Committee to Protect our Agricultural Water v. Occidental Oil & Gas Corp. (235 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 2017)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Dale A. Drozd, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter came before the court on June 22, 2016, for hearing of defendants’ motions to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. Nos. 51, 55, 57, 59, 63, 64.) Attorneys Patricia K. Oliver, R. Rex Parris, and Jennifer F. Novak appeared on behalf of plaintiffs Committee to Protect our Agricultural Water, Mike Hopkins, and John Wedel. Attorneys Matthew T. Kline and Dimitri D. Portnoi appeared on behalf of defendant Occidental Oil and Gas Corporation, and the California Resources Corporation. Attorney Christopher R. Rodriguez appeared on behalf of defendant Western States Petroleum Association. Attorneys' William E. Thompson and Zach Hughes appeared on behalf of defendant Chevron U.S.A., Inc. Attorney Keli N. Osaki appeared on behalf of defendant California Independent Petroleum Association. Deputy Attorney General Kenneth ’G. Lake appeared on behalf of defendant California Division of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal Resources, Governor Edmund G. Brown, Timothy R. Kustic, and Mark Ne-chodom. Attorneys Joel M. Athey, Kristina Azlin, and Kern County Counsel Theresa A. Goldner appeared on behalf of defendant Lorelei H. Oviatt. Following oral argument, defendants’ various motions were taken under submission.

The task of addressing six separate motions to dismiss and all of the arguments raised in support of and in opposition to. those motions has proven to be somewhat cumbersome. In the end, the court has concluded that the allegations of the operative complaint are deficient with respect to each of the claims presented. In addition, the court has concluded that some of those deficiencies cannot be cured. For the reasons explained more fully below, the court will grant defendants’ motions to dismiss.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 31, 2015 plaintiffs Committee to Protect our. Agricultural Water, Mike Hopkins, and John Wedel, commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. (Doc. No. 1.) On August 31, 2015, the case was transferred to .the Eastern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a). (Doc. No. 95.)

This action now proceeds before the court on plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), filed June 16, 2015. (Doc. No. 16.) In the FAC, plaintiffs bring claims against various defendants, including California Governor Edmund G. Browii; three California state officials, the former State Oil & Gas Supervisor (“Supervisor”) for the Division of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal Resources (“DOGGR”) Timothy Rustic, Director of the .California Department of Conservation (“CDC”) Mark Nechodom, and Kern County official Lorelei Oviatt; three. oil companies, Occidental Oil and Gas Corporation (“Occidental”), California Resources Corporation (“CRC”), and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (“Chevron”); and two trade associations, the Western States Petroleum Association (“WSPA”) and California Independent Petroleum Association (“CIPA”).

The FAC alleges in relevant part as follows. Oil development 'in California is subject to both federal and state regulation. The federal Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 (“SDWA”) provides rules for protection of public drinking water supplies. (Id. at 4); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(f) et seq. Under the SDWA, the Environmental Protection Agency '(“EPA”) is authorized to regulate underground injection of fluid through wells, and to oversee states implementing these federal standards. (Doc. No. 16 at 25); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(h), et seq. The EPA has specifically approved California’s underground injection control program. (Doc. No. 16 at 25); see also 40 C.F.R. § 147.250. Pursuant to California’s program, companies must obtain permits when they seek to use water disposal injection wells, known as Class II wells, to stimulate oil production. (Doc. No. 16 at 25.); see also Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 3000 et seq. The CDC’s DOGGR is charged with granting such permits. Id.

In 2008, California, oil companies began to increase their use of Class II wells in California. (Id.) Around 2010, oil and gas companies began to require more well-drilling permits than were previously needed. (Id.) In -response to the increased need, the oil and gas companies began contacting government officials in an attempt to streamline the process for DOGGR issuance of well-drilling permits. (Id.)

Plaintiffs allege that as early as September 27, 2011, defendants formed an “enterprise” to illegally increase oil production and maximize profits and tax revenue by allowing oil companies to inject salt water into fresh water in violation of the SDWA. (Id.) According to plaintiffs, this violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 1341, 1343, 1346.43, 1512(b), and 1513(b), and thus, constitutes racketeering activity. (Id.)

' The FAC asserts the following claims against all defendants: (i) claims under the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and (d); and (ii) civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985(3). (Id. at 48, 51.). Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and monetary damages. (Id. at 53-54.)

On August 10,. 2015, defendants Occidental, CIPA, Chevron, WSPA, and Oviatt filed individual motions to dismiss, (Doc. Nos. 51, 55, 57, 59, 63), and defendants Governor Brown, DOGGR, Rustic, and Ne-chodom (“state defendants”), filed a joint motion to dismiss, (Doc. No. 64). On. August 20, 2015 plaintiffs filed opposition papers to defendants’ motions to dismiss. (Doc. Nos. 71, 73-77.) Defendants filed their replies on August 27, 2015. (Doc. Nos. .81, 83, 85, 88, 90, 91.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC, 736 F.3d 1180, 1182 (9th Cir. 2013). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Though Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Novak v. United States, 795 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 2015). It is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the ... laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983).

ANALYSIS

In their various motions to dismiss, defendants collectively advance eight arguments: (i) plaintiffs’ claims are entirely barred by the Noerr-Pénnington doctrine; (ii) plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (iii) plaintiffs’ claims are barred by absolute immunity; (iv) plaintiffs’ claims are barred by qualified immunity; (v) plaintiffs fail to state a cognizable RICO claim, as they lack standing and have not met federal pleading standards; (vi) plaintiffs fail to adequately plead claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985(3); (vii) plaintiffs Hopkins and Wedel have failed to join necessary parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7); and • (viii) plaintiffs Hopkins’ claims, are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Additionally, both plaintiffs and defendants Occidental and CRC, Oviatt, Chevron, and WSPA request that the court , take judicial notice of several documents and other items. (Doc. Nos. 53, 58, 61, 63-2, 72.)

