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Opinion CORRIGAN, J. A jury convicted defendant Morris Solomon, Jr., of four counts of first degree murder and two counts of second degree murder, and found true a multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation. It also found him guilty of sexually assaulting two other victims. On retrial following jury deadlock at the first penalty trial, a second jury returned a verdict of death. This appeal is automatic. We affirm the judgment. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The facts are summarized here for background purposes. Further details and procedural matters are discussed in connection with defendant’s specific contentions. A. Guilt Phase: Overview of Prosecution’s Case In the 10 months between June 1986 and April 1987, Sacramento police discovered the bodies of seven local prostitutes. All but one were found at homes where defendant had worked or resided. More than half were buried in shallow, backyard graves. Nearly all of the women had been bound, two were gagged, and four were nude or partially clad from the waist down. All were drug users. After defendant’s arrest for the murders, three prostitutes reported to police that defendant had sexually assaulted them. One had been bound and gagged. Police interviewed defendant multiple times. Both before and after his arrest, defendant made inconsistent and false statements about his presence and activities in the places where the bodies were found. He also falsely denied knowing, or misrepresented the nature of his interactions with, the victims. 1. The six murders a. The first degree murder of Yolanda Johnson On the morning of June 18, 1986, a 911 call summoned officers to an abandoned duplex on 4th Avenue in the Oak Park section of Sacramento. They discovered the decomposing body of 22-year-old Yolanda Johnson in the closet of the upstairs apartment. There were ligature marks on her neck and wrists, and her body position suggested her wrists had been bound together behind her back. Johnson, a prostitute and drug user, was nude from the waist down and there were semen stains on her thighs. She had sometimes used the abandoned building to engage in prostitution. The day before Johnson’s body was found, defendant told several people he was looking for her. An autopsy showed Johnson had died one to four days earlier. Due to decomposition, the pathologist was unable to determine the exact cause of death. But he opined Johnson could have died from either drug toxicity or strangulation. ABO blood-grouping tests showed defendant could have been the source of the semen stains on Johnson’s thighs. b. The first degree murder of Maria Apodaca On March 19, 1987, workers digging a ditch in the backyard of an abandoned house on 19th Avenue in South Sacramento unearthed the body of 18-year-old Maria Apodaca. The victim was a heroin addict and prostitute who had been missing for several months. Apodaca was buried at a depth of about three feet, under a piece of plywood covered with dirt. Her clothed body was bound in a fetal position; a cloth belt held her wrists behind her knees. The body was wrapped in a bedsheet enveloped by black plastic. The body was badly decomposed. The pathologist estimated death had occurred two to eight months earlier. The cause of death could not be determined, but dark discoloration around Apodaca’s neck suggested asphyxia from suffocation or from a broad-width ligature. c. The second degree murder of Cherie Washington On April 20, 1987, one month after the discovery of Apodaca’s body, police detectives investigating defendant’s possible involvement in that murder visited his former residence on 44th Street in Oak Park. An unusual depression in the backyard yielded the body of 26-year-old Cherie Washington from a shallow grave. She was nude from the waist down, but had not been bound or wrapped in a covering. Washington was a rock cocaine addict who sometimes engaged in prostitution to support her habit. Neighbors recalled seeing her several times standing at the front door of the house where her body was recovered. Again, advanced decomposition precluded an exact determination of the date or cause of death. The pathologist estimated she died between three and nine months earlier, possibly of positional asphyxia, strangulation with a soft, wide ligature, or cocaine overdose. d. The second degree murder of Linda Vitela On April 22, 1987, two days after Washington’s body was unearthed, the body of 24-year-old Linda Vitela was recovered from a shallow grave in the backyard of an uninhabited residence on Broadway in Oak Park. Vitela’s body was fully clothed and wrapped in a blanket tied with electrical wire in several places. Vitela was a prostitute and a heroin addict. An autopsy disclosed Vitela had died approximately one year before her body was discovered. Although decomposition precluded a determination of the cause of death, the pathologist could not exclude the possibility of asphyxia or fatal intoxication from drugs or alcohol. e. The first degree murder of Sheila Jacox Also on April 22, 1987, police found the body of 17-year-old Sheila Jacox in a second shallow grave in the Broadway backyard. Jacox’s nude body was wrapped in bedding secured by duct tape. Duct tape had also been used to bind her body from the waist down and to hold a balled-up sock inside her mouth. Jacox was a prostitute and narcotics user. The decomposition of Jacox’s body was even more pronounced than that of Vitela’s. However, a forensic anthropologist estimated that Jacox had been dead “about a year.” Although the pathologist who performed the autopsy reported the cause of Jacox’s death as “undetermined,” he could not exclude alcohol or drug overdose, or most forms of asphyxia. f. The first degree murder of Sharon Massey On April 28, 1987, police unearthed the body of 29-year-old Sharon Massey from the same 19th Avenue backyard where Maria Apodaca had been exhumed the previous month. Massey’s body was encased in a sheet knotted over her left shoulder, then covered with a bedspread. Her thighs, legs, and ankles were bound with a severed electrical cord, and a braided fabric strap held her wrists behind her back. Draped around her neck was a three-foot-long stereo speaker connector. Massey’s upper body was fully clothed, but her panties and jeans were on only the right leg, and were pulled down to the thigh. A red sock was compacted into her throat, and a second sock protruded from her mouth. Massey had supplemented her income from a hospital clinic job with prostitution, and she may have been a crack cocaine user. The pathologist who performed the autopsy of Massey’s decomposed, mummified body estimated she had been dead approximately six months. A cause of death could not be determined, but asphyxia was not excluded. 