Jackson v. Conway (763 F.3d 115, 2014)

HALL, Circuit Judge:

BACKGROUND

In the pre-dawn hours of November 30, 2000, officers of the Town of Greece Police Department responded to a 911 call placed from Shawn A. Jackson’s (“Jackson’s”) residence. Jackson’s wife, Rebecca Jackson (“Rebecca”), met the officers on arrival and, upon entering the house, the officers encountered Jackson’s ex-wife, Karen Jackson (“Karen”), and his fourteen-year-old daughter, “CJ.” The three visibly upset women told the officers that Jackson had raped them each multiple times over the course of the evening and early morning. The officers woke Jackson, who was asleep on the living room couch, and transported him to police headquarters. Karen and CJ went to Rochester General Hospital for medical evaluations. From the house, the officers collected potential physical evidence, including sheets from the living room floor and from Jackson’s bed.

At police headquarters, Sergeant Christopher Bittner interviewed Jackson at approximately 6:45 that morning. The sergeant initially told Jackson he was not under arrest but then formally arrested him when Jackson sought to leave the interview room. After being informed of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), Jackson invoked his right to remain silent and refused to speak with Sergeant Bittner or any other officer. The police placed him in a holding cell, where he remained until approximately 3:20 that afternoon.

At some point during the day, a member of the Town of Greece Police Department informed the Monroe County Department of Social Services, Child Protective Services (“CPS”) about the incident. Kathy Bonisteel, a CPS caseworker, contacted Sergeant Bittner to request an interview with the victims as part of her parallel investigation into the sexual abuse allegations. Later that afternoon, Bonisteel and Town of Greece police officers interviewed Karen and CJ at police headquarters. When those interviews concluded, Bonis-teel asked to speak with Jackson. Sergeant Bittner agreed and escorted Jackson from his holding cell to a table in the hallway at which Bonisteel sat. The sergeant retreated around a corner where he was out of sight of the table but within earshot of the ensuing conversation.

At the time she interviewed Jackson, Bonisteel knew that he was in custody and had refused to speak with the police. Bon-isteel introduced herself as a CPS caseworker, explained her role, and asked Jackson if she could speak with him about the victims’ allegations. She did not, however, inform him of his right to an attorney or give him any other warnings. Jackson agreed to speak with her.

During the interview, Jackson first detailed the nature of his relationship with Rebecca and Karen, explaining that he lived with both of them to keep all of his children together. Jackson described himself as the “alpha male” of the family. While he denied hitting either woman, he stated that both Rebecca and Karen knew “what to do” and that he was “in charge.” He stated that he regularly engaged in sexual intercourse with each woman separately and, occasionally, all three had sex together. Jackson asserted that both women knew the “routine” on these latter occasions, which usually occurred in the early morning hours: Jackson would send Rebecca upstairs to wake Karen and bring her to the living room where, on a sheet spread on the floor, Jackson would engage in anal sex with Karen while she performed oral sex on Rebecca.

Jackson told Bonisteel that he began to drink around 8:00 the night of the incident, visiting several bars over the course of the evening. He also snorted several lines of cocaine. Jackson did not recall the time he arrived home, but remembered pulling into the driveway and “feeling happy that he ... made it home safe.” Jackson entered in the house where he found Rebecca sleeping on the couch. He woke her up “to get a little loving” and, the next he knew, the police were in the house. In response to Bonisteel’s questions, Jackson repeatedly denied hurting CJ, but acknowledged the “possibility” that he may have been “so drunk that he wouldn’t have remembered if he raped [her].”

Eventually, a grand jury in Monroe County, New York, charged Jackson in a 48-count indictment with numerous counts of first- and third-degree rape, first- and third-degree sodomy, first-degree attempted sodomy, third-degree assault, first-degree sexual abuse, incest, endangering the welfare of a child, and coercion. The indictment alleged that on the night of November 29-30, 2000, Jackson committed multiple acts of oral and anal sodomy against Rebecca and Karen, raped and sexually abused CJ a number of times, and committed multiple acts of incest, oral sex, and anal sodomy against CJ. It also alleged that Jackson (1) assaulted, sexually abused, and committed acts of anal sodomy against Karen in June 1999 and November 2000; (2) coerced, raped, assaulted, and committed acts of oral and anal sodomy against Rebecca in June 1999, June 2000, and November 2000; and (3) assaulted his son, “GJ,” in June 1999 and January 2000.

I. Pretrial Proceedings

On March 23, 2001, County Court Judge Stephen R. Sirkin held a suppression hearing to determine the admissibility of Jackson’s statements to CPS Caseworker Bon-isteel. Jackson, then represented by the Monroe County Public Defender’s Office, argued that Bonisteel acted as an agent of the police when she interviewed him on the day of his arrest. The trial court disagreed, concluding that Bonisteel interviewed Jackson “as part of a completely separate civil proceeding” and “did not act as a law enforcement officer or an agent of a law enforcement officer.” The court held that, as a “child protective worker,” Bonisteel was not required to give Jackson Miranda warnings and, therefore, his statements to her were admissible at trial.

One week before the scheduled trial date, the State notified Jackson of its intent to call Tony Arnold — a jailhouse informant also represented by the Public Defender’s Office. This resulted in a conflict that disqualified the Public Defender’s Office from the case and necessitated the appointment of a new defense attorney, Joseph D’Amelio. Upon his appointment, D’Amelio informed the court at an April 23, 2001 conference that he needed one month to prepare for trial. After the court suggested a start date of June 18, D’Amelio instead proposed May 29 and the court scheduled trial accordingly. At some point before trial, the State furnished the defense with a letter stating that it would not call an expert medical witness at trial.