Below, the court will first address the parties’ requests for judicial notice, and, thereafter, will turn to the arguments advanced by each of the defendants in support of their motions to dismiss.

I. Judicial Notice

When ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court is permitted to consider material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint, documents that are not physically attached to the complaint if their authenticity is not contested .and the plaintiffs’ compkint necessarily relies on them, and matters of public record. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001); Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990)(documents .attached to the complaint are considered a part thereof and may be addressed in resolving a motion to dismiss); see also Johnson v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 793 F.3d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir. 2015) (materials referred to in the complaint, but not attached thereto, may be considered on a motion to dismiss, if no one questions their authenticity); MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986) (judicially noticeable materials should be considered by the court in resolving a motion to dismiss). However, a court may not take judicial notice of a fact that is “subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003).

a. State Court Documents and Corporate Filings

Defendants Occidental, CRC, and Chevron, request that the court judicially notice the following three documents: the original and First Amended Complaints filed in Palla Farms v. Crimson Resource Management Corp., et al., Case No. S-1500CV-283013-DRL; a corporate filing for Monache Meadows Farming Co., LLC; and a corporate filing for Palla Farms, LLC. (Doc. Nos. 53 at 2-3; 61 at 4.) The latter two documents are on file with the California Secretary of State. (Id.)

The court grants the request for judicial notice of the Palla Farms complaints, but only for purposes of noticing the existence of the lawsuit and the claims presented therein. See United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992); Lexington Ins. Co. v. Energetic Lath & Plaster, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00861-KJM-EFB, 2015 WL 5436784, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2015); see also Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that courts may take judicial notice of “documents on file in federal or state courts”); see generally Fed. R. Evid. 201 (governing judicial notice of adjudicative facts). The court also grants the request for judicial notice of the corporate filings, which are “matters of public record outside the pleadings.” Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distribs., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991); see also White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000).

b. Kern County Planning Department Documents

Defendant Oviatt requests that the court take judicial notice of the following documents: minutes from the Kern County Board of Supervisors meetings held on November 6, 2012, November 13, 2012, December 11, 2012, and January 22, 2013; letters from defendant Oviatt to the Kern County Board of Supervisors, dated January 22, 2013, April 30, 2013, and June 4, 2013; documents related to Oil & Gas Zoning Ordinance Amendments, including a Notice of Decision from August 30, 2013, a presentation to the Kern County Board of Supervisors from September 16, 2013, and an Executive Summary from July 2015; a Kern County Staff Report on revisions to Kern County Zoning Ordinance 2015 C, from July 27, 2015; and a Kern County public meeting schedule from August 9, 2015. (Doe. No. 58 at 2-5.)

Because these documents are publicly available official records of the Kern County Planning Department, they constitute “matters of public record” which may be judicially noticed. Intri-Plex Technologies, Inc. v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007); Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the court grants these requests for judicial notice.

c.Publications from the DOGGR and CEPA, and the Office of Governor Brown

Defendant Chevron requests that the court take judicial notice of the following documents: the “Proposed Text of the Aquifer Exemption Compliance Schedule Regulations” prepared by the DOGGR, dated May 29,2015; a letter from DOGGR Supervisor Steve Bohlen from February 6, 2015; a memorandum from the California Environmental Protection Agency, dated March 2, 2015; and a press release from the Office of Governor Brown, dated January 13, 2012. (Doc. No. 61 at 2-3.) Again, because, these documents are matters of public record, having been prepared and made public by official government agencies, the court grants defendant Chevron’s requests for judicial notice. See United States v. 14.02 Acres of Land More or Less, 547 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2008). Defendant Chevron further requests that the court take judicial notice of a video from the Office of Governor Brown, dated January 13, 2012, referenced by plaintiffs in their FAC. (Doc. No. 61 at 4-5.) The court grants this request. See Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that courts may consider evidence on which the “complaint necessarily relies if: (i) the complaint refers to the document; (ii) the document is central to the plaintiffs’ claim; and (iii) no party questions the authenticity of the copy attached to the 12(b)(6) motion”).

d.California Secretary of State Documents

Defendant WSPA requests that the court take judicial notice of a report concerning lobbying activity for WSPA between July 1, 2013, and September 30, 2013, published on the California Secretary of State website. (Doc. No. 63-2 at 2.) As this report is a matter of public record maintained by a governmental agency, the court grants WSPA’s request for judicial notice. See United States v. 14.02 Acres of Land More or Less, 547 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2008).

e.Plaintiffs’ Requests for Judicial Notice & Submission of Chernow Declaration

Plaintiffs request that the court judicially notice one hundred and fifteen items, comprising over seven hundred pages of factual statements, images, letters, emails, and newspaper articles. (Doc. No. 72.) Plaintiffs do not offer specific arguments supporting judicial notice of each item, but instead argue in conclusory fashion that the documents “are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” (Id. at 2.) Additionally, plaintiffs have lodged a declaration of CDC official Derek Chernow in support of their opposition to defendants Occidental and CRC’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 78.)

Defendants Occidental, CRC, and Oviatt oppose plaintiffs’ requests for judicial notice, and request that the court strike both plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice and the Chernow declaration. (Doc. Nos. 82, 84, 92.) With respect to plaintiffs’ requests for judicial notice, defendants argue that plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that the items of which they seek judicial notice are not reasonably subject to dispute. (Doc. No. 82 at 3.) Specifically, defendants argue that “plaintiffs do not authenticate the documents, identify which document falls into which category, or provide any authority for the proposition that any documents obtained pursuant to a public records request is automatically noticeable.” (Doc. No. 84 at 2.) With respect to the Chernow declaration, defendants argue that it is improper in the context of a motion to dismiss under Federal Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), and that it lacks foundation and contains inadmissible hearsay. (Id. at 8.)

