United States v. Lisbon (835 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 2011)

ORDER

THOMAS W. THRASH, JR., District Judge.

This is a criminal action. It is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation [Doc. 304] of the Magistrate Judge recommending denying the Defendant’s Motions to Suppress [Doc. 178, 194 & 256], No useful purpose would be served by repeating the facts and contentions of the parties set forth in the thorough and well-reasoned Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. The Magistrate Judge correctly found that the Defendant lacks standing to contest the search at 1899 Trotti Street. The items seized at 355 West Ponce de Leon Avenue were in plain view. There was probable cause to search the Chevrolet Malibu. The searches of the safe deposit boxes were supported by probable cause. The Court approves and adopts the Report and Recommendation as the judgment of the Court. The Defendant’s Motions to Suppress [Doc. 178, 194 & 256] and Motion to Sever [Doc. 180] are DENIED.

ORDER FOR SERVICE OF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ALAN J. BAVERMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

Attached is the Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) of the United States Magistrate Judge made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and N.D. Ga. CrR. 58.1(A)(3)(a), (b). Let the same be filed, and a copy of the R & R, together with a copy of this Order, shall be served upon counsel for the parties.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party may file written objections to the R & R within fourteen (14) days of service of this Order. Should objections be filed, they shall specify with particularity the alleged error(s) made (including reference by page number to the transcript if applicable) and shall be served upon the opposing party. See United States v. Gaddy, 894 F.2d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir.1990). The party filing objections will be responsible for obtaining and filing the transcript of any evidentiary hearing for review by the District Court. Failure to object in accordance with this rule waives a party’s right to review. Fed.R.Crim.P. 59(b)(2).

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(H), the above-referenced fourteen (14) days allowed for filing objections is EXCLUDED from the computation of time under the Speedy Trial Act (“the Act”), whether or not objections are actually filed. If objections to this R & R are filed, the Clerk is DIRECTED to EXCLUDE from the computation of time all time between the filing of the R & R and the submission of the R & R, along with any objections, responses and replies thereto, to the District Judge. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D), (H); Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 331, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986); United States v. Mers, 701 F.2d 1321, 1337 (11th Cir.1983). The Clerk is DIRECTED to submit the R & R with objections, if any, to the District Court after expiration of the above time period.

IT IS SO ORDERED and DIRECTED, this 13th day of October, 2011.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Defendant Lisbon has filed a motion, an amended motion, and a second amended motion to suppress evidence, [Docs. 178, 194, 256], as to which the Court held evidentiary hearings on April 13, 2011, [Doc. 257] (“T1-._”) and June 16, 2011, [Doc. 285] (“T2-_”). The parties then filed post-hearing briefs. [Docs. 266, 271, 292, 293]. With briefing concluded, the motions are now ripe for recommended resolutions. For the following reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the motions be DENIED. In addition, Lisbon filed a motion for severance, [Doc. 180], which the undersigned RECOMMENDS be DENIED.

Motions to Suppress

Lisbon filed motions to suppress seeking to exclude evidence seized from searches conducted by warrant at 1899 Trotti Street, Atlanta, Georgia (hereinafter “Trotti”), 335 W. Ponce De Leon Avenue, Unit 210, Decatur, Georgia (hereinafter “W. Ponce”), and three safe deposit boxes, as well as a warrantless search of W. Ponce and an automobile located there. The Court previously concluded that Lisbon was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to the searches conducted by warrant at Trotti and W. Ponce. [Doc. 242]. Because that order was issued to set evidentiary hearings (as discussed infra), the Court repeats its prior analysis for purposes of review by the District Court and discusses the issues that remain to be decided following the evidentiary hearings and briefing.

I. Searches as to which Lisbon was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing:

A. 1899 Trotti Street, Atlanta, Ga. (No. l:10-MJ-728-LTW, issued June 10, 2010) [Doc. 203-1].

The Court previously concluded that Lisbon was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the execution of the search warrant at Trotti. Lisbon objected to the search conducted at Trotti on three grounds. He argued that (1) the search warrant lacked particularity, (2) the executing agents exceeded the scope of the search warrant when they seized “miscellaneous paperwork” from that location and searched a Pontiac automobile on the premises at the time of the search, [Doe. 194 at 12-13]; and (3) the agents lacked probable cause to search the Pontiac. [Id. at 14].

The Court rejected each argument. First, Lisbon did not establish “standing” to contest the Trotti Street search. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); United States v. Cooper, 203 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir.2000). One’s standing to challenge governmental actions on Fourth Amendment grounds is a threshold question. United States v. McBean, 861 F.2d 1570, 1573 (11th Cir.1988). A defendant bears the burden of showing a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1147-48 (11th Cir.1997); United States v. Ramos, 12 F.3d 1019, 1023 (11th Cir.1994). To have standing to challenge a search, one must manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in the invaded area that “society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 & n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 421; United States v. Cooper, 133 F.3d 1394, 1398 (11th Cir.1998). A defendant must establish both a subjective and an objective expectation of privacy. United States v. Segura-Baltazar, 448 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir.2006); United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir.1995). “ ‘The subjective component requires that a person exhibit an actual expectation of privacy, while the objective component requires that the privacy expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.’ ” Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1328; see also Cooper, 133 F.3d at 1398. Also, the individual’s expectation, viewed objectively, must be justifiable under the circumstances. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979). A bare claim that an individual has an interest in the items seized during a search, however, is insufficient to establish that his or her Fourth Amendment rights were implicated by a search. United States v. Chaves, 169 F.3d 687, 690 (11th Cir.1999). Courts assess on a case-by-case basis the “standing” of a particular person to challenge an intrusion by government officials into an area over which that person lacked primary control. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 191 n. 13, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984). The subjective prong is a factual inquiry. United States v. McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir.1987); see also United States v. Jones, 184 Fed.Appx. 943, 947 (11th Cir.2006). The objective prong is a question of law. McKennon, id.

