Carlton Energy Group, LLC v. Phillips (369 S.W.3d 433, 2012)

OPINION

TERRY JENNINGS, Justice.

Appellant/cross-appellee, Carlton Energy Group, LLC (“Carlton”), challenges the trial court’s judgment, entered after Carlton accepted the trial court’s suggested remittitur of the jury’s actual damages award in lieu of a new trial, in Carlton’s suit against appellees/cross-appellants, Gene E. Phillips, individually and doing business as Phillips Oil Interests L.L.C. (“Phillips”), EurEnergy Resources Corporation, formerly known as EurEnergy Resources LLC (“EurEnergy”), Syntek West, Inc. (“Syntek”), and CabelTel International Corporation (“CabelTel”) for tor-tious interference with contract and breach of contract. In three issues, Carlton contends that the trial court erred in “suggesting a remittitur to $31.16 million in actual damages when factually-sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding of actual damages of $66.5 million or, alternatively at least $38 million”; setting aside the jury’s alter ego findings against Syn-tek and CabelTel; and not imposing joint and several liability on Phillips for the exemplary damages awarded against Eu-rEnergy “when the jury found Phillips responsible for EurEnergy’s conduct.”

In their cross-appeal, Phillips and Eu-rEnergy, in their first six issues, contend that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s award of $31.16 million in actual damages; the jury’s finding that Phillips and EurEn-ergy tortiously interfered with Carlton’s contract with CBM Energy Limited (“CBM”); the jury’s awards of exemplary damages against Phillips and EurEnergy; the jury’s finding that Phillips breached his contract with Carlton; the jury’s awards of attorney’s fees to Carlton; and the jury’s finding that EurEnergy is Phillips’s alter ego. In their seventh issue, Phillips and EurEnergy contend that the trial court’s “erroneous admission of voluminous, irrelevant evidence about Phillips-related companies was harmful and prejudicial” and requires a new trial.

We affirm in part and reverse and render in part.

Background

On October 4, 2000, CBM entered into an agreement with the government of the country of Bulgaria (the “Bulgaria/CBM concession”) permitting CBM to conduct exploration and prospecting for natural gas on a large parcel of land located within that country (the “Bulgaria Project”). The Bulgaria/CBM concession provided CBM with an initial term of three years to conduct the prescribed exploration and the possibility of two extension periods of no more than two years each. The Bulgaria/CBM concession also defined CBM’s “minimum work obligations,” which included the drilling of one exploratory well, which, if successful, would require the drilling of two additional wells.

On April 25, 2008, CBM, in need of financing to satisfy its obligations under the Bulgaria/CBM concession, entered into a letter agreement with Carlton (the “CBM/Carlton agreement”) under which Carlton, in exchange for making, pursuant to a schedule, three tranches of funding totaling $8 million, would acquire, incrementally, a 48% interest in the Bulgaria Project. Upon “actual[ ] funding]” of the first tranche of $1.25 million, which was to be applied to cover the costs for drilling the first well, as well as other incidental costs, Carlton would acquire a 7.5% interest in the Bulgaria Project. Additionally, upon the actual funding of the first tranche, the “arrangement” between CBM and Carlton would become “exclusive.” Carlton would then have three months to “actually fund” the second tranche of $1.5 million, which was to be applied to cover the costs of two additional wells. Carlton would then have one year after the date of the second tranche to “actually fund” the remainder of its $8 million financing commitment.

In 2004, Bulgaria, by way of an annex to the Bulgaria/CBM concession, granted CBM a two-year extension of the Bulgaria Project. In turn, on April 18, 2004, CBM and Carlton amended the CBM/Carlton agreement so that upon Carlton’s “actually fund[ing]” of a first tranche of $900,000, Carlton would be entitled to a 5.4% interest in the Bulgaria Project and, as with the original agreement, the “arrangement” between CBM and Carlton would become “exclusive.” Carlton would then have three months to “actually fund” the second tranche of $1.85 million and one year after the date of the second tranche to “actually fund” the remainder of its $8 million financing commitment. The CBM/Carlton agreement, as amended, further provided that it would not become effective until “actual funding” of the first tranche and “actual funding” would occur if Carlton funded $300,000 in cash and a $600,000 letter of credit. Carlton presented evidence that CBM subsequently agreed to an oral modification of the terms regarding the second tranche, and the jury specifically found that CBM had “agree[d] that the timing of the second tranche of funding ($1,850,000) would take place within 90 days of the funding of the initial tranche or 30 days after receipt of logs for the initial well, whichever date was later.” Phillips and EurEnergy disputed that such an oral amendment was ever made, or could have been made, and they asserted that Carlton was not entitled to an additional 30-day period to review the logs from the initial well before making the second tranche.

On April 27, 2004, Carlton, with funds provided by investor Robert Assil, furnished the $600,000 letter of credit, and it is undisputed that this letter of credit was sufficient to extend the Bulgaria/CBM concession to 2005. Subsequently, on July 20, 2004, Carlton, with funds provided by investor Kenneth Scholz, transferred the remaining $300,000 in its attempt to satisfy the first tranche of funding prescribed in the amended CBM/Carlton agreement. At trial, Carlton asserted that it had satisfied its first tranche obligation and, thus, it earned its “vested” 5.4% interest in the Bulgaria Project and obtained its right to fund the second tranche. Phillips and Eu-rEnergy disputed this and emphasized that on July 27, 2004, after receiving the $300,000 wire transfer, CBM sent Carlton a. letter in which it noted that it would not agree to certain restrictions placed by Scholz on the $300,000 payment. In the letter, CBM noted that Carlton’s funding obligations were “absolute,” the parties had not contemplated “partial funding,” the wire transfer did “not constitute performance,” and CBM would not agree to an extension for Carlton to make the second tranche. Carlton presented evidence that, despite this letter, it and CBM subsequently conducted themselves as if Carlton had satisfied the first tranche of funding.