On the date of trial, County Court Judge Peter E. Corning — the third judge assigned to the case — ruled on the State’s intended introduction of Jackson’s various prior acts and threats of violence against his family members that occurred between 1983 and 2000. Over defense counsel’s objection, the court held that such evidence could be admitted to prove the element of forcible compulsion as to the charged rapes, but ruled that the State would be limited to acts that occurred “subsequent to 1994,” because any acts before then were “too remote.”

II. Trial

A. Opening Statements

Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) Cara M. Briggs theorized in her opening-statement that Jackson used physical violence and threats of violence to exert control over his family and to force Rebecca and Karen to satisfy his sexual proclivities. Briggs alluded to the testimony the jury would hear from Karen, Rebecca, and CJ about the sexual and physical abuse they suffered at the hands of Jackson on the night of November 29-30, 2000, as well as on a number of previous occasions. The witnesses’ testimony, Briggs asserted, would expose Jackson “as a twisted, sadistic man who delighted in controlling the members of his very own family to the point that he abused them constantly.”

The defense theory of the case was straightforward: the State would not present any physical evidence of the alleged sexual and physical abuse, and the witnesses fabricated their testimony. Defense counsel highlighted that although the police collected several sheets and the victims’ clothing for testing, the jury would not hear the results of those tests.

B. State’s Trial Evidence

The trial evidence is extensively described in the district court’s opinion, see Jackson v. Conway, 765 F.Supp.2d 192, 205-29 (W.D.N.Y.2011), and we reproduce it here only as necessary for our decision.

1. Testimony of Karen, Rebecca, and CJ

Karen and Rebecca told the jury about the nature of their relationship with Jackson, described previous instances of physical and sexual abuse, and gave their accounts of the events of the night of November 29-30, 2000. Karen married Jackson in 1983 and divorced him in 1990, although she continued a relationship with him thereafter. Jackson left Karen’s house after the divorce but moved back several months later with Rebecca, whom he married in 1991. From at least 1995 onwards, the three regularly participated in sexual activity together. The State elicited from Rebecca that, shortly after the three began living together, Jackson raped Karen, causing her to become pregnant with a daughter.

Both women described Jackson as controlling and physically abusive. He routinely threatened to kill Karen or injure members of her family if she left him and he hit Rebecca when she disobeyed his orders. In June 1999, Jackson beat and strangled Karen until she lost consciousness. When she woke, he proceeded to engage in oral and anal sex with her. That same month, Jackson became angry with Rebecca, cut her shorts, removed her underwear, and forced her to walk down several city streets in that condition while calling her a “prostitute.” Approximately one year later, in June 2000, Jackson punched Rebecca in the mouth, knocking out one of her teeth. Jackson hit Rebecca again several days later when she complained about her tooth and then had oral, anal, and vaginal sex with her multiple times. Two days before the events that led to his arrest, Jackson forced Rebecca and Karen to perform numerous sexual acts. In the process, Jackson squeezed Rebecca’s throat, nearly causing her to lose consciousness.

The women testified that on the night of November 29-30, 2000, Jackson returned home drunk and told Rebecca, who was on the couch, to retrieve Karen from the upstairs bedroom she shared with CJ. When the women returned to the living room, Jackson had them disrobe and spread a sheet on the floor. After directing each woman to perform oral sex on him, Jackson had anal sex with Karen. Several minutes later, Jackson left the living room and went upstairs. CJ testified that she had been sleeping in her upstairs bedroom when Jackson woke her and took her to his bedroom. There, he placed her onto the bed, touched her breasts, and had both vaginal and anal sex with her. He then returned to the living room, where he again made Rebecca perform oral sex on him before attempting to have anal sex with Karen.

Jackson repeated this cycle of going upstairs to CJ and then returning to Karen and Rebecca in the living room two additional times. The three women testified that, over the course of the entire evening, Jackson made Rebecca perform oral sex on him three times, had anal sex with Karen once and attempted to have anal sex with her twice, and had vaginal sex with CJ “[a]t least twice” and anal sex with her two times. According to Karen, Jackson had difficulty maintaining an erection-while he was “[sjomewhat” erect the first time he had anal sex with her, he was not able to fully penetrate her on the latter two occasions. CJ did not know whether Jackson ejaculated that night. The women complied with Jackson’s demands because they were frightened he would become violent if they refused. When Jackson finally fell asleep, Rebecca called the police.

Later, at Rochester General Hospital, medical personnel examined Karen and CJ, taking samples of their pubic hair and swabs of their vaginal and anal areas that they placed into sexual assault kits. Neither Karen nor CJ complained of any injuries to their vaginal or anal areas, although Karen “always felt like there were cuts” around her anus. At the time of the incident, CJ was menstruating — she put on a sanitary napkin before she went to bed and wore the same one to the hospital. The State introduced two of CJ’s medical reports prepared at Rochester General Hospital on November 30, 2000. The first, prepared by Dr. Everett, indicated that a gynecological examination “reportedly” showed the presence of an “irritation at the introitus,” or vaginal opening. The second, a sexual assault form prepared by Dr. Thompson, indicated that CJ had no bruises on her body or lacerations in her vaginal area. Dr. Thompson noted, however, the existence of an “abrasion” on CJ’s “introitus” and the presence of “old blood in vault.”

2. Dr. Ann Lenane

Dr. Ann Lenane was an emergency physician at the University of Rochester who worked in the Child Abuse Program. Defense counsel objected as she took the stand, explaining that he believed the State was about to breach its pretrial written representation that it would not elicit expert testimony. ADA Briggs conceded that she had made such a representation, but argued that the defense had subpoenaed the relevant medical records and, as a result, should have been on notice that the State would likely introduce the testimony of a “doctor or a sexual assault nurse examiner.” The court stated that Dr. Lenane was entitled to testify about her findings and conclusions made “as a treating physician,” but that, due to the lack of notice, the State could not allow her testimony to “escalate” into expert opinion. After ADA Briggs assured the court that she would not elicit from Dr. Lenane any “hypothetical^]” or “theories,” the court permitted the doctor to testify “[a]s a treating physician.”