The court agrees with defendants in large part. While the court may take judicial notice of matters of public record under Federal Evidence Rule 201, it may not take judicial notice of contested facts. See Ritter v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 58 F.3d 454, 458-59 (9th Cir. 1995); NLRB v. Big Bear Supermarkets # 3, 640 F.2d 924, 926 n.1 (9th Cir. 1980) (declining to take judicial notice of letters .because the defendant “has failed to establish that the information, in the letters is not subject to reasonable dispute”); cf. In re American Apparel, Inc. Shareholder Litig., 855 F.Supp.2d 1043, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“Courts in the Ninth Circuit routinely take judicial notice of press releases,” and listing cases). Here, plaintiffs have made no showing as to why the court may take notice of the documents and items which are the subject of their request under Federal Evidence Rule 201, It is not incumbent upon the court to sort through the voluminous list of exhibits to determine whether any of the contents are appropriate subjects for judicial notice. See Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131-1132 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1026 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003) (“In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiffs moving papers”) (quoting Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998)). Accordingly, the court denies plaintiffs’ requests for judicial notice.

However, because the court has found it unnecessary to examine the Chernow declaration, in analyzing the defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiffs’,complaint, the court will deny defendants’ motion to strike that declaration as moot. See Forest-Keeper v. Benson, No. 1:14-cv-00341-LJO-SKO, 2014 WL 4193840, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2014) (denying a motion to strike as moot because “the Court did not rely on the contested information when coming to its decision regarding Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss”); see also Doe v. Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 837 F.Supp.2d 1145, 1157 (D. Idaho 2011) (denying a motion to strike as moot because “in reaching its decision in this case, the Court has not found it necessary to consider the extrinsic materials provided, by [plaintiff]”).

II. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine

Defendants first argue that the FAC should be dismissed because plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the First Amendment’s Noerr-Pennington doctrine.

The Noerr-Pennington doctrine derives from the First Amendment’s guarantee of the “right of the people ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”, U.S. Const. amend. I; United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670, 85 S.Ct. 1585, 14 L.Ed.2d 626 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136-37, 81 S.Ct. 523, 5 L.Ed.2d 464 (1961); Nunag-Tanedo v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 711 F.3d 1136, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2013). Under this doctrine, those who petition any department of the government for redress are generally immune from statutory liability for their petitioning conduct, or for conduct that is “incidental” to valid petitioning conduct. Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 n.4, 108 S.Ct. 1931, 100 L.Ed.2d 497 (1988) (observing that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunizes conduct “if it is ‘incidental’ to a valid effort to influence government action”); Nunag-Tanedo, 711 F.3d at 1139. Though it initially emerged in the antitrust context, the Supreme Court has held that the doctrine also applies in other, indeed all, statutory contexts as well. Nunag-Tanedo, 711 F.3d at 1139; Kearney v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, 590 F.3d 638, 643 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972)). In particular, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has been found to apply to RICO arid 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. See Sosa, 437 F.3d at 930-32 & n.6; Boulware v. State of Nev., Dept. of Human Res., 960 F.2d 793, 800 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Lynn v. Friedenthal, No. CV 09-08717-PSG (VBK), 2011 WL 6960823, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2011) (stating that Noerr-Pennington immunity “applies no matter how a plaintiff chooses to. characterize a purported cause of action”). Moreover, Noerr-Pennington applies to conduct by both private and government actors. Manistee Town Ctr. v. City of Glendale, 227 F.3d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Kearney, 590 F.3d at 644.

Immunity under Noerr-Pennington is not absolute, however. In particular, immunity is withheld when the petitioning is a “sham.” Kottle v. Northwest Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1998). Sham petitioning is “private action that is not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action.” Kottle, 146 F.3d at 1060; see also Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 486 U.S. at 500 n.4, 108 S.Ct. 1931. The sham exception applies when a defendant uses government processes, as bpposed to the otitcome of those processes, as a mechanism to injure plaintiffs, Empress LLC v. City and County of San Francisco, 419 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Ad Visor, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co., 640 F.2d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1981) (“The cases following Noerr and Pennington show the ‘sham’ exception to be a test of whether the efforts to obtain judicial or legislative action can be characterized as an abuse of process.”).

The scope of the Noerr-Pen-nington sham exception depends on the branch of government involved. Kottle, 146 F.3d at 1061. If the relevant petitioning activity involves the legislature, “the sham exception is' extraordinarily narrow.” See Kottle, 146 F.3d at 1061; see. also I. Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, 262 at'¶ 204 (2013) (noting that, in the context of legislative petitioning, “it is virtually impossible' to identify the sham”); cf. Stuart N. Senator, Noerr-Pennington: Safeguarding the First Amendment Right to Petition the Government, 23 J. Antitrust & Unfair Competition L. Sec. St. B. Cal. 83, 89 (2014) (observing that, “in the context of legislative petitioning, no circuit court appears to. have expressly applied such an exception or explained what exactly it would be”). In the legislative context, the sham exception has been found to apply if actors use the legislative process “with no expectation of obtaining legitimate government action.” Southern Union Co. v. Southwest Gas Corp., 165 F.Supp.2d 1010, 1042 (D. Ariz. 2001); see also Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Misrepresentations made during otherwise protected petitioning conduct and aimed at the legislature do not amount to sham petitioning. See Liberty Lake Inv., Inc., v. Magnuson, 12 F.3d 155, 158 (9th Cir. 1993); Boone v. Redevelopment Agency,

841 F.2d 886, 896 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 486 U.S. at 499-500, 108 S.Ct. 1981 (stating that conduct seeking legislative action enjoys Noerr-Pennington immunity “even when [it] employs unethical and deceptive methods”); Kottle, 146 F.3d at 1061 (noting that “[misrepresentations are a fact of life in politics,” and “lobbying is the sine qua non of democracy”).