Believing that it had satisfied the first tranche of funding, Carlton, in the course of seeking additional resources to fund its remaining obligations, came into contact with Phillips. In the summer of 2004, Carlton, in a proposed letter agreement, offered Phillips the right to acquire a “10% working interest” in the Bulgaria Project in exchange for $8.5 million. Carlton was to use the cash infusion to fulfill its funding obligations under the CBM/Carlton agreement, and its 48% interest in the Bulgaria Project would be reduced to 38% with Phillips’s acquisition from Carlton of the 10% interest. On August 23, 2004, Phillips signed the letter agreement (the “Carlton/Phillips agreement”) with an “addendum” that provided that Phillips would “have a 30 day period to review all documentation and technical information in connection with [the Bulgaria Project]” and “[i]f for any reason” he was “not satisfied with [his] investigation then [he would] withdraw from this agreement.”

Carlton, at trial, contended that its chairman and managing director, T.C. O’Dell, signed and accepted Phillips’s counteroffer and, thus, it formed a contractual relationship with Phillips. O’Dell testified that he signed the Carlton/Phillips agreement with Phillips’s addendum “shortly” after receiving it from Phillips, and Carlton introduced a fully executed copy of it into evidence. O’Dell explained that Carlton, pursuant to ordinary procedures, would have sent a fully executed copy of the Carlton/Phillips agreement to Phillips, but he conceded that Carlton did not possess a record of having sent a copy to Phillips.

The undisputed evidence presented at trial demonstrates that Phillips, in September 2004, shortly after he had signed the Carlton/Phillips agreement, met with Carlton representatives, including O’Dell, regarding the Bulgaria Project. Nevertheless, Phillips testified that he had never received notice that Carlton had accepted the terms of what he described as his “counteroffer” and, thus, he had never formed a contractual relationship with Carlton.

Phillips did not provide to Carlton any funding pursuant to the Carlton/Phillips agreement. And Carlton presented evidence that during the fall of 2004, when it was providing Phillips with technical information about the Bulgaria Project, Phillips and his representatives, without Carlton’s knowledge, were in direct contact with CBM about the Bulgaria Project. Carlton contended that this evidence demonstrates that Phillips, beginning in the early fall of 2004, was taking steps to supplant Carlton in the Bulgaria Project “by secretly dealing with CBM.” Phillips countered with evidence that he withdrew from the Carlton/Phillips agreement for business reasons. According to Phillips, he “quickly became disenchanted with Carlton” and O’Dell during his “due diligence efforts” and, by mid-November 2004, he had already informed a Carlton broker that he had no interest in working with Carlton. On December 3, 2004, Phillips sent Carlton a letter in which he stated that because of “tight time constraints,” he was “unable to make a determination to participate in this venture,” and he declined “to go forward with any proposed transaction.”

On February 10, 2005, EurEnergy, a company which was later revealed to be connected to Phillips, sent CBM a letter outlining the details of a joint development agreement between EurEnergy and CBM regarding the Bulgaria Project. CBM agreed, upon EurEnergy’s funding, to declare Carlton in default of the CBM/Carlton agreement and return Carlton’s investment. EurEnergy agreed to “replace” the $600,000 letter of credit that had been posted by Carlton and indemnify CBM in any future legal proceedings brought against it by Carlton. EurEnergy and CBM, on February 11, 2005, executed a joint development agreement (the “CBM/EurEnergy JDA”), in which CBM acknowledged that it needed financing for the Bulgaria Project and EurEnergy agreed to fund at least $6.5 million in exchange for a conditional 60% interest in the Bulgaria Project.

CBM, on February 25, 2005, in satisfaction of its agreement with EurEnergy, sent Carlton a notice stating that Carlton’s “material breach of the critical funding terms,” including Carlton’s failure to make the second tranche, forced it to seek reliable financing for the Bulgaria Project. CBM offered to remit to Carlton the $900,000 it had funded, but only if Carlton would acknowledge that it had no further interest in the Bulgaria Project.

CBM and EurEnergy’s relationship subsequently soured, and litigation between CBM and EurEnergy ensued. In May 2006, Phillips, on behalf of EurEnergy, signed a settlement agreement of its suit against CBM, and EurEnergy reaffirmed its obligations and liabilities to CBM “concerning the Carlton matter.” Subsequently, Bulgaria terminated the Bulgaria/CBM concession.

In December 2006, Carlton sued Phillips and EurEnergy, along with several other Phillips-related entities, including CabelTel and Syntek, that Carlton alleged were involved in tortious conduct and breach of contract. Specifically, Carlton alleged that Phillips had breached the Carlton/Phillips agreement, Phillips and EurEnergy had tortiously interfered with the CBM/Carlton agreement, and CabelTel and Syntek were alter egos of EurEnergy.

After a lengthy trial, the jury, in regard to Carlton’s breach-of-contract claim, found that Carlton and Phillips entered into the Carlton/Phillips agreement; Carlton agreed to the terms, including those set forth in Phillips’s addendum, before receiving a December 3, 2004 letter from Phillips in which he declined participation with Carlton in the Bulgaria Project; Phillips did not send his December 3, 2004 letter in compliance with the terms of the addendum, i.e., the provision providing Phillips 30 days to review documentation and technical information; Phillips failed to comply with the Carlton/Phillips agreement; and Phillips’s failure to comply was not excused. In regard to damages, the trial court instructed the jury to award damages for “[t]he fair market value” of Carlton’s “interest in the project, if any, at the time of the failure to comply,” and the jury found that Phillips’s failure to comply caused Carlton $66.5 million in actual damages.

In regard to Carlton’s tortious-interference claim, the jury found that Carlton had complied with the provision in the CBM/Carlton agreement requiring Carlton to “actually fund[]” the initial $900,000; CBM and Carlton had agreed that the timing of the second payment of $1.85 million “would take place within 90 days of the funding of the initial tranche or 30 days after receipt of logs for the initial well, whichever date was later”; CBM failed to comply with the CBM/Carlton agreement; Phillips and EurEnergy intentionally interfered with the CBM/Carlton agreement; neither Phillips nor EurEner-gy had a “good faith belief’ that it had the right to interfere with the CBM/Carlton agreement; and, by clear and convincing evidence, the harm caused by Phillips and EurEnergy to Carlton resulted from malice. The jury found that Phillips and Eu-rEnergy’s interference caused Carlton $66.5 million in actual damages; Phillips was “responsible for the conduct of ... EurEnergy”; and CabelTel and Syntek were the alter egos of EurEnergy.

