Full opinion text
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. OPINION Antonio Rios and David Casillas were charged along with twenty-nine co-defendants in a sprawling racketeering indictment charging that they were involved in the criminal activities of the Holland, Michigan chapter of the organization known as the Latin Kings. Rios and Casil-las were the only ones to go to trial — the others pleaded guilty and were sentenced, and we recently resolved the appeals of nine co-defendants who challenged the sentences they received. See United States v. Penaloza, Nos. 14-1360, 648 Fed.Appx. 508, 2016 WL 2755180 (6th Cir. May 12, 2016). The case against Rios and Casillas focused on a racketeering-conspiracy charge (“Count One”) under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., which alleged that the Holland Latin Kings was a racketeering enterprise that “was and is overseen by, has always had connections' to, and received directions from, the Chicago Heights, Illinois (21st and Wenworth) Latin Kings.” R. 480 (Fourth Superseding Indictment at 5) (Page ID #2142). Count One alleged the commission of 129 overt acts in furtherance of the twenty-year-long racketeering conspiracy, and also contained eleven special sentencing allegations, charging various defendants with conspiring to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine between 1993 and 2013, and the commission of ten assaults with the intent to commit murder. Id. at 15-37 (Page ID #2152-74). Rios and Casillas were each charged in Count One and its special sentencing allegation regarding the distribution of cocaine, and Rios was additionally charged with three of the assaults with the intent to commit murder. See id. at 3, 33-36 (Page ID #2140, 2170-73). Count Fourteen' — with which Rios and Ca-sillas were charged — alleged a conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine between 2006 and 2012. See id. at 54-55 (Page ID #2191-92). Count Fifteen — with which Rios was charged, but Casillas was not— alleged a conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute one-hundred kilograms or more of marijuana between 2009 and 2012. See id. at 56 (Page ID #2193). Rios and Casillas proceeded to trial on June 2, 2014. The evidence presented was extensive, and we review many facets of it in detail in connection with our assessment of the various legal arguments presented by Rios and Casillas. In summary, three initial witnesses painted a picture of the national Latin Kings organization and how the Holland Latin Kings fit into its structure and practices. Much of the rest of the trial consisted of testimony, largely from cooperating co-defendants, corroborating aspects of the testimony regarding the Holland Latin Kings, and setting forth details about a number of specific criminal acts that the government claimed had been committed in furtherance of the racketeering conspiracy. On June 13, 2014, the jury found Rios and Casillas guilty of Count One, the RICO conspiracy, and Count Fourteen, the cocaine conspiracy. See R. 1197 (Verdict Form at 1-3) (Page ID #13777-79). The jury also found Rios and Casillas responsible for the Count One special sentencing allegation related to the distribution of five kilograms or more of cocaine between 1993 and 2013. See id. at 1-2 (Page ID #13777-78). The jury acquitted Rios of Count Fifteen, the marijuana-distribution conspiracy, as well as the special sentencing allegations regarding assault with the intent to commit murder. See id. at 1-3 (Page ID #13777-79).- Rios was later sentenced to concurrent terms of 240 months on Count One and 300 months on Count Fourteen, with 61 months of credit “for gang-related discharged terms of imprisonment,” R. 1396 (Rios Judgment at 2) (Page ID #20861), and Casillas was sentenced to concurrent terms of 200 months on Count One and 360 months on Count Fourteen, with 148 months of credit “for gang-related discharged terms of imprisonment,” R. 1397 (Casillas Judgment at 2) • (Page ID #20867). On appeal, they each raise issue with many aspects of the trial, as well as the sentences they received. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM Rios’s conviction and sentence, and AFFIRM Casil-las’s conviction and sentence. I. ANALYSIS — TRIAL ISSUES A. Appropriateness of Expert Testimony The government proposed pretrial that it would utilize two expert witnesses. Keith Bevacqui would serve as an expert “regarding the Latin Kings national organization,” R. 912 (Gov’t’s Suppl. Response to Expert Mot. at 3) (Page ID #6840), and Detective Kristopher Haglund — who had also served as a lead investigator in this case — would provide expert testimony regarding “the unique attributes of the Holland chapter of the Latin Kings” and “as to who, in his opinion, is a member of the Holland Latin Kings,” R. 895 (Gov’t’s Initial Response to Expert Mot. at 2) (Page ID #6442). The defendants sought to exclude both witnesses, arguing that Bevac-qui could not “reliably apply his principles and methods to the facts of this case,” R. 954 (Defs.’ Suppl. Expert Mot. at 2) (Page ID #8760), while Haglund lacked a reliable methodology, would be testifying to matters that would be covered by fact witnesses, and would confuse the jury by virtue of his dual role as both fact and expert witness, R. 845 (Defs.’ Expert Mot.) (Page ID #5452-66). The district court denied both requests. See R. 1064 (April 18, 2014 Opinion) (Page ID #11477-87). Both witnesses testified as experts at trial, with Bevacqui focusing on the structure, norms, and operations of the Almighty Latin King Nation, and Haglund linking that testimony to similar practices by the Holland Latin Kings. Haglund also testified to the Holland Latin Kings’s drug-trafficking activities, and its use of violence to protect those activities, its members, and its territory. On appeal, Rios and Casillas raise a number of arguments regarding this testimony. Both argue that Bevacqui’s testimony was irrelevant and unreliable because Bevacqui knew nothing about the Holland Latin Kings. Rios also contests Haglund’s testimony, arguing that it served only to .impart “his opinion that the Defendants who went to trial were guilty” and that he “mixed fact and expert testimony together.” Rios Appellant Br. at 29-30. Relatedly, Rios and Casillas rely extensively on a portion of the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008), that discussed the proper scope of gang-expert testimony under Rule 702. Before analyzing these interrelated arguments, we set forth the law regarding the use of expert witnesses on gangs and discuss the many pitfalls that attend to the use of such witnesses. 1. Law Governing the Use of Gang-Expert Witnesses. Like all experts, the role of gang-expert witnesses is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which provides: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. Although Rule 702 commonly applies to scientific expert testimony, it applies equally to witnesses whose expertise stems from other types of specialized knowledge, granting the district court “considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable,” provided that the gatekeeping mandate of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), is followed “to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony,” Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). The Rule 702 analysis proceeds in three stages: “First, the witness must be qualified by ‘knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.’ Second, the testimony must be relevant, meaning that it ‘will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.’ Third, the testimony must be reliable.” In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 529 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1152, 129 S.Ct. 1673, 173 L.Ed.2d 1037 (2009). “We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s determination to admit or exclude expert testimony.” .Id. at 528. To determine whether an expert’s testimony will be relevant, we look to “whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 702, Adv. Comm. Notes (quoting Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 414, 418 (1952)). Accordingly, “[a] district court may commit manifest error by admitting expert testimony where the evidence impermissibly mirrors the testimony offered by fact witnesses, or the subject matter of the expert’s testimony is not beyond the ken of the average juror.” United States v. Amuso, 21 F.3d 1251, 1263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 932, 115 S.Ct. 326, 130 L.Ed.2d 286 (1994). In cases involving law-enforcement experts, we have interpreted this to mean that the district court, in performing its gatekeeping role, must assess whether, “without expert testimony, the average juror is unlikely to understand” the material about which the expert proposes to testify. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 676, 682 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1162, 116 S.Ct. 1558, 134 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996), abrogated on other grounds by Morales v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 151 F.3d 500, 515 (6th Cir. 1998). Law-enforcement expertise is therefore relevant when it imparts “evidence regarding the inner-workings of organized crime[, which] has been held to be a proper subject of expert opinion because such matters are ‘generally beyond the understanding of the average layman.’ ” United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 419 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Thomas, 74 F.3d at 682). For example, an FBI Agent in a case about organized crime may properly give expert testimony “on the structure, the organization, [and] the rules” of the organized-crime entity. Id. at 418 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor are we alone in condoning the use of such experts in prosecutions involving criminal organizations. See, e.g., United States v. Kamahele, 748 F.3d 984, 998 (10th Cir. 2014) (gang-expert testimony was helpful to the jury where expert would provide “expertise about [the gang’s] structure, insignia and history,” “[a]nd the district court could have assumed that a typical juror would lack knowledge of the gang terminology and the significance of [the] insignia”). Given the variation in practices among different gangs, a gang expert’s testimony on these relevant subjects is reliable only insofar as it is based on significant experience with the gang about which the expert is testifying. See, e.g., United States v. Norwood, 16 F.Supp.3d 848, 861-62 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (noting that gang expertise “usually arises from the officer’s significant experience investigating a particular gang” and concluding that a proffered expert would be unreliable because the expert had not been involved with the specific gang at issue, or even the geographic region). This straightforward theory of gang-expert testimony does not always play out in practice. “An increasingly thinning line separates the legitimate use of an officer expert to translate esoteric terminology or to explicate an organization’s hierarchical structure from the illegitimate and impermissible substitution of expert opinion for factual evidence.” Mejia, 545 F.3d at 190. District courts must therefore remain vigilant to ensure that all of a law-enforcement expert’s testimony relates to issues that are “beyond the ken of the average juror.” Amuso, 21 F.3d at 1263. Otherwise, [i]f the officer expert strays beyond the bounds of appropriately ‘expert’ matters, that officer becomes, rather than a sociologist describing the inner workings of a closed community, a chronicler of the recent past whose pronouncements on elements of the charged offense serve as shortcuts to proving guilt. As the officer’s purported expertise narrows from ‘organized crime’ to ‘this particular gang,’ from the meaning of ‘capo’ to the criminality of the defendant, the officer’s testimony becomes more central to the case, more corroborative of the fact witnesses, and thus more like a summary of the facts than an aide in understanding them. The officer expert transforms into the hub of the case, displacing the jury by connecting and combining all other testimony and physical evidence into a coherent, discernible, internally consistent picture of the defendant’s guilt. Mejia, 545 F.3d at 190-91. A related issue arises when the law-enforcement expert is also a fact witness in the case. This creates a “ ‘significant risk that the jury will be confused by the officer’s dual role,’ ” although we have refused “to adopt a per se prohibition of the practice.” Tocco, 200 F.3d at 418 (quoting Thomas, 74 F.3d at 682-83). One concern is “that a case agent who testifies as an expert receives ‘unmerited credibility’ for lay testimony.” United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 903 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 2003)). Alternatively, “the witness’s dual role might confuse the jury,” or “ ‘the jury may unduly credit the opinion testimony of an investigating officer based on a perception that the expert was privy to facts about the defendant not presented at trial.’ ” United States v. York, 572 F.3d 415, 425 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Upton, 512 F.3d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 2008)). To assuage these concerns, we have suggested that “the district court and the prosecutor take care to assure that the jury is informed of the dual roles of a law enforcement officer as a fact witness and an expert witness.” Tocco, 200 F.3d at 418 (agent’s “dual roles were emphasized to the jury by the fact that he testified at two different times” and “the district court instructed the jury, both before he gave his opinion and again in the jury charge, that it should consider [the agent’s] dual roles in determining what weight, if any, to give [the] expert testimony”). 2. Bevacqui’s Testimony Was Relevant and Reliable. This framework is easily applied to Bevacqui’s expert testimony. The substance of the defendants’ attack on Bevacqui is that his knowledge about the national Latin Kings does not bear on the Holland Latin Kings, making it irrelevant and unreliable in this case. To be sure, Bevacqui admitted that “[t]he first time that I heard about the Holland Latin Kings was through [a] telephone call” from the U.S. Attorney’s Office regarding this case. R. 936 (Tr. of Bevacqui Hearing at 22:9-21) (Page ID #7735). Thus, he would not have been a reliable expert on the Holland Latin Kings. See Norwood, 16 F.Supp.3d at 862 (“expert testimony has been rejected when the proposed expert witness lacked relevant experience with a particular group”). But Bevacqui did not purport to give opinion testimony about the Holland Latin Kings. Rather, he opined about the nationwide Latin Kings, and the government sought to make the link to the Holland Latin Kings through other testimony. In light of other testimony linking the Holland Latin Kings to the national organization, and showing that the Holland Latin Kings shared with the national organization many of the characteristics Bevacqui discussed, Bevacqui’s testimony was appropriate “evidence regarding the inner-workings of organized crime,” Tocco, 200 F.3d at 419, including testimony similar to that we approved in Tocco regarding “the structure, the organization, the rules, the interpretation of phrases, and jargon that’s been used in [the] trial,” id. at 418. 