If the relevant petitioning activity involves judicial processes, the sham exception is broader. In judicial settings, misrepresentations to adjudicatory bodies do invoke the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 486 U.S. at 499-500, 108 S.Ct. 1931 (observing that “in less political arenas, unethical and deceptive practices can constitute abuses of ... judicial processes”); California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513, 92 S.Ct. 609, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972) (finding that illegal or fraudulent lobbying activities normally immunized by Noerr-Pennington are not immunized if they occur in a judicial or quasi-judicial setting); Kottle, 146 F.3d at 1061.

Finally, if the petitioning involves an executive agency, the scope of the sham exception depends on whether the executive entity more resembles a judicial body or a political entity. See Forro Precision, Inc. v. International Bus. Machines Corp., 673 F.2d 1045, 1060 n.10 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Kottle, 146 F.3d at 1061. “An administrative process is deemed ‘political’ or ‘adjudicatory for purposes of the ‘sham’ exception by considering the totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis.” Marina Point Dev. Assoc. v. United States, 364 F.Supp.2d 1144, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Kottle, 146 F.3d at 1061). The critical inquiry is whether the agency has discretion and independence, characteristic of a political process, or whether it must instead follow rules and other enforceable standards subject to review, as is the case with an adjudicatory process. See Kottle, 146 F.3d at 1061; Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976) (rejecting the judicial sham exception with respect to proceedings before the San Francisco Board of Permit Appeals, after concluding that the Board was essentially a political body); see also Mercatus Grp. LLC v. Lake Forest Hosp., 641 F.3d 834, 846 (7th Cir. 2011) (articulating standards for distinguishing between legislative and adjudicatory, includingj whether the entity has legislative power,- whether the actions were matters of discretionary authority or were guided by definite standards susceptible to judicial review, the formality of the fact-finding processes, whether testimony was taken under oath, whether the fact-finding process is subject to political influences, and whether the proceedings involve ex parte communications).

In their motions to dismiss, defendants each argue that plaintiffs’ claims are entirely barred by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, because those claims seek to attach liability to petitioning conduct protected under the First Amendment. (Doc. Nos. 51 at 18-23; 55 at 20; 57 at 24; 59-1 at 17; 63-1 at 8; 64-1 at 17-19.)

Plaintiffs contest the defendants’ arguments in this regard. (Doc. Nos. 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77.) While plaintiffs do not deny that their claims are based on defendants’ petitioning activities, they argue that the sham exception applies here. (Doc. No. 71 at 14.) However, plaintiffs do not clearly explain the scope of the sham exception they seek this court to apply. (Id. at 16 n.3.)

In reply, defendants argue that the sham exception is inapplicable in this case. (Doc. No. 90 at 26-28.) They contend that their actions all occurred in a legislative rather than a judicial context, and that any alleged misrepresentations made by the defendants cannot constitute sham petitioning. (Id.) Even if the relevant conduct occurred in a judicial arena, defendants argue, plaintiffs have not alleged in their FAC any specific instances of misrepresentation sufficient to indicate sham petitioning. (Id. at 28.)

Defendants’ arguments are persuasive with respect to defendants Occidental, Chevron, CIPA, and WSPA. The court first concludes that the defendants’ acts as alleged in the FAC constitute protected petitioning activity. In their FAC, plaintiffs bring claims against defendants Occidental, Chevron, CIPA, and WSPA based the following conduct: (i) “closed-door” gatherings between defendants and DOGGR officials in 2012 and 2013, (Doc. No. 16 at 30, 38-39, ¶¶ 139, 189-196); (ii) threats by CIPA and WSPA to file suit against the DOGGR based on well-drilling permit policies, (Id. at 27, ¶¶ 124-125); (iii) political contributions by oil company defendants to defendant Governor Brown, (Id. at 33, ¶¶ 154-155, 198); (iv) marketing and public relations campaigns by Occidental, Chevron, CIPA, and WSPA, (Id. at 42-43, ¶¶ 209-210); and (v) letter-writing campaigns by WSPA and CIPA to defendant Governor Brown, (Id. at' 27-28, ¶¶ 127, 131). All such alleged conduct falls within the scope of protected petitioning. See Boone, 841 F.2d at 894 (discussing meetings between private individuals and government officials, and honoraria or campaign contributions to public officials); see also Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 937 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing litigation-related activities preliminary to the formal filing of a lawsuit, including communications voicing an intent to file suit); Manistee Town Ctr., 227 F.3d at 1090 (discussing marketing and public relations campaigns targeting the general public and seeking government action); White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1227 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing letter-writing campaigns to government officials). Indeed, in their opposition to the pending motion plaintiffs do not deny that their claims are based on petitioning activity, arguing only that defendants’ conduct involves sham petitioning. (Doc. No. 71.) Accordingly, the court concludes that the conduct of defendants Occidental, Chevron, CIPA, and WSPA as alleged in the FAC represents constitutionally protected petitioning within the ambit of Noerr-Pennington.

Furthermore, the sham exception does not apply to the alleged conduct by defendants Occidental, Chevron, CIPA, and the WSPA. As noted above, the scope of the sham exception hinges on the type of petitioning conduct at issue. Since the relevant petitioning activity here involves an executive agency, the DOGGR, the scope of the exception depends on whether the DOGGR more closely resembles a judicial body or a legislative entity. See Kottle, 146 F.3d at 1061. The crucial question is thus whether the DOGGR operates with discretion and independence, characteristic of a political process, or whether it must instead follow formal rules and other enforceable standards subject to review, like an adjudicatory process. Id.