The trial court then conducted the exemplary-damages phase of trial, after which the jury assessed $8.5 million in exemplary damages against Phillips and $8.5 million in exemplary damages against EurEnergy. The parties then tried the issue of attorney’s fees to the court, and the trial court found that Carlton was entitled to $9,954,000 in attorney’s fees for trial, $750,000 in attorney’s fees in the event of an appeal to the court of appeals, and $250,000 for attorney’s fees in the event of an appeal to the Texas Supreme Court.

Carlton moved for judgment on the jury verdict, and Phillips, EurEnergy, Cabel-Tel, and Syntek moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Syntek and Cabel-Tel, concluding that there is no evidence to support the jury’s alter ego findings. The trial court, sua sponte, determined that the jury’s actual damages award of $66.5 million for breach of contract and tortious interference is not supported by factually-sufficient evidence and suggested a remit-titur to $31.16 million. Carlton accepted the remittitur, but reserved its right to appeal.

In its final judgment, the trial court awarded Carlton $31.16 million in actual damages on its tortious-interference claim against Phillips and EurEnergy, jointly and severally, and assessed exemplary damages against Phillips and EurEnergy in the amount of $8.5 million each, severally-

Tortious Interference

In their second issue in their cross-appeal, Phillips and EurEnergy argue that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding that Phillips and EurEnergy tortiously interfered with the CBM/Carlton agreement because Carlton had no valid contract with CBM as Carlton had forfeited any interest it held under the CBM/Carlton agreement, CBM did not fail to comply with the CBM/Carlton agreement, there was no valid oral modification to the CBM/Carlton agreement, Phillips and EurEnergy did not intend to wrongfully interfere with any such agreement, and Phillips and EurEn-ergy’s alleged interference was based on their “good-faith exercise of colorable rights.”

In order to recover damages on a claim for tortious interference with a contract, a plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a contract subject to interference; (2) a willful and intentional act of interference with the contract; (3) the interference proximately caused the plaintiffs injury; and (4) actual damages or loss. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fin. Review Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex.2000).

We will sustain a legal-sufficiency or “no-evidence” challenge if the record shows one of the following: (1) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (2) rules of law or evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Tex.2005). In conducting a legal-sufficiency review, a “court must consider evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it.” Id. at 822. The term “inference” means,

In the law of evidence, a truth or proposition drawn from another which is supposed or admitted to be true. A process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition sought to be established is deduced as a logical consequence from other facts, or a state of facts, already proved....

Marshall Field Stores, Inc. v. Gardiner, 859 S.W.2d 391, 400 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (citing Black’s Law Dictionaky 700 (5th ed. 1979)). For a jury to infer a fact, “it must be able to deduce that fact as a logical consequence from other proven facts.” Id.

If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the challenged finding, we must uphold it. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex.1998). “ ‘[W]hen the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, the evidence is no more than a scintilla and, in legal effect, is no evidence.’ ” Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex.2004) (quoting Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex.1983)). However, if the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions, then jurors must be allowed to do so. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 822; see also King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex.2003). “A reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trier-of-faet, so long as the evidence falls within this zone of reasonable disagreement.” City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 822.

In conducting a factual-sufficiency review, we must consider, weigh, and examine all of the evidence which supports and which is contrary to the jury’s determination. Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex.1989). Because Carlton, not Phillips and EurEn-ergy, had the burden to prove liability at trial, we may set aside the jury’s verdict only if the evidence that supports the verdict is so weak as to make the verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986).

In regard to Phillips and EurEnergy’s primary argument that Carlton had no valid contract with CBM because Carlton had failed to comply with the funding provisions of the CBM/Carlton agreement, we note that Phillips and EurEnergy did not challenge the trial court’s instruction to the jury. Also, the record reveals evidence demonstrating Carlton’s compliance, CBM’s conduct consistent with Carlton’s compliance, and Carlton and CBM’s modification of certain terms in the CBM/Carlton agreement.

The jury found that Carlton complied with the requirement in the CBM/Carlton agreement that it “actually fund[ ]” the $900,000 first tranche with a $800,000 cash payment and a $600,000 letter of credit, which then created between CBM and Carlton an “exclusive arrangement” with which Phillips and EurEnergy interfered. The evidence supports the jury’s finding. It is undisputed that Carlton furnished CBM a $600,000 letter of credit, which, accepted by CBM, extended the Bulgaria/CBM concession. Carlton also funded the $800,000 cash portion of the tranche with the wire transfer of an investor, Kenneth Scholz.

It is true that Scholz included some restrictions with his $300,000 payment beyond the contemplation of the CBM/Carlton agreement. And CBM did object to these restrictions in its July 27, 2004 letter. However, Carlton, in August 2004, responded to CBM by letter, noting that the funds had been transferred, the restrictions placed by Scholz were “substantially the same” as those set forth in the CBM/Carlton agreement as amended by a subsequent oral agreement, and Carlton considered the “funding requirement” to have been “fully complied with.” Carlton explained that CBM had previously agreed, albeit orally, to allow Carlton a 30-day period to review the logs from the initial well before making the second tranche. Carlton also noted that although Scholz had requested a 45-day period to review the logs, he had since consented to the 30-day period to comport with Carlton and CBM’s oral agreement already in place.

Significantly, Carlton presented evidence that it and CBM had continued to operate under the CBM/Carlton agreement as modified. CBM retained the entire first tranche, including the $300,000 wire transfer, for almost one year. Indeed, CBM used the $600,000 letter of credit to extend the Bulgaria/CBM concession, and it did not provide Carlton with any notice of default until February 25, 2005, after it had executed the CBM/Eu-rEnergy JDA. Carlton also presented evidence that CBM, Phillips, and EurEnergy had themselves concluded that Carlton had “actually fund[ed]” the first tranche of $900,000 and had acquired a 5.4% interest in the Bulgaria Project. In fact, in the February 10, 2005 letter from EurEnergy to CBM, EurEnergy agreed to “replace” the $600,000 letter of credit that Carlton had posted. From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably found that Carlton actually funded the first tranche and the CBM/Carlton agreement constituted a valid and enforceable contract, which was subject to interference by Phillips and Eu-rEnergy.