Upon retaking the stand, Dr. Lenane described the findings contained in CJ’s medical report:

The relevant physical findings that [CJ] had when she was examined were mainly an abrasion, on the written notes they said [it] was at the introitus, and when they circled on the diagram where that was, it is in the area of the genitalia that is just below the hymen and above the rectal area.... The other finding that they noted was old blood in the vulva, which means that he was inside the vagina[.]

App’x at 210. The State then inquired whether the “abrasion[ ]” indicated on CJ’s medical records was “consistent with penetration.” Dr. Lenane responded that the abrasion was “consistent with some type of trauma” that “could include penetration, but ... wouldn’t necessarily have to.” When asked again whether the abrasion was “consistent with penetration,” Dr. Lenane answered, “Yes.”

Defense counsel objected as the State attempted to move on to Karen’s medical records, arguing that it had not established that the doctor treated Karen. In response to the court’s questioning, Dr. Lenane stated that she had not personally examined the women, and that the State had asked her “to review the medical records and express an opinion about the consistency of the history and the physical findings.” Upon hearing this, the court sustained defense counsel’s objection and excused the jury, explaining that because Dr. Lenane had not personally examined the women, her testimony was that of an expert, not a treating physician. ADA Briggs argued that her questions were not taking Dr. Lenane’s testimony beyond “the realm of what the treating physician would be able to say,” and repeatedly reiterated her position that the defense should have known that the State would call a doctor to testify about the physical findings contained in the medical reports. At one point, she acknowledged that Dr. Lenane was an expert, but argued that the defense “had notice.” The court rejected these arguments, declaring that defense counsel was entitled to rely on the State’s pretrial written representation that it would not call an expert.

Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that he relied on the State’s pretrial representation when highlighting in his opening statement the lack of physical evidence. The court, apologizing for its “unfamiliarity with the case,” stated that it had “presumed that [Dr. Lenane] was the treating physician.” Although it initially considered a mistrial, the court took that option off the table after reviewing the doctor’s testimony, explaining that the only expert opinion given was that CJ’s “abrasion [wa]s consistent with penetration.” Instead, the court gave defense counsel two options: either the court could direct the jury to disregard Dr. Lenane’s testimony in its entirety, or defense counsel could have the weekend to obtain his own expert. When defense counsel declared it impossible to hire an expert on such short notice, the court expressed confusion as it had previously authorized the defense to consult with a medical expert. Defense counsel explained that although he had “reviewed] the records” with a nurse, he did not intend to “bring a nurse in here to try and combat what a doctor had to say on the issue of abrasion versus irritation.” Accordingly, defense counsel opted for the curative instruction.

After recalling the jury, the court stated that initially it had been “a little bit unclear” about whether the State brought Dr. Lenane “in as a treating physician or ... as an expert” but, as she testified, it had become evident she was an expert. The court explained:

[Bjefore bringing in an expert, the [State] must give notice to the defendant ... which they failed to do.... Accordingly, I am directing you to disregard the testimony of Dr. Lenane on the grounds that she was called as an expert and no notice was given.... Any statements of fact or any conclusions that she would render to you I direct that you disregard in their entirety.

App’x at 228-29. Later in the proceeding, defense counsel objected to the nature of the curative instruction, asserting that the court had given “the impression that but for that improper notice,” the testimony would have been acceptable, “rather than advising the jury that the evidence was improperly] before them and should not be considered.” The court overruled this objection.

3. Jailhouse Informant Tony Arnold

Tony Arnold, who shared a cell with Jackson, testified that Jackson told him about the November 29-30, 2000 incident. According to Arnold, Jackson stated that he was intoxicated and had sex with “both of his wives,” who waited until he fell asleep and then called the police with allegations that he had raped his daughter. Jackson offered Arnold $100,000 to kill his “wife and ex-wife,” which Arnold declined.

4. Kathy Bonisteel

CPS Caseworker Kathy Bonisteel related Jackson’s statements made to her during their post-arrest conversation at police headquarters. This testimony included Jackson’s assertion that he was sexually active with both Karen and Rebecca, his claim that both women knew the sexual “routine” they were to perform, and his boast that he was the “alpha male” who was “in charge” of the family. Bonisteel also recounted Jackson’s version of the events on the night of November 29-30, 2000 — that he had returned home after consuming a large amount of alcohol and some cocaine, woke Rebecca for “a little lovin’ ” and then remembered nothing more until he was awoken by the police. With respect to Jackson’s statements about CJ, Bonisteel testified:

I asked [Jackson] if he remember[ed] [molesting his daughter], or if he did that. He said he would never hurt [CJ]. And I asked him again if anything happened the night before when he got home. He repeated again that he would never hurt [C J] I said, was it possible that he was so drunk that he couldn’t remember raping [CJ]? And he said it was a possibility.

Trial Tr. at 503-04.

C. Closing Arguments

The defense did not introduce any evidence at trial. In closing, defense counsel pointed out that despite their allegations of rape and assault, Rebecca and Karen had both lived with Jackson for many years without complaint. Counsel also emphasized that although police had collected the sheets, victims’ clothing, and sexual assault kits, the State had been unable to present at trial any physical evidence of the numerous alleged acts of rape and sodomy that occurred on the evening of November 29-30, 2000.