3. Haglund Improperly Mixed Fact and Expert Testimony, and May Have Testified Outside the Scope of Rule 702. The application of the gang-expert legal framework is more complex with respect to Detective Haglund. Haglund’s testimony was largely either within the appropriate scope of gang-expert testimony, as it focused on the traditional areas in which a gang expert can testify — history, organization, and unique terminology or symbols— or involved him testifying to specific facts and events he personally witnessed. But Haglund strayed into testimony that is potentially problematic when he testified about specific criminal actions, including: (1) drug dealing by the Holland Latin Kings and, for example, his estimate that it was “a common thing for members to do,” R. 1233 (Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 323:8-324:19) (Page ID #14467-68); (2) how the Holland Latin Kings obtained and utilized “nation guns,” id. at 329:4-330:2 (Page ID #14473-74); (3) his “experience” that the Holland Latin Kings commonly engage in violent disputes with other gangs, id. at 298:3-13 (Page ID #14442); and (4) the use of violence against those who steal drugs from the Holland Latin Kings, id. at 324:20-24 (Page ID #14468). Much of that information is well within the average juror’s ability to understand, making expert testimony unnecessary. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 793 F.3d 1194, 1213 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[Tjhere is no sociological expertise in testifying to gang members’ specific travels, specific uses of gang funds, or commission of specific crimes.”), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 860, 193 L.Ed.2d 758 (2016). Using an expert to convey that information ran the risk that Detective Haglund would “transform! ] into the hub of the case, displacing the jury by connecting and combining all other testimony and physical evidence into a coherent, discernible, internally consistent picture of the defendant’s guilt.” Mejia, 545 F.3d at 190-91. These aspects of Haglund’s testimony may have been proper if they were given in Detective Haglund’s capacity as a fact witness, based upon his actual experience with the investigation. If an expert also gives fact-witness testimony, his relaying of information that exceeds the scope of Rule 702 is not problematic if done in his capacity as a fact witness. See id. at 196 (recognizing that an officer giving facts he personally investigated and separate expert opinions would not exceed the scope of Rule 702). In this case, it is difficult to parse what came from Haglund the expert and what came from Haglund the investigator because there was no clear demarcation between his fact and expert testimony during the trial. This confusion regarding the capacity in which Haglund was testifying is independently problematic. The district court did not delineate Detective Haglund’s testimony — and Haglund himself never distinguished between his fact and expert testimony. Haglund testified twice during the trial, but the bulk of his testimony came the first time (the second time, Haglund testified solely about his involvement with a January 2011 traffic stop of Rios). Ha-glund’s main testimony touched on all aspects of the Holland Latin Kings’s structure, organization, history, and symbols, but also discussed more specific events, some but not all of which he appears to have witnessed directly. This was problematic because “[sjeamlessly switching back-and-forth between expert and fact testimony does little to stem the risks associated with dual-role witnesses.” York, 572 F.3d at 426. The district court did not clarify the situation when instructing the jury, stating only: “You’ve heard the testimony of Kris Haglund from the Holland Police Department who testified both as a fact and as an opinion witness. Each of these type of testimonies should be given the proper weight.” R. 1274 (Trial Tr. Vol. 9 at 2147:12-24) (Page ID #17711). Nor did anyone explain that the jury could consider Haglund’s status as a key fact witness for the government in evaluating the credibility of his expert testimony. Accordingly, even if Haglund’s testimony did not exceed the scope of Rule 702, his overall presentation as a dual fact-expert witness without further demarcation or explanation to the jury was in error. 4. The Admission of Haglund’s Testimony Was Harmless. Any error — either the admission of some expert testimony that exceeded the scope of Rule 702 or the confusing mixing of Haglund’s expert and fact testimony— was harmless. Although Haglund formed a key part of the introductory portion of the trial, much of his testimony was separately confirmed by witnesses who testified to the same or very similar facts. This was true of the testimony regarding specific criminal actions, as well as much of Haglund’s overall discussion of the history, structure, and operations of the Holland Latin Kings. Accordingly, we cannot say on these specific facts that “it is more probable than not that the error materially affected the verdict.” United States v. Pritchett, 749 F.3d 417, 433 (6th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 196, 190 L.Ed.2d 152 (2014). B. Confrontation Clause Rios and Casillas also argue that Bevac-qui and Haglund based portions of their expert testimony on hearsay in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST, amend. VI. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Clause to bar “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The Clause is in some tension with Federal Rule of Evidence 703, which permits an expert witness to base an opinion on inadmissible evidence “[i]f experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject.” This conflict is not insurmountable. “[T]he Rule and the Clause can be reconciled if the expert exercises ‘independent judgment’ in assessing and using the hearsay (and other sources) to reach an expert opinion.” Garcia, 793 F.3d at 1212 (quoting Kamahele, 748 F.3d at 1000). In general, then, “[a]n expert witness’s reliance on evidence that Crawford would bar if offered directly only becomes a problem where the witness is used as little more than a conduit or transmitter for testimonial hearsay, rather than as a true expert whose considered opinion sheds light on some specialized factual situation.” United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 635 (4th Cir. 2009). With law-enforcement experts, this line can be difficult to draw because they base their opinions on their experience, which often includes the interrogation of suspects and discussions with cooperating witnesses. When an expert’s