According to the allegations of the FAC, the DOGGR is the executive agency charged with enforcing the SDWA in California and issuing permits to companies seeking to use Class II wells to stimulate oil production. (Doc. No. 16 at 21-22, ¶¶ 95, 100.) At oral argument on the pending motions, plaintiffs described the permit-issuing process as “essentially ministerial,” indicating that applicants must fulfill a “checklist” of requirements before being granted permits, with such permits automatically granted after ten days, absent any DOGGR action. (Doc. No, 166 at 8-9.) Plaintiffs have not indicated, either in their FAC or at oral argument, that the permit-issuing process features any recognizable hallmarks of adjudication—that it was guided by definite standards, involved a formal fact-finding procedure, incorporated proceedings with testimony taken under oath, or produced reviewable decisions. In the absence of any indications to the contrary, the court therefore concludes that the process for issuing well-drilling permits is more akin .to a political process than a judicial one. Cf. Mercatus, 641 F.3d at 847-48 (finding that proceedings related to a proposed physician center before a village. board were “legislative,” because the decisions were “not guided by enforceable, definite standards subject to review,” and “[n]one of the evidence the Board considered was subject to strict rules of admissibility or any recognizable eviden-tiary rules”); U.S. Futures Exch. LLC v. Bd. of Trade of City of Chi, No, 04 C 6756, 2012 WL 3155150, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2012) (finding that proceedings before the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission for approval to launch exchanges was legislative, as the fact-finding process was informal, évidence was not taken on the record, no rules of evidence were applied, testimony was not given under oath, and the proceedings were subject to lobbying and other ex parte influences). Plaintiffs have also failed to plead facts in the FAC suggesting that defendants Occidental, Chevron, CIPA, and WSPA exercised their petitioning rights “with no expectation of. obtaining legitimate government' action.” Southern Union Co., 165 F.Supp.2d at 1042. As such, plaintiffs cannot invoke the legislative sham exception to circumvent Noor-Penning-ton immunity.

Accordingly, the court finds that the alleged conduct of defendants Occidental, Chevron, CIPA, and WSPA does not fall within the sham exception, and that plaintiffs’ claims against these defendants are barred by the First Amendment’s Noerr-Pennington doctrine.

Defendants’ arguments are less persuasive, however, with respect to. the applicability of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to government defendants DOGGR, Governor Brown, Rustic, Nechodom, and Oviatt. Plaintiffs’ claims against these-government defendants are premised on alleged conduct including: (i) defendant Governor Brown’s personnel decisions concerning Miller and Chernow, (Doc. No. 16 at 49, ¶ 238); (ii) defendant Governor Brown’s declining to provide documents in response to Public Records Act requests, (Id.); (iii) defendant DOGGR, Rustic, and Oviatt’s private meetings with oil companies and trade groups, (Id. at 30, 38-40, ¶¶ 139, 189-196, 201); and (iv) defendant Oviatt and defendant Nechodom’s communications with unidentified farmers concerning complaints about contamination, (Id. at 48, ¶ 238.)

As defendants correctly observe, Noerr-Pennington can apply to government actors acting in their official capacities. See Manistee Town Ctr. v. City of Glendale, 227 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding the doctrine applicable to government officials petitioning an Arizona county). However, government actors are only protected by Noerr-Pennington if they- engage in activity that is properly considered petitioning or “sufficiently related to petitioning activity.” Sosa, 437 F.3d at 935; see also Manistee Town Ctr., 227 F.3d at 1094 (finding that city officials’ lobbying efforts amounted to a petition on behalf of citizens); cf. Kearney, 590 F.3d at 644 (concluding that “there is no reason, however, to limit Manistee’s holding to lobbying efforts,’-’ arid noting that Noerr-Pennington immunity can apply when government officials act to “advance their constituents’ goals, both expressed and perceived”). Thus, the - Noerr-Pennington doctrine generally does not apply to actors engaging in conduct to influence private associations. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 501-02, 108 S.Ct. 1931, 100 L.Ed.2d 497 (1988). But cf. Sosa, 437. F.3d at 936 (noting that communications with private parties can trigger Noerr-Pennington “so long as they are sufficiently related to petitioning activity”). The Ninth Circuit has generally not interpreted Noerr-Pennington to extend immunity to state actors engaging with private entities who are themselves exercising petitioning rights. See generally Manistee Town Ctr., 227 F.3d at 1093-94 (observing that government actors are only protected by Noerr-Pennington when engaging in petitioning activity aimed at “another government entity”); Kearney, 590 F.3d at 644-45 (finding that “a governmental entity or official may receive Noerr-Pennington'immunity for the petitioning involved in an eminent domain proceeding,” because “a government entity acts on behalf of'the public-' it represents when it seeks to take private property and convert it to public use”).

Here, plaintiffs’ claims against the government defendants .are primarily premised' on the alleged interactions of those defendants with private oil companies and trade groups, and not on attempts by those government defendants to engage with other state entities for the sake of “procuring favorable government action.” Kottle v. Northwest Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1998). Because plaintiffs’ claims against defendants Governor Brówn, the DOGGR, Rustic, Nechodbm, and Oviatt, are not rooted in petitioning conduct, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not bar these claims against the government defendants.

III. Eleventh Amendment

■ Defendants next argue that plaintiffs’ claiiris against defendants DOGGR, Governor Brown, Nechodom, and Rustic are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought by private citizens against state governments without the state’s consent. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890); Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. Brown, 124 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 1997); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Cal. Dept, of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996). Application of Eleventh. Amendment immunity sub-jects a complaint to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039-1040 (9th Cir. 2003).