2. The nonfatal sexual assaults on other victims News of defendant’s arrest prompted two women to report that defendant had sexually assaulted them. Police later discovered a third sexual assault victim. Melissa H. was a prostitute with a $300-a-day heroin habit. Although Melissa had once smoked cocaine with defendant in his car, she had repeatedly rebuffed his attempts to “date” her, telling him she did not date Black men. In early June 1986, several weeks before the discovery of Johnson’s body, defendant grabbed Melissa by the neck as she entered the back door of the vacant apartment where she often brought clients. At knifepoint, defendant directed Melissa to disrobe and get on the bed. He hit her in the face with his fist and a table leg, and forced her to orally copulate him. After binding Melissa’s wrists behind her back with a piece of leather, defendant sodomized, orally copulated, and raped her. At one point, defendant placed a sock in Melissa’s mouth, which muffled her screams. Then, to prevent her from getting up, he tied her feet to the foot of the bed with an electrical cord that ran up her body and encircled her neck. About five hours later, defendant fled through the back door when Melissa’s boyfriend/pimp started knocking on the doors and windows, yelling for her to open up. Melissa’s boyfriend found Melissa wrapped in a quilt, bound, gagged and bleeding from her nose, mouth, and vaginal area. Sherry H. supported her cocaine addiction with prostitution. One morning in October 1986, she agreed to “date” defendant for $50 and got into his car. After arriving at a house on 19th Avenue, Sherry started to remove her sweater. As she did so, defendant approached her from behind and tried to strangle her with a shoestring. Sherry frustrated the attempt by slipping her fingers between the shoelace and her neck and then falling to the ground. After an act of intercourse, she convinced defendant to take her home. Sherry suffered welts on her neck and internal hemorrhaging in one eye. 3. Defendant’s presence in the locations where the bodies were found Defendant either lived in or worked at each of the locations where the murder victims were discovered. In November 1985, defendant was hired to remodel a fire-damaged house on Broadway. He lived there until June 18, 1986, when he was evicted for failing to pay rent. The bodies of Linda Vitela and Sheila Jacox were unearthed from the backyard in April 1987. Vitela was last seen alive in February 1986. Jacox had been missing since March 20, 1986. After the bodies were discovered, defendant’s next-door neighbor told police she saw defendant dig in five places in the backyard. Defendant had told her he was working on a sewer line and planting a garden. In April 1986, while still living on Broadway, defendant was performing “end work” in the restoration of an abandoned duplex on 4th Avenue. Starting sometime in May, defendant was the sole worker there, and the only person with keys. The second and third floors of the building were separately locked, but the basement was unsecured and frequently inhabited by transients, drug users, and prostitutes. On June 17, 1986, the building’s owner arranged to meet defendant at the site the following morning to discuss the status of the project. However, on June 18, defendant arrived early at the duplex, unlocked the front door and entered, and then came outside shouting he had found a corpse inside. Responding officers found the body of Yolanda Johnson in a closet in the upstairs apartment. She had been missing for three days. In August 1986, shortly after defendant’s eviction from the Broadway residence, he rented the master bedroom in a house on 19th Avenue. He lived there until October 23, 1986, when he and the other residents were evicted for failure to pay rent. The bodies of Maria Apodaca and Sharon Massey were unearthed from the backyard on March 19, 1987, and April 28, 1987, respectively. Apodaca was alive as of September 8, 1986, when she was released from custody following a prostitution arrest. Sharon Massey was last heard from on September 14, 1986. After leaving the 19th Avenue residence, defendant spent several months living out of his car near a jobsite. Then, on December 15, 1986, he and a friend moved into a vacant house on 44th Street. Defendant’s mother lived across the street. At the end of February 1987, defendant and his housemates were evicted. On April 20, 1987, the body of Cherie Washington was found buried in the backyard. She was last seen alive on February 6, 1987. 4. The investigation a. Defendant’s prearrest statements Defendant was questioned by police immediately after the discovery of Yolanda Johnson’s body on June 18, 1986. He falsely identified himself as Ernest Carl Padilla, and said he was last inside the building two days earlier, on Monday, June 16, 1986. Defendant also told police he did not recognize the victim. But when asked by a television news reporter at the scene if the victim was a prostitute, as bystanders had suggested, defendant said, “It wouldn’t be right... to call her a working girl.” Defendant spoke with police twice more that same day. In the afternoon, defendant corrected himself, saying he had last been inside the duplex on the previous Monday, June 9, 1986, not June 16. Later that evening, defendant provided his true name. He explained he initially had identified himself as his brother because of several outstanding warrants. Defendant then agreed to talk with the officers at the police station. Investigators conducted a taped interview that night. When shown a photograph of Yolanda Johnson, defendant said he knew her as “Yo Yo,” and had once “dated” her in a camper parked in front of his Broadway home. He also indicated she once stole $20 from him. Defendant stated he and Johnson had never been in the 4th Avenue duplex together, and he had no idea how she ended up inside the closet. However, Johnson’s mother reported that Johnson told her she had “dated” defendant in the houses he was renovating. Over the next few days, defendant provided fingerprints and a blood sample, and had several brief telephone conversations with police. No arrest was made. Defendant was interviewed again on March 20, 1987. The previous day, the body of Maria Apodaca was unearthed from the backyard of defendant’s former residence on 19th Avenue. When asked where he had lived in the past, defendant omitted the 19th Avenue house from his list. He admitted having stayed there only when asked about it directly. Defendant also falsely claimed that he had moved away from that location in September 1986. Again, defendant was not arrested. One month later, in the early afternoon of April 20, 1987, Detective Pane came to defendant’s jobsite to reinterview him. Defendant said he knew Johnson but had never seen Apodaca before. During the conversation, defendant consented to a search of a Ford Maverick that he had abandoned in front of his former residence on 44th Street. Several hours later, while officers searched the car, they noticed an indentation in the backyard. At that spot, the body of Cherie Washington was exhumed from a shallow grave. Detective Pane came to defendant’s home in the evening and confronted him with the latest discovery. Defendant claimed he had never done any digging in the backyard of that house, and insisted he had not killed anyone. b. Defendant’s postarrest statements Defendant was finally arrested on April 22, 1987, the same day the long-buried bodies of Linda Vitela and Sheila Jacox were found in the backyard on Broadway. During a lengthy custodial interrogation, defendant continued to maintain his innocence. Defendant said that Yolanda Johnson frequently visited the Broadway house when he lived there with a small group of prostitutes. She stole an expensive ring from him, but he denied being angry about it. However, police learned that defendant had once remarked to an acquaintance as Johnson walked past them that he was “going to kill that bitch” for her role in the theft of his stereo equipment. And when asked to explain the presence of his palm print on the closet door where Johnson’s body was