understanding of the inner workings of a criminal organization stems in significant part from such activities, courts have agreed that it is the process of amalgamating the potentially testimonial statements to inform an expert opinion that separates an admissible opinion from an inadmissible transmission of testimonial statements. “If an expert simply parrots another individual’s out-of-court statement, rather than conveying an independent judgment that only incidentally discloses the statement to assist the jury in evaluating the expert’s opinion, then the expert is, in effect, disclosing that out-of-court statement for its substantive truth.” United States v. Pablo, 696 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 2012); see also Kamahele, 748 F.3d at 1000 (phrasing the inquiry as whether the expert “simply parroted a testimonial fact learned from a particular interview”); United States v. Palacios, 677 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir.) (gang expert’s testimony did not violate Crawford, even though the expert’s views were based in part on discussions with other officers and interviews with gang members and victims, because the expert’s testimony “did not specifically reference any of these interviews”); cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 124, 184 L.Ed.2d 59 (2012). That is not to say that a law-enforcement expert may simply avoid quoting a testimonial statement or identifying its source. In Mejia, for example, the Second Circuit drew the line at gang-expert testimony that discussed specific facts about the gang at issue when the expert had learned the information from interviews. 545 F.3d at 198; see also Garcia, 793 F.3d at 1213 (“An important consideration in distinguishing proper testimony from parroting is the generality or specificity of the expert testimony.”). Thus, the Confrontation Clause is concerned with the use of experts to transmit particular testimonial statements, or their specific substance, to the jury. Although Rios and Casillas assert that Bevacqui based his opinions in part on testimonial hearsay statements, they do not cite examples of the transmission of particular testimonial statements, noting only that Bevacqui must have based his expert opinion on testimonial statements. See Rios Appellant Br. at 30-31; Casillas Reply Br. at 4. As discussed, however, merely basing an expert opinion on testimonial statements is not problematic. The defendants are more specific with regard to Detective Haglund, Rios Appellant Br. at 30-31; Casillas Appellant Br. at 27, and the trial record makes clear that Ha-glund’s expert opinion was influenced by hearsay in three ways: First, in discussing his history of investigating gangs in Holland, Detective Haglund testified that he “spoke to a lot of informants in an attempt to kind of understand what was going on in our community at the time,” and admitted to having “listen[edj to jail conversations,” “read jail letters,” and “[i]nterview[ed] people.” R. 1233 (Trial Tr. Yol. 2 at 290:4-15) (Page ID #14434). Second, in discussing the “beating-out process” — when Latin King members physically beat a member who has chosen to leave the gang — Ha-glund indicated that he had “interviewed and seen people who went through that beating-out process.” Id. at 315:16-18 (Page ID #14459). Third, while describing the lengths to which Latin Kings go to protect their meetings from surveillance, Detective Haglund talked about having “witness[ed] via video and audio recording a meeting in which strip-searches were done [of attendees].” Id. at 321:2-11 (Page ID #14465). Detective Haglund’s mention of investigating gangs by interviewing various people, listening to jail conversations, and reading letters from jail likely involves potentially testimonial statements only insofar as the interviews are concerned. See Ohio v. Clark, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2173, 2182, 192 L.Ed.2d 306 (2015) (“Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial.”). For similar reasons, Detective Haglund’s viewing of surveillance of a Holland Latin Kings meeting likely does not pertain to a testimonial statement. Furthermore, Detective Haglund’s general reliance on interviews or other forms of testimonial statements to form his opinions does not itself violate the Confrontation Clause, which asks only whether he transmitted those statements or their specific substance to the jury. The sole testimony cited by the defendants that may have done so was Detective Haglund’s relaying of the “beating-out process” based upon interviewing Latin Kings about it. He was asked whether he had interviewed someone who went through the process and then explained: “He was taken to a different location from where they were at originally and was beaten by several Latin Kings throughout the face, the body, and suffered injuries.” R. 1233 (Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 315:22-24) (Page ID #14459). This implied directly that a specific individual told Detective Haglund about a specific event, and that Detective Haglund’s account of what occurred was based upon this individual’s statement. This testimony violated the Confrontation Clause, but the violation was harmless because Mario Herrera testified about the severity of the same process. See id. at 453:23-455:2 (Page ID #14597-99). Although Haglund was discussing a particular incident, while Herrera’s testimony was more general, Haglund shared few details of the specific incident that differed from Herrera’s more general discussion. C. Vargas’s Testimony Was Relevant Rios argues that the testimony of Alexander Vargas — a former senior leader of the national Latin Kings — was irrelevant because it related only to Vargas’s activities with the Latin Kings in Chicago. Rios does not point to a motion or objection made before the district court to exclude the entirety of Vargas’s testimony, so we may review only for plain error. See United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 816, 129 S.Ct. 68, 172 L.Ed.2d 26 (2008). Rios relies on Rule 403, which provides that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Vargas’s testimony discussed the history, organization, symbols, and activities of the nationwide Latin Kings organization. Vargas painted a picture of the operations of the national Latin Kings, its links to local chapters, and the various symbols, methods, and organizational details of the operation, which other witnesses then linked to the Holland Latin Kings. Vargas also testified to some direct linkages between the national Latin Kings and Latin Kings in Michigan. See R. 1232 (Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 195:18-197:10) (Page ID #14337-39) (describing how Vargas was once responsible for overseeing a region of Latin Kings that included Michigan and that cocaine was then being sent to Michigan from Chicago, and also discussing a subsequent reorganization of the Michigan-area Latin Kings); R. 1233 (Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 226:25-232:1) (Page ID #14370-76) (discussing a time when another senior leader of the Latin Kings went to Michigan to “appoint! ] the leadership for Michigan,” as well as an incident when Michigan Latin Kings assisted in organizing a Latin Kings chapter in Iowa). This testimony was probative in a manner similar to that of Bevacqui: It helped prove the