State immunity extends to state agencies and to state officers who act on behalf of the state. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 142-46, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993); see also Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007) (Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 damages claims against state officials in their official capacity); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to state agencies), cf. Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1422-23 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that immunity may not apply if the entity “is organized or managed in such a way that it does not qualify as an arm of the state”). Pursuant to the' Eleventh Amendment, state agencies and officials are generally immune from liability under RICO and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Vierria v. California Highway Patrol, 644 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1232 (E.D. Cal. 2009); see also Thornton v. Brown, 757 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2013); Brown v. California. Dept. of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009); Bair v. Krug, 853 F.2d 672, 674-75 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that RICO does not override a state’s sovereign immunity). However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against state officials sued in their individual capacity for acts taken during the course of their official duties. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 31, 112 S.Ct. 358; Stilwell v. City of Williams, 831 F.3d 1234, 1245-46 (9th Cir. 2016), Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1992).

There are various exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity. First, Congress may abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity when it unequivocally expresses its intent to do so, and when it acts pursuant to a valid exercise of power. Townsend v. Univ. of Alaska, 543 F.3d 478, 484 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (noting that “Congress, in passing § 1983, had no intention to disturb the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity’). Second, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit in federal court against a state officer accused of violating federal statutory or constitutional law. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). The Ex parte Young doctrine is premised on the notion that states cannot authorize state officers to violate the Constitution and laws of the United States. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 124 F.3d at 1183. Accordingly, when a plaintiff brings suit against a state official alleging a violation of federal law, the court may award prospective injunctive relief, but may not award retroactive relief that requires the payment of funds from the state treasury. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102-03, 104 S.Ct. 900; Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 124 F.3d at 1184; Natural Resources Defense Council v. California Dep’t of Transportation, 96 F.3d 420, 422 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[W]hen a plaintiff brings suit against a state official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court may award prospective injunctive relief that governs the official’s future conduct, but may not award retroactive relief that requires the payment of funds from the state treasury.”); see also Pena, 976 F.2d at 473 (emphasizing that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits seeking damages against state officials sued in their individual capacities).

To determine whether Ex parte Young applies, a court “need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Com’n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 685, 645, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002). To invoke Ex parte Young against an official, the official sued must have some connection to the enforcement of the allegedly unconstitutional act. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157, 28 S.Ct. 441; Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012). This connection “must be fairly direct; a generalized duty to enforce state law or general supervisory power over the persons responsible for enforcing the challenged provision will not subject an official to suit.” Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 674 F.3d at 1134 (quoting Los Angeles Cty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1992)).

An entity invoking Eleventh Amendment immunity generally bears the burden of asserting and ultimately proving those matters necessary to establish its defense. Del Campo v. Kennedy, 517 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2008); Hill v. Blind Indus. & Servs. of Md., 179 F.3d 754, 762 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999), amended by 201 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2000). However, once a defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to plaintiff to demonstrate that an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity applies. See Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, defendants DOGGR and CIPA assert in their motions to dismiss that plaintiffs’ claims against defendants DOGGR, Governor Brown, Rustic, Nechodom are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. Nos. 55 at 26-27; 64-1 at 14-15.) Defendants make three specific arguments in this regard. First, defendants argue that the DOGGR is immune from liability under Eleventh Amendment immunity and, as a state agency, is not subject to the Ex parte Young exception. (Doc. Nos. 55 at 26-27; 64-1 at 14-15.) Second, defendant DOGGR argues that plaintiffs cannot seek monetary damages against defendants Governor Brown, Rustic, and Nechodom, because the Eleventh Amendment bars all kinds of relief other than prospective relief. (Doc. No. 64-1 at 16.) Finally, defendant DOGGR argues that defendants Governor Brown, Rustic, and Nechodom are immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment, and that Ex parte Young does not apply. (Doc. No. 64-1 at 17.) Defendant DOGGR contends that Ex parte Young does not apply to claims against defendants Governor Brown and Nechodom because there are no allegations establishing that they did not have a sufficiently close connection to the enforcement of the allegedly unconstitutional acts. (Id.) In particular, defendant argues that only current DOGGR supervisors have “direct authority and principal responsibility for enforcing” legislation related to the issuance of well-drilling permits. (Id.) Defendant also contends that the Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiffs’ claims against former DOGGR Supervisor Rustic. (Id.) While defendants concede that Ex parte Young can apply to current DOGGR supervisors, they argue that former supervisors do not have .the type of direct connection to allegedly unconstitutional activities required under Ex parte Young. (Id.)

In their opposition to defendants’ motions to dismiss, plaintiffs do not contest that the Eleventh Amendment bars claims against defendant DOGGR. (Doc. No. 77.) Plaintiffs also do not deny that the Eleventh Amendment bars all relief other than prospective injunctive relief. (Doc. No. 77 at 21.) However, plaintiffs • contend that claims ' against defendants Governor Brown, Nechodom, and' Kustic are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment due to the applicability of .the Ex parte Young doctrine. (Id. at 19-21.) Plaintiffs argue that Ex parte Young applies here because defendants Governor Brown and Nechodom have a sufficiently close connection to the enforcement of alleged unconstitutional acts, and because defendant Nechodom conspired with current state officials to effectuate, constitutional violations. (Id. at 19-21.)

The court concludes that the Eleventh Amendment bars all claims' against defendant DOGGR,' claims against defendants Governor Brown, Nechodom, and Kustic in their official capacities for monetary relief, and claims against defendants Governor Brown and Kustic for injunctive relief. First, claims against the DOGGR are barred as a matter of law because the DOGGR' is a state agency protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See National Audubon Society, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 847 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The two state agencies are also immune from suit because they are state entities, not individual state officers.”); Freeman v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1999).

