2009, and again on or about July 7, 2009; and (2) that he did so to further the crime of violence alleged in Count Two. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Those charges arose from the weapons training sessions conducted by Boyd and others in 2009 in Caswell County. Finally, to secure Sheriffs conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1117 on the Count Eleven conspiracy, the government was required to demonstrate: (1) that Sherifi entered into a conspiracy; (2) the object thereof was to kill or attempt to kill officers and employees of the executive branch of the federal government (here, members of the uniformed services), on account of — or while such officers and employees were engaged in — the performance of their official duties; and (3) that at least one overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Count Eleven identified several overt acts, including the following: In June 2009, Sheriffs coconspirator Boyd conducted reconnaissance at the Quantieo, Virginia Marine Corps Base; also in June 2009, Boyd reviewed maps of Quantieo, intending the maps to be used to plan and coordinate an attack on the base; and, in July 2009, Boyd possessed weapons and ammunition that would be used at Quanti-co, asserting that they were for the base and to attack Americans. C. During the post-indictment period leading to the trial, the appellants filed multiple pretrial motions in the district court, several of which sought to curtail the government’s case. For example, the appellants challenged the government’s expert witness and moved to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”). The district court disposed of some of the appellants’ evidentiary challenges prior to trial. First, after conducting a Daubert hearing, the court authorized the trial testimony of the government’s expert, Evan Kohlmann, subject to specified limitations. See Dau-bert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 118 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Second, the court considered and rejected the appellants’ challenges to the government’s FISA-derived evidence. After conducting an in camera and ex parte review of relevant materials, the court ruled that such evidence was admissible. Finally, the court considered several other evidentiary challenges, holding some of them in abeyance pending the trial proceedings. Before trial, the prosecution moved to preclude the appellants from arguing to the jury that their alleged unlawful conduct was protected by the First Amendment. Although the trial court agreed with the government “that there is no First Amendment defense to the crimes with which [the appellants] are charged,” the court determined “that granting the government’s motion would go too far.” See United States v. Boyd, No. 5:09-cr-00216, slip op. at 8-9 (E.D.N.C. July 12, 2011), ECF No. 1222. The court further explained: While the government correctly points out that the First Amendment provides no constitutional right to actively support violent crime, the wording of the government’s motion would suggest that defendants should not be allowed to mention the First Amendment at all at trial, a restriction that strikes the court as inappropriate. As defendants note, it is the government’s burden at trial to prove that defendants engaged in unlawful conduct. Based on defendants’ briefs, it seems that defendants intend to challenge exactly what “conduct” the government contends is unlawful. This is a permissible argument to make. However, in making opening and closing arguments and in questioning witnesses, defendants may not invite jury nullification by suggesting that the First Amendment is a defense to the crimes charged. Both sides may submit proposed jury instructions regarding the First Amendment, and such proposals will be considered by the court at the appropriate time. Id. at 9 (footnotes omitted). II. During the trial itself — which was conducted in New Bern over a three-week period in September and October of 2011 — the government presented approximately forty witnesses. Of those, about twenty-two were law enforcement officers, including FBI agents and employees. Other prosecution witnesses included expert Kohlmann, three informants, and three named coconspirators (Boyd and his sons Dylan and Zakariya), as well as former friends and associates of the defendants. Of the three appellants, only Sher-ifi presented evidence. During his trial presentation, Sherifi called three witnesses, including himself. A. Our description of the trial evidence is provided in the light most favorable to the government. See United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862-63 (4th Cir.1996) (en banc). That evidence established a series of conspiratorial activities centering on Boyd, who, after pleading guilty to two of eleven charges, became the prosecution’s chief trial witness. 1. A citizen of the United States who converted to Islam as a child, Boyd had, as a young adult, spent time in Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1980s and early 1990s. While living abroad, Boyd participated in the Afghan resistance against the Soviet occupation and received the nickname “Saifulla,” which, in Arabic, means “Sword of God.” Boyd later learned that he had been in a training camp operated or funded by the notorious al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden. Boyd returned to the United States in the early 1990s, and, after another trip to Pakistan, settled with his family near Raleigh. Boyd thereafter grew increasingly radicalized in his religious beliefs and, by 2004, began to espouse a violent ideology, including the view that the killing of non-Muslims was a “fard,” or “fard’ayn,” that is, a religious obligation imposed by Islam. As Boyd became more extreme, he disassociated himself from the Islamic community in the Raleigh area. Boyd then began to meet and discuss his violent religious views with others at his Raleigh home and at the Blackstone Halal Market, a grocery store he owned and operated for about a year in nearby Garner. The appellants met and talked with Boyd on numerous occasions during the course of the conspiratorial activities, during which they often discussed violent jihad. Boyd explained that, to him, jihad required “doing something to fulfill [his] obligation in Islam,” and was “suggestive of [men] actually involving [themselves] with going and physically helping with the resistance or fighting against ... the NATO forces in Afghanistan or Iraq, or anyplace, really.” J.A. 1549. Boyd and the appellants “were at a point of agreement or a meeting of the minds” as to this ideology and understanding of violent jihad. Id. at 1549-50. 