In regard to the modifications to the CBM/Carlton agreement, the trial court instructed the jury as follows,

The Letter Agreement between Carlton Energy Group and Phillips and the Letter Agreements as amended between [Carlton] and CBM contain provisions which state that the agreements cannot be orally modified or amended and that any amendment or modification must be in writing and signed by both parties. These provisions in a contract can be waived.

The Letter Agreements as amended between [Carlton] and CBM contains a non-waiver clause (Paragraph 16g). This provision in a contract may be waived.

Waiver is an intentional surrender of a known right or intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming the right. Silence or inaction, for so long a period to show an intention to yield the known right, is also enough to prove waiver. If those provisions are waived, the parties may orally agree to other provisions. In deciding whether the parties reached an agreement, you may consider what they said and did in light of the surrounding circumstances, including any earlier course of dealing. You may not consider the parties’ unexpressed thoughts or intentions.

Phillips and EurEnergy did not object to these instructions and do not complain about them on appeal. When there has been no objection to the court’s charge, we assess the legal sufficiency of the evidence according to the instructions given by the trial court to the jury. Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 55 (Tex.2000).

The evidence supports the jury’s implied finding that CBM had waived the no-oral-modification clause and non-waiver clause in the CBM/Carlton agreement. Carlton presented ample evidence that CBM accepted the first tranche, even though the $300,000 cash payment was made subject to certain restrictions, including the restriction that Scholz be provided an additional period of days to review well logs. The evidence also supports the jury’s finding that Carlton and CBM had agreed that Carlton’s second tranche of funding could be made within 90 days of the funding of the first tranche or 30 days after receipt of the well logs, whichever date was later.

Carlton also presented evidence that CBM had failed to comply with the CBM/Carlton agreement when, after accepting the first tranche and after modifying the timing requirement for the second tranche, CBM declared Carlton in default and sought to “replace” Carlton with Eu-rEnergy. And Carlton presented evidence that Phillips and EurEnergy intentionally interfered with the CBM/Carlton agreement and neither Phillips nor EurEnergy had a good faith belief that they had a right to do so.

On August 23, 2004, Phillips signed the Carlton/Phillips agreement under which Phillips, in exchange for $8.5 million, would acquire a 10% interest in the Bulgaria Project. Phillips, in an addendum that was subsequently agreed to by Carlton, requested 30 days to review documents and “technical information” and the right to withdraw. In September 2004, Phillips met with Carlton representatives to review some of this information, and the jury was presented evidence that would have entitled it to reasonably conclude that Carlton had shared information with Phillips during the fall of 2004 pursuant to the Carlton/Phillips agreement. The jury was also presented with evidence that, during this same time frame, and unbeknownst to Carlton, Phillips had acquired from Dr. Henry Crichlow, a registered professional engineer, two reports on the Bulgaria Project.

In a June 28, 2004 memorandum report on the “Bulgaria Coalbed Methane (CBM) Project,” Dr. Crichlow suggested that the Bulgaria Project was a “valuable international prospect.” And, in his second report, an October 11, 2004 “interim due-diligence report on the 108,000 acre Coal Bed Methane Project in ... Bulgaria for Mr. Gene Phillips et al,” Crichlow encouraged Phillips to send Carlton a withdrawal letter and obtain “[ljegal advice ... regarding the supplanting of the Carlton Energy position with the Phillips Group under the same 48% interest position” held by Carlton. Crichlow, who had met with the principals of Raven Ridge Resources (“RRR”), a consulting company involved in energy resource assessment, to discuss the “administrative, commercial, political, engineering and operational aspects” of the Bulgaria Project, urged that,

A partnership with CBM is highly recommended considering the quality and experience of the ownership and management. RRR and CBM have been involved in this project for over six years. It is very unusual to have the amount of data available for a project of this type and the extreme enthusiasm for success that was expressed by the principals of such a highly respected industry leader such as Raven Ridge Resources. These factors greatly reduce the investment risk in this type of project.

Crichlow also suggested that any deal directly between CBM and Phillips “be based on CBM declaring Carlton in default of their original contract.” Crichlow cautioned that “[c]are should be taken” to avoid “potential Phillips Group liability for ‘tortious interference’ directed at Phillips [ ] for the termination of the contract between CBM and Carlton.” From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Phillips willfully planned to cut Carlton out of what all the parties believed at the time to be an extremely lucrative deal.

Carlton also presented evidence that Phillips, in the fall of 2004, had direct contact with CBM, and substantial documentary evidence reveals that he, as early as October 2004, was contemplating a “possible cash settlement” with Carlton in an effort to remove it from any involvement in the Bulgaria Project. Notes and documents that were obtained from CBM and introduced into evidence also reveal that Phillips, during this time frame, had provided CBM with assurances that he would support CBM in potential litigation involving Carlton. CBM’s lawyer testified at trial that he was “concerned” that the direct negotiations between Phillips and CBM could have been interfering with the contract between Carlton and Phillips. In November 2004, CBM’s lawyer specifically asked Phillips if there was a contract between Phillips and Carlton, and, according to these documents, Phillips represented that they had no contract. Also, in November 2004, CBM’s lawyer sent to a Phillips-related entity a letter in which he detailed the competing interests in the Bulgaria Project. In regard to the “current relationship with Carlton,” CBM stated that it and the Phillips-related entity needed to “establish a joint position on any position Carlton may have, and whether it’s advantageous to approach Carlton to either return its partial funding to date (including replacing the letter of credit) and perhaps allocating some consideration to Carlton for its partial performance to date.” CBM also noted that the Phillips-related entity had advised CBM that it would “support (including financially) CBM in any possible dispute which may arise of out of Carlton’s misinterpretation of its position” in the Bulgaria Project. Thus, the jury was presented with evidence that both Phillips and CBM were pursuing a course of action for which they anticipated the possibility of legal liability to Carlton.