found, defendant contradicted his earlier account about the scope of his work in that room. Defendant repeated his earlier claim that he did not know Maria Apodaca. But defendant’s Broadway housemates reported Apodaca had visited defendant there several times. Defendant also adamantly denied the reports of his friends and former housemates that the sheet encasing Apodaca’s body came from defendant’s bed. When told his 19th Avenue housemates had also said he did some digging in the backyard near the location of Apodaca’s shallow grave, defendant claimed he did no repair work or landscaping at that residence. Defendant maintained he had never seen Cherie Washington. But one of his 44th Street neighbors said defendant introduced Washington to her while the three of them stood in defendant’s living room. After the introductions, Washington followed defendant into his bedroom. Defendant also told Detective Pane in a prearrest interview that he did not dig in the backyard there. After his arrest, he indicated he once dug in the backyard while replacing 50 feet of sewer line. As for his activities in the backyard of the 19th Avenue residence, defendant first told Detective Pane he did some digging when he replaced posts on the back porch. But he immediately changed course, saying he did no digging whatsoever. 5. Defendant’s interactions with local prostitutes Evidence at trial showed defendant was a well-known figure in Oak Park. He enjoyed the company of prostitutes both socially and sexually. Defendant told Detective Pane that prostitutes were “more real [than the] average person.” Some of Oak Park’s prostitutes considered defendant a gentle and caring friend who gave them money and a safe place to stay when they needed it. However, defendant could be rough and intemperate with the prostitutes he “dated,” even with those who considered him a friend. And he characterized women generally, and prostitutes specifically, as “bitches, whores and tramps.” Around the time of the earliest murders, defendant had a short-lived love affair with a prostitute named Rosella Fuller, who moved into the house on Broadway, with a $200-a-day crack cocaine habit. The relationship led defendant into a costly drug habit of his own that ruined him financially. B. Penalty Phase 1. Prosecution evidence a. Circumstances of the crimes The jury that decided defendant’s guilt deadlocked on penalty, and the court impaneled a new jury for retrial of the penalty phase. To show the circumstances of the crimes, the prosecution presented its case-in-chief a second time. With minor departures, the evidence was substantially the same as that presented before. b. Evidence of defendant’s other violent crimes and prior convictions The prosecution presented evidence of violent crimes defendant committed a decade or more before the capital offenses. All of the incidents involved sexual assaults of young women, and some of the facts were strikingly similar to evidence in the capital case. i. Aggravated assault on Mary K. Mary K. testified that on September 19, 1969, she was 18 and working as a street prostitute in Oakland. Around 10:00 p.m., she got into defendant’s car to negotiate for sexual services. Defendant drove to a darkened residential street, paid Mary $10, and orally copulated her. He then demanded his money back. When Mary refused, defendant held a curved knife to her throat. Mary agreed to give the money back, but then started screaming. As she swung her left leg out of the car, defendant cut her right thigh with the knife. The injury required 23 stitches. ii. Abduction, sexual assault, and robbery of Virginia J. Virginia J. testified that in January 1971, she was in her early 20’s and living in a motel in Oakland. On January 12, as she walked along MacArthur Boulevard looking for a place to eat, defendant grabbed her from behind, threatened to shoot her, and forced her into his car. Defendant had propositioned her once before, but she had told him she was not a prostitute. Defendant drove Virginia to an isolated area in the Oakland hills to sexually assault her. En route, Virginia complied with defendant’s demand to remove her clothing. After parking the car, defendant ordered her to orally copulate him, and to lick his anus, testicles, and scrotum, which she did. Defendant unsuccessfully attempted to sodomize her, then raped her. After-wards, he inserted his fingers into her vagina, put his fingers into her mouth and ordered her to swallow. When she refused, he punched and pulled at her nipples. He then kicked her out of the car and drove off with her jewelry and clothes. iii. Abduction and assault on Dale W In May 1971, Dale W. was a student at Alameda Junior College. On May 17, she studied on campus at the University of California, Berkeley, until the library closed at 10:00 p.m. As she walked down Telegraph Avenue hoping to hitch a ride home to downtown Oakland, defendant pulled up and offered her a lift. She got into the car, but defendant drove to the freeway and headed in the opposite direction. He told Dale he wanted to have sex with her and would not harm her if she cooperated. He then grabbed her hair and held her head back over the seat so she could not see where they were going. Defendant pulled off onto a dirt road. While Dale fought and clawed at him, she managed to pull the key out of the ignition and throw it out the window. She fled from the moving car, but defendant gave chase and overtook her. He knocked her to the ground and kicked her face, then ran back to the car to stop it from rolling away. Defendant was later convicted of assault to commit rape. (§ 220.) iv. False imprisonment of and sexual assault on Connie S. Connie S. testified that on October 18, 1975, she did a “guest spot” performance as a topless dancer in a San Jose club. Around midnight, defendant agreed to pay her for sex and they went to defendant’s trailer across the street. Defendant paid Connie $25 and they had intercourse. As Connie was dressing to leave, defendant came up from behind and pulled a chain around her neck, saying, “Are you ready to die bitch?” She lost consciousness. When Connie came to, defendant urinated on her face. He then wrapped her hands together with tape, positioned her knees between her arms, and bound her ankles. Defendant hoisted Connie onto the bed and forced her to orally copulate him. He then left in her car. When defendant returned 30 minutes later, he removed Connie’s bindings and raped her four or five times over the course of the night. Before defendant left in the morning, he taped Connie’s legs to a chair and wired her hands together behind her back. He then brought his Doberman pinscher into the room and warned Connie that if she moved, the dog would attack her. The dog remained seated as Connie managed to free her hands and ankles, however, and she fled to the trailer next door to call police. Two years later, defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and false imprisonment. (§§ 245, subd. (a), 236.) v. Assault on Darlene G. In December 1976, 18-year-old Darlene G. was living with her mother in Sacramento. She testified that around 8:00 p.m. on December 6, she left her home and walked down Stockton Boulevard. Defendant came up from behind, choked her into unconsciousness, and dragged her into a car. He then hauled her into a house located a short distance away. When Darlene regained consciousness, she was nude from the waist down. Defendant placed her in a closet, where he bound her hands together behind her back and tied them to her feet using rope and shoelaces. He then hit her with a fan belt and whipped her in the face with his penis, threatening to ejaculate on her. Darlene spent the entire night in the closet while defendant slept in the adjoining room. In the morning, she heard a woman knock on the bedroom door and tell “Junior” to get up for work. Before leaving the house, defendant secured Darlene’s bindings and said he would kill her if she removed them. Darlene nevertheless managed to untie her feet and made her way to the gas stove to bum off the bindings on her wrists. Defendant returned to the house just as Darlene finished dressing. She escaped by brandishing a knife and ran the two blocks to her mother’s home. Four months later, defendant was convicted of assault with intent to rape and false imprisonment. (§§ 220, 236.) vi. Grand theft In 1984, defendant was convicted of three counts of grand theft in Arizona. 