Full opinion text
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge: Frederick R. Whatley ("Petitioner") murdered a bait shop owner in Georgia in 1995. He was convicted and sentenced to death. After the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed his convictions and death sentence, Whatley v. State , 270 Ga. 296, 509 S.E.2d 45, 53 (1998), he petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He alleged that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel (1) by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase and (2) by failing to object when he testified before the jury during the penalty phase in shackles. The District Court granted relief on the first claim and denied relief on the second. Both parties appeal. We reverse on the first claim and affirm on the second. Our opinion proceeds in seven parts. Part I recounts the trial proceedings, with an emphasis the penalty phase. Part II briefly describes the direct appeal. Part III explains the evidence that Petitioner presented to the state habeas court and notes that Court's decision. Part IV explains the Supreme Court of Georgia's decision, which is the decision we effectively review on appeal. Part V recounts the District Court's decision, and Part VI takes up the two issues on appeal. Part VII concludes. I. Petitioner was indicted for murder in June of 1996. Whatley , 509 S.E.2d at 48 n.1. The Superior Court for Spaulding County, Georgia, appointed Johnny B. Mostiler ("Trial Counsel"), the Spaulding County Public Defender, to represent Petitioner 12 days after his arrest. Whatley v. Schofield , No. 99-V-550, slip op. at 5 (Ga. Super. Ct. Nov. 29, 2006) (order denying habeas relief). He was convicted by a jury in January of 1997. Whatley , 509 S.E.2d at 48 n.1. This appeal focuses on how Trial Counsel performed in preparing for the penalty phase of Petitioner's trial and in representing Petitioner during that phase. We must analyze Trial Counsel's conduct under the performance standard set out in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To decide whether Petitioner satisfied Strickland 's prejudice standard, we must consider the strength of the State's case. Specifically, what should Trial Counsel have anticipated the State would present in the guilt-innocence phase and, if the jury found Petitioner guilty of murder, what additional evidence would the State present in the penalty phase to persuade the jury to recommend a death sentence? The Superior Court of Butts County (the "State Habeas Court"), which heard Petitioner's habeas petition, described Trial Counsel's decision this way: [Trial Counsel] was confronted with a conundrum of trying to defend a death penalty case by denying the obvious guilt of his client, and asserting defenses where there were none and then trying to convince the jury of the defendant's credibility and worthiness as a human being when it came to the [penalty] phase of the trial. Whatley , slip op. at 5 (order denying habeas relief). We recount the guilt-innocence phase and the penalty phase separately. A. Trial Counsel defended Petitioner by putting the State to its proof-that appeared to be the only available defense strategy. At the time of the murder, Petitioner had recently arrived in Georgia after escaping from a halfway house in Washington, D.C. Shortly after arriving, Petitioner told a cousin that he needed a gun to "make a lick," to commit a robbery. Here's how he made the lick. He walked into a bait shop and pulled out a gun. Whatley , 509 S.E.2d at 48. He forced an employee to lie down behind the counter, pressed the gun against the employee's head, and told another person, the storeowner, to give him the money from the register. Id. The storeowner complied and put the money in a sack on the counter; Petitioner grabbed the sack and fired two shots. Id. One shot hit the storeowner in the chest, "pierc[ing] his left lung." Id. Petitioner fired this shot, according to expert testimony, while standing just 18 inches from the storeowner. Id. The second shot missed its mark-Petitioner tried to shoot the employee (still lying behind the counter) in the head, but the bullet hit the counter and missed. Id. Petitioner left the store and ran into a man who was getting out of his car. Id. Petitioner forced the man back inside the car and told the man to take him where he wanted to go. Id. Before the car could leave, the "mortally wounded" storeowner grabbed a gun from the store and fired "several shots" at Petitioner. Id. Petitioner returned fire, and the storeowner eventually collapsed and died from bleeding caused by the first gunshot. Id. Petitioner dropped the sack of money and fled on foot; the man in the car noticed that Petitioner was limping. Id. Officers arrived on the scene, and both the employee and the man who Petitioner tried to carjack told them the attacker had used a "silver revolver." Id. The day before, one of the officers had taken a report from a man who said that his silver revolver was missing; he suspected his cousin-Petitioner-had taken it. Id. The officers located Petitioner, who was staying with a relative. Id. Sure enough, he had a bullet wound in his leg, and the officers found the missing silver revolver under his mattress. Id. A firearms expert concluded that the missing silver revolver was in fact the murder weapon. Id. There was more. "The police also found a bloody pair of thermal underwear with a bullet hole in the leg, a bloody towel, and bloody boxer shorts in a trash can behind the house." Id. Officers removed a bullet (one that matched the caliber of the murder weapon) from the car that Petitioner tried to carjack. Id. There were fibers on the bullet, and the fibers "were consistent with fibers from the thermal underwear, and DNA taken from blood on the fibers matched [Petitioner]." Id. Petitioner's palm print was on the sack of money that was dropped outside the store when the attacker fled. Id. at 48-49. Based on this evidence, the jury found Petitioner guilty of malice murder. Id. at 49. B. A month after the grand jury indicted Petitioner, the State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Whatley , slip op. at 6 (order denying habeas relief). To support its request for death, the State would argue that one or more of these three aggravating circumstances applied: (1) Petitioner committed the murder while engaged in armed robbery, (2) Petitioner committed the murder to obtain money, or (3) Petitioner committed the murder after he had escaped from a place of lawful confinement. The State also told Trial Counsel that it would rely on Petitioner's convictions and probation revocations-in 1988, 1989, and 1990-from Washington, D.C., to establish the aggravating circumstances. Trial Counsel was well aware of this evidence and planned to counter it with evidence that showed (1) Petitioner's life was worth saving and (2) that life imprisonment would be sufficient punishment. We recount the penalty phase chronologically. We begin with the State's case and then consider Petitioner's response. We end with closing arguments. 