Lisbon first argued in his brief that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence because although it was his father’s, he kept belongings, including his vehicle, at the residence. [Doc. 194 at 8]. It is true that “even where a defendant does not own the property searched, he or she may nonetheless have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that place by virtue of his or her relationship with that place.” Chaves, 169 F.3d at 690. For example, the Supreme Court has held that an overnight guest in a house of a third party has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). However, as the Supreme Court has affirmed, not everyone “who is merely present with the consent of the householder” may necessarily be able to challenge a search of the premises. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998) (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421). In Carter, the Supreme Court in fact declined to find that a visitor to a residence, present for only a short period of time and for the purpose of conducting illicit drug transactions, without any known prior connection to the residence, had a reasonable expectation of privacy to contest a search of the residence. Carter, id. at 90-91, 119 S.Ct. 469.

The allegations asserted in Lisbon’s brief were insufficient to establish standing since they failed to demonstrate that Lisbon had “an unrestricted right of occupancy or custody and control of the premises” that would create a legitimate expectation of privacy in the residence. United States v. Cossio, 336 Fed.Appx. 909, 912 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Baron-Mantilla, 743 F.2d 868, 870 (11th Cir.1984)); see also United States v. Torres, 705 F.2d 1287,1294-95 (11th Cir.1983), vacated en banc, consideration pending remand to panel, 718 F.2d 998 (11th Cir. 1983), remanded, 720 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1983), on appeal after remand, 741 F.2d 1323 (11th Cir.1984) (where appellants were house guests of searched house, ate, slept and showered there, stored personal belongings there and were the only guests in house at time of search, appellants would have standing to challenge search); United States v. Garcia, 741 F.2d 363, 366 (11th Cir.1984) (although appellant had more than tenuous interest in searched apartment, appellant had no standing where connections were not regular or personal enough to find that appellant adopted apartment as a place of business or as a residence). Since these allegations did not allege facts that if proved would require the grant of relief, the Court held that an evidentiary hearing on the issue of standing was not warranted. Cooper, 203 F.3d at 1285 (quoting United States v. Sneed, 732 F.2d 886, 888 (11th Cir.1984)).

The former Fifth Circuit’s discussion in United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981), upon which Lisbon relied, demonstrates the inadequacy of Lisbon’s showing on standing. In Haydel, the evidence established that the defendant’s parents had given him permission to use their home and had given him a key, causing the court to conclude that his access was for all practical purposes unencumbered. Id. at 1155. Although the defendant in Haydel did not reside regularly at his parents’ home, he kept clothing there and had occasionally remained overnight, when he and his wife had domestic problems. Id. & n. 2. Unlike Haydel, Lisbon’s statements that he kept belongings there are insufficient to establish the requisite legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises, as explained below.

In an affidavit filed with his reply brief, Lisbon testified that “one of the businesses [he] was involved in was Trotti Used Car Sales, Inc., a Georgia Corporation with its principal office and place of business at 1899 Trotti Street,” and that he “had an office in the residence at 1899 Trotti Street where [he] kept property.” [Doc. 207-1 at 3]. These ambiguous statements are similarly insufficient to satisfy his burden to demonstrate standing in the Trotti property. Individuals may have a “reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police” into their offices. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (“Within the workplace context, ... an expectation [of privacy] in one’s place of work is based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the Amendment.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). But, unlike the nearly absolute protection of a residence, the “great variety of work environments” requires analysis of reasonable expectations “on a ease-by-case basis.” Id. at 718, 107 S.Ct. 1492. The Fourth Amendment inquiry hinges on whether the area or thing “searched was one in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion.” Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968). The corporate employee, moreover, must demonstrate a sufficient “nexus between the area searched and [his] own work space.” United States v. Britt, 508 F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th Cir.1975); see also Wayne R. Lafave et ah, 3 Criminal Procedure § 9.1(c) (3d ed. Nov. 2010) (“Consistent with Mancusi, courts have held that a corporate or individual defendant in possession of the business premises searched has standing, and that an officer or employee of the business enterprise has standing if ‘there was a demonstrated nexus between the area searched and the work space of the defendant.’ ”) (footnotes omitted). Because Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature, “an individual cannot assert a corporation’s Fourth Amendment rights absent a showing that he had an independent privacy interest in the good seized or the area searched.” United States v. Vicknair, 610 F.2d 372, 379 (5th Cir.1980). Although an analysis of a legitimate expectation of privacy in business premises necessarily must be determined on a case-by-case basis, there are several considerations that provide guidance:

Generally, courts tend to find that these elements are sufficiently established when the area searched is set aside for the defendant’s exclusive use, such as an individual office. However, courts are more skeptical of standing claims when the defendant only occasionally used the area searched. The greater the degree of exclusivity and control over a work area, and the more time a defendant spends there, the more likely standing is to be found. By contrast, the less private a work area — and the less control a defendant has over that work area — the less likely standing is to be found.

United States v. Hamdan, 891 F.Supp. 88, 94-95 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (citations omitted). For example, in Henzel v. United States, 296 F.2d 650 (5th Cir.1961), the former Fifth Circuit held that the sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing to challenge the seizure of corporate books and records when the individual had prepared much of the confiscated material, which was kept in his office along with his personal belongings. Id. at 653. In Chaves, the Eleventh Circuit found that the defendant had standing to contest a search of the warehouse, where he possessed the only key and he kept business and personal papers in the warehouse. Chaves, 169 F.3d at 691.