2. a. About 2005, the FBI initiated a criminal investigation into Boyd’s activities. By mid-2006, the FBI had introduced its first informant, Abdullah Eddarkoui, into the Boyd investigation. In that capacity, Ed-darkoui grew close to Boyd and his family, eventually interacting with Boyd on a daily basis. In 2007, the FBI introduced a second confidential informant, Alvin Harris, into its investigation. Harris obtained a job with another Boyd business, a construction company called Saxum Walls. Like informant Eddarkoui, Harris became a close friend of the Boyd family. Harris generally spent several days a week with Boyd. Boyd eventually helped Harris obtain a passport so that Harris could travel abroad to engage in violent jihad. Appellant Yaghi met Boyd in 2006 when Yaghi, then eighteen years old, approached Boyd at an Islamic center in Durham. The two men initially spoke about Boyd’s experiences in Afghanistan, after which Yaghi obtained Boyd’s phone number. That same year, the FBI also opened an investigation into Yaghi, which was eventually merged into the Boyd investigation. In the months that followed their first meeting in 2006, Boyd and Yaghi had several conversations, primarily at Islamic centers in the Raleigh area and in Boyd’s home. The men discussed various topics, including Boyd’s experiences overseas, plus his views on Islam and violent jihad. Yaghi also sought Boyd’s advice about Jordan, because Yaghi wanted to travel in that country to visit relatives and study Islam. Yaghi explicitly asked Boyd where in Jordan he would find the “best brothers.” J.A. 1548. This inquiry referred to Muslim men who were “going to pray” and maintain “the bonds of fellowship and Islam,” and those who “understood [the] obligation of jihad” and could help Yaghi “gain access” to violent resistance movements. Id. at 1550-51. In response, Boyd told Yaghi about a mosque in Jordan where he could find the “best brothers.” In October 2006, Yaghi travelled to Jordan. Shortly before Yaghi left the United States, Boyd and several others — who understood and shared Boyd’s violent and extremist ideology — met in a parking lot outside a Durham Islamic center to wish Yaghi well. Boyd described this as a “joyous send-off,” during which Boyd and the others gave Yaghi gifts, including an Afghan blanket and a “traditional Pashtun hat.” J.A. 1561-62. The men wished Ya-ghi well, sending him off with the valediction “may we meet again in heaven,” which conveyed their hope that Yaghi would make his way to the battlefield, and, if he died, find his way to heaven. Id. at 1555, 1562. According to Boyd, the terms “battlefield” and “battlefront” were used to refer to locations where Muslims were then actively waging violent jihad against the “kuffar,” including wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Chechnya, Somalia, Palestine, and Kashmir. As Boyd and others explained to the jury, “kuffar” is a derogatory term, commonly used by violent Muslims to refer to non-Muslims. See id. at 989-90, 1399-1400, 1557. Boyd and his coconspirators shared the view that getting to the jihadist battlefield and fighting against the kuffar was a necessary and laudable aspiration. While in Jordan in 2006, Yaghi remained in touch with Boyd by phone and email. In November 2006, Yaghi sent Boyd an email explaining that it was “getting more and more obvious that the true believer[s]” of Islam — such as Yaghi and Boyd — were “under attack by the kuffar and by ‘mus-lims.’ ” J.A. 4000. As Boyd explained, Ya-ghi’s reference to “muslims” in that email meant those who claimed to be believers but who were not actually “true believers.” Id. at 1556-57. Boyd recalled a “shared understanding amongst a lot of the rhetoric online and some of the people in the community” that those who shared his beliefs were “under attack ... physically in the different battlefields,” as well as “under attack ideologically from the ... naysayers of our religion,” who did not believe that Muslims had an obligation to defend those fighting on the jihadist battlefields. Id. at 1557. Prior to his departure for Jordan, Yaghi told Boyd that he hoped to find a wife overseas. While abroad, Yaghi wrote Boyd that Yaghi was waiting to see how his “marriage” would go before planning to “make [his] next move,” concluding by advising Boyd that they would “meet in a far better place than this earth.” J.A. 4000. It was understood by Boyd and his associates that the phrases “getting married” and “finding a wife” were code for seeking to reach the battlefield to engage in violent jihad. Id. at 1592. During some of their exchanges while Yaghi was abroad, Boyd recalled Yaghi seeming “frustrated” that Boyd “wasn’t able to fulfill any real helpful role for [Yaghi] to, you know, get inside somewhere to a battlefield.” Id. at 1560-61. While in the Middle East in 2006, Yaghi also posted numerous statements and copious information on Facebook concerning his adherence to the violent jihadist ideology. Yaghi consistently praised the teachings of Anwar al-Awlaki, an imam and cleric who was born in the United States and later became an al-Qaida militant in Yemen. Al-Awlaki was well known as an al-Qaida leader who espoused violent and radical jihadist views. While overseas, Yaghi also kept in touch with appellant Hassan, who had been his good friend for some time. Yaghi and Hassan corresponded with one another largely through Facebook. In their Facebook postings, Hassan and Yaghi discussed the teachings of al-Awlaki and posted rap songs and poems about their animosity towards the non-Muslim kuffar. One of Yaghi’s Face-book postings included the following: [F]eds tryed ta get at me but im quick wit the trickery thas how I stay slippery/kuffar get smoked like hickory/dickery dock i pull the glock so fast the clock dont have chance ta toek/or tick let the shots rip then I stop the shit/pop my wrists I don’t give uck if cops exist/im above the law already explained how im quick on the draw/heard the battle in fallujahs ferocious/niggas runnin out