1. The State relied on the evidence presented during the guilt-innocence phase to establish the first aggravating circumstance-that Petitioner committed the murder while engaged in armed robbery-and the second aggravating circumstance-that Petitioner committed the murder to obtain money. It relied on records from the District Court for the District of Columbia and the D.C. Superior Court to establish the third aggravating circumstance-that Petitioner committed the murder after escaping from a place of lawful confinement. The State also used these records to show the extent of Petitioner's criminal history and to paint a broader picture of him. Using the records, the State argued that this murder wasn't Petitioner's "first brush with the law" and that he had "every break possible" to turn things around but failed to do so. The records showed, according to the State, that Petitioner had a history of violence and would always be dangerous. There are lots of records, and they are, at times, quite convoluted. For the reader's sake, we hit the records' high points, and we explain only those records that are necessary for our analysis. The records show that Petitioner was charged in three separate criminal cases from 1988 to 1990: (1) he forged a U.S. Treasury check, (2) he robbed a man at gunpoint, and (3) he assaulted a woman in public. The judicial proceedings in these cases overlapped, and many times, what happened in one case affected something in the other. Thus, rather than dividing our discussion by offense or topic, we explain the records chronologically. In January of 1986, Petitioner stole a U.S. Treasury check, forged the payee's signature, and negotiated the check. In January of 1988, he also robbed a man at gunpoint. He was indicted in the District Court for the forgery, United States v. Whatley , No. CR 88-030 (D.D.C.), and he pled guilty in May of 1988. Petitioner was indicted in the Superior Court for the armed robbery, United States v. Whatley , No. F-1046-88 (D.C. Super. Ct. Crim. Div.), and he pled guilty to a lesser charge of robbery in April of 1988. During the plea colloquy in the robbery case, Petitioner admitted that he "put a loaded shotgun ... to the [victim's] back and demanded [his] wallet which he forcibly took from [the victim]. ... [Petitioner] was arrested that same day ... and the ... loaded shotgun and shells were recovered." The Superior Court accepted the guilty plea and ordered that Petitioner be "committed" to the D.C. Department of Corrections "for observation and study" under the Youth Rehabilitation Act (the "YRA") before sentencing. He would be sentenced after the studies were finished. Later in April of 1988, Petitioner was sentenced in the forgery case. He was ordered to reside at the Hope Village Community Treatment Center for four months and to participate in a drug treatment program. But Petitioner wasn't taken to Hope Village immediately and remained incarcerated until there was room for him at Hope Village. Between April and June of 1988, Petitioner was evaluated according to the YRA. In August of 1988, Petitioner was also given a neuropsychological evaluation, which his caseworker, Eugene Watson ("Caseworker Watson") arranged. As we explain below, Petitioner relies heavily on these reports and evaluations from 1988 to support his habeas petition. Sentencing in the robbery case was continued several times. Finally, in March of 1989, the Superior Court held the sentencing hearing. At the hearing, Petitioner's lawyer presented a sentencing plan that was created by Caseworker Watson. Petitioner's lawyer asked the Court to sentence Petitioner to a term of probation, conditioned on Petitioner's following the sentencing plan. The Court agreed and sentenced Petitioner as follows: "Five to fifteen years [imprisonment] with the execution suspended with a five year period of probation with the condition that he enter and complete the New Life [for Youth] Program, both residential and aftercare." Petitioner was never taken to the New Life for Youth facility. Instead, he was taken to the Hope Village facility the next month, consistent with his sentence in the forgery case. He absconded from Hope Village about two months later. In turn, his probation in the forgery case was revoked, and he was incarcerated for two months. In light of this, the Superior Court ordered Petitioner to show cause as to why his probation should not be revoked in the robbery case. The Court held a hearing in December of 1989, and, rather than revoking probation, it modified the terms of Petitioner's release. Fast forward to September of 1990; the Superior Court again ordered Petitioner to show cause as to why his probation should not be revoked in the robbery case. It held a hearing the next month-Petitioner didn't appear, and the Court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. Seven days after the Court issued the bench warrant, Petitioner was arrested for assaulting a female. He was charged in the Superior Court with "assault with intent to rape." United States v. Whatley , No. F 11978-90b (D.C. Super. Ct. Crim. Div.). In December of 1990, he pled guilty to a lesser charge, simple assault. The Court sentenced Petitioner to the custody of the Attorney General for one year. Finally, in late December of 1990, the Superior Court held a hearing on its show cause order, the order that directed Petitioner to show why his probation should not be revoked in the robbery case. The Court focused on the assault charge that Petitioner had recently pled guilty to and been sentenced for. The question was whether the assault established cause for revoking Petitioner's probation. The Court noted the "Herculean efforts [that] were made" to help Petitioner deal with "difficult personality, and perhaps psychological, problems that he had." It then noted that this was the second probation revocation hearing, and the Court highlighted that Petitioner committed the assault after having been served with a bench warrant for his arrest. Next, the Court turned to the facts of the assault. Even after considering Petitioner's "dubious" version of the incident, and giving Petitioner "the most benefit of the doubt," the Court noted that Petitioner showed "some violent behavior with somebody ... in a way that ... could have been quite dangerous." The Court went on and described the incident "as a significant outburst of violent behavior by somebody who was then on the run from me for a prior criminal act of violent behavior, namely a robbery." It concluded with this: "I think there have been serious violations of the probation, here, in the case of somebody who's been given lots and lots of chances ... to try to stay out of Lorton [prison] on a long-term basis. And, I think he basically blew it." The Court revoked Petitioner's probation and sentenced him to prison for a term of 4 to 12 years. Petitioner was incarcerated in Lorton Reformatory immediately. He was released 47 months later, in November of 1994, and put in a halfway house in Washington, D.C. He fled on December 2, 1994, and became a fugitive from justice. He was still a fugitive when he returned to Georgia in January of 1995. 2. Trial Counsel countered the State's case with nine witnesses; collectively, they portrayed Petitioner's life as worth saving. We focus on three witnesses-Janet Wyche, Lorraine Goodman, and Cleveland Thomas, Jr.