Lisbon did not submit any evidence to support a conclusion that he exercised “a measure of control and ability to exclude others” as to the Trotti property. His statement that he was “involved” in the business at that address does not satisfy his burden. “[A] motion to suppress must in every critical respect, including allegations of standing, be ‘sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural to enable the [C]ourt to conclude that a substantial claim is presented.’ ” United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 994 (11th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 1208-09 (11th Cir.1991), and United States v. Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514, 1527 (11th Cir.1985)); see also Cooper, 203 F.3d at 1285 (holding that an evidentiary hearing on the issue of standing is not necessary unless the defendant alleges facts in his motion sufficient to establish his standing).

On the other hand, the Court concluded that Lisbon has standing to challenge the search of the Pontiac searched at the Trotti residence. See United States v. Borno, 946 F.Supp. 972, 977 (M.D.Fla. 1996) (recognizing that vehicle owner may contest its search); see also United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980) (recognizing that “property ownership is clearly a factor to be considered in determining whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights have been violated”).

Second, even if Lisbon had properly asserted standing to challenge the Trotti search, he would not be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress. As to his challenge to the search of a Pontiac automobile in the garage, circuit precedent authorizes the search of a vehicle on the premises during the execution of a search warrant:

Many courts have held that a warrant describing the premises includes the vehicles parked on the property so described. In United States v. Singer, 970 F.2d 1414, 1417-18 (5th Cir.1992), the Fifth Circuit affirmed a trial court’s decision refusing to suppress evidence obtained from a search of two automobiles located on the property of a residence for which a search warrant was issued. In affirming the lower court, the Circuit Court explained that “[t]his court has consistently held that a warrant authorizing a search of ‘the premises’ includes vehicles parked on the premises.” Singer, 970 F.2d at 1418 (citing United States v. Cole, 628 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir.1980) (additional citations omitted))

There is binding precedent in this circuit holding that a search of the premises includes vehicles parked on the premises. See United States v. Napoli, 580 F.2d 1198, 1200 (5th Cir.1976) (“We conclude that the search of the camper was authorized by the warrant. We think that the reference to ‘on the premises known as 3027 Napoleon Avenue’ was sufficient to embrace the vehicle parked in the driveway on those premises.”).

Those reasons apply in the instant case. The Search Warrant describing the premises as Route 4, Box 133 Rolling Hills Circle, Ozark, Alabama, was sufficient to embrace the Lexus parked in the driveway on those premises. For this reason, the court adopts the Magistrate’s Recommendation as to the search of the Lexus.

United States v. Ridolf, 76 F.Supp.2d 1305, 1311 (M.D.Ala.1999); see also United States v. Cole, 628 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.1980), where the court wrote:

In [Napoli], this court held that a warrant to search “premises3 known as” a particular address and described as a residential dwelling conferred authority to search a camper parked in the driveway. Here the warrant referred to “premises described as” a family dwelling, “being the rear apartment” of a particular address. There is no significant difference in the terms of the two warrants. Under Napoli, therefore, appellant’s truck, parked in a carport attached to the rear apartment, was within the scope of the warrant.[ ] The officers were thus authorized to search the truck, limited only by the nature of what they were searching for. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980); Hams v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 152, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947). Both the hat (in which the gun was found) and the attached case (in which the silencer was found) might have contained drugs. The officers thus did not exceed the scope of the warrant in searching those items. The convictions on counts one through four, based on the pen gun and the silencer, must be affirmed.

Cole, 628 F.2d at 899-900 & n. 3 (citing United States v. Anderson, 485 F.2d 239 (5th Cir.1973) (warrant for premises held to include flower bed outside house); United States v. Long, 449 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1971) (warrant for premises held to include outside trash barrel); Brooks v. United States, 416 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir.1969) (warrant for lot and cabin held to include automobile parked near cabin)). As a result, in order to lawfully search the Pontiac automobile in the course of searching Trotti, the executing agents did not need any probable cause independent of that supporting the search warrant for the premises. Therefore, the Court concluded that Lisbon was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the Pontiac was properly searched as part of the execution of the Trotti search warrant.

Next, the Court held that the Trotti warrant was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. The search warrant authorized the following items at the location to be searched for and seized:

1. Cocaine and other controlled substances

2. U.S. Currency

3. Firearms

4. Jewelry

5. Ledgers and other drug records

6. Cellular telephones, SIM cards, Laptops, Blackberries, and other similar devices capable of sending and receiving emails or text messages, including their contents

7. Drug paraphernalia, including but not limited to scales, kilo presses, and materials for packaging drugs and drug money

8. Indicia of identity and/or occupancy, such as identification documents and mail.

See Exhibit A to Search Warrant located at Doc. 203-1 at 3. The face page of the warrant, below the typed entry of “Exhibit A,” contained the following handwritten notation:

which is property which constitutes evidence of violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846.

[Doc. 203-1 at 2]. Lisbon argued that the term “identification documents and mail” is too open-ended to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. [Doc. 194 at 22],

The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” (emphasis added). “This requirement is aimed at preventing ‘general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.’ ” United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1348 (11th Cir.1982) (quoting Coolidge v. Neto Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)). The requirement for particularity “ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.” Maryland .v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987). A warrant which fails to sufficiently particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized is unconstitutionally overbroad and the resulting general search is unconstitutional. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485-86, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965). In order to deter such warrants and searches, any evidence so seized must be excluded from the trial of the defendant. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976); United States v. Travers, 233 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir.2000). A description is sufficiently particular when it enables the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things to be seized. United States v. Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 614 (11th Cir.1985); Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1349; United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981). A search warrant must indeed be sufficiently precise as not to permit a general search, but the test is the reasonableness of the description. Elaborate specificity is unnecessary. See United States v. Strauss, 678 F.2d 886, 892 (11th Cir.1982); United States v. Osborne, 630 F.2d 374, 378 (5th Cir.1980). And, while the Court is mindful of the Supreme Court’s often-quoted admonition in Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927), that “as to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant,” as the Eleventh Circuit has pointed out, “if this statement were construed as a literal command, no search would be possible.” Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1349 n. 4 (citing Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d 253 (5th Cir.1968)). Instead, the test is whether the search was a general exploration or was specifically directed to the means and instrumentalities by which the crime charged had been committed. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 153-54, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947).