On December 3, 2004, at the same time that Phillips was in direct contact with CBM about the Bulgaria Project, Phillips sent Carlton a letter in which he represented that he had not been aware that Carlton faced “time constraints” in regard to the Bulgaria Project, but because of these “tight time constraints,” he was unable to make a determination to participate in this venture and he declined “to go forward with any proposed transaction” with Carlton. Despite Phillips’s representations in his withdrawal letter, Phillips and CBM continued their direct negotiations, which included their shared “handling” of what they referred to as the Carlton “situation.” A Phillips representative stated in a December 2004 e-mail to CBM that “it would not be prudent for Gene [Phillips] to immediately get involved until they [Carlton] have been called into default.” From these communications and the documentary evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that not only did Phillips intentionally breach the Carlton/Phillips agreement but also that Phillips and CBM willfully planned to remove Carlton from any involvement in the Bulgaria Project and for Phillips, or a Phillips-related entity, to supplant Carlton.

Finally, we note that the evidence reveals that in the beginning of 2005, R.N. Real Estate, a Phillips-related entity, formed EurEnergy, a wholly owned subsidiary. Shortly thereafter, in February 2005, EurEnergy and CBM executed a letter agreement and the CBM/EurEnergy JDA, both of which demonstrated that CBM had agreed to declare Carlton in default of the CBM/Carlton agreement and EurEnergy had agreed to indemnify CBM for any legal liability to Carlton.

In sum, Carlton presented ample evidence supporting the jury’s findings in regard to Carlton’s tortious-interference claim. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s findings, we conclude that the jury could have reasonably found that Carlton complied with the provision in the CBM/Carlton agreement requiring Carlton to actually fund the first tranche, Carlton and CBM agreed to the modification of their agreement in regard to the timing of the second tranche, CBM failed to comply with the CBM/Carlton agreement, Phillips and EurEnergy intentionally interfered with the CBM/Carlton agreement, and neither Phillips nor Eu-rEnergy had a good-faith belief that it had the right to interfere with the CBM/Carlton agreement. We further conclude that the evidence supporting these findings is not so weak as to render the jury’s verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s liability findings on Carlton’s tortious-interference claim.

We overrule Phillips and EurEnergy’s second issue.

Actual Damages

In their first issue in their cross-appeal, Phillips and EurEnergy argue that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s award of $81.16 million in actual damages because determining the fair market value of Carlton’s interest in the Bulgaria Project in~ volved “a specialized field outside [the] jurors’ knowledge” and the testimony of Carlton’s expert, who utilized unreliable foundational data, amounted to “conjecture and speculation.” Within their legal-sufficiency challenge, Phillips and EurEnergy attack the two valuation models used by Carlton’s expert. Alternatively, Phillips and EurEnergy argue that the evidence is factually insufficient to support an award of damages any “greater than the 5.4% of the [Bulgaria Project’s] market value” because Carlton was only able to conditionally fund $899,990 and “there is no evidence that Carlton would have obtained” the required $8 million in “funding from any other source.”

In its first issue in its appeal, Carlton argues that the trial court erred in “suggesting a remittitur to $81.16 million in actual damages” because “factually sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding of actual damages of $66.5 million or, alternatively, at least $38 million.” Carlton asserts that the evidence presented supports “three possible damages awards”: (1) a review of all the evidence supports the jury award of $66.5 million, (2) “a calculation by Carlton’s damages expert, Pete Huddleston, using a conventional cash-flow model, or ‘max/min’ analysis, supports a damages award of $38 million,” and (3) “an alternative calculation by Hud-dleston using a ‘comparable sale’ approach supports the award of $31.16 million.”

As noted above, in conducting a legal-sufficiency review of the evidence, we must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s award and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it; we must consider evidence favorable to the jury’s findings if a reasonable fact-finder could consider it, and disregard evidence contrary to the finding unless a reasonable fact-finder could not disregard it. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827; Brown v. Brown, 236 S.W.3d 343, 348 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). When considering a party’s assertion that unreliable scientific evidence or expert testimony is legally insufficient to support a verdict, we independently consider whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded jurors to reach the verdict. Whirlpool Corp. v. Camacho, 298 S.W.3d 631, 638 (Tex.2009) (citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827). Such a review “encompasses the entire record, including contrary evidence tending to show the expert opinion is incompetent or unreliable.” Id. Conclusory or speculative expert opinion testimony is not relevant evidence because it does not tend to make the existence of material facts more probable or less probable. See Tex.R. Evid. 401; Whirlpool Corp., 298 S.W.3d at 637. We are to “rigorously examine the validity of facts and assumptions” of an expert’s opinion “as well as the principles, research, and methodology underlying the expert’s conclusions.” Whirlpool Corp., 298 S.W.3d at 637.

In reviewing the trial court’s remittitur, we must determine whether factually-sufficient evidence supports the jury’s award. Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 620 (Tex.2002); Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex.1998). In conducting our factual-sufficiency review, we may not pass upon the witnesses’ credibility or substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Mar. Overseas Corp., 971 S.W.2d at 407. Because Carlton, not Phillips and EurEnergy, had the burden to prove its damages at trial, a remittitur of the jury’s damages award should not have been required unless the evidence supporting the award is so weak that the jury’s award is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. See id.; Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176. If we sustain Carlton’s challenge that the trial court should not have required the remittitur, we must render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered. See Tex.R.App. P. 46.2.

In making its determination of what sum of money would fairly and reasonably compensate Carlton for its damages caused by the tortious interference with the CBM/Carlton agreement, the trial court instructed the jury to consider the fair market value of Carlton’s interest in the Bulgaria Project at the time of the interference, and it defined fair market value as:

... the amount that would be paid by a knowledgeable buyer who desires to buy but is not required to buy, to a knowledgeable seller, who desires to sell but is under no necessity of selling.