-because Petitioner also submitted their testimony in his habeas proceedings. Petitioner testified himself and expressed remorse for what he had done, and Caseworker Watson testified as well. As a brief introduction, we note that Petitioner was raised by his great-aunt and great-uncle, Marie and Cleveland Thomas. He moved to Washington, D.C., to live with his mother a couple of time during his teenage years. The criminal history that we just explained took place in Washington, D.C. And at the time of the murder, he had just returned to Georgia from Washington, D.C., after escaping from a halfway house. Petitioner explained this during his testimony, which we discuss below. Janet Wyche knew Petitioner before he went to live with his mother in Washington, D.C. When he returned to Georgia, Petitioner stayed off and on in the same house where Ms. Wyche lived. She said he was nice and got along with everyone. Ms. Wyche didn't comment on Petitioner's childhood or his experience living with the Thomases. Lorraine Goodman is related to Petitioner. She described him as respectful and knew that he was raised by the Thomases, who took him to church every Sunday. She was unaware of Petitioner getting into any trouble while living with the Thomases. She said that Petitioner stayed at her house when he returned to Georgia from Washington, D.C.; she asked him to leave because they could not afford to have another person in the house. She claimed that Petitioner looked for a job every day while staying with her, and she said her children "loved him." Cleveland Thomas, Jr.'s father and stepmother raised Petitioner. He said that as a child growing up, Petitioner was "real nice," had good manners, and did well in school. He "thought the sky was the limit for him," and he asked the jury to "spare [Petitioner's] life." Five other witnesses testified and generally said positive things about Petitioner. Next, Trial Counsel called Petitioner himself to the stand. Petitioner first explained his upbringing. As a child, he was told that his mother "had some problems," so she left him with his great-aunt and great-uncle (the Thomases), who raised him. He described the Thomases' household as "very stationary, very unconditional as far as ... loving and ... support, and ideally everything that a child could ... ask for growing up." In eighth or ninth grade, he went to live with his mother, brothers, and sisters in Washington, D.C.-he "had a yearning ... to be part of [his] family." But life there was chaotic, and his mother kicked him out after the two got into a fight. He returned to Georgia. At 19, he moved back because he still wanted to be with his mother and siblings. Back in Washington, D.C., he "assumed the position of head of the household." But that deteriorated because his mother was taking money from him, and he moved out. Petitioner then addressed his involvement with drugs and said he started out dealing drugs for a profit. He noted that he has "always had some dealings in the streets." Next, Petitioner explained his criminal history. He said "trouble came along" when he "got introduced to ... and ... associated with some individuals that were into forgery and uttering and credit cards, white collar crimes." As for the robbery, Petitioner claimed he "did not have the shotgun on" him during it. He said the victim owed him money, and he stuck a "closed knife" in the victim's back. He claimed the shotgun was around the corner during the robbery, and after taking the victim's money, he was going to retrieve the gun. Petitioner also explained why he violated his probation in the forgery case. He said he was required to stay at Hope Village for four months, but he got in trouble by taking "a furlough." He claimed he was unaware that he wasn't supposed to leave the facility. When he returned, his supervisor "placed [him] on restriction." The next night, another staff member let him out, and he was considered an escapee. Moving on to his probation sentence in the robbery case, Petitioner noted that he worked with Caseworker Watson "on a regular basis ... for a couple of years." He said they stopped working together when he went "on the run." He was on the run because he hadn't reported to his probation officer, and there was a warrant out for his arrest. Then, Petitioner explained why he escaped from the halfway house in December of 1994. The night he escaped, Petitioner said, he left work early and went to visit an ex-girlfriend. There was a curfew, and he realized he would be cutting it close, so he called the halfway house and asked for an extension. It was denied. So, Petitioner tried to catch a cab, but he was in a part of town where it was "very difficult" "for a black male to catch a cab that time of night." He called the halfway house again, and he was told that he should still be able to make curfew. He finally found a cab, but the driver had to go pick up another passenger in Maryland. Petitioner explained that he had a curfew, and the driver told Petitioner to give him $ 25-he didn't have that much money, so the driver just let him out in Maryland. At this point, he had missed curfew, and he didn't report back to the halfway house. Petitioner bounced around and stayed with different friends and family members. He came back to Georgia hoping to get a job and make some money. Once in Georgia, he continued to stay with other people, and he eventually stole a pistol from a man he was staying with. He stole the pistol because had been selling drugs and needed to go to "rough neighborhoods" to sell. There were also people who owed him money, Petitioner said. On the night of the murder, "it just so happened" that he got a ride and "passed by" the bait shop. He "felt like it was in a secluded area," so he could "go in," "get the money," and "get out of town." Finally, Petitioner explained how he wound up shooting the victim. He said he took the money and was backing out of the shop without looking at the door. He heard someone coming to the door and turned around-at that point, the victim grabbed a gun. Petitioner turned back, apparently saw the gun, and fired a shot. This shot, Petitioner claimed, was the one that hit the counter. Petitioner backed out of the shop and ran into a person trying to enter. By this time, the victim had fired his own shot, and Petitioner had made it outside. Once outside, Petitioner and the victim continued shooting at each other. Petitioner said he didn't shoot the victim inside the store; he was hit after chasing Petitioner outside. Petitioner wrapped up the direct examination by saying he did not intend to kill the victim. He only intended to rob the store. On cross examination, Petitioner stuck to his story about what happened in the shop-he never admitted that he fired two shots inside the shop, one at the employee who was lying behind the counter, and one at the victim, with the pistol just 15 to 18 inches from the victim's chest. Petitioner also stuck to his version of what happened during the robbery in Washington, D.C. That is, Petitioner said he did not have the shotgun with him when he robbed the victim. He acknowledged the plea agreement-where he admitted to putting a loaded shotgun to the victim's back-but said he was willing to admit facts that didn't happen because of the plea deal. This concluded Petitioner's testimony. Trial Counsel finished up by calling Caseworker Watson. As we explained above, he created the sentencing plan that the Superior Court considered in Petitioner's robbery case. Caseworker Watson worked with Petitioner for about a year and a half, and he said that he found Petitioner to be both personable