Lisbon’s argument that the term “identification documents and mail” lacks particularity ignores the fact that the term itself modifies the authorization to search for and seize “[i]ndieia of identity and/or occupancy,” [Doc. 203-1 at 3], and was further limited to evidence related to the investigation at hand, i.e., property which constitutes evidence of violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. [Id. at 2], “A search warrant may be used, not only to gather evidence of a criminal activity, but also to gather evidence of who controlled the premises suspected of connection with criminal acts.” United States v. McLaughlin, 851 F.2d 283, 286 (9th Cir.1988). The use of a generic term or a general description (i.e., identification documents and mail) is not per se violative of the Fourth Amendment. Cook, 657 F.2d at 733. When a more specific description of the items to be seized is unavailable, a general description will suffice, but “[fjailure to employ the specificity available will invalidate a general description in a warrant.” Id.

Here, the items sought (identification documents and mail) were tempered by the object of the search — evidence of identity and/or occupancy of the premises searched — and in relation to the crimes under investigation. See Gurleski, 405 F.2d at 258 (noting that the “search must be one directed in good faith toward the objects specified in the warrant or for other means and instrumentalities by which the crime charged had been committed”). The executing agents were therefore given sufficient direction in executing the warrant and as a result, the warrant did not - offend the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

The Court also rejected Lisbon’s next argument, that the executing agents exceeded the scope of the warrant. The search was not made invalid because the executing agents seized, as Lisbon describes, “extensive banking and financial information” from the residence and the Pontiac. “The Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant particularly describe the place to be searched and the terms or person to be seized; exploratory rummaging is prohibited.” United States v. Jenkins, 901 F.2d 1075, 1081 (11th Cir.1990). A search may be as extensive as reasonably necessary to locate the items described in the warrant. Id. at 1082 (quoting Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1352). Generally, when law-enforcement officers conduct a search that exceeds the proper scope of a warrant, evidence obtained in that search may be excluded. United States v. Hendrixson, 234 F.3d 494, 497 (11th Cir.2000) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990)). However, the seizure of items not covered by a warrant does not automatically invalidate an otherwise valid search. United States v. Schandl, 947 F.2d 462, 465 (11th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir.1988)), where the court held that agents did not exceed the scope of the warrant in a mail-fraud conspiracy case despite the fact that such items as “office supplies, blank paper, horse records, divorce records, and personal income tax records” were seized. “Only the evidence seized while the police are acting outside of the boundaries of the warrant is subject to suppression.” Hendrixson, 234 F.3d at 497. Evidence that is properly within the scope of the warrant will be suppressed only where there has been a “flagrant disregard” of the terms of the warrant. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1354. The crucial inquiry is always “whether the search and seizures were reasonable under all the circumstances.” Id. at 1352; see also United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1254 (D.C.Cir.1981), cited in Schandl, 947 F.2d at 465. Such things as the scope of the warrant, the behavior of the searching agents, the conditions under which the search was conducted, and the nature of the evidence being sought must be considered in determining whether the search was reasonable. Heldt, 668 F.2d at 1254.

This aspect of Lisbon’s motion should be denied for three reasons. First, Lisbon has not specifically pointed out which items he contends were seized in violation of the warrant. He only generally complained about the seizure of “extensive banking and financial records.” Without specifically detailing how the warrant’s scope was exceeded in execution, Lisbon was not entitled to a hearing nor the relief of suppression.

Second, the government produced to the Court and Lisbon copies of the documents seized. The Court has reviewed the documents and the overwhelming majority of them clearly fall within the express terms of the warrant.

Third, while Lisbon contended that “extensive banking and financial information” was seized, [Doc. 194 at 13], those records were subject to seizure as “[i]ndicia of identity and/or occupancy.” See United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1027 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that since specific examples of documents proving ownership or residency were already included, a clause authorizing “indicia of occupancy, residency and/or ownership of the premises” did not violate particularity; such documents would tend to prove facts that would be relevant in establishing the identity of the perpetrators of the robbery).

As a result, Lisbon was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issuance and execution of the search warrant at 1899 Trotti Street. Therefore, having rejected Lisbon’s other arguments as to the search, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Lisbon’s motions directed at suppressing the fruits of the search at 1899 Trotti Street be DENIED.

B. 335 West Ponce de Leon Avenue, Unit 210, Decatur, Georgia (No. l:10-MJ-784-LTW, issued June 11, 2010) [Doc. 203-2].

Lisbon also was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to the search by warrant of W. Ponce. He argued that probable cause was lacking for the issuance of the warrant since there was no nexus between that location and any criminal activity. [Doc. 194 at 19-20].

The affidavit in support of the warrant related that David G. Noe, the affiant, was a DEA Task Force Agent, with over 20 years experience in investigating violations of the narcotics laws. He also had extensive training in the investigation of drug trafficking and drug organizations. [Doc. 203-2 at 2-4]. Based on his training and experience, Noe testified in the affidavit that

(c) Drug traffickers must maintain and have quick access to large amounts of United States currency or other liquid assets in order to maintain and finance their ongoing drug business.

(d) Drug traffickers often maintain in their residences and/or business establishments computerized . or written books, records, receipts, diaries, notes, ledgers, airline tickets, cashier’s checks, money orders and other papers relating to the transportation, ordering, sale and distribution of controlled substances and the outstanding debts and collections from controlled substances that have been distributed.

(e) Drug traffickers commonly conceal contraband, proceeds of drug transactions, records of these transactions, and records reflecting names, nicknames, addresses and telephone numbers of drug associates within their residence and/or places of business, their business vehicles, or the curtilage of their residences or businesses for ready access and to hide them from law enforcement agencies.