Indictment’s charge that “[t]he Holland Chapter of the Latin Kings ... was and is overseen by, has always had connections to, and received directions from, the Chicago Heights, Illinois ... Latin Kings.” R. 480 (Fourth Superseding Indictment at 5) (Page ID #2142). Vargas’s interactions with Michigan Latin Kings provided the added benefit of supplying a basis for the jury to apply directly his knowledge of the national organization to the Latin Kings in Michigan. Nor was Vargas’s testimony unduly prejudicial. Although he described the Latin Kings’s drug-related and violent activities, those activities were largely similar to the types of acts that were discussed in detail involving the Holland Latin Kings. D. Gang-Tattoo Evidence At trial, the government relied heavily on gang-tattoo evidence to link members of the Holland Latin Kings to each other. Evidence was introduced regarding the kinds of tattoos that Latin Kings throughout the country generally get, R. 1232 (Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 160:3-14, 198:15-199:6) (Page ID #14302, 14340-41), as well as the particular tattoos that various members of the Holland Latin Kings had, R. 1233 (Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 331:8-18, 350:1-352:13, 354:1-358:3, 359:16-360:25, 455:23-456:12) (Page ID #14475, 14494-96, 14498-14504, 14599-600); R. 1236 (Trial Tr. Vol. 5 at 1224:23-1225:3) (Page ID #15373-74). Finally, evidence was admitted of the tattoos that Rios and Casillas have. See R. 1233 (Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 366:20-371:3, 377:10-381:1) (Page ID #14510-15, 14521-26). Most prominently, evidence showed that Rios had an intricate tattoo on his left bicep, which displayed a scale similar to the scales of justice. See id. at 382:2-11 (Page ID #14526). On the lighter side of the scale was depicted “a cross and a book and ... a rosary,” while the heavier side had a gun, “a bag with a dollar sign on it,” and packages that Detective Haglund testified appeared to be similar in appearance to bricks of marijuana or cocaine. Id. at 382:12-383:9 (Page ID #14526-27). Rios and Casillas moved pretrial to exclude the tattoo evidence. See R. 840 (Rios Mot. to Exclude Tattoos) (Page ID # 5432-35); R. 841 (Casillas Mot. to Exclude Tattoos) (Page ID #5436-37). The district court denied the motions, finding that the tattoos could be probative of affiliation with the Holland Latin Kings. See R. 881 (Jan. 16, 2014 Opinion at 2-3) (Page ID #6088-89). On appeal, Rios and Casil-las contend that this evidence is irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which provides that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” We review for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Boyd, 640 F.3d 657, 667 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, - — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 271, 181 L.Ed.2d 160 (2011). Gang-affiliation evidence may be highly probative of an individual’s membership in a particular gang, so it “has been held admissible, in cases where the interrelationship between people is a central issue.” United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408, 430 (6th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Thomas, 86 F.3d 647, 652 (7th Cir. 1996)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1051, 120 S.Ct. 592, 145 L.Ed.2d 492 (1999). Where other evidence suggests that members of a particular gang tend to have unique tattoos, gang-tattoo evidence helps to identify an individual as a member. See United States v. Ford, 761 F.3d 641, 649 (6th Cir.) (gang-tattoo evidence “is relevant because it demonstrates the relationship amongst the co-conspirators”), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 771, 190 L.Ed.2d 640 (2014); United States v. Alviar, 573 F.3d 526, 538 (7th Cir. 2009) (“the evidence of Latin King handshakes, symbols, colors, and tattoos tended to establish gang membership or affiliation, and it was proper for the government to prove gang membership as part of the conspiracy”), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 916, 130 S.Ct. 1312, 175 L.Ed.2d 1095 (2010). When the existence of a conspiracy or racketeering enterprise is not charged, however, the probative value of gang-membership' evidence is often quite low. See, e.g., United States v. Irvin, 87 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir.) (evidence that two defendants in a drug-distribution case were members of the same gang was irrelevant when the defendants were not charged with a conspiracy because it was “not especially probative of whether they jointly ventured to distribute drugs, unless the motorcycle club is shown to be involved with drugs.”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 903, 117 S.Ct. 259, 136 L.Ed.2d 184 (1996). And there is a “substantial risk of unfair prejudice attached to gang affiliation evidence,” for “[g]angs generally arouse negative connotations and often invoke images of criminal activity and deviant behavior.” Id. at 864-65. Thus, we held that the probative value of a gang-related tattoo depicting firearms was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect in a prosecution for unlawful possession of a firearm because, “[s]imply put, the fact that [the defendant] had a tattoo of a gun-wielding man or the words ‘thug life’ on his arm did not make it any more likely that he possessed the particular gun charged in the indictment on the day in question.” United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 603 (6th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Thomas, 321 F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 2003) (where the government had introduced evidence of a defendant’s tattoo of “two revolvers,” the Seventh Circuit “fail[ed] to see how the ... tattoo was admitted for any purpose other than to establish [the defendant’^ propensity to possess guns”). The vast majority' of the tattoo evidence that was introduced in this case was garden-variety gang-membership evidence used to prove the affiliation of individuals with a charged racketeering conspiracy. Evidence demonstrated the types of symbols and sayings that were important to the Latin Kings and nearly all of the tattoos that were discussed at trial were of those symbols or sayings. This evidence was highly relevant because the case involved a RICO conspiracy charge, so the government was required to prove both the existence of a racketeering enterprise and each defendant’s association with that enterprise. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)-(d). A much closer issue is raised by Rios’s “scale tattoo,” which appears to depict Christian religious symbols on a scale being outweighed by money, a handgun, and a “brick” of narcotics, R. 1233 (Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 382:2-383:9) (Page ID #14526-27), and was never linked to Latin Kings membership. The government emphasized the tattoo during its closing argument: Mr. Rios will tell you why he is guilty of this crime. Look at his arm. These are scales, folks, that Mr. Rios has em-blaz[o]ned on the inside of his arm. You see religious connotation on the left, and they’re a little light and the scale is tired. It’s worn out. It’s got a skull on the top. And then what is heavy? What is winning the battle? Guns, drugs, money. That’s how you know Antonio Rios is telling you he’s guilty. R. 1274 (Trial Tr. Vol. 9 at 2030:17-25) (Page ID #17594). On appeal, the government argues that Rios’s tattoo showed “that Rios had competing interests in his life, and the criminal aspects were most important.” Appellee Br. at 47. The government therefore treats the tattoo as expressive conduct — an admission by Rios that guns, drugs, and money are more important to him than religion. In that sense, the tattoo is more strongly linked to the charged activity — a racketeering conspiracy that itself engaged in gun crime and drug dealing. This can be a permissible use of tattoo evidence, as a recent decision from the Second Circuit instructs. In United States v. Pierce, 785 F.3d 832 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 172, 193 L.Ed.2d 139 (2015), the government introduced evidence that a defendant had. a number of gang tattoos, including one depicting the phrase “Y.G.K.,” which evidence showed stood for “Young Gunnaz Killer” — the ‘Young Gunnaz” being a rival gang, id. at 840. The government introduced this tattoo through photographs of the defendant “pointing a gun at his Y.G.K. tattoo,” which the government argued “indicated] ... his desire to harm members of the Young Gunnaz.” Id. The Second Circuit found the tattoo admissible “to help establish [the defendant’s] motive for violence against the Young Gunnaz.” Id. at 841. Thus, gang-tattoo evidence can serve a purpose other than proving the affiliation between individuals, when it functions as a potential admission by the individual. We view Rios’s tattoo along similar lines, although we find the inference weaker. The tattoo depicts a scale being weighed down by a firearm, drugs, and money. Thus, the message could be that guns, drugs, and money were occupying a central role in Rios’s life. Such an “admission” is relatively broad when compared to an admission of a specific fact underlying the charged crime, so this is not nearly as probative as a photograph of a defendant pointing a gun at a tattoo that labels him a “Young Gunnaz Killer” in a prosecution that involved, among other things, violence against the Young Gunnaz. The potential for unfair prejudice in the form of a propensity inference also remains quite high as the tattoo is an elaborate depiction of firearms and drugs. We therefore hold that the scale tattoo was improperly admitted under Rule 403. As the government contends, however, the error was harmless because we cannot say that “it is more probable than not that the error materially affected the verdict.” Pritchett, 749 F.3d at 433. Rios’s tattoo was a relatively small piece of the case. To be sure, the government mentioned it during its closing argument, so this is not a case where a tattoo was referenced so fleetingly that harmlessness is clear. See Newsom,, 452 F.3d at 602 (erroneously admitted evidence regarding a tattoo of a firearm was discussed only after a witness stated that she had never seen the defendant with a firearm, and then resulted in only “single response that she was not aware of any tattoos ... depicting firearms,” which was “so attenuated an exchange in the context of the overall trial”). But neither is this a case where the government otherwise had weak evidence on a specific factual point on which the tattoo could have pushed the jury over the line. See, e.g., Irvin, 87 F.3d at 866 (erroneous admission of gang tattoo in non-conspiracy drug case was not harmless where the government had minimal other evidence from which a jury could infer that a defendant had possession of drugs and the tattoo served to link the defendant to a co-defendant, whose association with the drugs was clearer). Extensive evidence linked Rios directly to the Holland Latin Kings and their drug trafficking and racketeering operations and to. specific criminal events, so it is difficult to say that admission of Rios’s tattoo “contribute[d] to the verdict obtained” by inflaming the jury to find a link between Rios and guns and drugs. Newsom, 452 F.3d at 602 (quoting United States v. Baldwin, 418 F.3d 575, 582 (6th Cir. 2005)). E. Evidence of Actions of Other Holland Latin Kings Casillas objects to the introduction of evidence regarding racketeering acts committed by members of the Holland Latin Kings other than himself and Rios, on the grounds that this evidence was unfairly prejudicial. He filed a motion in limine on the matter before the district court, R. 830 (Casillas Mot. to Exclude Unrelated Acts at 2-4) (Page ID #5379-81), which denied the motion, R. 898 (Jan. 27, 2014 Opinion) (Page ID #6469-70), so we review the district court’s Rule 403 analysis for abuse of discretion, see Boyd, 640 F.3d at 667. On appeal, Casillas cites only two incidents that he claims were improperly admitted. The first citation is to the following portion of the government’s opening statement: “In 2011 there was another attempted] murder, this time of Devon Ruff. It does not involve Defendant Rios or Defendant Casillas, but this is another example of what happens when somebody steals drugs from the Latin Kings.” R. 1232 (Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 129:23-130:1) (Page ID #14271-72). The other incident cited by Casillas was a drive-by shooting conducted by Holland Latin Kings during a time when the two Holland chapters of the Latin Kings were fighting each other. See R. 1233 (Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 493:1-496:7) (Page ID #14637-40). The government rightly maintains that a RICO conspiracy may be proven by utilizing the acts of others within the conspiracy. “Unlike a substantive RICO charge, a RICO conspiracy charge does not require proof that the defendant committed any predicate acts” and “does not even require proof that the defendant ‘agreed to commit two predicate acts himself, or even that any overt acts have been committed.’ ” United States v. Fowler, 535 F.3d 408, 421 (6th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Saadey, 393 F.3d 669, 676 (6th Cir. 2005)), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1060, 129 S.Ct. 661, 172 L.Ed.2d 636 (2008). In fact, the RICO conspiracy charge “merely requires proof that the defendant ‘intended to further an endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all of the elements of a substantive [RICO] criminal offense [and] it suffices that he adopt the goal of furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor.’ ” Id. (quoting Saadey, 393 F.3d at 676). The substantive RICO offense requires proof of “(1) the conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern of racketeering activity,” Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 62, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997), and a “pattern of racketeering activity” will be found only upon proof of “at least two acts of racketeering activity,” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). Proof of the two incidents about which Casillas complains could therefore have sufficed to prove the necessary pattern of racketeering activity. The Devon Ruff assault was done by multiple Holland Latin Kings, after an attack order had been issued on Ruff by leadership of the Holland Latin Kings because Ruff had stolen marijuana from a Holland Latin Kings member. See R. 1271 (Trial Tr. Vol. 6 at 1418:19-1420:16) (Page ID #16976-78); R. 1272 (Trial Tr. Vol. 7 at 1573:21-1578:5, 1612:20-1613:25) (Page ID #17133-38, 17172-73). The drive-by shooting, similarly, was retaliation during a time when the West Side and East Side chapters of the Holland Latin Kings “were beefing back and forth.” See R. 1233 (Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 493:1-496:7) (Page ID #14637-40). The incidents were therefore probative of the existence and contours of the Holland Latin Kings enterprise and of specific racketeering acts committed in support of that enterprise. Nor did the evidence have a significant unfair prejudicial effect. Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial because its “legitimate probative force” hurts a defendant’s case; rather, the question is whether the evidence “tends to suggest decision on an improper basis.” Gibbs, 182 F.3d at 429. To the extent that the evidence could inflame the jury against Latin Kings as a whole and thereby lead it to punish the defendants merely by virtue of their admitted membership in the Holland Latin Kings, that would be unfairly prejudicial, but many events involving equivalent violence were discussed during the trial, and Rios and Casillas were alleged to have been involved in those events in their capacity as members of the Holland Latin Kings. Thus, the addition of the two incidents cited by Casillas created minimal prejudice, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting them. F. Evidence of Unindicted Acts by Casil-las Casillas next challenges the admission of evidence of what he claims were improper “bad acts evidence” under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) that also resulted in either a constructive amendment of or prejudicial variance from the indictment. He mentions three genres of evidence: (1) the story of a 1996 shooting; (2) the subsequent search of “a van that he was driving[,] and a statement that he made”; and (3) “his individual conduct while living in Texas.” Casillas Appellant Br. at 37. In advance of trial, Casillas filed a motion to exclude evidence of the same episodes. See R. 1126 (Casillas Mot. to Exclude Unindicted Propensity.Evidence) (Page ID #12760-64). In response, the government contended that all of the challenged evidence was intrinsic to the racketeering conspiracy. See R. 1127 (Gov’t Opp’n) (Page ID #12765-70). The district court denied Casillas’s motion on the basis of the government’s argument why .the evidence was part of the conspiracy, but noted that the government “ha[s] the burden of pro[ving] that it’s part of the conspiracy.” R. 1537 (Tr. of May 16, 2014 Motion Hearing at 7:22-8:1) (Page ID #21312-13). The following evidence was introduced at trial: First, the government introduced testimony from Desidario Amaro, a fellow Holland Latin King, who described an incident in which individuals at a house party attacked a neighbor who complained about the noise caused by the party, and who later turned out to be a member of a gang from Grand Rapids. See R. 1234 (Trial Tr. Vol.' 3 at 729:22-730:5) (Page ID #14874-75). In retaliation, “[t]here was word that these guys from Grand Rapids were coming down to Holland to start a war with us,” which led the Holland Latin Kings to organize at a house the following night. See id. at 730:20-731:12 (Page ID #14875-76). The rival gang members showed up to that house “to start a fight with us, like they’re coming to start a war with us, so people started shooting at them,” id. at 731:2.1-23 (Page ID #14876), and Casillas fired a gun out of the house in the direction of the attackers, see id. at 679:4-680:20, 732:3-8 (Page ID #14824-25, 14877). Second, the government introduced evidence regarding its investigation of that shooting. A detective encountered Casillas in a vehicle while on patrol the day after the shooting and pulled him over. See id. at 695:18-696:25, 697:9-21 (Page ID #14840-42). During a patdown, Casillas stated “[t]hose are my bullets” and the detective felt what seemed to be ammunition in a pocket of a jacket that Casillas was holding. See id. at 699:1-700:10 (Page ID #14844-45). Casillas then told the detective that he had been at the house at the time of the shooting, and “that at one point there were some black guys who had come up to the house and he was walking toward the front of the house when he suddenly heard what was like a pop-pop-pop sound.” Id. at 701:10-702:1 (Page ID #14846-47). Casillas denied having fired a shot. See id. at 702:2-8 (Page ID #14847). Later, the van -Casillas had been driving was searched pursuant to a warrant, officers found “a black bag which contained four handguns,” id. at 703:19-704:6 (Page ID #14848-49), and Casillas took responsibility for “[everything in the van,” id. at 717:14-24 (Page ID #14862). Third, a significant amount of evidence was introduced regarding Casillas’s activities in Texas. It is not clear from Casillas’s brief what evidence he is objecting to (he refers to it as evidence of “his individual conduct while living in Texas,” Casillas Appellant Br. at 37). A number of witnesses testified to a drug trafficking operation — headed by Casillas — that was based in Texas and served both to sell drugs to individual users in Texas and also to provide a way of buying drugs wholesale at much cheaper Texas prices and then shipping them to Holland for distribution. See R. 1233 (Trial Tr. Vol. 2 at 497:5-500:2) (Page ID #14641^4); R. 1235 (Trial Tr. Vol. 4 at 892:21-904:25) (Page ID #15039-51); R. 1271 (Trial Tr. Vol. 6 at 1421:11-1449:21) (Page ID #16979-17007). 1. Rule 404(b) Casillas claims that admission of this evidence was improper under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1), which provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” “The Rule 404(b) inquiry consists of three parts”: First, the trial court must make a preliminary determination as to whether sufficient evidence exists that the prior act occurred. Second, the district court must make a determination as to whether the ‘other act’ is admissible for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b). Third, the district court must determine whether the ‘other acts’ evidence is more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403. United States v. Mack, 258 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 2001). This framework “is not implicated when evidence of prior acts is ‘part of a continuing pattern of illegal activity’ or is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the indicted crime.” United States v. McGee, 510 Fed.Appx. 377, 381 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Barnes, 49 F.3d 1144, 1149 (6th Cir. 1995)). The district court’s determination that the evidence was admissible is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Mack, 258 F.3d at 553. The acts were each part of the crimes with which Casillas was charged. The analysis is clearest with the “Texas evidence,” as Casillas was charged with conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana during the time period in which the drug-related acts occurred. That evidence was directly probative of his guilt on the subject. The drug activity in Texas along with the 1996 shooting and its aftermath are similarly intrinsic to the charged racketeering conspiracy. Testimony suggested that the 1996 shooting incident began as part of a “war” between the Holland Latin Kings and a rival gang from Grand Rapids. See R. 1234 (Trial Tr. Vol. 3 at 729:22-731:23) (Page ID #14874-76). Casillas’s Texas trafficking activities were also linked to the Holland Latin Kings, as numerous members participated and were given discounted prices and drugs were shipped by Casillas and others to be sold in Michigan. See R. 1235 (Trial Tr. Vol. 4 at 892:21-904:25) (Page ID #15039-51); R. 1271 (Trial Tr. Vol. 6 at 1421:11-1449:21) (Page ID #16979-17007). These acts, then, were properly admitted as evidence of actions taken in furtherance of the RICO conspiracy. See United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 812-13 (2d Cir.) (evidence of unindicted robberies committed by alleged members of a RICO conspiracy that was charged with, among other things, a string of similar robberies was intrinsic to the RICO conspiracy charge as “acts in furtherance of the RICO conspiracy”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 977, 115 S.Ct. 456, 130 L.Ed.2d 364 (1994). 