2. Defense evidence The defense presented an extensive case in mitigation. Eighteen witnesses testified over the course of seven days. The defense case largely attempted to show that defendant’s crimes stemmed from psychopathology bom of the relentless humiliation, abuse, and violence he experienced during his formative years, compounded by his tour of duty in Vietnam and fueled by cocaine use. a. Defendant’s early childhood Relatives and friends described defendant’s upbringing in rural Georgia as frightful and abusive. In 1945, when defendant was an infant, his parents moved in with defendant’s grandmother Bertha and other family members. Bertha and the adults in the house constantly fought with one another, both verbally and physically. At one point, defendant’s parents moved away, leaving him and his older brother behind. Bertha beat the children daily for infractions such as wetting themselves, mispronouncing words, or crying during a beating. Sometimes, she hit them for no apparent reason. When defendant was very young, Bertha beat him by laying him over her lap and hitting him repeatedly. When he got older, Bertha punished him the same way she did the other children in the household: She made defendant remove all his clothing and stand on a stool in the comer, where she beat his bare body, including his genitalia, with an electrical cord or switches she made him bring to her. Bertha sometimes beat defendant until he bled. Once, she tied his hands around the pole of a bed with an extension cord to keep him from backing away from her during a beating. Defendant had little contact with his parents for the first 13 years of his life. He was reunited with them when Bertha and the family moved to Isleton, a small farming town 40 miles from Sacramento. They were among a handful of Black families living in a poor, rundown section of the town known as “Cannery Row” or “Tinpan Alley.” Defendant’s parents frequently beat and sexually assaulted one another in front of him. His mother and grandmother often beat him and verbally abused him in public. b. Adolescence and young adulthood The defense called a number of witnesses who knew defendant during his high school years in Isleton. They described defendant as an outgoing, gentle, normal person. Although he could be “pesty” and sometimes behaved inappropriately towards girls, he was never violent or aggressive. If defendant’s feelings were hurt, he would keep it all inside. Defendant was an average student, played in the marching band, and competed in track. He invited no one to his home and never spoke about his parents. But defendant’s friends knew that his mother and grandmother were hard on him. They considered defendant’s mother a “loose woman,” who regularly “entertained” different men. Witnesses who knew defendant after high school likewise described him as kind and outgoing. He attended community college and worked hard at various jobs, including carpentry, car repair, and bus driving. Defendant was generous with his money, and showed women affection by buying them presents. c. Vietnam and its aftermath Defendant served in Vietnam for one year starting in the summer of 1966. Defendant’s platoon sergeant, Carrol Crouse, testified that he and defendant ran convoys to and from fire bases between their camp and the Cambodian border. Riding in the convoys was stressful because they were likely to encounter mines and small arms fire at any time. He considered defendant an outstanding and trustworthy soldier who saved Crouse’s life during a mortar attack. Fellow infantryman Gary Harris served in the same division with defendant. Once, defendant risked his life to rescue four injured soldiers whose tank had hit a landmine. Both witnesses testified that Vietnamese prostitutes were cheap and plentiful, even on the front lines, and that defendant used their services. Shad Meshad, an expert on Vietnam veterans, explained that American military personnel viewed the prostitutes the same way they saw Vietnamese generally, as subhuman. Defendant returned to Isleton after his tour of duty ended in the summer of 1967. He was a changed person, distant, untruthful, and ill tempered. If defendant heard a loud noise, he would duck. Around this time, defendant became engaged to a woman he had known before going to Vietnam. When she broke off the engagement, defendant was hurt and moved away. He relocated to the San Francisco Bay Area, married someone else, and fathered a daughter. Defendant divorced and eventually moved back to Sacramento. In April 1977, defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting Darlene G. While at San Quentin State Prison, he was lead inmate in the furniture factory and drove a forklift in the detergent plant. The plant supervisor testified that defendant was rated “excellent” and “exceptional” in attitude, work habits, and perseverance. d. Expert testimony Three defense experts explained how defendant’s upbringing, Vietnam experience, and drug use created the psychopathology that drove him to commit the crimes. Clinical forensic psychologist Brad Fisher, Ph.D., testified that defendant’s childhood abuse led to the extreme mental, emotional, and behavioral problems that were strongly linked to his crimes. Even though defendant knew killing was wrong and did not hurt all of the prostitutes he encountered, he did not have full control over his behavior. Defendant suffered from a complex mental disorder involving his relationship with women, which was triggered in certain situations, like when he was made to feel humiliated. Clinical psychologist John P. Wilson, Ph.D., testified as an expert on stress and trauma. Like Dr. Fisher, Dr. Wilson said defendant was driven to commit the crimes by the psychopathology bom of his traumatic, abusive childhood. The chaotic, dysfunctional, and brutal environment traumatized him during his formative years. The abuse made defendant feel worthless and angry with' the people who abused him. But defendant denied and repressed his experiences and disassociated himself from the situation. Dr. Wilson observed that defendant compensated for feeling rejected by being the “good guy” during high school and college. But his Vietnam experience reinforced a pattern experienced in childhood. Trauma and extraordinary stressors occurred daily in a setting where aggression and violence were sanctioned. Furthermore, defendant engaged in deviant sexual contact with Vietnamese prostitutes, who were dehumanized by American military personnel. As Dr. Wilson explained, defendant