(f) Drug traffickers commonly maintain records at their residences and/or places of business reflecting names, nicknames, addresses and telephone numbers of their current and past drug associates; based on my training and experience, it is common for drug traffickers who provide controlled substances for distribution on a consignment sale basis to create records or ledgers in order to assist them in the collection of drug debts.... Based on my experience, drug traffickers also use cellular telephones, pagers, Blackberry’s and similar electronic devices to retain information, including contact names and phone numbers of other drug traffickers and customers.

(h) Drug traffickers will commonly conceal within their vehicles, residence or businesses, or within the curtilage of their residence or businesses, caches of drugs, large amount of currency, firearms, financial instruments, precious metals, precious gemstones, jewelry, electronic equipment, and other items of value and/or proceeds of drug transactions and evidence of financial transactions relating to obtaining, transferring, secreting, or spending large sums of money made in drug trafficking activities.

[Doc. 203-2 at 9-11].

Noe also recounted in the affidavit how law enforcement had been investigating a Mexico-based drug trafficking organization with distribution cells in Atlanta and elsewhere. Jose Trinidad Ayala-Baez, a/k/a Trino, was one of the cell’s leaders in Atlanta, who in turn took directions from “Burra” in Mexico. Investigation of the organization had led to the discovery of 33 kilograms of cocaine and over $1.5 million on January 13, 2010, and 15 kilograms of cocaine on January 29, 2010. [Id. at 14]. In September 2009, agents intercepted telephone calls detailing the organization’s turning over a vehicle with a secret compartment to one of its customers. Surveillance showed Trino and others arriving at an address and then “Tin,” one of Trino’s workers, delivering a pickup truck (registered to Lisbon at 713 McKoy Street, Decatur, Georgia) to 1827 Lomita Road, S.E., Atlanta, Georgia. A pole camera at that location showed a significant amount of short-term visitors at that location, and on June 4, 2010, agents stopped a car that had just driven away from that residence. The driver, who was found to be in possession of a small amount of cocaine, stated that she purchased small amounts of cocaine from a tall black male at that location 4 to 5 times a month. [Id. at 14-17].

The affidavit also related that Trino was intercepted on a telephone call on May 21, 2010, being instructed by Burra to deliver 10 kilograms of cocaine to “Bebe.” [Id. at 23]. Following Trino’s arrest on June 9, 2010, he cooperated and identified Bebe as a black male customer to whom, on Burra’s instructions, Trino delivered cocaine. Trino also picked up drug money from Bebe. Trino identified Lisbon’s photograph in a photographic lineup as “Bebe.” Trino stated that the pickup truck with the hidden compartment was delivered to Lisbon at the Lomita residence. Trino also stated he picked up drug proceeds from Lisbon at Trotti within the past couple of weeks. He further admitted to delivering to Lisbon approximately 50 kilograms of cocaine during the preceding 10 months, and picking up drug money directly from Lisbon on three occasions and sending Tin on other occasions. He stated that Lisbon drove a brown, late-model Chevrolet Impala. [IcL at 24-25]. An agent observed a gold Chevrolet Impala parked adjacent to Trotti and determined that the vehicle was registered to Trotti Used Cars at that address. [Id. at 26].

Probable cause to support a search warrant exists when the totality of the circumstances allow a conclusion that there is a fair probability of finding contraband or evidence at a particular location. See United States v. Gonzalez, 940 F.2d 1413, 1419 (11th Cir.1991). “[Probable cause is a fluid concept — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts[.]” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The task of the issuing magistrate judge in determining whether to issue a warrant “is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id.; United States v. Jiminez, 224 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000). The issuing magistrate judge may credit statements of a declarant containing admission of criminal conduct. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583-84, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971) (“Admissions of crime, like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of credibility — sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search. That the informant may be paid or promised a ‘break’ does not eliminate the residual risk and opprobrium of having admitted criminal conduct. Concededly admissions of crime do not always lend credibility to contemporaneous or later accusations of another. But here the informant’s admission that over a long period and currently he had been buying illicit liquor on certain premises, itself and without more, implicated that property and furnished probable cause to search.”).

Then, the task of a reviewing court is not to conduct a de novo determination of probable cause, but only to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the magistrate judge’s decision to issue the warrant. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728, 104 S.Ct. 2085, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984). Reviewing courts must not interpret supporting affidavits in a hypertechnical manner; rather, a realistic and commonsense approach should be employed so as to encourage recourse to the warrant process and to promote the high level of deference traditionally given to magistrates in their probable cause determinations. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236-37, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965)). “[Pjrobable cause must exist when the magistrate judge issues the search warrant,” United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 672 (11th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Harris, 20 F.3d 445, 450 (11th Cir.1994)), because a search is not to be made legal by what it turns up, United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948).

An affidavit in support of a search warrant for a suspect’s residence “should establish a connection between the defendant and the residence to be searched and a link between the residence and any criminal activity.” United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, where a warrant to search a residence is sought, the affidavit must supply the authorizing magistrate judge with a reasonable basis for concluding that Defendant might keep evidence of his crimes at his home, i.e., a “safe yet accessible place.” United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1310 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82, 87-88 (1st Cir.1999)). “[T]he nexus between the objects to be seized and the premises searched can be established from the particular circumstances involved and need not rest on direct observation.” United States v. Lockett, 674 F.2d 843, 846 (11th Cir.1982). With regard to a suspect’s home, the Kapordelis Court reiterated that:

“[t]he justification for allowing a search of a person’s residence when that person is suspected of criminal activity is the common-sense realization that one tends to conceal fruits and instrumentalities of a crime in a place to which easy access may be had and in which privacy is nevertheless maintained. In normal situations, few places are more convenient than one’s residence for use in planning criminal activities and hiding fruits of a crime.”