ADA Briggs began her closing argument by telling the jurors that the case required their “courage” to recognize that the allegations “really happened” and that the “person [who] committed these heinous, horrific acts has been sitting in the same room with [the jurors] for almost a week now.” Pointing Jackson out, ADA Briggs stated, “that man sitting there, looking like he is pondering every word that is being said, is guilty.” ADA Briggs argued that “no one can feign the terror” that the victims had displayed and that “[e]ven the best actor or actress could probably not tremble with fear as continuously as some of these witnesses did.” She also questioned why Jackson’s family members would testify against him, positing that “[t]he only possible explanation for what they told [the jury] is because it is true and he is guilty.” The witnesses’ testimony, ADA Briggs contended, left the jury with “a picture of a man that has consistently abused his family for years, basically beaten them into submission and he committed all of the counts of the indictment here against his family.... He is guilty of everything.”

With respect to the lack of physical evidence, ADA Briggs argued that the absence of semen did not contradict the witnesses’ testimony, as both Rebecca and Karen testified that Jackson had been unable to “get an erection” the evening of November 29-30, 2000. ADA Briggs also argued that CJ’s medical records corroborated her version of the events because the “abrasion” on her introitus was “right where [Jackson’s] penis would have been rubbing.”

Addressing Bonisteel’s testimony, ADA Briggs stated:

Kathy Bonisteel asked [Jackson], Is it possible that you were so drunk that you don’t remember raping [CJ]? And he says, Yeah, that’s possible. Now, I ask you, ladies and gentlemen, if you were a person who stood accused of having sex with your own child, and you hadn’t done it, if somebody asked you if that was possible, would you say ‘maybe,’ or would your answer be, no, I would never, ever, ever do something like that? There would be adamant denial, there would be something of a much stronger reaction than, “Yeah, maybe, I could have.” And the reason he says, “Yeah, maybe, I could have” is because he did. It’s that simple. Innocent people don’t admit that there is a possibility that they did something wrong, particularly when what we are talking about is sex with his own daughter.

App’x at 271.

Following closing arguments, defense counsel unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial on the ground that the summation was “replete with comments arousing sympathy for the victims.” Defense counsel also took issue with the State’s proposed jury charge on the first-degree sodomy counts because, in defense counsel’s view, first degree sodomy “require[d] some penetration.” The court disagreed, declaring that “[j]ust touching” was sufficient. In its subsequent jury charge, the trial court reminded the jury that statements made by the attorneys in summation were not evidence and that the jurors were to draw their own conclusions from the facts, rather than rely on those supplied by counsel. It also reminded the jury that it was not to consider any testimony the court had ordered stricken from the record.

Ultimately, the jury convicted Jackson on all 47 submitted counts. On June 21, 2001, the trial court sentenced Jackson to an aggregate total of 64 years’ incarceration.

III. State Postconviction Proceedings & Direct Appeal

Through counsel, Jackson appealed his judgment of conviction to the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department. Proceeding pro se, he simultaneously moved in the trial court to vacate the judgment pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10.

A. Section 440.10 Motion

Jackson argued in his § 440.10 motion that defense counsel’s performance was deficient in several respects. He indicated that he had brought the motion before filing his appellate brief because the trial record was insufficient to permit direct appellate review of his ineffective assistance claims. As exhibits to his motion, Jackson included reports of tests performed by the Monroe County Public Safety Laboratory. The first report found no spermatozoa or “seminal material” on any of the victims’ clothing or on the vaginal and anal swabs taken of Karen and CJ as part of the sexual assault kits. The second, dated March 27, 2001, excluded CJ as the source of DNA obtained from bloodstains found on the fitted sheet recovered from Jackson’s bed.

In its response, the State principally argued that the motion should be summarily denied pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10(2)(b) because Jackson’s direct appeal remained pending and the record contained facts sufficient to permit adequate appellate review of his ineffective assistance claims. By order dated November 17, 2003, the trial court agreed with the State and denied Jackson’s motion on the ground that the record contained sufficient facts to permit review of his claims on direct appeal. Jackson sought from the Appellate Division leave to appeal this decision but it denied his application on February 3, 2004.

B. Direct Appeal

While his § 440.10 motion remained pending in the trial court, Jackson filed a counseled appellate brief in the Fourth Department. In that brief he argued that his postarrest statements made to CPS Caseworker Bonisteel were improperly admitted in violation of his Miranda rights, that prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair trial, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. In his Miranda claim, Jackson argued that Bonisteel acted either as a law enforcement officer or as the “functional equivalent” of a police officer when she interviewed him without first providing the required Miranda warnings, and that his statements to her were thus inadmissible. In his prosecutorial misconduct claim, Jackson maintained that ADA Briggs’s improper conduct “pervaded the proceedings” and deprived him of a fair trial. He identified four instances of such misconduct: (1) the delayed disclosure that Tony Arnold would be a witness, which prompted a last minute change in defense counsel; (2) the opening statement comments about Jackson’s “twisted” and “sadistic” nature; (3) the improper attempt to elicit expert testimony from Dr. Lenane; and (4) the summation, in which ADA Briggs repeatedly expressed her personal opinion of Jackson’s guilt and the truth of the witnesses’ testimony, and argued facts not in evidence.

Jackson’s ineffective assistance arguments were essentially the same as those raised in his § 440.10 motion. With respect to defense counsel’s pretrial conduct, Jackson contended that his attorney: (1) did not adequately investigate the forensic and medical evidence or consult with an expert concerning that evidence; and (2) failed to prepare adequately for trial, as shown by his unfamiliarity with the elements of first-degree sodomy. As for counsel’s trial conduct, Jackson maintained that counsel: (1) presented no evidence and called no witnesses in defense, thus failing “to utilize the plethora of indisputable scientific evidence” not introduced by the State; (2) failed to utilize the medical and forensic evidence to conduct effective cross-examinations of the victims by exposing inconsistencies between their accounts of the sexual abuse and the medical findings; and (3) failed to offer expert medical testimony to explain the medical and forensic evidence.