of ammo but they stay strapped wit explosives/rpg 7s I aint worried if all them niggas die euz inshal-lah they all going ta heaven[.] J.A. 4395. Hassan also posted violent rhymes, including the following: I used to smoke tree/but I dont do that shit no more that shits far/only thing I smoke now is fuckin kuffar/getting high off their deaths/fuck buryin them, let the animals eat their flesh/leave their bones for weapons or for conditioning my shins[J Id. at 4388. Hassan and Yaghi actively promoted the violent views and teachings of al-Awlaki by providing literature and videos to others, both within and outside the conspiracies. In 2007, after Yaghi returned to North Carolina from Jordan, he continued his friendship with Boyd. The two men met on a substantial number of occasions throughout 2007. Yaghi also introduced Hassan to Boyd and accompanied Hassan to Boyd’s home at least twice. During their visits with Boyd, the three men discussed the “obligation of jihad,” which Boyd explained as the need “to go and actually defend against the specific wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that were taking place,” and to fight in other wars that were “going on in the Muslim world,” such as in Chechnya and Palestine. J.A. 1653-64. b. In February 2007, Yaghi learned that Boyd would be travelling to Israel and Palestine with his sons. Yaghi asked to accompany Boyd to the Middle East and asked if Hassan could join them as well. Because the Boyds were taking a family trip, Boyd told Yaghi that he and Hassan could not travel with the Boyds. Boyd agreed, however, to facilitate the purchase of plane tickets for Yaghi and Hassan to fly to Israel. Yaghi and Hassan then gave Boyd money for their tickets, and Boyd arranged through a travel agency for a wire transfer of the necessary funds. Boyd believed that Hassan and Yaghi wanted to travel overseas in an effort to “get to a battlefront somewhere.” J.A. 1587. Boyd also told informant Eddarkoui that he had asked Yaghi and another boy (whom Boyd did not specifically identify) to “go somewhere overseas for jihad.” Id. at 780. In the months leading to their June 2007 trip, Hassan and Yaghi sought Boyd’s advice about travelling in Israel and Palestine, and about the locations they should visit. Hassan and Yaghi also told Boyd that they hoped “to get married” and find wives while they sojourned in the Middle East. Id. at 1571. Hassan and Yaghi discussed being familiar with firearms and assault weapons, as well as the need for training in their use, both with one another and with Boyd. Has-san and Yaghi knew that Boyd maintained a large stockpile of such weapons. Boyd had built his weapons arsenal over the years, and it included numerous assault rifles and handguns. The Boyd sons were also familiar with such weapons. Prior to 2006, for example, Dylan Boyd showed an AK-47 to a high school friend. Hassan and Yaghi discussed the need to obtain such weapons to use in implementing their beliefs in violent jihad. In early 2007, Hassan wrote on Yaghi’s Facebook page, “[Y]o, theres an AK in Garner for sale— only 250 dollar ... us 3 could get it for real.” J.A. 4383. Hassan also posted a link to a YouTube video concerning the basics of shooting and marksmanship. In March 2007, Hassan purchased a small caliber rifle from a sporting goods store in North Carolina. Several months later, Hassan and Yaghi gave Boyd a car ride from a mosque in Durham where the three men had been attending religious services. During the ride, Hassan and Yaghi showed Boyd the small rifle, explaining that they had purchased it for “training” and “target practice.” Id. at 1796. c. Boyd and his son Zakariya departed for Israel on June 12, 2007, and Hassan and Yaghi left the very next day. Boyd and Zakariya were denied entry into Israel, however, and they instead went to Jordan via France. The Boyds toured Jordan, staying with a Mend, and they concluded their Jordanian trip in the town of Salt, where they were joined by Dylan Boyd. Like the Boyds, Yaghi and Hassan were denied entry into Israel; they instead detoured to Jordan via Germany. While abroad, Hassan and Yaghi repeatedly sought to contact Boyd by email and telephone. They received no responses from Boyd, however, notwithstanding that Boyd had email access during his travels. Hassan and Yaghi also attempted to reach Boyd by calling his home in North Carolina, but they were unable to make contact. Boyd later told the FBI that, as the trips were originally planned, he was to meet Hassan and Yaghi when they arrived in Israel and “hook them up” with persons who would assist their travels in Israel and Palestine. J.A. 1584. Hassan and Yaghi were to “go on their way from there,” id., that is, they would ultimately find their way to the battlefield and participate in violent jihad. While the four men were travelling in the Middle East, rumors circulated in Raleigh that Boyd had sent Hassan and Ya-ghi overseas to go to the battlefield — specifically to engage in violent jihad. Boyd learned that Aly Hassan, Hassan’s father in North Carolina, was upset by those rumors. Boyd called the senior Hassan from Jordan, and the two men had a heated discussion about the younger Hassan’s travel plans. Boyd told the senior Hassan that Boyd was not in touch with either Hassan or Yaghi, and he could not get a message to them. d. After Boyd and his sons, on the one hand, and Hassan and Yaghi, on the other, returned from their 2007 trips to the Middle East, Hassan and Yaghi remained close friends. Their contacts with Boyd, however, diminished substantially. Has-san and Yaghi neither emailed nor phoned Boyd, but they visited him at the Blackstone Halal Market in Garner on at least two occasions, in the fall of 2007 and again in the spring of 2008. During one of those visits, Yaghi introduced Boyd to defendant Jude Kenan Mohammad. Mohammad had been raised in the United States, though his father was from Pakistan and still lived there. Boyd and Mohammad became good Mends, often discussing such matters as Boyd’s experiences fighting in Afghanistan, Mohammad’s relatives in Pakistan, and their shared radical and violent religious views. Mohammad also spoke of the evils of westernized living. In the fall of 2008, Mohammad talked of travelling to Pakistan to “go back with his people,” which Boyd “assumed was to eventually try to get to the