Kapordelis, 569 F.3d at 1310 (quoting United States v. Green, 634 F.2d 222, 226 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)). The Kapordelis Court continued:

There need not be an allegation that the illegal activity occurred at the location to be searched, for example the home, but “the affidavit should establish a connection between the defendant and the residence to be searched and a link between the residence and any criminal activity.” [] Martin, 297 F.3d [at] 1314[ ]; see United States v. Anton, 546 F.3d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir.2008) (evidence of possession of contraband of type normally expected to be hidden in residence will support search); United States v. Jenkins, 901 F.2d 1075, 1080-81 (11th Cir.1990) (nexus between items to be seized and defendant’s home can be established circumstantially where contraband is capable of being hidden in residence). But see Green, 634 F.2d at 226 (convenience of defendant’s residence “for use as a place to plan and hide fruits of the crime [was] thus diminished, if not eliminated” where alleged obstruction of justice, suborning of perjury, and violations of citizen’s civil rights took place thousands of miles from home in absence of other evidence linking residence and the criminal activity).

569 F.3d at 1310.

In this case, probable cause supported the issuing magistrate judge’s conclusion that there was sufficient reason to believe that evidence of Lisbon’s drug trafficking would be found at W. Ponce. The affidavit clearly established that Lisbon had committed violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. The affidavit further demonstrated that the W. Ponce apartment was one of Lisbon’s residences. Noe had extensive experience in investigating drug traffickers and averred that the residence was a likely hiding place for contraband and evidence of Lisbon’s crime. “These combined facts would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that a search of [Lisbon’s] home would uncover evidence of [drug trafficking].” Jenkins, 901 F.2d at 1081; see also id. (“This is not to say that the isolated word of an experienced FBI agent- that people hide stolen items in their homes is sufficient to provide probable cause to search a residence. Nor does probable cause to believe that the defendant has stolen something justify search of a residence. We hold, however, that the combination of a finding of probable cause that Jenkins committed the theft, the fact that the contraband stolen was composed of items which are capable of being hidden in a residence, and the statement of an agent who had ten years’ experience investigating bank robberies provided sufficient probable cause to justify a search of Jenkins’ home.”); Anton, 546 F.3d at 1358 (holding that warrant was supported by probable cause where affidavit recounted that (1) agents observed Anton with firearms at several gun shows; (2) confidential informant indicated that Anton would attend a specific gun show and claimed to be in possession of over 300 firearms; (3) based upon agent’s experience, convicted felons and firearms dealers possessing contraband typically store these items on their property; and (4) Anton’s trailer was observed at multiple gun shows). Thus, the Court rejects Lisbon’s probable-cause challenge.

Lisbon’s remaining challenges about the W. Ponce search by warrant are identical to the arguments he made with regard to Trotti; that is, the warrant’s description of “identification documents and mail” was in violation of the particularity requirement, and the executing agents exceeded the terms of the warrant when they seized “extensive banking and financial information.” These arguments are rejected for the same reasons set forth in relation to the Trotti search.

Because the Court concludes that the Trotti and W. Ponce warrants were validly issued and executed, the Court need not address in detail the parties’ arguments about the application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule as set out in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). In Leon, the Supreme Court established a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule to prevent suppression of the items found pursuant to a search warrant. Under Leon, 468 U.S. at 913, 104 S.Ct. 3405, the good-faith exception to the rule requiring the suppression of evidence for Fourth Amendment violations keeps evidence from being suppressed when law-enforcement officers obtain evidence through objective, good-faith reliance on a facially valid warrant that is later found to lack probable cause. See United States v. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d 999, 1004 n. 4 (11th Cir.1992). Nevertheless, “it is clear that in some circumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23, 104 S.Ct. 3405. Leon’s good-faith exception does not apply to the following situations: (1) where the magistrate in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role; (3) where the affidavit supporting the warrant is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) where, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant is so facially deficient — i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized — that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. United States v. Robinson, 336 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003). Thus, under Leon’s third exception, the affidavit must not be a “bare-bones” statement containing nothing more than conclusory allegations. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 915, 104 S.Ct. 3405; United States v. Glinton, 154 F.3d 1245, 1257 (11th Cir.1998).

The Court does not find that the affidavit was so lacking in probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. Robinson, 336 F.3d at 1296. The affidavit set forth an extensive drug-smuggling and — distribution network with which Lisbon was associated, and as to whose activities Lisbon utilized both his vehicles and residences. As a result, even if probable cause did not exist to issue the W. Ponce search warrant, the evidence seized should not be excluded from Lisbon’s trial on account of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Lisbon’s motions to suppress challenging the search warrant for W. Ponce be DENIED.

C. Safe deposit boxes: Bank of America Safe Deposit Box #C~ 128, (No. l:10-MJ-825-LTW, issued June 15, 2010) [Doc. 203-3]; SunTrust Bank Safe Deposit Box # 214 (No. l:10-MJ-828, issued June 15, 2010) [Doc. 203-4]; Wachovia Bank Safe Deposit Box # 089 (No. 1:10-MJ~827, issued June 15, 2010) [Doc. 203-5]

Lisbon moved to suppress three search warrants for safe-deposit boxes, Bank of America Safe Deposit Box # C-128, located in Conyers, Georgia, [search warrant located in the record at Doc. 203-3]; Wachovia Safe Deposit Box # 089, located in McDonough, Georgia, [Doc. 203-5]; and SunTrust Bank Safe Deposit Box #214, located in Conyers, Georgia, [Doc. 203-4], (See Amended Motion to Suppress, [Doc. 194]). The Court initially denied Lisbon an evidentiary hearing on his motions to suppress the results of the searches of those boxes, [Doc. 242 at 27-28], because his contentions that the searches were invalid were premised solely on the fact that these warrants were fruits of the unlawful searches by warrant at Trotti and W. Ponce, [see Doc. 194 at 6, 24]. Since the Court rejected Lisbon’s challenges as to the sufficiency and execution of those search warrants, it followed that the warrants for the safe-deposit boxes were not invalid as fruits of any prior unlawful search.