The Fourth Department affirmed Jackson’s conviction on February 11, 2004, but reduced his overall sentence to 50 years’ imprisonment on New York statutory grounds not relevant here. See People v. Jackson, 4 A.D.3d 848, 772 N.Y.S.2d 149, 150 (App.Div. 4th Dep’t 2004). The Fourth Department held that Jackson’s Miranda claim was meritless because the “record established] that [Bonisteel] was not engaged in law enforcement activity.” Id. (citation omitted). Addressing the prosecutorial misconduct claim, the Fourth Department held that “the comments of the prosecutor in her opening and closing statements were not so egregious as to deprive defendant of his right to a fair trial.” Id. (brackets, quotation marks, and citation omitted). Finally, it rejected Jackson’s “contention ... that he received ineffective assistance of counsel,” holding that he was “not entitled to error-free representation” and had “failed to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel’s alleged failures.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).

Jackson sought leave to appeal all of his claims to the New York Court of Appeals. Then-Chief Judge Kaye denied his application on May 20, 2004, see People v. Jackson, 2 N.Y.3d 801, 781 N.Y.S.2d 300, 814 N.E.2d 472 (2004) (table), and Jackson timely filed a habeas application in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

IV. Federal Habeas Proceedings

In his § 2254 petition and addendum to that petition, Jackson raised his Miranda, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance claims, with some slight modifications to the latter two. First, Jackson added to his allegations of prosecutorial misconduct the prosecutor’s “improper tactics of introducing prior uncharged crimes and bad acts” and her “abuse of the charging function.” Second, Jackson divided his ineffective assistance claim into four “points.” In “Point One,” Jackson argued that defense counsel’s lack of preparation was “painfully exposed” by counsel’s “decision to NOT put on a defense ... due to the fact that he was under the incorrect assumption that the prosecution was required to prove the element of penetration in order to sustain a conviction of Sodomy in the 1st.” App’x at 15 (emphasis in original) (additional capitalization removed). Jackson maintained in “Point Two” that counsel “failed to correctly marshal an investigation into the plethora of exculpatory evidence (physical, medical, forensic, visual, tactile, [etc.])” and then failed to introduce this evidence at trial. Id. at 16 (capitalization removed). In “Point Three” he contended that defense counsel failed to consult with a medical expert “to help him interpret and then apply through [testimony the results of the entire battery” of medical and forensic tests. Id. at 16-17. Finally, in “Point Four,” Jackson asserted that the above deficiencies, coupled with defense counsel’s failure to cross-examine the victims using the medical evidence, constituted ineffective assistance. Id. at 17.

After reviewing the petition, the magistrate judge appointed counsel and ordered an evidentiary hearing pursuant to our decision in Sparman v. Edwards, in which we expressed our belief that “a district court facing the question of constitutional ineffectiveness of counsel should ... offer the assertedly ineffective attorney an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.” 154 F.3d 51, 52 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam). At the resulting hearing, the magistrate judge heard testimony from a medical expert and from defense counsel, who explained his trial preparation and strategy.

By amended order entered in February 2011, the magistrate judge granted Jackson’s application for habeas relief in part. See Jackson v. Conway, 765 F.Supp.2d 192 (W.D.N.Y.2011). The magistrate judge held that the Fourth Department’s rejection of Jackson’s Miranda claim was both contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, and that the admission of his post-arrest statement to Bonisteel was sufficiently injurious as to warrant habeas relief on the convictions involving CJ. See id. at 270-84. The magistrate judge also held that the prosecutor’s pretrial and trial conduct cumulatively deprived Jackson of his right to due process, and that the Fourth Department’s decision to the contrary was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. See id. at 251-60. Finding that the prosecutor’s misconduct “permeated the entire trial proceeding,” the magistrate judge vacated all of Jackson’s convictions on this ground. Id. at 253, 260.

Next, the magistrate judge found that Jackson had failed to exhaust in the state courts Points One and Two of his ineffective assistance claim, and that those Points were barred by the operation of a state procedural rule because they could have been, but were not, raised on direct appeal. See id. at 260-61. The magistrate judge grouped Jackson’s remaining ineffective assistance arguments into two sections — counsel’s failure to consult with and call a medical expert to explain State’s medical evidence, and counsel’s failure to investigate adequately the medical and forensic reports not introduced by the State at trial. See id. at 262-70. The magistrate judge found habeas relief was warranted only as to the first group, and then only as to the convictions involving CJ, because it was as to those allegations that the State’s medical evidence and the defense’s lack of a medical expert were most damaging. See id. at 262-68.

For these reasons, the magistrate judge directed the State to vacate Jackson’s convictions on all counts unless it commenced re-prosecution of Jackson within ninety days. Id. at 287. The magistrate judge stayed the judgment pending the completion of any appellate proceedings. Id. The State appealed insofar as the magistrate judge granted habeas relief and Jackson cross-appealed those portions of the decision adverse to him.

DISCUSSION

We review a district court’s grant of habeas relief de novo, and its underlying findings of fact for clear error. See Cardoza v. Bock, 731 F.3d 169, 177 (2d Cir.2013).