and likeable. He thought Petitioner "had a lot of potential." To prepare the plan, Caseworker Watson spoke with the Thomases to better understand Petitioner's background. He talked to them "on a very regular basis, maybe once a week." After talking to the Thomases, Caseworker Watson "could see" "that [Petitioner] came from a good family." Mrs. Watson, especially, gave him something to "latch onto," something he "could convince the [C]ourt was worth investing in." He called them Petitioner's "support." As part of his work on Petitioner's case, Caseworker Watson arranged for a clinical psychologist and an educational psychologist to evaluate Petitioner. (We consider these reports in detail below.) Finally, Caseworker Watson discussed his attempt to enroll Petitioner at Howard University. He introduced Petitioner to "certain deans" at Howard, and Petitioner "impressed" them. Caseworker Watson was unable to take the next step, though, and have Petitioner apply for admission because he "wasn't able to raise enough money to insure his tuition." He concluded his testimony on direct examination with this: "[I]f we had been able to provide tuition and he could have been a student at Howard, I'm convinced that his life would have been different. I know this." With this, the parties rested and made their closing arguments. 3. The State argued that life without parole was inadequate given the nature of the murder. It also noted that Petitioner attempted to pin part of the responsibility on the victim and that he showed no remorse. The State said that Petitioner should have admitted that the murder happened just as the State's evidence showed: that is, he fired two shots intending to kill two people, both at close range. The State compared Petitioner's version of the murder-that he shot the victim after he was out of the store, and only because the victim was shooting at him-with Petitioner's explanations of his criminal history. He cashed the U.S. Treasury check "because some of his friends talked him into it." He didn't really put a shotgun to his victim's back during the robbery in Washington, D.C. He missed curfew at the halfway house "because the taxi cab driver was late." Petitioner's troubles were always someone else's fault, according to the State. Turning to the lack-of-remorse argument, the State claimed that Petitioner was not sorry for what he did; it said he would "brag" about the murder in prison. Trial Counsel argued for a life sentence without parole. He claimed that Petitioner would not kill again if he were sentenced to life without parole. Turning to the murder itself, Trial Counsel argued that the murder happened just as Petitioner said it did. That is, Petitioner entered the bait shop with no intention of killing anyone. Trial Counsel argued that Petitioner was remorseful and was reminded of what he did every day. He also tried to humanize Petitioner, calling the Thomases "a good strong family" that taught him right and raised him well. He said Petitioner's tragic mistake was moving in with his dysfunctional mother in Washington, D.C. The jury recommended the death penalty, and the Court sentenced Petitioner to death. II. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia and raised one argument that's relevant here: he said the trial court-by allowing the jury to see him in shackles-denied his rights to due process, equal protection, a fair trial, and a reliable determination of punishment under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Although Petitioner wore shackles during both phases of the trial, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the jury did not see them during the guilt-innocence phase. Whatley , 509 S.E.2d at 52. The Court implied that the jury did in fact see the shackles during the penalty phase, but it rejected the claim under the invited error doctrine. See id. Indeed, it was the State that raised the shackles issue before the penalty phase, and Trial Counsel said, "[w]ell, he's convicted now" and allowed Petitioner to take the stand in front of the jury. Id. (alteration in original). The Court said, "A party cannot during the trial ignore what he thinks to be an injustice, take his chance on a favorable verdict, and complain later." Id. (quoting Dennard v. State , 263 Ga. 453, 435 S.E.2d 26, 29 (1993) ). The Court affirmed Whatley's convictions and death sentence, see id. at 53, and the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari review, Whatley v. Georgia , 526 U.S. 1101, 119 S. Ct. 1582, 143 L.Ed.2d 676 (mem.), reh'g denied , 527 U.S. 1016, 119 S. Ct. 2361, 144 L.Ed.2d 256 (1999) (mem.). III. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Butts County. Whatley v. Schofield , No. 99-V-550 (Ga. Super. Ct.). Petitioner claimed that Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance (1) by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence about his background and mental health (the "Mitigation Claim") and (2) by not objecting to Petitioner's appearing before the jury in shackles during the penalty phase (the "Shackles Claim"). By this time, Trial Counsel had died, so the State Habeas Court did not have the benefit of his testimony in deciding whether he provided ineffective assistance under Strickland . We address each claim separately. A. The State Habeas Court considered many sources of evidence in deciding the Mitigation claim: the pleadings the State filed while prosecuting the case; the trial transcript; Trial Counsel's hand-written notes that he kept in his case file; Trial Counsel's timesheet entries (which reflected the work he did); the testimony of Trial Counsel's investigator, Dewey Yarbrough ("Investigator Yarbrough"); the testimony of others whom Trial Counsel contacted before and during the trial; and the evidence Petitioner's habeas counsel presented. The Court held an evidentiary hearing on the Mitigation Claim. We consider Petitioner's evidence first and then take up the State's response. 1. We group the evidence Petitioner presented to the State Habeas Court into three categories: (1) five reports stemming from the YCA Study, which the Superior Court ordered after Petitioner pled guilty in the robbery case-we refer to these collectively as the "1988 Reports"; (2) affidavits about Petitioner's childhood, from people familiar with his family situation growing up; and (3) affidavits related to Petitioner's mental health-one from a clinical psychologist, Dr. Lisak, and another from a psychiatrist, Dr. Dudley. Although we group the evidence into three categories, there are two common threads running through each category: Petitioner's troubled childhood and his mental health. Those threads are the bedrock of Petitioner's Mitigation Claim, so that's where we focus our attention. a. The 1988 Reports note that Petitioner's mother neglected her parental duties, and he was raised by his great-aunt and great-uncle. One report says that his great-uncle "provided an excellent role model" for Petitioner "during his formative years." Another one claims that Petitioner "reported a good relationship with his great aunt and uncle." The report also says that Petitioner had "a stable upbringing in his early years," but Petitioner did note "that his great uncle drank regularly and gave him beer" at a young age. Petitioner reported that he began using marijuana at age 15; he also used cocaine