Carlton, in regard to its tortious-inter-ference claim, sought damages for the fair-market value of its 38% interest in the Bulgaria Project, which was to be measured at the time that it was deprived of its interest as a result of the tortious interference. We first address Phillips and Eu-rEnergy’s argument that Carlton may not recover actual damages totaling more than the fair market value of a 5.4% interest in the Bulgaria Project because Carlton did not present evidence that it would have obtained the money necessary to fulfill its funding obligations under the CBM/Carlton agreement. The argument ignores the fact that Phillips, pursuant to the Carlton/Phillips agreement, was to pay Carlton $8.5 million in exchange for a 10% interest in the Bulgaria Project. This would have enabled Carlton to fulfill its funding obligations and entitled it to obtain its 88% interest in the Bulgaria Project. As discussed below, the jury found that not only did Phillips and EurEnergy tortiously interfere with the CBM/Carlton agreement, but also that Phillips failed to comply with the Carlton/Phillips agreement. And, as we hold below, the jury’s finding that Phillips failed to comply with the Carlton/Phillips agreement is supported by legally- and factually-sufficient evidence.

As evidence of the fair market value of its 38% interest in the Bulgaria Project, Carlton presented the expert testimony of Huddleston and Dr. Crichlow. Dr. Cri-chlow testified that he obtained his doctorate in petroleum engineering from Stanford University and had previously served as a professor of engineering and the head of the Department of Petroleum Natural Gas and Geological Engineering at the University of Oklahoma. His company, HBC Registered Professional Engineers, is involved in reserve evaluations of major oil fields, and he had previously worked for the World Bank in evaluating the reserves for the country of Bolivia in order to justify the construction of a pipeline from Bolivia to Brazil and Argentina. Crichlow had also worked with the country of Kuwait “to decide which wells should be looked at first” to ensure “minimal loss of resources” as a result of the Kuwaiti oilfield fires in 1991. He had also worked for the United States Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to evaluate 29,000 oil and gas reserves packages that were being held by banks. And, Crichlow is the author of a book titled, Modem Reservoir Engineering — A Simulation Approach.

In his June 28, 2004 memorandum report, Dr. Crichlow explained that he had reviewed the Bulgaria Project, his recommendations were “favorable,” the Bulgaria Project had “several highly desirable characteristics,” and the detailed characteristics made the project a “valuable international project.” He discussed the Bulgaria Project’s geology, resource base, economics, gas valuation, and regulatory requirements. And Crichlow emphasized the Bulgaria Project’s existing exploratory drilling, “relatively shallow depth,” “excellent economics,” and “pipeline availability.” In a section of his report entitled “Gas Valuation,” Crichlow provided detailed estimates of the amount of gas in place and the value of the gas in the ground for both a 100% and a 1% interest in the Bulgaria Project. In regard to the valuation of a 100% interest, Crichlow estimated that there was 35,000 billion cubic feet of gas in place, a 90% recoverability factor, a gas price of $1 per MMBTU (or one million British Thermal Units), and a “gas valuation in ground” of “$31.5 billion U.S.” Cri-chlow estimated that a 1% interest concerning 350 billion cubic feet of gas in place, with a 90% recoverability factor and a “gas price in ground” of $1 per MMBTU, would result in a “gas valuation in ground” of “$315 million US.”

In his October 11, 2004 “interim due-diligence report” prepared “for Mr. Gene Phillips et al,” Dr. Crichlow, who had met with the principals of RRR about the Bulgaria Project, issued his findings, conclusions, and recommendations. He issued findings on various aspects of the Bulgaria Project, including “Commercial, Administrative, and Political” as well as “Engineering and Operational.” Crichlow also summarized CBM’s exploration and prospecting programs. And he emphasized that it was “very unusual to have the amount of data available for a project of this type,” the Bulgaria Project had a “greatly reduce[d] ... investment risk,” and it had a “[bjillion dollar profit potential.” Thus, Crichlow “highly recommended” that Phillips enter into a partnership with CBM and a Phillips-related entity supplant Carlton’s position in the Bulgaria Project. He concluded that a “successful partnership with CBM that includes the anticipated cash flow from gas production, should allow the reinvestment in Bulgaria to compound the returns to [Phillips] many times over.”

Huddleston, a registered professional engineer and the principal of Huddleston & Company, a consulting firm of petroleum and geological engineers, testified that he was involved in oil and gas consulting, exploration, and production. He noted that his company has worked for over 500 companies, including “every major oil company” and most “large independents.” It had also been retained on a major project for the United Nations to assess the losses to oil and gas reserves as a result of Operation Desert Storm. Huddleston explained that he has been “involved in virtually every phase” of “upstream activities,” including exploration and development of prospects; his company has been involved in “several billion dollars of consulting on buy-sell projects”; he has furnished reports to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and public companies; and he has been involved in project analysis, including the estimation of reserves for transmission lines in the United States. Huddleston, who analyzes approximately 200 projects annually, taught two senior engineering courses — petroleum management and petroleum investment analysis — at Texas A & M University from 1981 to 1998. He had also prepared manuals that were used by the petroleum schools at the University of Texas and Louisiana State University. Huddleston noted that he has published in excess of 300 papers on oil and gas topics and made presentations for multiple organizations, including the Society of Petroleum Evalúation Engineers and the Texas Bar Association.

In his testimony to the jury regarding the fair market value of Carlton’s interest in the Bulgaria Project at the time of Phillips and EurEnergy’s tortious interference with the Carlton/CBM agreement, Huddleston generally explained two possible damage models: (1) the “most likely” model and (2) the “cash flow” or “min/max” model. In calculating a valuation using the “most likely” damages model, Huddleston explained that he primarily considered the value of the Carlton/Phillips agreement. Because Phillips himself had agreed to pay Carlton $8.5 million for a 10% working interest in the Bulgaria Project, Huddleston explained that the total value of the Bulgaria Project at the time of the tortious interference could be calculated to have been approximately $85 million and, after the subtraction of well costs, the net market value of the Bulgaria Project could be calculated to have been approximately $82 million. Thus, using the amount that Phillips himself had agreed to pay for a 10% working interest in the Bulgaria Project, Huddleston opined that the approximate fair market value of a 38% interest in the Bulgaria Project at the time of the tortious interference could be calculated to have been at least approximately $31 million. Huddleston also explained that he considered the value of the February 2005 CBM/EurEnergy JDA when opining on the value of what would have been Carlton’s remaining 38% interest in the Bulgaria Project. Although Huddleston agreed that the CBM/EurEnergy JDA was “more complicated” and “confusing,” he explained that this separate agreement could serve to at least confirm, “to some extent,” that his valuation of the Carlton/Phillips agreement was “probably” reasonable.