Second, plaintiffs’ claims for monetary relief against defendants Governor Brown, Nechodom, and Kustic in their official capacities are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. As noted above, the Eleventh Amendment bars official capacity suits against government entities seeking monetary damages. See Pena, 976 F.2d at 473; see generally Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26, 112 S.Ct.. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). (noting that “the phrase ‘acting in their official capacities’ is best understood as a reference to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury?’). Here, plaintiffs’ FAC does not explicitly state whether plaintiffs bring claims against state defendants in their official or individual capacities. (Doc. No. 16.) At oral argument on the pending motion, plaintiffs’ counsel described this action as a “hybrid” between an official and individual capacity suit. (Doc. No. 165 at 39.) Insofar as plaintiffs bring claims for monetary damages against defendants Governor Brown, Nechodom, and Kustic in their official capacities, these claims are barred under the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102-03, 104 S.Ct. 900. To the extent plaintiffs seek monetary damages against these state defendants in their' individual capacity, however, plaintiffs’ claims are not precluded by the Eleventh Amendment. See Pena, 976 F.2d at 473.

Plaintiffs’ claims against defendants Governor Brown and Kustic for prospective injunctive relief are also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The FAC alleges that defendant Governor Brown “requested records about the permitting process,” (Doc. No. 16 at 29, ¶ 140); advised the DOGGR on its permitting process, (Id. at 5-6, 31, ¶¶ 23, 148); and fired a DOGGR supervisor based on her refusal to approve certain well-drilling permits, subsequently converting the position of DOGGR supervisor to a political appointment, (Id. at 6, 33, ¶¶ 23-25, 156). However, the FAC does not allege facts suggesting that defendant Governor Brown has the requisite enforcement authority to directly issue the permits in question or to change the rules governing the permit process. Thus, plaintiffs may not invoke Ex parte Young with respect to claims against defendant Governor Brown, and plaintiffs’ claims for prospective injunctive relief against this defendant are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Associa tion des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding Governor Brown was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims for prospective in-' junctive relief based on his alleged involvement in administering a state law plaintiffs claimed was unconstitutional, because “his only connection to [the relevant statute] is his general duty to enforce California law”); National Audubon Soc., Inc., 307 F.3d at 847 (finding that “suit is barred against the Governor ... as there is no showing that they have the requisite enforcement connection”); cf. Artichoke Joe’s v. Norton, 216 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1110 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that Governor Brown was subject to suit under Ex parte Young where the plaintiff alleged “a specific connection to the challenged statute,” in that the governor “negotiated and approved the compacts that give rise to the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries”), aff'd 353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiffs also may not invoke Ex parte Young in pursuing claims against defendant Kustic, the former DOGGR Supervisor. It is undisputed that the current DOGGR Supervisor has a direct enforcement connection to the allegedly unconstitutional actions identified by plaintiffs. However, a number of district courts in this circuit have concluded that Ex parte Young does not apply to former government officials sued in their official capacities, even if those officials may have previously been subject to suit under the Ex parte Young doctrine. See, e.g., Marilley v. McCamman, No. C-11-02418 DMR, 2011 WL 5416254, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (finding that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against ex-government employees “given their status as former [officials]”). The rationale that has typically been offered by courts reaching this conclusion is that former government officials are “no longer in a position to provide injunctive relief.” Himmelberger v. Lamarque, No. C 03-3011 RMW (PR), 2008 WL 2683117, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2008); see also Redd v. Alameida, No. C 05-3675 JF (PR), 2007 WL 518838, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2007) (finding that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against ex-government actors because such defendants were not “in a position to provide injunc-tive relief’); but cf. Reefshare, Ltd. v. Nagata, No. CV 87-0024, 1987 WL 109921, at *14-15 (D. Hawai’i Aug. 4, 1987) (finding that the Eleventh Amendment- did not bar suit against a former government official for prospective injunctive arid declaratory relief, but not addressing the feasibility of injunctive relief involving former government officials,- and not considering the decisions of courts concluding that such claims against former officials were barred). Here, defendant Kustic is no longer an active DOGGR supervisor. Ostensibly, he is therefore no longer involved in the well-drilling permit issuance process, and would not be in a position to comply with any court order directing his actions in that area. Plaintiffs’ official capacity claims against-defendant Kustic are thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and plaintiffs may not invoke Ex parte Young with respect to defendant-Kustic.

Next, defendant Nechodom is immune from suit in his official capacity under the Eleventh Amendment,' but may properly be sued for prospective injunctive relief. In the FAC, plaintiffs allege the following: that defendant Nechodom was a director of the CDC at the time of the challenged action; that he “[set] policies to permit injection wells into or near fresh water”; and that he attended regular meetings with DOGGR officials and California oil'and gas companies to negotiate the granting of underground injection permits. (Doc. No. 16 at 17, 34, 51, ¶¶ 76, 162, 251.) California Public Resources Code § 3013 additionally provides that CDC directors “shall have all powers” that are “necessary to carry out the purposes of this division,” and that DOGGR supervisors may only act “with the approval of the director.” Cal. Pub. Res. Code. § 3013. Together, plaintiffs’ allegations and this statutory language suggest that defendant Nechodom had more than a “general duty to enforce,” but rather had a direct role in approving the DOGGR supervisor’s permit decisions. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157, 28 S.Ct. 441. As such, defendant Ne-chodom has the requisite connection to enforcement to be subject to suit pursuant to Ex parte Young and may be sued for prospective injunctive relief. See Artichoke Joe’s, 216 F.Supp.2d at 1110 (holding that Governor Brown was subject to suit under Ex parte Young where the plaintiff alleged “a specific connection to the challenged statute,” in that the governor “approved the compacts that give rise to the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries”).

IV. Absolute Immunity

Defendants also argue that the plaintiffs’ claims against defendants Governor Brown, Nechodom, Rustic, and Oviatt are barred by absolute immunity.