2. Constructive Amendment and Variance Casillas also claims that the same evidence worked a constructive amendment to the indictment or, at a minimum, constituted a prejudicial variance from the indictment. The district court denied Casillas’s pretrial motion claiming that a variance or constructive amendment would occur upon admission of the challenged evidence, holding that the government nonetheless would have the burden of proving that the acts about which Casillas complained were in fact part of the conspiracy. See R. 1537 (Tr. of May 16, 2014 Hearing at 7:22-8:1) (Page ID #21312-13). We “evaluate[] claims of constructive amendments to or variances from an indictment de novo.” United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667, 682 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 928, 130 S.Ct. 342, 175 L.Ed.2d 227 (2009). Constructive amendments and variances are related issues that stem from the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “A constructive amendment ‘results when the terms of an indictment are in effect altered by the presentation of evidence and jury instructions which modify essential elements of the offense charged such that there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant may have been convicted of an offense other than the one charged in the indictment.’ ” Kuehne, 547 F.3d at 683 (quoting United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 338 (6th Cir. 2005)). “A variance ‘occurs when the charging terms [of the indictment] are unchanged, but the evidence at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 756-57 (6th Cir. 2000)). Casillas’s arguments fail because the evidence he challenges is intrinsic to the RICO and drug conspiracy charges. That some of the specific actions were not listed in the indictment as additional overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy or as other evidence of the existence of a conspiracy or RICO enterprise does not mean that their admission constituted an amendment or a variance. There is no requirement that a RICO conspiracy indictment allege any overt act, Salinas, 522 U.S. at 63, 118 S.Ct. 469, and even if proof of an overt act were required for conviction, it is a “well-established rule ... that the overt act element of a conspiracy charge may be satisfied by an overt act that is not specified in the indictment, at least so long as there is no prejudice to the defendant,” United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608, 619 (2d Cir. 2003). In any event, the evidence was quite similar to the specific overt acts of racketeering that were alleged in the indictment. It therefore neither created “a substantial likelihood that the defendant may have been convicted of an offense other than the one charged in the indictment,” as would be required for a finding that the indictment was constructively amended, Kuehne, 547 F.3d at 683 (quoting Martinez, 430 F.3d at 338), nor supplied proof of actions that were “materially different from those alleged in the indictment,” as would be required for a finding that there was a variance, id. (quoting Prince, 214 F.3d at 756-57). G. Rios’s Motion to Suppress Next, Rios contests the district court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence of the cocaine that was seized from his ear on January 26, 2011. We summarize the relevant facts: In January 2011, Ralph Leal informed Detective Haglund “that Mr. Rios was trafficking narcotics within Holland city and that he would often make trips to Chicago or Detroit to obtain large amounts of cocaine and bring it back to Holland city and cut the cocaine up into larger amounts.” R. 918 (Tr. of Jan. 27, 2014 Motion Hearing at 7:18-8:7) (Page ID #6978-74). Ralph Leal later told Detective Haglund “that [Rios’s then-girlfriend] Kandie Rodriguez just received a phone call from Antonio Rios and [Ralph Leal] overheard a conversation that took place between Mr. Rios and Ms. Rodriguez.” Id. at 10:12-19 (Page ID #6976). The substance of the conversation was “that Mr. Rios would be picking her up at 11:00 on the 25th of January” from the house Rodriguez and Leal shared, and that they would be going to “get cocaine.” Id. at 11:19-12:12 (Page ID #6977-78). Officers set up surveillance on the house and “observed Mr. Rios pick Ms. Rodriguez up from the residence.” Id. at 13:4-12 (Page ID #6979). As Rios drove away, other officers observed him “travelling] eastbound on 16th Street towards U.S. 31.” Id. at 14:12-15 (Page ID #6980). Rios stopped at a gas station, at which point officers became concerned that Rios had noticed them. See id. at 14:16-15:4 (Page ID #6980-81). Officers therefore stopped tailing Rios, last seeing him traveling in the direction of the highway that one would take to get from Holland to either Detroit or Chicago. See id. at 15:12-24 (Page ID #6981). Having lost track of Rios, investigators sought and obtained a warrant for “[a]ll subscriber information and real time precision location information for” Rios’s cell phone “for the next 2 days.” R. 852-1 (Search Warrant Aff. ¶ 2) (Page ID #5657). Upon receiving their “first ping back” regarding the cell phone’s location, investigators learned that Rios was in Detroit. See R. 918 (Tr. of Jan. 27, 2014 Motion Hearing at 18:4-14) (Page ID #6984). They continued to monitor Rios’s phone as it began to move back toward Holland the following morning. See id. at 21:24-23:3 (Page ID #6987-89). Investigators set up to intercept him and prepared a “K-9 unit” nearby. Id. at 23:4-11 (Page ID #6989). Rios was stopped after being observed speeding. See R. 852-1 (Police Incident Report) (Page ID # 5663). As soon as Rios was stopped, Haglund called the K-9 unit, R. 918 (Tr. of Jan. 27, 2014 Motion Hearing at 24:1-16) (Page ID #6990), which arrived between five and ten minutes later, id. at 42:10-23, 54:5-7 (Page ID #7008, 7020). The dog then quickly alerted on the tailgate of the car, id. at 54:16-21 (Page ID #7020), and officers found cocaine in a hidden compartment in the car’s center console, see id. at 54:24-25, 57:13-25 (Page ID #7020, 7023). Rios moved pretrial to suppress the cocaine. See R. 852 (Mot. to Suppress) (Page ID #5645-55). The district court held a hearing on the motion on January 27, 2014, at which Detective Haglund and the K-9 officer testified. See R. 918 (Tr. of Jan. 27, 2014 Hearing) (Page ID #6967-7034). The district court later denied Rios’s motion to suppress. See R. 909 (Jan. 31, 2014 Opinion) (Page ID # 6825-35). 1. Search Warra