In regard to the “cash flow” or “min/max” model, Huddleston explained that he derived an approximate range of fair market values based upon reserve reports and other documents prepared by Dr. Crichlow, whose services had been obtained by Phillips. Huddleston characterized Crichlow’s reserve report as “extremely good.” And Crichlow, in his deposition, which was introduced into evidence, explained that his report was “reliable.” Using the information contained in Crichlow’s reports, Huddleston opined that the fair market value of the Bulgaria Project at the time of the tortious interference could have been between “in excess” of $100 million and a minimum of “roughly 32 million, or something like that.” When asked to derive “the most likely between these two” figures, Hud-dleston cautioned that it was more appropriate to provide the jury with a possible range of values rather than a specific number, noting that the jury could consider all of the evidence in determining the fair market value of Carlton’s 38% interest in the project at the time of the tortious interference.

The jury awarded Carlton for its actual damages $66.5 million, which exceeded the general approximate range of fair market values suggested by Huddleston under both his “most-likely” and “cash-flow” models for Carlton’s 38% interest in the Bulgaria Project. However, the jury’s award of $66.5 million is not rendered legally or factually insufficient simply because it exceeded the range of values suggested by Huddleston. See City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62, 73 (Tex. 2000) (“A jury may award more damages than requested by a party if there is evidence supporting the higher award of damages.”). And we are not compelled to affirm the trial court’s remittitur simply because Carlton’s counsel, in closing argument, suggested that the jury award actual damages of $31.16 million. Rather, our duty on appeal is to instead determine whether the record evidence, including, but not limited solely to Huddleston’s expert opinion testimony, is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s award.

Again, in conducting our legal-sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s award and indulge “every reasonable inference” that would support it, and we “must consider all evidence favorable” to the jury’s award if a reasonable fact-finder could. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. In regard to our factual-sufficiency review of the trial court’s remittitur, we again note that a trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury and may require a remittitur only if the evidence suggesting the award is so weak that the jury’s award is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. See Mar. Overseas Corp., 971 S.W.2d at 406; Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176.

In calculating the fair market value of Carlton’s 38% interest in the Bulgaria Project at the time of the tortious interference and awarding Carlton $66.5 million, the jury had before it not only Huddleston’s expert opinions and methodologies, but also the underlying data and information obtained by Dr. Crichlow regarding the Bulgaria Project. As noted above, Cri-chlow, in regard to the valuation of a 100% interest, estimated that there was 35,000 billion cubic feet of gas in place, a 90% recoverability factor, and a “gas price in ground” of $1 per MMBTU, resulting in a “gas valuation in ground” of “$31.5 billion U.S.” For a 1% interest, Crichlow estimated a “gas valuation in ground” of “$315 million U.S.” In his testimony, Huddle-ston explained that the $1 per MMBTU figure used by Crichlow was a reasonable price. And Huddleston supported his testimony by referring to Institutional Investor magazine, which “covers monthly all of the oil and gas transaction activity certainly in the United States and Canada; and they commonly report transactions that people are making, probably average a billion a month or something, of what they paid for reserves in the ground.” From Huddleston’s testimony on this subject, the jury could have reasonably concluded that, based on industry practice, Crichlow’s estimates reflected a reasonable market price for the Bulgaria Project’s gas in the ground. Huddleston, in discussing general recoverability rates, explained that “[tjypical coalbed recoveries probably range from a low of 70% maybe to 85%.” From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that a lower recoverability rate than the 90% recoverability rate used by Crichlow could provide a more conservative guide to evaluate the fair market value of the project. Huddleston further testified that Crichlow’s June 2004 report did “have economics to it,” and the jury could have reasonably concluded that the estimates used by Crichlow in valuing the Bulgaria Project’s gas in the ground took into account many of the market variables that Phillips and EurEnergy identify on appeal. Finally, when asked if “valuing gas in the ground” is “one of the ways in which” an investor could determine whether “to do a project,” Huddleston agreed that this could be used “as an approximate early on.”

Moreover, we note that in attacking Carlton’s expert evidence and underlying data on actual damages, Phillips and Eu-rEnergy, in the trial court below, did not present the jury with any contradictory evidence that the jury could not have disregarded. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. Nor did they present any expert testimony of their own to suggest a lesser, alternative fair market value of Carlton’s interest in the Bulgaria Project. Rather, Phillips and EurEnergy’s primary contention was that, regardless of liability, which they vigorously challenged, Carlton was not entitled to recover anything for its lost interest. Nor, in their cross-appeal in this Court, do Phillips and EurEnergy cite us to any record evidence establishing that it would have been inherently unreasonable for the jury to have relied upon Carlton’s expert evidence or the underlying data in determining the fair market value of its interest in the Bulgaria Project. Specifically, we note that there is nothing in the record to establish that it would have been inherently unreasonable for the jury, in assessing the fair market value of Carlton’s interest at the time of Phillips and EurEnergy’s tortious interference, to have placed great weight on Dr. Crichlow’s unchallenged data regarding the value of a mere 1% interest in the Bulgaria Project’s gas in the ground. Huddleston, in regard to the “cash flow” or “min/max” models, explained the importance of gas reserves, and he further testified that an investor in this type of project should consider and weigh certain information and data in determining whether and how much to invest. And, rather than giving the jury a specific fair market value of Carlton’s interest, he testified that the jury, in making its own assessment, could consider a range of values as well as the pertinent information and data. Indeed, assessing the fair market value of Carlton’s interest in the project was the jury’s job as fact finder, and nothing precluded it from placing great weight upon the value of the Bulgaria Project’s gas in the ground. And Phillips and EurEnergy have not presented us with either established facts or law that logically undermines the jury’s finding of actual damages in this case.