tried to do what he believed was expected of him when he first returned from Vietnam. He held down a job, married, and began to raise a family. But he was a different person after his tour of duty. Although he did not meet the diagnostic criteria for posttraumatic stress disorder, he exhibited many of the symptoms, including anger, irritability, and fiscal irresponsibility. Had the military known in 1967 what it knew about psychopathology at the time of trial, Dr. Wilson opined, defendant would have received the kind of treatment he needed. Instead, defendant quit his job, became involved with prostitutes and began selling drugs. According to Dr. Wilson, beginning with the sexual assaults in 1969 and 1971, defendant could no longer control the psychopathology he previously had managed to keep in check. Dr. Wilson noted a common pattern to the assaults, which he characterized as the reenactment of the humiliation, abuse, and sexual sadism defendant experienced in his formative years. Defendant’s acts of violence against his victims paralleled what had happened to him as a boy. In defendant’s mind, his victims were replacements for Bertha, who had acted out her rage by humiliating, torturing, and beating him into submission. The pattern of reenactment escalated in 1986, when defendant’s use of cocaine further fueled his psychopathology. In Dr. Wilson’s view, defendant harbored a murderous rage. Cocaine use increases paranoia, and diminishes inhibitions and control. Thus, defendant’s rage was intensified and he was more likely to act out in a pathological way. Leon Marder, M.D., an expert in addiction medicine, also testified about the effects of cocaine. An individual’s life experiences are important indicators of how cocaine will affect him or her. Use of cocaine by mentally disturbed or unstable persons will worsen their condition. A person with violent tendencies will be unable to control them while under the influence of cocaine. Moreover, once the proclivity for violence is elevated, it can remain active long after the drug itself has left the body. Prior use of cocaine causes hypersensitivity of the nervous system so that violence can be triggered by stress, anxiety, frustration, and anger. II. DISCUSSION A. Guilt Phase Issues 1. Sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation and deliberation The prosecution charged defendant with seven counts of murder. The jury found defendant guilty of six murders, four of them in the first degree. Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation supporting the first degree murder convictions. To the contrary, the record in this case contains substantial evidence from which a rational jury could find premeditation and deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt. Our task in deciding a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is a well-established one. “[W]e review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value— from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] In cases in which the People rely primarily on circumstantial evidence, the standard of review is the same. [Citations.]” (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 514 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 199, 828 P.2d 101].) “ ‘An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the evidence even if the court would have concluded otherwise. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 419 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 721, 165 P.3d 512].) The prosecutor’s sole theory of first degree murder as to all seven murder counts was willful, deliberate and premeditated murder. (§ 189.) “A verdict of deliberate and premeditated first degree murder requires more than a showing of intent to kill. [Citation.] ‘Deliberation’ refers to careful weighing of considerations in forming a course of action; ‘premeditation’ means thought over in advance. [Citations.]” (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1080 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335].) “ ‘Premeditation and deliberation can occur in a brief interval. “The test is not time, but reflection. ‘Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 849 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209]; see People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1286-1287 [78 Cal.Rptr.3d 295, 185 P.3d 727].) People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 [73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942] (Anderson) discusses three types of evidence commonly shown in cases of premeditated murder: planning activity, preexisting motive, and manner of killing. (Id. at pp. 26-27.) Drawing on these three categories of evidence, Anderson provided one framework for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting findings of premeditation and deliberation. In so doing, Anderson’s goal “was to aid reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence is supportive of an inference that the killing was the result of preexisting reflection and weighing of considerations rather than mere unconsidered or rash impulse.” (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577, 831 P.2d 1159].) But, as we have often observed, “Anderson did not purport to establish an exhaustive list that would exclude all other types and combinations of evidence that could support a finding of premeditation and deliberation.” (People v. Perez, supra, at p. 1125; see People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1019 [81 Cal.Rptr.3d 299, 189 P.3d 300]; People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1249 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225].) Defendant claims that upholding the first degree murder verdicts under current precedent violates due process and Eighth Amendment principles. In support, he presents one commentator’s view that this court’s frequent reliance on the “great rapidity” with which thoughts may ripen into a premeditated and deliberated intent to kill, coupled with our recent “manipulation” of the Anderson factors, have collapsed any meaningful distinction between first and second degree murder. (Mounts, Premeditation and Deliberation in California: Returning to a Distinction Without a Difference (2002) 36 U.S.F. L.Rev. 261, 327-328.) This argument completely misses the mark. Defendant overlooks a core principle that has guided appellate courts in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation and deliberation for over 60 years; “The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection.” (People v. Thomas (1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 900 [156 P.2d 7]; see People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1080; People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 767 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485].) We have observed that “[t]houghts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly . . . .” (People v. Thomas, supra, at p. 900.) Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, a killing resulting from preexisting reflection, of any duration, is readily distinguishable from a killing based on unconsidered or rash impulse. {Ibid.) Defendant’s argument also overstates the role of the Anderson factors. As we have explained, Anderson “did not refashion the elements of first degree murder or alter the substantive law of murder in any way.” (People v. Thomas, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 517; see also People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1125 [Anderson factors are not an exhaustive list of evidence that could support a finding of premeditation and deliberation; the reviewing court need not accord them any particular weight].) There is no infirmity, constitutional or otherwise, in the principles guiding our sufficiency review of the evidence supporting a finding of premeditation and deliberation. Despite his criticism, defendant invokes the Anderson factors nonetheless, focusing on the evidence relating to each of the four first degree murder victims individually. But the inferences of premeditation and deliberation in this case are reinforced by evidence of the shared characteristics of the six murder victims, the common circumstances preceding and causing their deaths, and the sheer number of murders. We discuss this evidence before addressing defendant’s separate challenges to each of the first degree murder convictions. (See People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 529-538 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171] [assessing evidence common to all 12 murder victims in a case involving numerous deaths occurring under similar, unusual circumstances].) a. Evidence of premeditation and deliberation common to all victims All six of the murder victims and both of the sexual assault victims were street prostitutes. Defendant referred to prostitutes as “bitches, whores and tramps.” He said he treated them “like that because that’s the way they wanted to be treated” and “that’s why they’re out there. . . . They liked that and they enjoy it.” Indeed, defendant once related with amusement a time he “fucked the bitch so far in the ass that she shit on herself.” That every one of defendant’s victims was a prostitute, coupled with defendant’s expressions of enmity towards prostitutes generally, strongly suggests defendant entertained a motive to sexually brutalize and then kill them. (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1253 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543, 156 P.3d 1015] [jury could infer defendant harbored animus against young White women from evidence of other crimes against similar victims]; People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1250 [strong inference of motive from defendant’s statement to police he hated women and evidence he previously killed a young woman similar in appearance to the victim].) The evidence showed that defendant had thought about this kind of violence outside the immediate circumstances of his crimes and conveyed his views to others. All four of the first degree murder victims were bound at the wrists and three were also bound at the ankles. The jury reasonably could infer defendant had bound the murder victims before killing them, rather than afterwards, from the evidence of defendant’s sexual assaults against Melissa H. Melissa testified that defendant bound her wrists behind her and then forcibly sodomized, orally copulated, and raped her. After the sexual assaults, when Melissa tried to get up, defendant disabled her by tying her ankles to the foot of the bed with an electrical cord that ran up her body and encircled her neck. If Melissa moved her legs, the cord around her neck tightened. Defendant kept Melissa bound in this manner for five hours, until her pimp arrived unexpectedly and defendant fled the scene. Having inferred from this evidence that defendant bound his victims before killing them, the jury reasonably could infer that defendant had ample time to reflect upon and plan their deaths. (People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 529 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100] [after binding the victim, defendant had a significant period in which to contemplate and plan her eventual death].) Defendant asserts that the binding evidence showed he acted impulsively and spontaneously, rather than pursuant to a preconceived plan, because the materials he used were close at hand and traceable to him. In People v. Rowland (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 1 [184 Cal.Rptr. 346], the appellate court concluded there was insufficient evidence to support the element of premeditation and deliberation when the evidence showed the defendant strangled the victim with an electrical cord he found in the bedroom where the murder occurred. (Id. at p. 8.) In the Rowland court’s view, the evidence in that case did not suggest the defendant had taken “ ‘thoughtful measures’ to procure a weapon for use against the victim.” {Ibid.) Here, by contrast, it reasonably can be inferred from the evidence that defendant bound his victims in order to disable them and then contemplated and planned their deaths. That defendant tied his victims with materials that were close at hand does not preclude the inference that he thereafter considered a course of action to kill them. Because the victims’ bodies were badly decomposed when discovered, pathologists could not determine the precise causes of death. The experts found, however, that asphyxiation was a possible cause of death in every case. Their testimony, coupled with evidence that defendant used ligatures and a gag during his sexual assaults on the two surviving victims, strongly supports an inference that defendant asphyxiated each murder victim. From this manner of killing, the jury reasonably could infer that defendant had time to consider the murderous nature of his actions. (People v. Bonillas (1989) 48 Cal.3d 757, 792 [257 Cal.Rptr. 895, 771 P.2d 844] [“Ligature strangulation is in its nature a deliberate act.”].) Defendant finds it “hard to see how a juror could have made a constitutionally supportable decision as to how the deathfs] occurred” when the pathologists who examined the victims were unable to do so. We agree that the manner-of-killing evidence presented at trial was not definitive. We note, too, that neither expert testified about the length of time it took to render the victims unconscious. Viewed in light of the entire record, however, the pathologists’ testimony provided a “reasonable foundation” for an inference of premeditation and deliberation. (People v. Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 25.) “ ‘[W]hat the pathologist can say from a laboratory examination is more limited than what a reasonable trier of fact may find beyond any reasonable doubt, after considering the evidence as a whole.