battlefield.” J.A. 1605-06. Mohammad also stayed at the Boyd home when the Boyds were on vacation. While in Boyd’s home, Mohammad reviewed Boyd’s materials on violent jihad and extremist Islamic ideology. Mohammad passed along some of those jihadist materials to others, including Yaghi. His mother recalled dramatic changes in Mohammad’s behavior during 2008, after he began to espouse Boyd’s violent jihadist ideology. In October 2008, Mohammad went to Pakistan. Following his departure, Mohammad’s mother confronted Yaghi — who had moved into Mohammad’s apartment — about the changes in her son. Yaghi advised her that Mohammad was “in the same place” that Yaghi had been “a year prior.” Id. at 1904-05. Boyd explained that being in the “same place” metaphorically referred to Mohammad having the understanding and beliefs that Yaghi espoused with respect to violent jihad. Id. at 1744. e. Aside from the aforementioned encounters at the Blackstone Halal Market, Boyd had little contact with either Hassan or Yaghi after their return from the 2007 trip to the Middle East. In January 2009, Ya-ghi and Hassan were arrested on unrelated charges. While detained, Hassan asked his then paramour to email al-Aw-laki directly to seek advice on Hassan’s behalf. Hassan also asked her to remove from Facebook some of Hassan’s postings, messages, and videos, specifically those relating to violent jihad. In March 2009, Boyd contacted Yaghi, seeking to ascertain what, if anything, Yaghi may have discussed with law enforcement officers while he was in custody. In that conversation with Boyd, Yaghi denied being a snitch. Otherwise, Hassan and Yaghi failed to keep in touch with Boyd, and the government has conceded that they were not part of Boyd’s inner circle after late 2007. Although the defense lawyers for both Hassan and Yaghi emphasized their clients’ termination of communications with Boyd, the evidence — viewed in the proper light — established a “parallel set of initiatives” that the prosecution proved were being carried on by Hassan and Ya-ghi in 2008 and 2009. See United States v. Boyd, No. 5:09-cr-00216, slip op. at 19 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 10, 2011), ECF No. 1494 (“Sufficiency Opinion I”). As the district court explained, after his return from the 2007 trip to the Middle East, Yaghi gave a speech at the Islamic Association of Raleigh promoting jihad and the corresponding moral obligation to commit violence against non-Muslims. Hassan and Yaghi regularly communicated with one another through email and Facebook about jihadist ideology and continued to discuss and engage in weapons training. Hassan espoused increasingly violent and extremist jihadist views during that period, as demonstrated by his Facebook postings. The trial court emphasized that Hassan was highly proficient in using technology to disseminate his beliefs and in seeking to recruit others to his violent ideology. See id. at 25. Hassan also became progressively fervent in his support of al-Awlaki. Hassan befriended an individual named Jamar Carter in late 2006 or early 2007, first meeting Carter at a UPS store where Carter worked near Raleigh. Hassan and Yaghi introduced Carter to the Islamic religion, and shared with Carter their beliefs in violent jihad and appreciation for the teachings of al-Awlaki. At one point, Hassan showed Carter videos depicting car bombings and expressed his view that such actions were permissible. Carter, having decided that his views of Islam varied dramatically from those of Hassan and Yaghi, eventually ceased associating with them. Boyd’s lack of contact with Hassan and Yaghi after 2007 was attributed by the prosecution to several factors, including Boyd’s concern that Hassan and Yaghi talked too much and drew unwanted attention to Boyd and his family. As the trial court observed, Boyd was questioned by FBI agents twice in the summer of 2007, once in July and again in August, and Boyd thus grew ever more concerned that he was under FBI surveillance. See Sufficiency Opinion I at 18. During his meetings with the FBI, the agents asked Boyd about his travels abroad and his contacts with Hassan and Yaghi. Boyd misled the FBI concerning the extent of his contacts with Hassan and Yaghi, initially failing to reveal that he had planned to meet Hassan and Yaghi in 2007 while they were travel-ling abroad in the Middle East. 3. a. In March 2008, a mutual friend introduced Boyd to appellant Sherifi, who was then about twenty-three years old. Sherifi and Boyd became close friends, and Sherifi often visited the Blackstone Halal Market where he and Boyd discussed their shared views advocating a violent jihadist ideology. Boyd and Sherifi believed that dying “shahid” — as a martyr — was an important goal for a good Muslim. In the spring of 2008, Sherifi introduced Boyd to defendant Subasic. Sherifi, Boyd, Dylan, and Zakariya made regular efforts to raise money to support jihadist causes — that is, to fund their own travels or to send money to other “brothers” to further violent jihadist efforts overseas. In June of 2008, Sherifi gave Boyd $500 cash for the “sake of Allah.” J.A. 1657. Boyd explained “that this money was to be used to either help get somebody over there to the battlefield or get it to the people who were already there fighting.” Id. On July 21, 2009, shortly before his arrest, Sherifi received a $15,000 check from a man named Elbay-tam, who lived in Raleigh and attended the same mosque as Sherifi. Elbaytam may have intended the funds for charity, consistent with the Muslim custom of “zakat,” i.e., charitable giving based on accumulated wealth. Sherifi advised informant Ed-darkoui, however, that the money would instead be used to support jihadist efforts. On July 23, 2009, Sherifi deposited $5,000 cash into his bank account. Sherifi also spoke with Boyd about his desire to travel abroad to join in violent jihad. In June 2008, Sherifi told Boyd about the challenges that Sherifi faced in obtaining the necessary travel documents. Sherifi also speculated that when “there was Shari’ah” he could travel anywhere. J.A. 4035. Boyd suggested that if Sherifi could not travel, he should “make jihad” in the United States. Id. Sherifi promptly responded in the affirmative, intoning “In-shallah,” or “God willing.” Id. In July of 2008, Sherifi was finally able to travel, and he departed for