I. Rules Governing Federal Habeas Corpus Review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

As amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and interpreted by the Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 — the statutory provision authorizing federal courts to provide habeas corpus relief to prisoners in state custody — is “part of the basic structure of federal habeas jurisdiction, designed to confirm that state courts are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). A number of requirements and doctrines, four of which are relevant to this appeal, ensure the centrality of the state courts in this arena. First, the exhaustion requirement ensures that state prisoners present their constitutional claims to the state courts in the first instance. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)). Should the state court reject a federal claim on procedural grounds, the procedural default doctrine bars further federal review of the claim, subject to certain well-established exceptions. See generally Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 82-84, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). If the state court denies a federal claim on the merits, then the provisions of § 2254(d) come into play and prohibit federal habeas relief unless the state court’s decision was either: (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l)-(2). Finally, when conducting its review under § 2254(d), the federal court is generally confined to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim. See Cullen v. Pinholster, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398-99, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011).

Because the issues presented in this appeal implicate all of the above facets of federal habeas jurisdiction, we provide a general overview of the standards governing each before applying those standards to Jackson’s ease.

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

To provide the state with the first opportunity to consider and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ constitutional rights, a state prisoner is required to exhaust all of his available state remedies before a federal court can consider his habeas application. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Carvajal v. Arbus, 633 F.3d 95, 104 (2d Cir.2011). This requires that the prisoner “fairly present” his constitutional claim to the state courts, which he accomplishes “by presenting the essential factual and legal premises of his federal constitutional claim to the highest state court capable of reviewing it.” Rosa v. McCray, 396 F.3d 210, 217 (2d Cir.2005) (citing Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217, 237 (2d Cir.2003)). While “a state prisoner is not required to cite chapter and verse of the Constitution in order to satisfy this requirement,” he must tender his claim “in terms that are likely to alert the state courts to the claim’s federal nature.” Car-vajal, 633 F.3d at 104 (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

A state prisoner’s procedural default in the state courts will also bar federal review except in narrow circumstances not relevant here. A procedural default occurs in one of two ways. First, if the state prisoner fails to exhaust his state remedies in a manner in which, were he to return to the state courts with his unex-hausted claim, those courts would find the claim barred by the application of a state procedural rule, “we ‘must deem the claim procedurally defaulted.’ ” Id. (quoting Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 90 (2d Cir.2001)) (brackets omitted). Alternatively, a procedural default occurs if the state court’s rejection of a federal claim rests on a state law ground — such as the operation of a state procedural rule — that is both “ ‘independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.’ ” Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d 382, 390 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991)). In this latter case, “[t]he preclusion of federal review applies only when the last state court rendering a judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.” Messiah v. Duncan, 435 F.3d 186, 195 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989) (“[A] federal claimant’s procedural default precludes federal habe-as review ... only if the last state court rendering a judgment in the case rests its judgment on the procedural default.”).

B. 28 U.S.C. § 225k(d) — Review of State Court Decisions on the Merits

As noted above, § 2254(d) is implicated when the habeas petitioner seeks federal review of a constitutional claim that was adjudicated by the state courts on the merits. As relevant here, AEDPA provides that habeas relief “shall not be granted” on such claims “unless the adjudication of the claim ... resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The analysis under § 2254(d)(1) proceeds in two steps. The first is to identify the governing “clearly established Federal law.” See Marshall v. Rodgers, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1446, 1449, 185 L.Ed.2d 540 (2013) (per curiam) (“The starting point for cases subject to § 2254(d)(1) is to identify the ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’ that governs the habeas petitioner’s claims.”); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004) (“We begin by determining the relevant clearly established law.”). The second asks whether, in the context of the petitioner’s ease, the state court’s decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of that clearly established precedent. See Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 663, 124 S.Ct. 2140; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). Separate considerations govern each step, and it is to those that we now turn.

1. “Clearly Established’’ Federal Law

In the AEDPA context, “ ‘[cjlearly established federal law’ refers only to the holdings of the Supreme Court” extant at the time of the relevant state court decision. Rodriguez v. Miller, 537 F.3d 102, 106 (2d Cir.2008); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (“ ‘[Cjlearly established law’ under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.”). Thus, “[n]o principle of constitutional law grounded solely in the holdings of the various courts of appeals or even in the dicta of the Supreme Court can provide the basis for habeas relief.” Rodriguez, 537 F.3d at 106-07 (citing Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74, 76-77,127 S.Ct. 649, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006)); see also Marshall, 133 S.Ct. at 1451 (A federal habeas court “may not canvass circuit decisions to determine whether a particular rule of law is so widely accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, be accepted as correct.”). While we may rely on our prior decisions to the limited extent that we have “already held that the particular point in issue is clearly established by Supreme Court precedent,” Marshall, 133 S.Ct. at 1450 (citation omitted), we must scrupulously avoid using our decisions (or those of other circuits) “to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] Court has not announced,” id. (citing Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2155, 183 L.Ed.2d 32 (2012) (per curiam)); see also Rodriguez, 537 F.3d at 109 (observing that we may no longer rely “on our own precedents to interpret and flesh out Supreme Court decisions”).

2. The “Contrary to” and “Unreasonable Application” Prongs

Once the clearly established Supreme Court principle has been distilled, the petitioner may pursue relief under § 2254(d)(1) via two paths. First, he may show that the state court’s decision was “contrary to” that clearly established principle by demonstrating either (1) “that the state court reached a conclusion of law that directly contradicts” a Supreme Court holding, or (2) that the state court arrived at a result opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court when presented with “ ‘facts that are materially indistinguishable from [the] relevant Supreme Court precedent.’” Evans v. Fischer, 712 F.3d 125, 132 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495).