As will be shown below, the evidence presented as to the warrantless search at W. Ponce presented a colorable claim that the three safe-deposit-box search warrants were tainted by the fruits of the warrant-less search. The Court discusses below the propriety of the safe-deposit-box warrants in light of that warrantless search and in light of Lisbon’s arguments that these warrants were fruits of unlawful warrantless searches of W. Ponce and an automobile at that address.

II. Searches as to which Lisbon was entitled to an evidentiary hearing

A. Facts

As noted in the Court’s previous order, Lisbon was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the warrantless search at W. Ponce at the time of his arrest, including the search of his automobile, which resulted in the seizure of the two cellular telephones in the apartment, Lisbon’s wallet in his automobile, and a two sets of keys, one in a pair of pants he put on following his arrest and one in the automobile. These seizures in turn potentially impacted the searches by warrant of the three safe-deposit boxes.

The evidentiary-hearing record discloses that on Friday, June 11, 2010, DEA Task Force Officer David Noe, along with several other DEA agents and task-force officers, went to the W. Ponce apartment to arrest Lisbon on the federal arrest warrant issued following the indictment in this case. Tl-7. At that time, the agents did not have a search warrant either for the premises or any automobiles. Tl-24. The complex in which Lisbon lived required an electronic card to access the living-units area and the parking garage. Tl-26. It appears that the agents gained entry to the development from the complex management. Id.

The agents knocked on the door to Lisbon’s apartment and Lisbon answered the door. Noe asked him if he was “Artis Lisbon.” Lisbon acknowledged his identity and Noe told him he had an arrest warrant for him. Tl-7, 27.

Lisbon’s apartment was a one-room flat comprised of a sleeping section, living-room section and kitchen. Tl-8. Although internal walls separated the three sections in the unit, the bedroom area was visible from the living room. Tl-9.

At the time of his arrest, Lisbon was dressed in his boxer shorts and asked if he could get dressed. Tl-9, Tl-62. Agents performed a security sweep of the apartment to ensure no one else was present, and then escorted him to the bedroom area so he could get dressed. Tl-9, Tl-62. Lisbon pointed out a shirt, a pair of pants and shoes he wanted to wear, and the agents searched them. Tl-9, Tl-62. A set of keys were located and removed from the pants before giving them to Lisbon to wear. Tl-15, Tl-30.

Noe read Lisbon Miranda rights from a card and asked Lisbon if he would consent to a search of the apartment. Lisbon stated that Noe would have to get a warrant. Noe stated he would. Tl-8.

Before Lisbon was removed from the apartment, Noe asked him for his identification. Tl-9. Lisbon stated it was in his wallet in the center console of his automobile. Tl-10, Tl-30-31, Tl-51. However, Lisbon was not asked if the officers could enter his vehicle to get the wallet. Tl-32.

As the agents escorted Lisbon from the apartment, Lisbon asked if he could take his cell phones, and Noe asked him where they were located. Tl-9, 10. Lisbon responded that they were on the coffee table. Noe knew that Lisbon would not be able to take the cell phones to jail. Tl-28. The agents had observed the cell phones on the coffee table while sweeping the apartment. Tl-42, Tl-48. Noe seized them. TIO. No cell phone subscribed to Lisbon had been intercepted during the investigation, but law enforcement did identify cell phones he was using during the investigation. Tl-35, Tl-36. For example, Lisbon was intercepted speaking with co-conspirators Keyna and Burra, who were located in Mexico, when he borrowed a cell phone from someone else. Tl-42.

The agents were in Lisbon’s apartment for 10 to 15 minutes before escorting him out. Tl-15. They exited through the enclosed, gated parking area below the apartment units. Lisbon pointed his head in direction of his vehicle, a gold Malibu, and verbally indicated to the agents where it was parked. Tl-16, Tl-34, Tl-50. Agents had seen Lisbon in this car some weeks before Lisbon’s arrest. Tl-24. A cooperating defendant had described “that car when he had conducted meetings to either pick up money or proceeds of drug sales or turn over drugs to” Lisbon. Tl-18. Using the keys seized from Lisbon’s pants, Agent Daniel unlocked the vehicle and retrieved Lisbon’s wallet and another set of keys. Tl-17, Tl-41., The keys included safe-deposit-box keys. Tl-36.

Noe examined the wallet’s contents on Friday, June 11, 2010, at his office after executing the Trotti search warrant. T29. When he opened the wallet to get Lisbon’s driver’s license, he saw a business card with a bank name and account numbers, as well as bank-account numbers and balances and safe-deposit-box numbers. Tl-37-39; Tl-65-66; T2-11; Def. Exhs. 1 at 6-8, 2 at 9. To Noe, this evidence corroborated the financial-record evidence he found at Trotti and subsequently at W. Ponce. T2-12.

Noe obtained a search warrant for W. Ponce on the same day as Lisbon’s arrest, June 11, 2010, at 12:25 pm. Tl-12, Tl-64; Gov’t Exh. 1. The search warrant authorized seizure and search of cell phones. Tl-13. The W. Ponce warrant was executed that day. T2-12. As a result of executing that search warrant, financial records, including documents reflecting a bank record, were seized. Tl-64; T2-12; Gov’t Exh. 2.