Kosovo. Sherifi advised some friends in Raleigh that he would be visiting family, while telling others that he was “looking for a way to go somewhere to make Jihad.” J.A. 765-66. Boyd and Sherifi thereafter remained in close contact, continuing their discussions about violent jihad. Boyd advised Sherifi about getting to the “battlefield” and finding others who adhered to his and Boyd’s extremist Islamic views. Boyd and Sherifi also discussed Sheriffs plans while he was abroad. Sherifi hoped ultimately to travel to Jerusalem, and he also considered travelling to Chechnya or Syria to aid in violent jihadist movements. In January 2009, Sherifi wrote Boyd that he had obtained travel documents to a location that, though not his planned destination, was “a good place to seek the greatest pleasure of Allah.” Id. at 4011. Sherifi also remained in contact with informant Eddarkoui, advising him of efforts to obtain weapons and participate in weapons training with likeminded persons in Koso-vo. In November of 2008, Sherifi wrote to Eddarkoui that “Allah ha[d] opened a way for [him].” Id. at 4009. Zakariya explained that opening or finding a way, in the context of violent jihad, meant that Allah had provided a “safe route that you wouldn’t get in trouble through to reach a current battlefield.” Id. at 2468-69. In January 2009, the FBI introduced a third confidential source into its investigation: Melvin Weeks, a Staff Sergeant in the United States Army at Camp Bond-steel, Kosovo. After meeting at a local mosque, Sherifi and Weeks soon became good friends. Sherifi, who believed that jihad meant “to fight physically with weapons against the enemies of Islam, wherever they are at and whoever they might be,” J.A.1947, thereafter began to discuss his violent jihadist beliefs with Weeks and made efforts to convert him. As Weeks explained, jihad, to Sherifi, was not “the jihad of the Prophet Mohammad,” but rather “just murderous acts against innocent soldiers and civilians.” Id. at 2018. Over the next few months, Sherifi provided Weeks with literature and videos, including a video of a beheading, coupled with the explanation that it was “[w]hat happens to the one who leaves the din,” i.e., one who leaves the religion of Islam. Id. at 1973. Sherifi also introduced Weeks to the teachings of al-Awlaki, providing him with an al-Awlaki writing entitled “44 Ways to Support Jihad,” in which the Imam explained how devoted “brothers” could assist violent jihadist causes by providing money and translating extremist texts, among other things. Weeks testified that Sherifi believed the “whole point of governance” was to impose Shari’ah law, and that Sherifi did not respect any other form of government. Id. at 2001-02. According to Weeks, Sherifi viewed everyone who did not share Sheriff’s beliefs in violent ideology to be an enemy of Islam, including “[everybody that America [or its allies were] fighting against.” Id. at 1949. While Sherifi was abroad in Kosovo, he also spent time with some like-minded individuals who agreed with Sherifi and advocated violent jihad. As a prime example of such contacts, Sherifi spoke with Bajram Asllani, also known as Abu Hatab, who was a native of Kosovo. Asllani, at the time of trial, was “wanted by the United States government” on “charges of material ... support to terrorism and conspiracy to kill, maim and injure overseas.” J.A. 2897. Asllani was also wanted in Serbia, where he had been tried and convicted in absentia for his involvement in a “conspiracy to blow up several buildings.” Id. After Sherifi returned to the United States from Kosovo, he maintained contact with Asllani, speaking with him at least once using a video camera on a computer. According to Sheriff’s own testimony, he spoke with Asllani several times and translated documents for him, though Sherifi claimed never to have met Asllani in person. Sherifi also wired Asllani money so that Asllani, who was still in Kosovo, could obtain travel documents. b. During the course of his conspiratorial activities, Boyd secured and maintained an extensive firearm and weapons arsenal, which he kept in and about his home and vehicles. Boyd and his sons generally carried firearms on their persons, and Boyd regularly purchased large quantities of ammunition. Zakariya explained that Boyd focused on obtaining armor-piercing ammunition as well as deadly hollow-point handgun ammunition. Beginning in 2008, Boyd voiced an interest in relocating his family overseas and talked about moving to Jordan. Boyd even began to sell his personal property, including some of his firearms, in preparation for such a move. Boyd was concerned that he would not be able to travel with his entire arsenal and, as a result, built a weapons bunker beneath his back porch and deck, where he planned to store some of the firearms. In July 2009, Boyd, Sherifi, and Harris spent several days working on the weapons bunker. The weapons bunker consisted of an entrenchment roughly six feet deep and was lined with sandbags for protection and stability. c. In May 2009, Sherifi returned to the United States from Kosovo, leaving his wife in that Balkan country. Sherifi told friends in Raleigh that he had returned to North Carolina to save money to buy a family farm in Kosovo. Sherifi advised others that he planned for the farmland in Kosovo to be used by his jihadist “brothers” en route to the “battlefield.” That spring, Boyd and Sherifi discussed and developed a scheme to attack the Quantico Marine Corps Base in eastern Virginia. While abroad, Sherifi had identified Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo as a potential target for attack, because the “brothers” hated the presence of American soldiers in Kosovo. After returning to this country, Sherifi worked delivering medical supplies to various locations, including the Fort Bragg Army Post in North Carolina. Sherifi boasted to Boyd about how easy it was, as a delivery truck driver, to access such military facilities. Boyd and Sherifi then identified Quantico as a target, in part because Boyd was already familiar with Quantico, having lived there as a child. As a result, Boyd travelled to Quantico to get a closer look, supplementing his reconnaissance efforts with online research on Google and other websites. Following his visit to Quantico, Boyd reported to Sherifi that it was easy to access the