More commonly, a petitioner may seek relief by demonstrating that the state court’s decision involved an “unreasonable application” of the clearly established principle. A state court unreasonably applies clearly established law if it “ ‘identifies the correct governing legal principle but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts’ of the case before it.” Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495) (ellipsis omitted). In this analysis, a state court’s “unreasonable” application of law is not synonymous with an “incorrect” or “erroneous” decision.' See Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166. Thus, “a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because.that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established law erroneously or incorrectly.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the state court’s application must be “objectively unreasonable,” id. (quotation marks omitted), which, we have recognized, requires “some increment of incorrectness beyond error,” Evans, 712 F.3d at 133 (quotation marks omitted). Whether the state court’s application is “objectively unreasonable” depends, in part, on the specificity of the clearly established rule of law. See Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140. If a legal rule is very specific, then the range of reasonable applications of that rule is correspondingly narrow. See id. By contrast, “[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway [state] courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” Id. In short, the standard. under the unreasonable application prong of § 2254(d)(1) “is difficult to meet,” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786, and “[a] state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision,” id. (quoting Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140).

Finally, federal review under either prong of § 2254(d)(1) “is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398-99. Thus, “evidence introduced in federal court has no bearing on § 2254(d)(1) review.” Id. at 1399. Put another way, the rule expressed in Pinholster generally “prohibits us from relying on evidence beyond the state court record to reach our result.” Young v. Conway, 715 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir.2013) (Parker, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the merits of Jackson’s claims.

II. Miranda Claim

As part of his Miranda claim pressed in the Fourth Department, Jackson argued that CPS Caseworker Bonisteel acted as the “functional equivalent” of a police officer because she was a government employee who interrogated him about the events leading to his arrest. See App’x at 100-01. As relevant here, the Fourth Department rejected the Miranda claim on the ground that Bonisteel “was not engaged in law enforcement activity.” See Jackson, 772 N.Y.S.2d at 150. Jackson argues, and the magistrate judge held, that this conclusion was both contrary to, and an unreasonable application of, the clearly established federal law set forth in the holdings of Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 381 (1968), and Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981). See Jackson, 765 F.Supp.2d at 275-82. While we do not find relief warranted under the “contrary to” prong of § 2254(d)(1), we agree with the magistrate judge that the Fourth Department’s rejection of Jackson’s Miranda claim constituted an objectively unreasonable application of this Supreme Court precedent. We further hold that the admission of Jackson’s statements had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict as to the count’s involving CJ. We therefore affirm the magistrate judge’s judgment insofar as it granted ha-beas relief on those counts.

A. Clearly Established Law

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const, amend. V; see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964) (extending the protection from compulsory self-incrimination to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602; see also Georgison, 588 F.3d at 155 (“It is well settled that Miranda requires all individuals who are under arrest, or otherwise in police custody, to be informed prior to interrogation, inter alia, of their right to remain silent and to have an attorney present during questioning.”). Should a person subject to custodial interrogation invoke his right to remain silent, “the interrogation must cease.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602. In this case, the admissibility of later statements made by the suspect will turn on “whether his right to cut off the questioning was scrupulously honored.” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 106, 96 S.Ct. 321 (holding a statement made after the suspect’s invocation of his Miranda rights admissible when questioning resumed “only after the passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings,” and the second interrogation was restricted “to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier interrogation”).

The Miranda safeguards apply only to “custodial interrogations.” That phrase has two components: the “in custody” requirement, see, e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994), and the “interrogation” requirement, see, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Only the interrogation requirement is at issue here — the State has never argued that Jackson was not “in custody” at the time Bonisteel interviewed him. In the context of Miranda, “the term ‘interrogation’ ... refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682. Absent an interrogation, there can be no infringement of the Fifth Amendment rights Miranda was designed to protect. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (defendant’s “voluntary, volunteered statements” not protected). While the Innis definition of “interrogation” speaks only in terms of questioning or other actions on the part of the “police,” the Supreme Court has not strictly limited its holdings in this regard to law enforcement personnel conducting criminal investigations.

In Mathis, the defendant was incarcerated on a state sentence when an agent of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) questioned him about discrepancies on his federal tax returns. See 391 U.S. at 3 & n. 2, 88 S.Ct. 1503. Over the defendant’s objection that he was not provided the requisite Miranda warnings, the government was permitted to introduce the defendant’s incriminating statements to the IRS agent at the defendant’s criminal trial for tax fraud. See id. at 3, 88 S.Ct. 1503. Before the Supreme Court, the government sought to “escape application of ... Miranda” by arguing that the IRS agent’s “questions were asked as a part of a routine tax investigation where no criminal proceedings might even be brought.” Id. at 4, 88 S.Ct. 1503. The Court rejected this argument, observing that although tax investigations may be initiated “for the purpose of a civil action,” they “frequently lead to criminal prosecutions.” Id. The Court also noted that the IRS agent who interviewed the defendant admitted that “there was always the possibility during his investigation that his work would end up in a criminal prosecution.” Id. For these reasons, the Court “rejected] the contention that tax investigations are im: mune from the Miranda requirements for warnings to be given a person in custody.” Id.

In Smith, 451 U.S. at 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, the Court again analyzed the Miranda requirements in the context of questioning by someone other than a law enforcement official. In that case, the trial judge ordered the prosecutor to arrange a psychiatric evaluation of the criminal defendant to determine his competency to stand trial. See id. at 456-57, 101 S.Ct. 1866. Without administering Miranda warnings, a doctor examined the defendant for approximately 90 minutes while he was in custody, ultimately concluding that the defendant was competent. Id. at 457, 101 S.Ct. 1866. After a jury convicted the defendant, the examining doctor was the state’s sole witness at the capital sentencing stage of the trial, where, in order to obtain a sentence of death, the state had to prove the defendant’s future dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 457-58, 101 S.Ct. 1866. Based on his 90-minute examination of the defendant before trial, the doctor offered a number of “devastating” opinions as to the defendant’s future dangerousness. Id. at 459-60, 101 S.Ct. 1866. The jury’s subsequent verdict made the death penalty mandatory. Id. at 460.