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Thomas, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 515.) Finally, the sheer number of killings, apparently carried out in the same manner, gives rise to an inescapable inference that most of them were preconceived and deliberate. As we previously have explained, “the more often one does something, the more likely that something was intended, and even premeditated, rather than accidental or spontaneous. Specifically, the more often one kills, especially under similar circumstances, the more reasonable the inference the killing was intended and premeditated. [Citations.]” (People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1244; see People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 853 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135].) Here, the evidence showed defendant killed six prostitutes. Four of them were bound, most were nude from the waist down, and all may have been asphyxiated. A reasonable jury could infer that, as to Jacox, Johnson, Apodaca, and Massey, who were the second, third, fourth, and fifth victims, defendant had engaged in a preconceived, deliberate plan to sexually brutalize and kill street prostitutes. (See People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1253 [evidence of five similar murders supported the inference that defendant went to sixth victim’s home with a preconceived plan to kill]; People v. Steele, supra, at pp. 1245, 1250 [inference of premeditation and deliberation from evidence of planning, motive, and manner of killing was strengthened by evidence that the defendant previously committed a similar crime].) Defendant acknowledges the possibility that his memory of murdering Vitela, the first victim, was part of the careful thought process required for a showing he deliberated the subsequent murders. But he suggests it is “just as likely” he did not engage in a careful weighing of considerations and that his victims said or did something to provoke a mindless and overpowering rage. He also points out that his sexual assault on one of the surviving victims, Sherry H., took place after six of the seven murders had been committed. According to defendant, this evidence shows he was capable of subsequent impulsive, unpremeditated violence notwithstanding having killed before. Defendant’s arguments fail because they misapprehend our role in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdicts. “ ‘[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1129 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321].) b. Evidence of premeditation and deliberation pertaining to each of the first degree murder victims In addition to the characteristics common to all the crimes, ample evidence of each crime supports the jury’s findings. i. Murder of Sheila Jacox Defendant asserts he had no prior relationship with Sheila Jacox from which a motive to kill could be inferred. (People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) Of course, motive is not an element of the crime (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 503-504 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754]), and a motive to kill a class of people would be probative even if the selected victim is a stranger (People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1253). Further, several witnesses testified Jacox was introduced to defendant at the Broadway residence. And regardless of how well defendant knew Jacox, there was evidence from which the jury reasonably could infer he knew she was a prostitute. According to one witness, Jacox occasionally solicited “dates” on Broadway, close to defendant’s residence. As for planning, the evidence that defendant bound Jacox strongly supports the inference of a premeditated plan to kill her. As previously discussed, from the evidence that defendant bound and then sexually assaulted the surviving victim Melissa H., it could be inferred he bound Jacox before, not after, killing her. Notably, the evidence showed that the binding was both secure and elaborate. Jacox was bound with duct tape at the ankles, thighs, legs, and trunk. Duct tape extending from Jacox’s face to the back of her head held a balled-up sock inside her mouth. From this evidence, and taking into account defendant had also bound three other murder victims, the jury could infer that, once having completely disabled Jacox, defendant reflected upon and planned her death. Defendant posits that the bedsheet, duct tape, and sock found with Jacox’s body were commonplace items that could have been used in the moment to violently conclude a bargain for sexual services. His argument in essence asks us to reweigh the evidence, which is a task we do not perform when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 323, 190 P.3d 664].) Expert testimony that Jacox could have died from asphyxia, together with evidence that five other victims may have been killed under similar circumstances, supports a conclusion that the murder was deliberate rather than impulsive. Defendant points out that no potential ligature was found with the body, nor was there any evidence of strangulation. Furthermore, he contends, no clear evidence showed the sock found in Jacox’s mouth would have prevented breathing. Again, these arguments call on us to improperly reweigh the evidence. ii. Murder of Yolanda Johnson The evidence showed additional premeditation in Yolanda Johnson’s killing. She was a frequent visitor at defendant’s home and stole from him. Defendant told Detective Pane during a pretrial interview that Johnson took an expensive ring. Although he claimed the theft did not bother him, trial testimony suggested otherwise. Defendant’s acquaintance, Vemell Dodson, testified that sometime in March 1986, several months before the murder, Johnson walked past him and defendant as they sat on the porch of the Broadway house. As she passed by, defendant remarked, “I’m going to kill that bitch,” and told Dodson that Johnson instigated the theft of his stereo equipment. Pamela Suggs, one of the prostitutes who lived with defendant at the house, testified that on the day before Johnson’s body was found, defendant was out looking for her. Suggs initially told Detective Pane that defendant also said he was “going to kick her fucking ass.” Defendant acknowledges the quoted testimony. But he argues that Dodson’s testimony was not “reasonable, credible, and of solid value,” and thus could not be relied upon by a reasonable trier of fact, because it was “thoroughly discredited.” He notes that Dodson did not contact police about defendant’s statement until one year after Johnson’s death, while he was in prison on a parole violation. Defendant’s argument is misplaced. It is the task of the jury, not the reviewing court, to determine the credibility of witnesses. (People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1129.) As for Suggs’s testimony that defendant was looking for Johnson the night before she disappeared, defendant asserts there was nothing in such evidence from which to conclude defendant was searching for Johnson in order to kill her, rather than to have sex with her. We reject defendant’s argument for two reasons. First, it ignores the testimony relating to Suggs’s initial report to police that defendant said he was “going to kick [Johnson’s] fucking ass.” Second, we will not reverse a judgment for insufficient evidence simply because the circumstances reasonably might support a contrary finding. (Ibid.) Evidence that Johnson had been bound before her death suggests planning. We note that when police discovered Johnson’s body, she was not bound. And as defendant correctly notes, the deputy coroner who conducted a cursory examination of Johnson’s body at the scene acknowledged during cross-examination that he did not see definitive ligature marks. However, the officers who discovered Johnson’s body did note distinctive ligature marks on her neck and wrists. The officers further testified that Johnson’s legs were spread apart but her feet were touching. Likewise, her hands were very close together and were pulled out to one side from underneath the body, as if someone had dumped her in the closet and then pulled off a binding. The jury, as the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility, was entitled to credit the officers’ testimony and thus to infer that Johnson had been bound. Further, the pathologist testified that death could have resulted from asphyxiation by ligature or manual strangulation. There is ample evidence to support a finding of deliberation and premeditation. iii. Murder of Maria Apodaca Like the other five murder victims, Apodaca was a street prostitute. Defendant points out there was conflicting evidence as to whether he even knew Apodaca. But it is the jury, not the reviewing court, that resolves conflicts in the evidence. (People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1129.) Similarly unavailing is defendant’s argument that a witness who stated he had seen Apodaca in defendant’s company fabricated his testimony. According to defendant, the witness’s trial testimony could not be squared with the account he gave to Detective Pane, which the jury also heard. But as we have explained, “Resolution of. . . inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact.” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487].) Apodaca’s body was wrapped in a sheet knotted at both ends. Inside the covering, a rope-like piece of cloth held the body in a fetal position, with both wrists bound together behind the knees. The binding evidence thus supports the inference that, once having disabled Apodaca, defendant contemplated and planned her death. The inference is further strengthened by evidence that defendant bound the three other first degree murder victims at the wrists. Areas of dark discoloration around Apodaca’s neck indicated she may have been asphyxiated, either by suffocation or ligature. Again, the manner of killing coupled with all the other evidence supports a finding that defendant acted deliberately, rather than spontaneously, when he killed Apodaca. iv. Murder of Sharon Massey Sharon Massey supplemented her hospital clinic salary by engaging in prostitution. Defendant again asserts there was no evidence he knew Massey. The record shows otherwise. For instance, defendant’s former housemate testified that he once smoked rock cocaine with defendant, Massey, and several others at the 19 th Avenue residence. Massey’s body was bound into a fetal position with a severed electrical cord that extended around her back and gathered her thighs, legs, and ankles together. A braided fabric strap secured her wrists behind her back. A stereo speaker connector hung loosely around Massey’s neck and shoulders. This extensive binding supports an inference that defendant incapacitated Massey, giving him ample time to consider and plan her death. As before, evidence of the other killings further supports such an inference. During Massey’s autopsy, the pathologist found two socks lodged inside her mouth, one of which was far back in her throat. In the pathologist’s view, either one or both of the socks could have suffocated Massey. He also opined that the stereo speaker connector draped around Massey’s neck could have been used to strangle her. This manner of death, particularly when combined with all the other evidence, strongly suggests defendant murdered Massey according to a deliberate design. Defendant argues that a killing by asphyxiation is as compatible with an “explosion of violence” as it is with premeditation and deliberation. But defendant again misperceives the standard by which we assess the sufficiency of the evidence. “ ‘[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1129.) 2. Admission of defendant’s postarrest statement a. Background Defense counsel argued at an in limine hearing that portions of defendant’s taped interviews with police should be excluded as more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. The prosecutor agreed that some of the material, including the references to prior crimes and prison terms, was inadmissible and offered to edit the tapes for trial. With defense counsel’s assent, the court deferred ruling on the admissibility of any specific parts of the taped interviews until the prosecutor had prepared the version he wanted to present at trial. The prosecution called Detective Pane to testify twice during its case-in-chief. Before the witness was scheduled to take the stand the second time, the prosecutor informed the court that the parties had not yet conferred on the edited version of Pane’s postarrest interviews with defendant, which the prosecutor intended to present during Pane’s testimony. Defense counsel assured the court he would finish reviewing the three-hour tape and meet with the prosecutor before the next court session. When trial resumed, defense counsel raised no objection to the admission of the tape. During the first postarrest interview, Detective Pane asked defendant, “How many people have you murdered?” Defendant replied, “None. None. N-O-N-E, sir.” Detective Pane then queried, “How many prostitutes have you strangled?” Defendant again answered, “None.” At one point in the second interview, Detective Pane asked defendant if he had ever sodomized anyone. Defendant replied, “No.” Pane then informed defendant, “Two girls say you wanted to sodomize [them].” Defendant explained, “I talk shit to a lot of women like that. It’s just strictly me talking.” Pane again asked defendant whether he had ever strangled anyone. Defendant again denied having done so, but added, “I know you’re going to have some girls say I did so.” Pane said he suspected that defendant had been lying to him, and asked defendant, “What would you believe if you were in my position?” The following exchange then occurred: “Pane: Okay, all right. So I can assume then—assume because I have these people saying that—that you lied there, I can assume that. “Defendant: Okay, I mean you can assume. “Pane: I have this here saying so many people did it. That you lied there. Is that right? “Defendant: Okay. You can assume that too. “Pane: Yeah, I’m assuming this. Never strangled girls. And I have the one here, so I can say you lied. Right? “Defendant: Okay. “Pane: So here you’ve lied three times to me. You’ve been in every one of these houses here. So never killed girls, I would think that that would be a lie.” b. Discussion Defendant contends that the court erred in admitting the italicized portion of his taped postarrest statement to Detective Pane. According to defendant, the jury would have inferred from the challenged statement defendant’s tacit acknowledgment that he had once “strangled a girl” to death. Because evidence of a defendant’s propensity to commit murder is highly prejudicial, he argues, its admission violated Evidence Code section 352 and his right to a fundamentally fair trial under federal constitutional principles. Defendant has forfeited his claim of error because defense counsel failed to object to the admission of the edited version of the taped postarrest statement. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) A motion in limine can preserve an appellate claim, so long as the party objected to the specific evidence on the specific ground urged on appeal at a time when the court could determine the evidentiary question in the proper context. (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 125-127 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887]; People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 188-191 [279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949].) At trial, the defense presented a pretrial motion to exclude defendant’s postarrest statements as more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352, but failed to identify the particular passage in question here or argue its purported prejudicial effects. Furthermore, the court deferred ruling on the in limine motion to allow the p