Noe further searched the wallet on the following Monday. Tl-64; T2-13. As a result of seeing financial records in executing the search warrants at Trotti and W. Ponce, as well as seeing the papers in the wallet, Noe directed another agent to call the banks the next day. T2-13, T2-18, T2-23. However, no documents from Wachovia were located during the searches, and Noe conceded that he directed the call to Wachovia Bank because of the documents found in Lisbon’s wallet. T2-20, T2-21. Wachovia, SunTrust, and Bank of America told law enforcement which accounts and safe-deposit boxes Lisbon had at their respective banks. T2-21. As a result of those calls, the agents learned of two additional accounts of which they were previously unaware. T2-16. Then, Noe drafted an affidavit in support of a search warrant for each of the accounts or boxes. T2-22. He did not advise the issuing magistrate judge that he learned of the safe-deposit boxes from searching Lisbon’s vehicle without a warrant. T2-22.

B. Contentions of the parties

Following the first evidentiary hearing, Lisbon filed his second amended motion to suppress, [Doc. 256], in which he contended that the search warrants for the safe-deposit boxes were the fruits of the illegal warrantless search of his apartment and automobile at the time of his arrest.

In its first post-evidentiary-hearing brief, the government first contends that the cell phones were lawfully seized pursuant to the plain-view doctrine. [Doc. 266 at 11]. It argues that while plain view requires that the probable cause that the object in plain view is contraband or evidence be “immediately apparent,” the doctrine does not require an “unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminatory character of evidence” or that police “ ‘know1 that certain items are contraband or evidence of a crime,” (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983)). [Doc. 266 at 11]. The government points out that courts have held that cell phones in drug-trafficking investigations may come within the plain-view exception “as items akin to contraband, in that they are often tools of ... drug-trafficking,” (quoting United States v. Santillan, 571 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1100-01 (D.Ariz.2008) (citation omitted)). [Doc. 266 at 13]. It then contends that in this case, the investigation involved intercepting approximately 26 cell phones, which resulted in agents overhearing conversations (corroborated by Trino’s post-arrest statements) that Lisbon was receiving drugs from the organization and money was being picked up by the organization from Lisbon. Thus, consistent with Noe’s testimony that drug trafficker’s cell phones often contain evidence of co-conspirator contacts and text messages indicating criminal activity, there was probable cause to believe that Lisbon’s cell phones contained evidence of criminal activity. [Id. at 14]. The government then contends that because the cell phones were properly seized pursuant to the plain-view doctrine, they did not need to be searched contemporaneously, and in any event no search warrant to search them was needed. [Id. at 15]. Alternatively, the government argues (1) that the subsequent search warrant for the W. Ponce apartment authorized the seizure and search of cell phones, [id. at 15 & n. 9 (citing Doc. 203-2 at 2) ], and (2) the independent-source doctrine justified the search, since the cell phones would have been searched pursuant to the warrant for W. Ponce. [Id. at 15].

Next, the government argues that the search of the Malibu’s console was justified under the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement, since there was probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of Lisbon’s drug trafficking. [Id. at 18]. In addition to intercepted phone calls demonstrating that drugs were being delivered to Lisbon and one intercepted call reflecting that a pickup truck registered to Lisbon contained a secret compartment, agents had seen the gold Malibu at the Trotti location, and Trino had indicated that Lisbon used a gold or light-brown vehicle in his drug-trafficking activities. [Id. at 19]. The government submits that this evidence, combined with Noe’s testimony that in his experience, drug traffickers’ vehicles often contains relevant evidence of their drug crimes, established probable cause to believe that the Malibu contained evidence of Lisbon’s drug activities. [Id. at 20]. Further, the government posits that the agents’ actual intent at the time the Malibu was searched is irrelevant and that law enforcement could seize the wallet and search it at a later time, relying on United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 105 S.Ct. 881, 83 L.Ed.2d 890 (1985), and United States v. Weber, 808 F.2d 1422 (11th Cir.1987). [Doc. 266 at 22].

Next, the government argues that the same legal principles governed the seizure of the keys from the Malibu. In this regard, the government contends that there was probable cause to seize the keys because they established Lisbon’s connection to Trotti. [IcL at 23-24].

The government further argues that the facts indicated that Lisbon impliedly consented to the search of the center console of the Malibu when he told Noe where his wallet was and pointed his head in the direction of the car. [Id. at 24-29].

Next, the government contends that the searches of the cell phones, wallet, and keys were lawful under the independent-source doctrine. [Id. at 29]. It argues that the same items would have been discovered, seized, and searched once the W. Ponce search warrant was obtained a few hours after Lisbon’s arrest. [M at 29-31].

Finally, the government argues that the safe-deposit-box search warrants were not tainted by the seizure of the cell phones and warrantless search of the Malibu. It argues that the cell phones and keys were not mentioned in the safe-deposit-box warrant applications. [Id. at 32], The government asks that the evidentiary record be re-opened to allow it to show that the discovery of financial records at Trotti and W. Ponce would have resulted in the calling of the banks and discovery of the existence of the safe-deposit boxes. [Id. at 33-35].

In response after the first evidentiary hearing, Lisbon first argues that Noe’s testimony about how the cell phones were seized was inherently incredible. Lisbon acknowledges that the agents were legitimately on the premises, given their arrest warrant for Lisbon and Lisbon’s state of undress, requiring entry into the apartment to get clothes. Nonetheless, he contends that Noe’s testimony was unworthy of belief because (1) it is highly unlikely that the agents, in conducting a protective sweep of the apartment, did not see the cell phones, and (2) since Noe said they were in plain view, it was unlikely that he had to ask Lisbon where the cell phones were located when Lisbon asked if he could take them as he was being escorted to jail. Similarly, Lisbon argues that since he had been to jail many times before and had to know that cell phones were contraband in jail, Noe’s testimony that Lisbon asked to take his cell phones to jail should be ignored as incredible. Further, Lisbon argues that Noe’s testimony about the seizure of the cell phones in this case was inconsistent with the seizure of cell phones in another case, United States v. Rodriguez-Alejandro, 664 F.Supp.2d 1320, 1332-33 (N.D.Ga.2009), where Noe also was involved and where the evidence was that during a protective sweep of the defendant’s apartment, the sweeping agents call