On federal habeas review, the lower courts vacated the death sentence based on the admission of the doctor’s statements. Smith, 451 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. 1866. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege was “directly” implicated because the state used against him “the substance of his disclosures during the pretrial psychiatric examination,” id. at 464-65, 101 S.Ct. 1866, and the defendant was not warned that this “compulsory examination would be used to gather evidence necessary to decide whether, if convicted, he should be sentenced to death,” id. at 467, 101 S.Ct. 1866. Because the defendant “did not voluntarily consent to the pretrial psychiatric examination after being informed of his right to remain silent and the possible use of his statements,” the Court held that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated. Id. at 468, 101 S.Ct. 1866. In reaching this conclusion, the Court found it “immaterial” that the defendant “was questioned by a psychiatrist designated by the trial court to conduct a neutral competency examination, rather than by a police officer, governmental informant, or prosecuting attorney.” Id. at 467, 101 S.Ct. 1866. The Court explained that, when the doctor “went beyond simply reporting to the court on the issue of competence and testified for the prosecution at the penalty phase on the crucial issue of [the defendant’s] future dangerousness, his role changed and became essentially like that of an agent of the State recounting unwarned statements made in a postarrest custodial setting.” Id.

B. Application

Under the circumstances of Jackson’s case, the state court’s rejection of his Miranda claim on the ground that Bonis-teel “was not engaged in law enforcement activity,” see Jackson, 772 N.Y.S.2d at 150, was an objectively unreasonable application of the above holdings. Echoing the Fourth Department, the State argues that Jackson’s Miranda claim must be denied because Bonisteel interviewed Jackson in connection with “an independent civil investigation for possible family court action.” State Br. at 35. As the above Supreme Court holdings make clear, where, as here, custody (as that term is used in Miranda and its progeny) is not at issue, whether the questioning official was engaged in “law enforcement activity” at the time incriminating statements are made is not the touchstone for applying the Miranda warning requirements. Mathis’s rejection of the argument that Miranda did not apply to “routine tax investigation^]” in which “no criminal proceedings might even be brought,” requires as much. Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4, 88 S.Ct. 1503.

The State argues that Mathis is inapplicable to Jackson’s case because it dealt with a civil investigation by the IRS, which has “unique dual roles, focusing on both civil and criminal enforcement of the federal tax laws.” State Br. at 36. Nothing in Mathis suggests, however, that the Court based its holding on the dual nature of IRS agents’ roles. Instead, the Court focused on the “possibility” that the IRS agent’s tax investigation would lead to a criminal prosecution, and the agent’s awareness of that possibility during his investigation. See Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4, 88 S.Ct. 1503. Here, Bonisteel was certainly aware of a similar possibility at the time she conducted her investigation into the allegations that Jackson had sexually abused CJ on the evening of November 29-30, 2000. While her investigation was civil in nature, if she discovered during the course of that investigation that Jackson sexually abused CJ, Bonisteel was required by New York law to report that finding to the “appropriate local law enforcement” authorities. N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 424(5-a). She in fact made such a determination at the conclusion of her interview with Jackson. See App’x at 171. Jackson’s case therefore falls within the ambit of Mathis.

Our conclusion that the nature of the investigation is not the benchmark for determining the applicability of Miranda does not end the matter. Instead, we must focus on whether Bonisteel’s interview of Jackson constituted an “interrogation” within the meaning of Innis, i.e., whether Bonisteel objectively “should have known” that her questions were “reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02, 100 S.Ct. 1682 (emphasis removed); accord Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4, 88 S.Ct. 1503 (observing that the IRS agent who interviewed the defendant acknowledged that the “there was always the possibility during his investigation that his work would end up in a criminal prosecution”). As she testified during the suppression hearing, Bonisteel knew at the time of the interview that Jackson had been arrested and was in police custody as a result of the same sexual abuse allegations she was investigating. See App’x 153-55, 168, 171. It is therefore clear from the record that Bonis-teel should have known that her express questioning about CJ’s rape allegations and about whether Jackson “did anything to [CJ]” could elicit an incriminating response. Contra Innis, 446 U.S. at 302-03, 100 S.Ct. 1682 (no interrogation when two officers held a conversation between themselves concerning the defendant’s missing firearm and the defendant merely commented on that conversation). Because Jackson was not informed prior to Bonis-teel’s interrogation that his statements to her could be introduced at his criminal trial, the State should not have been permitted to rely on those statements to secure Jackson’s conviction. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602; see also Smith, 451 U.S. at 468-69, 101 S.Ct. 1866. Accordingly, the admission of Bonisteel’s testimony at trial violated Jackson’s right to be free from compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

C. Harmlessness

The erroneous admission of a defendant’s statements in violation of Miranda is subject to harmless-error review. See Perkins v. Herbert, 596 F.3d 161, 174 (2d Cir.2010). “ ‘[I]n § 2254 proceedings a court must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the substantial and injurious effect standard set forth in [Brecht v. Abrahamson ].’ ” Wood v. Ercole, 644 F.3d 83, 93-94 (2d Cir.2011) (quoting Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 168 L.Ed.2d 16 (2007)) (additional internal quotation marks removed); see also Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635-37, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). Under Brecht, a federal court may overturn a state conviction “only when the constitutional violation ‘had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Wood, 644 F.3d at 93 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710). To make this determination, “ ‘we consider the importance of the wrongly admitted evidence, and the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.’ ” Id. at 94 (quoting Wray v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 515, 526 (2d Cir.2000)) (brackets and ellipsis omitted). The strength of the prosecution’s case without the erroneously admitted evidence “ ‘is probably the single most critical factor in determining whether the error was harmless.’ ” Id. (quoting Latine v. Mann, 25 F.3d 1162, 1167-68 (2d Cir.1994)). We assess the importance of the wrongly admitted evi