base. On several occasions, Boyd and Sherifi discussed their planned attack on Quanti-co, and, at least once talked about kidnapping a Marine officer, “a general or someone of high rank.” J.A. 1697. Boyd proposed holding the officer for ransom, seeking in return the release of an Islamic scholar being imprisoned by the United States. As part of this scheme, Boyd suggested cutting off the Marine’s ring finger and “sen[ding] his finger with one of his rings” to Marine officials so that the Marines would “know it was him” and that he was Boyd’s prisoner. Id. d. In the summer of 2009, Sherifi participated in two weapons training sessions in Caswell County, North Carolina. Those sessions involved Boyd and others, including informants Harris and Eddarkoui. The first session occurred on June 10, 2009, and the second was conducted about a month later, on July 7, 2009. The sessions took place on a rural property that Harris had obtained for weapons training, telling the group that it belonged to one of his relatives. The property was actually, however, under government control and FBI surveillance. Boyd organized the “practice” sessions with the “idea ... that they would use this [training] in furtherance if they were to go to try and fight somewhere.” J.A. 1820. During the sessions, Boyd instructed his trainees on military tactics and weapons skills, showing them how to use a variety of firearms. At the second session, Boyd taught the trainees more about military maneuvers. Boyd also had his trainees practice their firearms skills while he fired automatic weapons, so that they would become accustomed to using weapons while being subjected to the sound of gunfire. Sherifi attended and participated in both training sessions, and he sought to recruit others to the second session. On July 22, 2009, soon after the second training session, the initial indictment was returned in these proceedings. Boyd and his coconspirators had planned a third session for July 27, 2009, the very date on which they were arrested. After the arrests, the FBI seized Boyd’s weapons arsenal from his home, together with various and sundry gas masks, computers, cell phones, and cash. Fifteen of the firearms were loaded at the time of their seizure. A corresponding search of the North Carolina home of Sheriffs parents resulted in the seizure of packed suitcases and a money belt containing $10,000 in cash. B. During the trial, the appellants raised a number of evidentiary objections and reiterated various First Amendment arguments, some related to the court’s jury instructions. On October 7, 2011, at the close of the government’s case, the appellants moved for judgments of acquittal. The trial court denied each of the acquittal requests, explaining that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for the jury to find each of the appellants guilty of the charged offenses. The appellants renewed their acquittal motions — again on sufficiency grounds — at the close of all the evidence, and then again after the jury returned its verdicts. The acquittal motions were all denied. The prosecution’s closing argument reiterated the key evidence linking each of the appellants to the charged conspiracies, focusing on the covert and secretive nature of the appellants’ plans. The prosecution sought to underscore the violent tendencies of the appellants and their coconspira-tors, as evidenced by their fascination with weapons, postings on Facebook, and day-to-day communications with one another. The prosecutors also explained the government’s view of the evidence, particularly Boyd’s testimony, plus that of expert Kohl-mann concerning home-grown terrorism cells. Conversely, the defense lawyers focused on what they characterized as the scattered and vague evidence supporting the conspiracy allegations, contending that the prosecution had failed to establish any concrete object thereof, resulting in a fatal deficiency in its case. Moreover, the defense lawyers attacked the credibility of Boyd and his sons, arguing that their potential to receive life sentences had been substantially reduced by their testimony against the appellants. The defense also asserted that the FBI informants were not credible, emphasizing that all had been paid for their testimony. Finally, the lawyers stressed that, under the First Amendment, the appellants should not be convicted because the evidence against them consisted primarily of protected speech and, in any event, failed to prove the charged conspiracies. On October 13, 2011, after the closing arguments and instructions, the jury deliberated and returned its separate verdicts. On January 13, 2012, the court sentenced each appellant, and it thereafter filed three sentencing opinions explaining the sentences imposed. These consolidated appeals followed. We possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). III. By their appeals, the appellants challenge their convictions in multiple respects. First, they contend that their convictions cannot stand because the trial court committed reversible error in its First Amendment analysis. Second, the appellants pursue recognition of several evidentiary errors, seeking relief by way of a new trial. Finally, they maintain that their motions for judgments of acquittal were erroneously denied, in that the trial evidence was legally insufficient to sustain any of their convictions. We begin with the First Amendment, followed by other issues. A. The appellants contend that the trial court committed reversible error in its handling of the argument that their speech espousing violent jihad was protected by the First Amendment. Concomitantly, the appellants assert that they never agreed to take action in connection with their beliefs and expressions, and thus were prosecuted purely for their offensive discourse. Of course, their argument ignores that the jury found — as it was required to do in order to convict — that the appellants had, in fact, agreed to take action in furtherance of violent jihad. 1. The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const, amend. I. The Supreme Court has explained that, “as a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the First Amendment’s protections are not absolute, and the Court has approved government “restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, ... including obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the Court has been clear that prohibited conduct cannot “be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.” Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484, 113 S.Ct. 2194, 124 L.Ed.2d 436 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). The statutes underlying the appellants’ various convictions serve, inter alia, to criminalize providing, and conspiring to provide, material support for terrorism, see 18 U.S.C. § 2339A; conspiring to murder, kidnap, or maim outside the United States, id. § 956(a); and conspiring to kill a federal officer or employee, id. § 1117. Often, those offenses involve speech. For example, the § 2339A convictions in United States v. Stewart were premised on evidence that the defendants provided material support — personnel—to a § 956(a) conspiracy by communicating to the conspirators the messages of “ ‘spiritual’ leader” Abdel Rahman that were intended to induce “criminal acts of violence.” See 590 F.3d 93, 112-16 (2d Cir.2009). The Second Circuit rejected the defendants’ First Amendment argument that, because “the government established only that they provided the underlying conspiracy with Ab-del Rahman’s ‘pure speech,’ ” the defendants “did not provide ‘personnel’ within any constitutional interpretation of section 2339A.” Id. at 115. In so doing, the Stewart court determined that the issue was one of protected speech, rather than pure speech, and that Rahman’s “call to arms” was not protected. Id. The court explained that “[w]ords that instruct, solicit, or persuade others to commit crimes of violence violate the law and may be properly prosecuted.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). The appellants’ First Amendment contention is somewhat different than that of the Stewart defendants. As the appellants would have it, their convictions unconstitutionally rest on their own protected speech, i.e., mere expressions of belief in violent jihad. The appellants invoke Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010), wherein the Supreme Court recently entertained a First Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (making it a federal crime to knowingly provide material support or resources to “a foreign terrorist organization” designated as such by the Secretary of State). The Humanitarian Law Project plaintiffs “claimed that they wished to provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of [foreign terrorist organizations in Turkey and Sri Lanka] in the form of monetary contributions, other tangible aid, legal training, and political advocacy, but that they could not do so for fear of prosecution under § 2339B.” 130 S.Ct. at 2714. Although the Supreme Court concluded that, “in prohibiting the particular forms of support that plaintiffs seek to provide to foreign terrorist groups, § 2339B does not violate the freedom of speech,” id. at 2730, the Court emphasized “that Congress has [not] banned [the plaintiffs’] pure political speech,” id. at 2722 (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, [u]nder the material-support statute, plaintiffs may say anything they wish on any topic. They may speak and write freely about the [foreign terrorist organizations], the governments of Turkey and Sri Lanka, human rights, and international law. They may advocate before the United Nations.... The statute does not prohibit independent advocacy or expression of any kind. Section 2339B also does not prevent plaintiffs from becoming members of the [organizations] or impose any sanction on them for doing so. Congress has not, therefore, sought to suppress ideas or opinions in the form of “pure political speech.” Rather, Congress has prohibited “material support,” which most often does not take the form of speech at all. And when it does, the statute is carefully drawn to cover only a narrow category of speech to, under the direction of, or in coordination with foreign groups that the speaker knows to be terrorist organizations. Id. at 2722-23 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Stewart, 590 F.3d at 115 (“The government does not deny that section 2339A may not be used to prosecute mere advocacy or other protected speech, but contends that the defendants were prosecuted for criminal actions that did not amount to protected speech.”). The appellants rely on Humanitarian Law Project for the proposition that they could not be convicted under § 2339A for simply speaking, writing about, or even joining a terrorist organization. That proposition, however, does not undermine any of the appellants’ convictions. Their convictions rest not only on their agreement to join one another in a common terrorist scheme, but also on a series of calculated overt acts in furtherance of that scheme. For example, each of the appellants travelled abroad seeking to reach locations considered to be jihadist battlefields, with the hope and intent of engaging in violent jihad. To prepare themselves for jihad, the appellants trained with weapons and took instruction from Boyd. Moreover, Sherifi and Yaghi endeavored to recruit others into the conspiracies: Sherifi through explicit efforts to recruit Sergeant Weeks, and Yaghi by introducing Mohammad and Hassan to Boyd. Furthermore, it was entirely consistent with the First Amendment to make “evidentiary use of [the appellants’] speech to establish the elements of [their] crime[s] or to prove motive or intent.” See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 489, 113 S.Ct. 2194. Indeed, because “the essence of a conspiracy is an agreement to commit an unlawful act,” United States v. Jimenez Redo, 537 U.S. 270, 274, 123 S.Ct. 819, 154 L.Ed.2d 744 (2003) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted), the supporting evidence may necessarily include a defendant’s speech. See United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 117 (2d Cir.1999) (including conspiracy in list of offenses that “are characteristically committed through speech”). Such is the case here, where the appellants engaged in extensive conversations with Boyd and others about the necessity of waging violent jihad and their shared goal of reaching the jihadist battlefield. Meanwhile, evidence such as Sheriffs discussions with Weeks about the religious obligation to engage in jihad, as well as Sheriffs. statements to Eddarkoui about plans to