in high school. The 1988 Reports contain two psychological evaluations of Petitioner. One evaluation was done by a psychologist who reported that Petitioner "has uncontrollable impulses which brings him into constant conflictual situations with others because of his naive appreciation of how one plans, executes and attains realistic goals." The report also observed that Petitioner "feels he will be able to get away with anything because he can outsmart" others. It described his "emotional understanding and development" as "delayed and infantile." The report said Petitioner "is fighting against a very disturbed and painful emotional state but decompensating rapidly and escaping through drugs for relief." It noted Petitioner's "schizophrenic symptoms" and attributed much of his hardship to a desire to be closer to his mother: "[Petitioner] is experiencing a mental health breakdown and needs intensive intervention though psychotherapy to help him address his needs before he drifts into more serious adventures in an attempt to get the attention of his mother." The report concluded by recommending "long-term psychotherapy" and "drug therapy." The other report was done by a clinical psychologist, and the report explains the findings of many tests that were given to Petitioner. One test measured Petitioner's "current level of intellectual functioning" as being "in the Low Average range of ability." But the report pointed out that Petitioner's "potential is at least in the upper half of the Average range ... , if not higher." As for Petitioner's "[p]ersonality [f]unctioning," the report noted that he "appears to be experiencing considerable anxiety about his ego integrity, suggesting that the anxiety is so great at times that he comes close to being overwhelmed and losing his sense of reality." "Although some [of] his responses indicate idiosyncrati[c] perceptions and thinking, he does not appear to have schizophrenia." The report said that "[i]t is possible that under a great deal of emotional stress [Petitioner] could become psychotic, but such symptomology is likely to be temporary." Petitioner's "most important need," according to the report, "is intensive psychotherapy to deal with the emotional problems that underlie his drug usage." The report concluded with this: "Despite the complexity of [Petitioner's] problems, he has the capacity to improve his functioning and [to] become a productive member of society." According to Petitioner, if Trial Counsel had read the 1988 Reports, he would have asked for a trial continuance so he could investigate the information in those Reports. A more thorough investigation would have revealed a childhood that was anything but perfect. b. To show what Petitioner's childhood was really like, and what a more thorough investigation would have turned up, Petitioner presented affidavits from seven people to the State Habeas Court. Notably, three of the seven witnesses also testified during the penalty phase. We focus on the testimony of those three and summarize the testimony of the other four. Lorraine Goodman said in her affidavit that the great-aunt and great-uncle were "overly protective" of Petitioner and "smothered him." She suggested that the Thomases did not let Petitioner play with other children and kept him isolated from the outside world. During the penalty phase of the trial, Ms. Goodman said she was unaware of Petitioner getting into any trouble while living with the Thomases. She also said they took Petitioner to church regularly, and she thought he was "a respectful young man" when he was living with the Thomases. Finally, Ms. Goodman said that she heard Petitioner testify that he had an "idyllic childhood" with the Thomases-she never suggested during the penalty phase that Petitioner did not in fact have an ideal childhood. Janet Wyche's affidavit mirrored Ms. Goodman's; she said the Thomases were overly protective of Petitioner and "never wanted [him] to play outside with the other kids." During her testimony at the penalty phase of trial, Ms. Wyche said nothing about Petitioner's childhood or his experience living with the Thomases. Cleveland Thomas, Jr., said in his affidavit that Petitioner's great-uncle "drank." He also said that he has "always believed that something traumatic happened to [Petitioner]" because Petitioner's attitude about school changed "all of a sudden" before Petitioner was a teenager. This was just something that Mr. Thomas "felt"-Petitioner never told him anything of the sort. Nor did Mr. Thomas imply that the Thomases were responsible for this supposed traumatic event. During the penalty phase of the trial, Mr. Thomas did not comment on Petitioner's childhood, other than to say that Petitioner was "nice" and "mannerable" when living with the Thomases. The other four witnesses who submitted affidavits to the State Habeas Court did not testify during the penalty phase. They described Petitioner's childhood and painted a picture that was very different from the one Petitioner painted during his testimony at the penalty phase. We summarize their affidavits below. Petitioner's mother said that Cleveland Thomas was abusive and that he drank a lot. She claimed he yelled at Marie and choked her. She was "terrified" when she found out that Cleveland and Petitioner slept in the same bed while Petitioner was growing up. This terrified her because, in her words, Cleveland was a "child molester"; according to Petitioner's mother, Cleveland molested her when she was a child. Petitioner's mother described a time when Petitioner came to visit her in Washington, D.C. During the visit, she told Petitioner two "things that he was not old enough to handle": (1) the man that Petitioner thought was his father was not actually his father and (2) Cleveland raped her when she was nine months pregnant with him. Finally, one of her friends "forced herself on [Petitioner] and had sex with him" during that visit. Petitioner's aunt called Cleveland "a drinker, a womanizer, and a wife beater." She said he was "a mean, abusive man." She claimed that Marie "worked hard to make things look good from the outside," despite Cleveland's behavior. A neighbor said that she "felt sorry for" Petitioner when they were growing up because "Cleveland was a crazy drunk." The Thomases never let Petitioner do what the other kids were doing, and this neighbor "just knew [Petitioner] was going to grow up with problems because they were so overprotective." She said Petitioner "was not raised normally at all" because "[h]e was not allowed to play with other kids, he slept ... with Cleveland, and he had to deal with Cleveland's drunken, violent episodes." Another neighbor from Petitioner's childhood said that the Thomases "were extremely protective of" Petitioner; they never let him play outside. She described Petitioner's home life as "far from normal" because Cleveland drank and would fight with Marie. "Cleveland was known in our neighborhood as a crazy, violent, and scary drunk," she said. These affidavits were vital to the mental health opinions that Petitioner presented to the State Habeas Court. We now turn to those opinions. c. Petitioner presented affidavits from a clinical psychologist and a psychiatrist to explain how Petitioner's childhood-as described in the lay witness testimony that we just laid out above-affected Petitioner's mental