Legislators and judges have absolute immunity from suits stemming from acts committed within the jurisdiction of their position. See Johnson v. Reagan, 524 F.2d 1123, 1124 (9th Cir. 1975); see generally Steven H. Steinglass, Federal Immunity Doctrines, § 15:2 (2015), Specifically, “[t]he absolute immunity of legislators, in their legislative functions ... now is well settled.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (citations omitted); see also Trevino by and Through Cruz v. Gates, 23 F.3d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir. 1994). Absolute immunity extends to federal, state, and local legislators, and precludes suits for both injunctive and monetary relief. See Supreme Court v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731-34, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980); Zamsky v. Hansell, 933 F.2d 677, 684 (9th Cir. 1991); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 1982). The aim of this immunity is to “protec[t] the legislative process by shielding lawmakers from civil liability based on their legislative role which necessarily involves the balancing of social needs and rights of different groups.” Trevino, 23 F.3d at 1482; see also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951).

“Although legislators undertaking legislative acts are absolutely immune from suit, they receive less protection when performing executive acts.” Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 577-80 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Zamsky, 933 F.2d at 684. In deciding whether an act is legislative in nature, courts in this circuit are to consider a number of factors, including: (i) whether the act involves the formulation of policy rather than ad hoc decision-making, and (ii) whether the act applies generally to the community rather than being directed at one or few individuals. See Trevino, 23 F.3d at 1482; see also Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2010).

Judges and those performing quasi-judicial functions are absolutely immune from liability for damages based on acts performed within their judicial capacities. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); see also In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2002); Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1142 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that quasi-judicial absolute immunity precludes suits for monetary damages, but does not protect against suits for injunctive relief). Absolute immunity applies to non-judicial officers “only if they perform official duties that are functionally comparable to those of judges, i.e. duties that involve the exercise of discretion in resolving disputes.” In re Castillo, 297 F.3d at 948; see also Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435, 113 S.Ct. 2167, 124 L.Ed.2d 391 (1993). Officials of government agencies may thus be entitled to absolute immunity, but only insofar as they perform functions analogous to those of a prosecutor or a judge. See Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Burton v. Infinity Capital Mgt., 753 F.3d 954, 959-60 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit has articulated six nonexclusive factors for courts to consider in determining whether a defendant is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity: (i) the need to assure that the individual can perform his functions without harassment or intimidation; (ii) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for lawsuits as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct; (iii) insulation from political influence; (iv) the importance of precedent; (v) the adversary nature of the process; and (vi) the cor-rectability of error on appeal. Buckwalter v. Nev. Bd. of Med. Examiners, 678 F.3d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 2012).

For legislative and judicial absolute immunity, the party asserting the immunity carries the burden of proof. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 29, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991)). “[Officials seeking absolute immunity must show that such immunity is justified for the governr mental function at issue.” Id.

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ RICO and § 1983 claims against defendants Governor Brown, Nechodom, Rustic, and Oviatt on the basis of absolute immunity. Defendants first invoke absolute legislative immunity. Defendant DOGGR argues that absolute legislative immunity applies to all government defendants because plaintiffs’ claims are based on the DOGGR’s promulgation of policies and regulations concerning underground well injection. (Doc. No. 64-1 at 26.) Meanwhile, defendant Oviatt argues that plaintiffs’ specific claims against her stem entirely from her legislative acts—her involvement in county-wide zoning legislation. (Doc. Nos. 57 at 18-19; 64-1 at 25-26.)

Defendants next argue that, insofar as plaintiffs’ claims relate to DOGGR permitting decisions, such claims are barred by quasi-judicial absolute immunity. (Doc. No. 64-1 at 26-27.) Defendant DOGGR contends that permitting decisions are adjudicatory in nature, since they are subject to a statutory complaint process and to judicial review, and that defendants are thus absolutely immune from suit premised on their involvement in those permitting decisions. (Id.)

In their oppositions, plaintiffs argue that the individual government defendants are not protected by absolute immunity. They first deny that absolute legislative immunity applies here, arguing that their, claims do not arise from the DOGGR’s promulgation of new regulations, but rather from defendants’ efforts to deviate from existing federal laws and policies. (Doc. No. 77 at 22.) Plaintiffs also deny that absolute judicial immunity applies, contending that the DOGGR permitting process is not adjudicatory in nature. (Id. at 24-25.)

Here, plaintiffs’ claims against defendants Governor Brown, Nechodom, Rustic, and Oviatt are based on the following alleged conduct: (i) defendant Governor Brown acquiring certain permit approval records, communicating with DOGGR officials about the operation of the permitting program, and making DOGGR hiring decisions with the aim of controlling the well-drilling permit process, (Doc. No. 16 at 5-6, 29, 31, 33, ¶¶ 23-25, 148, 158); (ii) defendant Nechodom “setting policies to permit injection wells into or near fresh water,” endorsing a flexible permit-granting process by DOGGR ■ supervisors, and attending meetings with DOGGR officials and oil companies to negotiate the granting of underground injection permits, (Id. at 6,- 17, 34; 51, ¶¶26, 76, 162, 251); (iii) defendant Rustic issuing -underground injection permits to certain oil companies, and meeting, with oil and trade, groups to discuss environmental issues, ■ (Id. at 30, 38-40, ¶¶ 139, 189-196, 201); and (iv) defendant Oviatt communicating with defendant Nechodom to discüss environmental issues, and working with mther defendants to intimidate witnesses, suppress research, destroy documents, and withhold information from the public, (Id. at 7, 34, 35, at ¶¶ 35-37, 163, 166, 171). Based upon these allegations in the FAC -it appears that plaintiffs base their claims on conduct unrelated to the DOGGR’s promulgation of environmental regulations. Though the FAC makes general reference to defendant Nechodom’s involvement in ■ settin