recruit Weeks for violent jihad in Somalia, allowed the jury to attach nefarious intent to what otherwise might have been considered innocent acts. As further examples, Hassan’s and Yaghi’s Facebook postings advocating violent jihad, as well as their conversations with Boyd to that effect, serve as compelling support for the jury’s finding that Hassan and Yaghi travelled abroad with the hope of acting on their beliefs by engaging in jihad and fighting against the “kuffar.” As the Sixth Circuit explained with regard to another terrorism prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, “[forming an agreement to engage in criminal activities — in contrast with simply talking about religious or political beliefs — is not protected speech.” United States v. Amawi 695 F.3d 457, 482 (6th Cir.2012). In that case, “although the conspiracy was closely related to, and indeed proved by, many of the defendants’ conversations about political and religious matters, the conviction was based on an agreement to cooperate in the commission [of] a crime, not simply to talk about it.” Id. The Amawi analysis is readily applicable here. Put succinctly, the First Amendment was no bar to the government’s use of the appellants’ speech to demonstrate their participation in the charged conspiracies. 2. In any event, the appellants contend that the jury was not fully instructed — and thus misled — on the scope of the First Amendment’s protections. The trial court’s First Amendment instruction advised the jury as follows: I turn your attention now to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which establishes certain rights which accrue to each defendant. The First Amendment provides, in part, that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or the right of the people to be peaceably assembled. The right of freedom of speech and to engage in peaceful assembly extends to one’s religion and one’s politics. Having instructed you concerning rights of each defendant pursuant to the First Amendment, I also instruct you that the First Amendment is not a defense to the crimes charged in the indictment. J.A. 3567-68. Although the appellants offered eleven other First Amendment instructions, their appeal focuses on just three of those proposals. Specifically, they argue that their proposed instructions 37, 40, and 45 were erroneously excluded from the court’s charge to the jury. Those proposed instructions were as follows: Number 37: [Each appellant’s] right to exercise religion guarantees his right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine he desires. Number iO: The First Amendment protects speech that encourages others to commit violence, unless the speech is capable of producing imminent lawless action. Speech that makes future violence more likely, such as advocating for illegal action at some indefinite time in the future, is protected. Thus, speech may not be punished just because it makes it more likely that someone will be harmed at some unknown time in the future. Number Jp5: The First Amendment right to free speech protects the right of an individual or group to advocate for the use of force or advocate for the violation of law so long as the speech is: 1) not directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action and 2) is not likely to incite or produce imminent lawless action. The First Amendment even protects an individual’s right to praise groups or persons using terrorism as a means of achieving their ends. Advocacy is pure speech protected by the First Amendment. See id. at 453-460. We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to either give or refuse to give a proposed instruction. See United States v. Lighty, 616 F.3d 321, 366 (4th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). In assessing a claim of instructional error, “we do not view a single instruction in isolation; rather we consider whether taken as a whole and in the context of the entire charge, the instructions accurately and fairly state the controlling law.” United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207, 221 (4th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[a] district court commits reversible error in refusing to provide a proffered jury instruction only when the instruction (1) was correct; (2) was not substantially covered by the court’s charge to the jury; and (3) dealt with some point in the trial so important, that failure to give the requested instruction seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to conduct his defense.” Lighty, 616 F.3d at 366 (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if the three rejected instructions correctly recite the legal principles espoused therein, the appellants nevertheless fail in two essential respects. That is, they have not shown (1) that their proposals were not substantially covered by the court’s jury charge, or (2) that their proposals dealt with points so important that the court’s failure to give them seriously impaired the appellants’ ability to conduct their defenses. The court’s First Amendment instruction substantially covered the appellants’ right to freely exercise and express their religious beliefs, echoing proposed instruction 37. Proposals 40 and 45, encompassing the First Amendment protections extended to speech advocating violence, are of no import in this case. Put simply, the appellants were not prosecuted for inciting violence, cf., e.g., Stewart, 590 F.3d at 115, nor would the instructions have permitted any convictions on that ground. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to give— in haee verba — proposed instruction 37, 40, or 45. B. We turn now to the various evidentiary issues presented by the appellants. First, they assert that the trial court erred in admitting the opinion evidence of Evan Kohlmann, the government’s expert witness. Next, Hassan and Yaghi maintain that the admission of their Facebook pages and certain videos was erroneous. Hassan and Yaghi also challenge selected evidence against them as being inadmissible lay opinion and improper hearsay. Finally, Yaghi contends that the court erred in admitting evidence that the prosecution obtained improperly pursuant to FISA court orders. We assess challenges to a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hornsby, 666 F.3d 296, 307 (4th Cir.2012). In reviewing an evidenti