In sum, the jury could have placed great weight on Dr. Crichlow’s evidence, including his data on the value of the Bulgaria Project’s gas in the ground, and, from it, the jury could have logically deduced that the fair market value of Carlton’s interest in the Bulgaria Project significantly exceeded the range of values proposed by Huddleston in both of his damages models. The jury was presented with evidence that, in determining the fair market value of Carlton’s 38% interest in the Bulgaria Project, it could consider the valuation of its gas reserves. Dr. Crichlow, in his June 28, 2004 memorandum report, which was introduced into evidence without objection, valued a mere 1% interest in the Bulgaria Project’s gas “in ground” at $815 million. In this same report, Crichlow estimated a 90% recover-ability rate, although the jury also heard testimony from Huddleston that would support applying a more conservative re-coverability rate than that applied by Cri-chlow.

Moreover, the jury could have reasonably believed that Phillips himself had tremendous confidence in Dr. Crichlow’s data, conclusions, and recommendations. After agreeing on August 23, 2004 to pay Carlton $8.5 million for a 10% interest in the Bulgaria Project, Phillips obtained Cri-chlow’s October 11, 2004 interim due diligence report. In the report, Crichlow explained, “It is very unusual to have the amount of data available for a project of this type and the extreme enthusiasm for success that was expressed by the principals of such a highly respected industry leader such as Raven Ridge Resources.” Noting that the pertinent factors “greatly reduce[d] the investment risk in this type of project” and the Bulgaria Project had a “[b]illion dollar proft potential,” which would “compound the returns to [Phillips] many times over,” Crichlow “highly recommended” that Phillips enter a “partnership” with CBM. Thus, the jury had before it evidence that Phillips himself so highly valued Carlton’s interest in the Bulgaria Project that he was willing to breach the Carlton/Phillips agreement and supplant Carlton’s interest by forming his own partnership with CBM.

Although there is nothing in the record to directly set forth how the jury arrived at its damages award of $66.5 million, we conclude that the jury’s damage award is amply supported by Huddleston’s testimony, the detailed information contained in Dr. Crichlow’s reports, and the other substantial testimonial and documentary evidence introduced at trial. See State v. Harrell Ranch, Ltd., 268 S.W.3d 247, 258 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008, no pet.) (acknowledging that there was “nothing in the record to inform” court of jury’s reasoning in awarding damages for diminution of value, which exceeded proposed damage figures, but holding that “[gjiven [the] possible applications of the evidence, the jury award” fell within the “range of evidence” and was not “excessive”).

Phillips and EurEnergy make additional arguments in attacking the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s award of $66.5 million, or the award of any actual damages. In arguing that Huddleston’s expert testimony constitutes no evidence, Phillips and EurEnergy cite Rameo Oil & Gas Ltd. v. Anglo-Dutch (Tenge) L.L.C., 207 S.W.3d 801 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). In Rameo, the court held that there was “no evidence to prove with reasonable certainty” the claimed lost profits because the proof of lost profits was “largely speculative, dependent on uncertain and changing market conditions, and based on risky business opportunities and the success of an unproven enterprise.” Id. This, however, is not a lost-profits case.

Carlton sought to recover damages for the loss of its 38% interest in the Bulgaria Project, measured at the time that Phillips and EurEnergy tortiously interfered with the CBM/Carlton agreement. Carlton claims, and the jury concluded, that Phillips essentially appropriated Carlton’s interest, which was an asset that had a market value at the time it was taken. Texas courts have long recognized, in circumstances that are similar to those presented here, that a plaintiff may seek to recover the market value of a lost asset. See Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W. 190, 191 (Tex. Comm’n App.1925, judgm’t adopted), reh’g granted, 291 S.W. 538 (Tex. Comm’n App.1927, holding approved) (providing for recovery for market value of lost right to leasehold interest). Other courts have also recognized that, in certain circumstances, a plaintiff may seek to recover damages for the market value of an asset rather than lost profits. See Schonfeld v. Hilliard, 218 F.8d 164, 177 (2nd Cir.2000) (stating that “market value of an income-producing asset is inherently less speculative than lost profits because it is determined at a single point in time” and “represents what a buyer is willing to pay for the chance to earn the speculative profits”).

Of course, any investment of capital made to obtain an interest in a speculative venture involves risk, especially if the decision to make the investment can be made on nothing more than estimates. However, this simple fact of business life does not mean that such an interest has no market value. Nor does it preclude a fact-finder, utilizing pertinent data and factors, from determining the fair market value of the interest. Such determinations, often involving millions and sometimes billions of dollars, are made every day by businesses in a free market economy. As explained by Huddleston, it is “very common” for interests in ventures such as the Bulgaria Project to be bought and sold before there is any production from the venture. He also noted that he considered the Bulgaria Project to be “viable” and that his company “would [have] definitely considered]” investing in it.

Here, Carlton introduced evidence to support the jury’s findings that Phillips and EurEnergy tortiously interfered with its rights under the CBM/Carlton agreement and Carlton was deprived of its 38% interest in the Bulgaria Project as a result of the tortious interference. Under Texas law, Carlton was entitled to seek and recover, as a proper measure of its damages, the fair market value of its interest at the time of the tortious interference. See Humble Oil & Refining Co., 276 S.W. at 191. Carlton presented both expert testimony and documentary evidence, containing pertinent data and information, to support a broad range of values for the jury to consider in determining the fair market value of Carlton’s interest. Thus, Carlton was not required to prove any ultimate “lost profits” to recover actual damages caused by Phillips and EurEnergy’s tor-tious interference.

Phillips and EurEnergy also assert that Huddleston’s damage models are too speculative to provide any evidence of damages, citing City of Harlingen v. Estate of Sharboneau, 48 S.W.3d 177 (Tex.2001). In Sharboneau, the Texas Supreme Court determined that an expert’s testimony on the fair market value of a piece of undeveloped real property was not competent. Id. at 185. The court noted that the expert’s methodology required “more than a dozen analytical steps, most involving assumptions and estimates” and “fail[ed] to account for basic marketplace realities,” including marketplace characteristics, “unexpected competition,” political forces, “economic stagnation,” and “other risks.” Id. at 184-85.

Although Huddleston’s testimony could be view