health. First, we consider Dr. David Lisak's (the clinical psychologist) affidavit. Dr. Lisak was asked "to evaluate [Petitioner's] psychological development, with particular focus on the impact of any childhood abuse he may have experienced." Dr. Lisak described Petitioner as "a child, a teenager, and eventually a young man almost torn in two by the quarreling, violent, impulsive and often intoxicated adults who were responsible for raising him." On the one hand, his great-aunt "tried mightily to maintain a façade of normalcy, and to provide [Petitioner] with at least the basics of a normal upbringing." On the other hand, his great-uncle-"a violent alcoholic and womanizer ... [who] terrorized the household with his drunken rages"-"undid her efforts." Dr. Lisak said that Cleveland both "physically assaulted" and "sexually abused" Petitioner. Petitioner "became a pawn in the bitter conflict between his ... mother ... and [the Thomases]." In turn, this conflict "ruptured" Petitioner's understanding of "who he was and what his family members were really like." Dr. Lisak noted Petitioner's visit to Washington, D.C., the visit where his mother told him (1) that his father wasn't who he thought he was, (2) that his great-uncle had raped her, and (3) that his great-uncle was "waging a bitter and nasty war" against her to keep her from Petitioner. During the same visit, Petitioner was raped by his mother's friend. Because of this damage, Petitioner "lived a dual existence": one part of his identity "was molded by Marie" and her "desire for normalcy, while the other part of his identity was that of "a tougher, drug-using and potentially violent youth who was adapted to life on the streets." By the time Petitioner was arrested in 1995, Dr. Lisak said, "the abuse, conflicts, rejection and abandonment that had shaped [Petitioner] had yielded a very fragmented personality." Petitioner "was prone to severe dissociative episodes, a consequence of years of abuse; and he had developed unusual and at times grandiose ideas that struck mental health evaluators as far back as 1988 as being schizophrenic-like." Dr. Lisak said "[t]he lucid [Petitioner] co-existed with these other aspects of his personality, but they remained in conflict." Unable to "integrate these warring aspects of himself," Petitioner's decisions "were impulsive and often highly irrational." Dr. Lisak concluded with this: "[T]here is a continuous thread connecting his family's history of violence and substance abuse to the moment when [Petitioner] was convicted of murder ... and sentenced to death." Next, we consider Dr. Richard Dudley's (the psychiatrist) affidavit. Dr. Dudley "performed a psychiatric evaluation of" Petitioner. Beginning with Petitioner's family medical history, Dr. Dudley noted that "several persons" in Petitioner's mother's family had mental illnesses that can be passed down genetically. Thus, Dr. Dudley concluded, Petitioner "was born ... with a significantly increased risk for the development of similar psychiatric difficulties." In light of all this, and the abusive childhood that Dr. Lisak noted in his affidavit, Dr. Dudley concluded that Petitioner was suffering from a "mental illness ... best described as a Psychotic Disorder NOS,[ ] Depressive Disorder NOS, and Polysubstance Abuse with acute cocaine intoxication" when he committed the murder and when he was sentenced to death. The "psychotic disorder is primarily characterized by delusional thinking of the grandiose and paranoid type." As a result, Petitioner's "perceptions of himself and those around him do not reflect reality," and these delusional perceptions inform his decisions and actions. To explain the substance abuse disorder, Dr. Dudley pointed to Petitioner's "long drug history" that began in his early teens. The drug abuse "seems directly related to the abuse and trauma" Petitioner experienced during his childhood because "[t]he drugs provided a temporary respite" from these difficulties. Next, Dr. Dudley compared his diagnosis to the diagnosis made by Dr. Bailey-Smith and Dr. Fahey. (As we explain below, Dr. Bailey-Smith and Dr. Fahey evaluated Petitioner before trial to see whether he was competent to stand trial and to analyze his level of responsibility.) As Dr. Dudley put it, Dr. Bailey-Smith and Dr. Fahey diagnosed Petitioner with "personality disorder NOS with antisocial, borderline, narcissistic, and schizotypal features and rule[d] out Bipolar Disorder." Dr. Dudley said that "[t]he constellation of symptoms [they] described ... and used to support [their] diagnosis [was] similar to what [he] ... identified and used to make [his] diagnosis." But, "because the information from collateral sources about [Petitioner's] history is far more detailed now [in 2001] than it was in 1997," Dr. Dudley "believe[d] that the diagnosis ... [he] made better fit[ ] the symptoms described." Finally, Dr. Dudley considered the role that Petitioner's mental state played in the murder: [I]t is my opinion that [Petitioner's] mental capacity at the time of the offense may have been substantially diminished. He suffered from delusional thinking, was depressed, was on cocaine, and the convergence of these three disorders made him prone to even further deterioration in stressful situations, such as during a robbery. While I do not believe that he was under a delusional compulsion or could not understand right from wrong, there is a strong possibility that at the time of the offense, [Petitioner's] mental capacity was substantially diminished. 2. In response, the State contested both prongs of Strickland . Because we decide the Mitigation Claim under the prejudice prong, we focus on that part of the State's evidence. To show that Petitioner was not prejudiced by Trial Counsel's alleged deficiencies-especially those related to presenting evidence about Petitioner's mental health-the State called Dr. Bailey-Smith to testify at the evidentiary hearing before the State Habeas Court. Before delving into her testimony at the evidentiary hearing, we first explain her connection to Petitioner's case. a. Dr. Bailey Smith and Dr. Fahey examined Petitioner in December of 1996. The judge, who would preside over Petitioner's murder trial, asked the doctors to assess (1) whether Petitioner was competent to stand trial and (2) Petitioner's degree of criminal responsibility at the time of the murder. The doctors found that Petitioner was "in touch with reality" and concluded "that intelligence was not a significant issue in th[e] case." But they still decided to test Petitioner's intelligence to gauge "current functioning." The test showed that Petitioner was "functioning in the Average range of intellectual abilities." Next, the doctors gave Petitioner two personality tests. His answers to one test were suggestive of someone "with significant psychopathology." People with profiles like Petitioner's "generally appear boastful and egocentric"; while they might "exaggerate their self-worth, their self-concept is actually quite poor." They noted that people with this type of profile may daydream and fantasize in response to stress. As for Petitioner, the doctors said "this appears to take the form of magical thinking. ... [Petitioner] thinks he is unique and special, and ordained for a special purpose. He believes he has unique and special powers which can impact and often directly influence other's thinking and behavior, and consequently, the outcome of some situations." Next, the doctors made a diagnosis: they ruled out bipolar disorder and diagnosed him with "Personality Disorder NOS with antisocial, borderline, narcissistic, and schizotypal features." Finally, the doctors considered Petitioner's competency to stand trial. They said he had "the verbal skills" to work with his lawyer and the "conceptual skills" to weigh the strengths and weaknesses of his case. The doctors did point out that Petitioner seemed uninterested in using all his skills to help his lawyer; they said this lack of interest stemmed from his "lack of confidence in his attorney and the legal system" and from his belief that he is a "special" person. Petitioner didn't show the level of anxiety that they expected someone is his position to show, and this was because Petitioner thought a "higher power" would "ultimately intervene," even if he were found guilty. In turn, Petitioner did not think a death sentence was a realistic possibility, which the doctors said was problematic because he "may understand on a cognitive, but not on a motivational level, the gravity of his situation." As for the second question-Petitioner's degree of criminal responsibility at the time of the murder-the doctors concluded that "[a]lthough [Petitioner] indicated that he was experiencing a high level of distress, there [was] no evidence that he was suffering from a delusional compulsion at the time of the alleged offense. [Petitioner's] behavior at the time of the alleged offense also indicate[d] he had the ability to distinguish right from wrong." Dr. Bailey-Smith and Dr. Fahey did not have access to the 1988 Reports when they evaluated Petitioner in 1996. b. At the evidentiary hearing, the State used Dr. Bailey-Smith's testimony to rebut the 1988 Reports and the affidavits from Dr. Lisak and Dr. Dudley. First, the State showed Dr. Bailey-Smith the 1988 Reports and asked whether they caused her to "change any of [her] conclusions" about Petitioner. She answered no and said she did not "think the results [of her evaluations and testing] would have been any different." Next, the State showed Dr. Bailey-Smith the affidavits from Dr. Lisak and Dr. Dudley. The State asked whether the affidavits were "written in the typical fashion of psychological reports in the community that [Dr. Bailey-Smith] [was] in." She said no and elaborated: I've seen so many in this style I would have to say. They look like they were written for defense's viewpoint. They are more hypothetical, they are more creating-going back and trying to reconstruct the history and create a path of causation, this is what caused this, this is what caused this. Not what psychologists generally do when they do a psychological [report] .... These look more like someone is trying to reconstruct history and describe a person's life and put it almost in a very clean box like this happened and this is what this person felt and this is what happened next. ... [G]enerally most psychologists wouldn't feel as comfortable assigning causation based on a particular feeling .... I couldn't tell you why you acted the way you did yesterday with any degree of certainty. I don't think any psychologist could. We could tell you some factors that might have led to your behavior yesterday. We couldn't tell you the exact factors that caused that. These reports concern me a little bit in that they are going back many, many years and assigning a certain feeling and then saying that feeling caused this behavior and that the psychologist writing this is not hypothesizing [and instead] ... is certain .... And that's really out of our realm of scientific certainty. We can't do it that well. The State then directed Dr. Bailey-Smith to Dr. Dudley's opinion that Petitioner's "mental illness is best described as a psychotic disorder NOS," "primarily characterized by delusional thinking of the grandiose and paranoid type." The State asked Dr. Bailey-Smith whether she saw "any evidence that [Petitioner] had delusional thinking or fixed delusions at the time of the crime or during [her] evaluation." She said she and Dr. Fahey did think that Petitioner had some thought patterns that "were different and bordered delusional thinking" during their evaluations, but the doctors did not think Petitioner had any actual "delusional thoughts ... during the time of the crime or during [the] evaluation." Dr. Bailey-Smith agreed that Petitioner had no "fixed delusions" and said they "did not think it went to the level that he was not in touch with reality or didn't know it was real." Instead, "It was more some odd thought patterns, but [they] never thought [Petitioner] was delusional when [they] talked to him. He was very coherent and very logical and very intelligent when [they] talked to him." B. The parties did not present evidence on the Shackles Claim at the evidentiary hearing. Instead, the State Habeas Court relied on the transcript of the penalty phase. Petitioner argued that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the shackling and, as a result, he was prejudiced during the penalty phase. He also said the Supreme Court's decision in Deck v. Missouri , 544 U.S. 622, 125 S. Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005), "strongly supports [his] position." He claimed that-because shackling is inherently prejudicial-"by definition" he was prejudiced due to Trial Counsel's failure to object. The State argued that Petitioner was not prejudiced. It pointed to the jury's short deliberation before recommending death (90 minutes) and the overwhelming evidence at trial. It also argued that Deck , which was decided several years after Petitioner's trial, did not apply. C. The State Habeas Court denied relief. Whatley , slip op. at 63. It held that Petitioner could not show prejudice on any of his three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the Court held that Petitioner was not prejudiced by Trial Counsel's failure to discover evidence of abuse that he allegedly experienced as a child. Id. at 48-49. It noted that the lay witness "affidavit testimony ... was either cumulative ... , of questionable mitigating value, biased in contradiction of the mitigation strategy ... at trial ... or of other testimony presented ... at [the evidentiary] hearing or ... during the [penalty] phase, or [was] speculative." Id. at 49. Second, the Court held that Petitioner was not prejudiced by Trial Counsel's failure to examine the 1988 Reports or by his failure to ask Caseworker Watson what the Reports revealed. Id. at 35. The Court found, "as a matter of fact," that the 1988 Reports "contained information that was just as potentially harmful to Petitioner's case as it was potentially helpful." Id. For example, one report said that Petitioner showed no remorse for the robbery crime and instead showed only embarrassment for not acting smarter than he did. Id. The Court also discounted the report that said Petitioner was "experiencing a mental breakdown" and needed intense psychotherapy. Id. It did so because that report's author didn't actually diagnose Petitioner with a psychological disorder and because the report noted that Petitioner thought he could get away with anything because he could outsmart others. Id. Third, the Court held that Petitioner was not prejudiced by Trial Counsel's failure to hire a mental health expert who would echo Dr. Lisak's and Dr. Dudley's testimony that Petitioner was suffering from a major mental illness at the time of the murder. Id. at 49. The Court found that most of Dr. Lisak's and Dr. Dudley's conclusions were "speculative, at best." Id. And "their finding, some years later, that 'Petitioner was delusional and out of touch with reality at the time of his crimes' upon which their ultimate findings were largely based was refuted by Dr. Bailey-Smith's testimony." Id. Finally, the State Habeas Court found that Petitioner was not prejudiced by Trial Counsel's failure to object to his wearing visible shackles during the penalty phase. See id. at 21. The Court pointed out that the jury had already convicted him of malice murder (without knowing that he was wearing shackles), and the jury was aware of his escapee status. Id. IV. Petitioner appealed the State Habeas Court's denial of relief to the Supreme Court of Georgia. On the Mitigation Claim, Petitioner argued that Trial Counsel failed to investigate and present a mitigation strategy. Petitioner specifically mentioned Caseworker Watson, and he argued that Trial Counsel failed to even look at Watson's file. Had he looked, Trial Counsel would have discovered the information about Petitioner's family and the prior mental evaluations, all of which was presented to the State Habeas Court. Petitioner argued that he was prejudiced by this lackluster investigation during the penalty phase. Rather than presenting Petitioner as someone who came from a "good strong family," Trial Counsel would have told the jury about the abuse Petitioner suffered as a child and the mental problems Petitioner had, if only Trial Counsel had done a reasonable investigation. That type of testimony, according to Petitioner, would have convinced one juror to spare his life. As we explain in more detail below, the Supreme Court of Georgia assumed Trial Counsel performed deficiently and considered all of the mitigating evidence that Petitioner presented. See Whatley v. Terry , 284 Ga. 555, 668 S.E.2d 651, 659-63 (2008). It then weighed the mitigating evidence against all of the evidence that would be presented if the penalty phase were retried. See id. It held that Petitioner was not prejudiced by Trial Counsel's deficient performance. Id. at 659. Moving to the Shackles Claim, Petitioner argued that Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not objecting to his shackles. The Court again assumed that Trial Counsel performed deficiently and held that Petitioner did not show Strickland prejudice. See id. at 663. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, but it denied his petition for writ of certiorari. Whatley v. Terry , 556 U.S. 1248, 129 S. Ct. 2409, 173 L.Ed.2d 1316 (2009) (mem.). V. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court. The petition raised several claims, including the Mitigation Claim and the Shackles Claim now before us. The Court granted relief on the Mitigation Claim. Whatley v. Upton , No. 3:09-CV-0074-WSD, 2013 WL 1431649, at *34 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 9, 2013). It explained that even though Trial Counsel knew Petitioner had "prior psychological evaluations" and "a troubled upbringing," Trial Counsel "chose not to pursue" this information. Id. at *26. Thus, according to the District Court, Trial Counsel did not reasonably investigate Petitioner's "background and mental and psychological health," id. , and Trial Counsel's deficient investigation prejudiced Petitioner during the penalty phase, id. at *34. The District Court denied relief on the Shackles Claim. Id. at *39. It found that Trial Counsel "could have had a number of valid reasons for declining to object to his client being seen in restraints during the penalty phase." Id. at *38. Thus, the District Court found that Trial Counsel was not ineffective. Id. Alternatively, the Court found that even if Trial Counsel were ineffective, Petitioner was not prejudiced. Id. at *39. VI. The State appeals the District Court's decision granting the writ on the Mitigation Claim. Petitioner cross-appeals the Court's decision denying his Shackles Claim. We set out the standard of review and then consider each claim separately. A. Our review is constrained by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"): Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant a habeas corpus application with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), unless the state court's decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, § 2254(d)(1). Johnson v. Upton , 615 F.3d 1318, 1329 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Berghuis v. Thompkins , 560 U.S. 370, 380, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) ). Here, we apply AEDPA and ask (1) whether the Supreme Court of Georgia's decisions were "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined" in Strickland , see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or (2) whether the Supreme Court of Georgia's decisions were "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding," id. § 2254(d)(2). In answering these questions, we keep two points in mind. First, "[a] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado , 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004) ). Second, we "presume[ ]" that the state court's findings of fact are correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). So, if Petitioner challenges state court rulings that rest on findings of fact, he must overcome two hurdles. One, he must rebut the presumption of correctness that attaches to findings of fact, and he must do so with "clear and convincing evidence." Id. Two, he must overcome the deference that we give to the state court's legal decision under § 2254(d). To succeed on an ineffective assistance claim under Strickland , Petitioner must show (1) that his trial "counsel's performance was deficient" and (2) that it "prejudiced [his] defense." 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Petitioner satisfies the second element only if he shows there is "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. "It is not enough 'to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.' " Richter , 562 U.S. at 104, 131 S. Ct. at 787 (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067 ). Instead, "[c]ounsel's errors must be 'so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.' " Id. , 131 S. Ct. at 787-88 (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ). B. With these principles in hand, we consider each claim separately. 1. First, we address the State's appeal of the District Court's decision granting habeas relief on the Mitigation Claim. The District Court refused to defer to the Supreme Court of Georgia's decision-which it resolved under Strickland 's prejudice prong-on the Mitigation Claim. Whatley , 2013 WL 1431649, at *34. To decide whether the District Court erred, we begin with the exact version of the claim that Petitioner presented-in his briefing-to the Supreme Court of Georgia. In his brief to the Supreme Court of Georgia, Petitioner criticized the way Trial Counsel portrayed his childhood: "At trial, [Trial] [C]ounsel told the jury in closing argument that [Petitioner] came from a 'good strong family.' " "Had counsel done a reasonable investigation, h