Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM & ORDER MARGO K. BRODIE, District Judge: Plaintiff Omowale St. Juste brings the above-captioned action against Defendants Metro Plus Health Plan (“Metro Plus”), City of New York Health and Hospitals Corporation (“HHC”), the City of New York, Ileana Florentino, Ricardo Alaniz and Michael Stocker, alleging claims of religious discrimination, retaliation and hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. (“NYSHRL”) and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code, § 8-101 et seq., (“NYCHRL”). Defendants moved for summary judgment as to all claims. The Court heard oral argument on March 4, 2014. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs claims brought pursuant to Title VII, NYSHRL and § 1983. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims brought pursuant to the NYCHRL and dismisses those claims without prejudice. I. Background a. Plaintiffs hiring and initial employment Plaintiff Omowale St. Juste is an African-American male who converted to Islam at the age of twenty-three. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 5; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 5.) Defendant Metro Plus provides inexpensive health insurance options for New York City residents and is a subsidiary of HHC. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 1; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 1.) Plaintiff began working with Metro Plus on June 23, 2008, as a Medicaid Enrollment Sales Representative (“ESR”), where he was responsible for educating New York residents about Medicaid and enrolling them in Medicaid plans. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 8, 13; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶8, 13.) Plaintiff was a member of the team located at Woodhull Hospital in Brooklyn, and worked at different sites in Brooklyn including the Federal Courthouse. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 39; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 38.) Plaintiff was obligated by his religious observance to attend congregational prayer, otherwise known as Jumu’ah prayer, (Def. 56.1 ¶ 21; Pl. 56.1 ¶20), and while assigned to the Woodhull Hospital team, Plaintiff attended Friday prayer during the lunch hour, typically at the Masjid-At-Taqwa, a mosque in Brooklyn, (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 54-55; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 53-54). It took Plaintiff an hour and a half to attend Jumu’ah prayer, including travel time'between the mosque and Woodhull Hospital. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 56; Pl. 56.1 ¶55.) Plaintiff therefore required an additional thirty minutes for lunch on Fridays. Plaintiff had a verbal agreement with his supervisor, Florentino, that Plaintiff did not need to include this additional time in his time sheets. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 59; Pl. 56.1 ¶58.) Instead, he could offset the additional thirty minutes with after-hours work at either an event or a home visit. (Id.) Plaintiffs first supervisor, Telvis Austin, appointed Masjid-At-Taqwa, a mosque in Brooklyn, as a recruiting site, (Def. Ex. B, Deposition of Omowale St. Juste (“St. Juste Dep.”) 69:12-69:17; St. Juste Aff. ¶ 39), where Plaintiff was scheduled to work on Wednesdays, (Def. 56.1 ¶ 41; PI. 56.1 ¶ 40). Plaintiff asked his instructors if it was acceptable for him to wear his thawb to work and they informed him that wearing his thawb fell within Metro Plus’s dress code. (St. Juste Aff. ¶¶ 8, 9; St. Juste Dep. 4:17-74:25.) A thawb is a religious garment which resembles a priest’s robe and covers the wearer from his shoulders to his shins. (St. Juste Aff. ¶ 2; St. Juste Dep. 61:17-61:23.) Plaintiff wore a thawb to work and would typically pair it with a blazer, vest, and dress pants. (St. Juste Dep. 61:17-23; St. Juste Aff. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff admits that wearing the thawb is not a mandatory requirement for Muslims, and wearing a suit would comply with his religious beliefs as it comports with the religious obligation of dressing modestly. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 18, 19; PI. 56.1 ¶ 19; St. Juste Dep. 62:14-64:9.) b. Plaintiffs supervision by Alaniz On April 1, 2009, Alaniz, the Associate Marketing Director at Metro Plus, became Plaintiffs manager while Florentino was on personal leave. (St. Juste Dep. 150:3-150:6; Def. Ex. C, Deposition of Ricardo Alaniz (“Alaniz Dep.”) 24:2-24:7.) Alaniz supervised Plaintiff directly for two weeks, and indirectly from mid-April until October 2009. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶43, 71; PI. 56.1 iff 42, 70; Alaniz Dep. 24:1-25:3.) On Thursday, April 2, 2009, Alaniz sent an email scheduling a 3:00 p.m. meeting at Elmhurst Hospital for Friday, April 3, 2009. (St. Juste Aff. ¶ 46; PI. Ex. 6.) Plaintiff replied to Alaniz’s email stating, “I will be late for the meeting due to Friday religious services which end at about 2:20 pm.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 75; PI. 56.1 ¶ 74; PI. Ex. 6.) Alaniz responded by saying “this is unacceptable and your timely attendance is required. This meeting is paramount ... and attendance is mandated.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 76; PI. 56.1 ¶ 75.) Plaintiff attended Friday prayers and arrived five minutes late to the meeting which had not yet begun. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 79; PI. 56.1 ¶ 78; St. Juste Aff. ¶ 48.) Plaintiff was not disciplined for being late to the meeting. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 78; PL 56.1 ¶ 78.) A week later, Alaniz noticed that Plaintiff had not returned to Woodhull Hospital within the normal timeframe for lunch, did not see Plaintiff at his station, and did not have documentation on file from Plaintiff requesting time off. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 84, 86; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 83, 85; Alaniz Dep. 120:4-18.) Alaniz left a message with co-workers requesting that Plaintiff visit Alaniz when Plaintiff returned. (St. Juste Aff. ¶ 96; Alaniz Dep. 120:21-25.) Plaintiff claims that when he met with Alaniz, Alaniz made derogatory comments about the thawb calling it “unprofessional according to American culture.” (St. Juste Aff. ¶ 51.) Alaniz also informed Plaintiff that he was “stealing company time” by attending Friday prayers and that Plaintiffs attendance at these prayers was subject to Alaniz’s discretion. (Id.) Plaintiff informed Alaniz that he attended Jwmu’ah prayers on Fridays and therefore required additional time for lunch, (Def. 56.1 ¶ 87; PI. 56.1 ¶ 86), and Alaniz responded by stating that such behavior was inappropriate and “not conducive for the marketing operations,” (Alaniz Dep. 125:3-5). Subsequent to this meeting, Joseph Chasse, Associate Executive Director of Marketing, requested that Plaintiff wear a suit and not a thawb when working at the Federal Courthouse. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 81; PI. 56.1 ¶ 80; St. Juste Dep. 83:9-20.) Alaniz subsequently discontinued the use of Mas-jid-At-Taqwa as a Metro Plus work site, (Alaniz Dep. 133:4-134:25; St. Juste Aff. ¶ 97), according to Defendants, because of low enrollment numbers, (Def. 56.1 ¶ 40; Alaniz Dep. 133:4-15,134:14-23). Plaintiff claims that, at an unspecified time, Alaniz told him that his attendance at Friday prayers was a “privilege” that would only continue so long as he kept meeting his weekly enrollment goal. (St. Juste Dep. 181:16-23.) On May 21, 2009, Alaniz emailed Plaintiff a copy of Metro Plus’s policy with respect to ethnic and religious holidays. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 89; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 88; Def. Ex. S.) Alaniz explained in the email that he “will genuinely] make every effort to accommodate your needs but at the same time I also have an obligation to the -corporation to abide by all rules and regulations as previously explained,” and directed Plaintiff to reach out to Belinda Barneys, the Director of Labor Relations in the human resources department, to obtain clarification on the policy. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 90; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 89; Def. Ex. S.) Plaintiff reached out to Ryan Harris, Chief Human Resources Officer, who told Plaintiff that Metro Plus would accommodate his request to attend Friday prayers except where it affected the company’s operations. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 91; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 90.) HHC’s Operating Procedure on Ethnic and Religious Holidays provides that approved leave for observance of ethnic or religious holidays could be charged to annual leave or compensatory time credits, and, if the request for leave is otherwise appropriate, could be granted and charged against future accumulation of either annual or compensatory time if an employee had insufficient vacation days or accumulated compensatory time. (Pl. Ex. 4 (“HHC Operating Procedure No. 20-18”) at 2.) The policy also provides that each major operating unit “must establish the amount of advance notice required for submission of leave requests, and a procedure to ensure that employees are informed of the requirement well in advance of the time requests must be provided.” (Id. at 2.) A request for leave, whether annual leave or compensatory time, for a religious or other holiday must be made through submission of an “SR-70” form at least two weeks in advance. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 57; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 56.) Alaniz met with Harris from the human resources department on or about May 24, 2009, and subsequently concluded that the hospital “could not reasonably accommodate [Plaintiffs] request for more than a one-hour lunch” on Fridays. (Alaniz Dep. 114:12-17.) According to Defendants, Metro Plus operates in “a very regulated monitored industry,” and the New York City Department of Health and other city and federal government agencies require a schedule to be sent to them “two months in advance on where [Facilitated Enrollers (“FE’s”) ] are going to be located, including, their working hours. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 50; Alaniz Dep. 68:3-24.) The city and federal agencies send monitors out and if they do not see a particular employee at a scheduled site, Metro Plus could be fined and cited. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 50; Alaniz Dep. 68:3-24; Def. Ex, D and Pl. Ex. 2, Deposition of Ileana Florentino (“Florentino Dep.”) 53:8-12.) Alaniz testified that it was understood that the hours between 12 noon and 2 p.m. were allocated for employee lunch, “in which none of the regulatory agencies will come to monitor us.” (Alaniz Dep. at 68:13-16.) Alaniz informed Plaintiff that Plaintiff should either use his annual leave, or take unpaid leave to offset any additional time used to attend religious services. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 88.) In his deposition, Plaintiff acknowledged that Alaniz told him he needed to take either unpaid leave or “vacation days.” (St. Juste Dep. 146:13-16.) In his affidavit in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff states that Alaniz “insisted” that Plaintiff had to take this time off as unpaid leave only. (St. Juste Aff. ¶¶ 62, 100.) Alaniz never prevented Plaintiff from attending Friday prayers, and Plaintiff ultimately took unpaid leave to attend religious services on Friday afternoons. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 95; PI. 56.1 ¶ 94; St. Juste Dep. 182:2-7.) c. Plaintiffs Complaints On May 19, 2009, Plaintiff emailed Harris, stating: “I really need to meet with you in regards to a meeting I had with [Rjicardo [Alaniz], he advised me to speak to you.... It’s in reference to my religion.” (PI. Ex. 8.) On June 17, 2009, Plaintiff sent an email to Florentino expressing concerns about his interactions with Alan-iz. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 96; PI. 56.1 ¶ 95; PI. Ex. 13.) Plaintiff stated in part, “it appeared to me that [Alaniz] was trying to make me choose between my job and my religion. [I] even mentioned to him about federal laws to prevent such incidents from [occurring. ...” (PI. Ex. 13.) Two days later Plaintiff forwarded a copy of that email to Barneys and Harris. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 101; PI. 56.1 ¶ 100.) Alaniz met with Harris to discuss Plaintiffs use of additional lunch time to attend religious services. (Alaniz Dep. 125:14-125:22.) Harris recalls giving Alaniz a copy of Metro Plus’s operating procedure manual and explaining to him that he should attempt to accommodate an employee’s needs unless Alaniz believed that such an accommodation would negatively affect operations. (Def. Ex. E and PI. Ex. 7, Deposition of Ryan Harris (“Harris Dep.”) 150:3-151:6.) Harris also warned Alaniz against “singling anybody out.” (Id. at 151:5-6.) Harris also had a conversation with Plaintiff where he presented him with a copy of the operating procedure manual and explained that they would attempt to accommodate his needs but it would depend on the “operational needs of the department.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 91; Harris Dep. 151:13-151:25.) Alaniz confirms that Harris provided him with a copy of the operating procedure but stated that they mutually concluded that they “could not reasonably accommodate [Plaintiffs] request” for a longer lunch hour. (Alaniz Dep. 114:12-17.) d. Plaintiffs disciplinary history On April 13, 2009, Plaintiff attended a counseling session to discuss his failure to meet his monthly productivity goals from November 2008 through March 2009. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 66; PI. 56.1 ¶ 65; Def. Ex. Q Record of Employee Counseling Session (“April 2009 Counseling Memorandum”) 1-2,4) On August 17, 2009, a counseling memorandum was generated for Plaintiff to discuss excessive unscheduled absences. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 66; PL 56.1 ¶65; PI. Ex. 9, Memorandum Dated Aug. 17, 2009; April 2009 Counseling Memorandum at 3, Undated Record of Employee Counseling Session.) The memorandum stated that “during the last 3 months [Plaintiff has] ... exceeded the amount of unscheduled days off allowed by the corporation.” (Memorandum Dated Aug. 17, 2009 at 331.) Plaintiff wrote on the counseling memorandum, “I was at work. Only one of these days was unscheduled.” (Id.) According to Florentino, the counseling memorandum never became a genuine disciplinary issue because she met with Plaintiffs union representative on an unspecified date and the representative encouraged Plaintiff to produce doctor’s notes for all his unscheduled absences, which he did, and “that was the end of it.” (Florentino Dep. 62:17-21.) A counseling session to discuss these unexcused absences was scheduled for October 17, 2009, (PI. Ex. 11 & Def. Ex. Q,), but this counseling session never took place, (Florentino Dep. 61:12— 61:14). e. Fraud investigation In or around September 2009, while Flo-rentino was conducting Quality Assurance of Medicaid enrollment documents, she became suspicious of certain Medicaid enrollment documents submitted by Plaintiff. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 103; Florentino Dep. 85-87.) Several of Plaintiffs field applications for Medicaid were “in perfect shape,” with no wrinkles or folds, which was atypical of applications from this population. (Flo-rentino Dep. 87:9-23; Def. 56.1 ¶ 104.) Generally, enrollment forms were not “in perfect shape” and tend to have “wrinkles.” (Florentino Dep. 87:15-23.) On October 8, 2009, Florentino sent a memorandum to a manager in the Compliance Department, copying, among others, Chasse, Harris and Alaniz, documenting her investigation into the enrollment forms and requesting an investigation into possible fraud by Plaintiff. (Pl. Ex. 12 and Def. Ex. U at 68-70, (“Florentino Mem.”) at 68-70.) In the memorandum Florentino described three enrollment forms from three different clients, produced by Plaintiff, which she believed to be counterfeit. (Id.) Florentino described contacting Plaintiffs clients and confirming that they had not provided the letters that Plaintiff had submitted with their enrollment forms. (Id.) Florentino concluded that Plaintiff “violated [Facilitated Enroller] provisions by altering eligibility documents and did not adhere to our Marketing Department operating procedures.... ” (Id.; Florentino Dep. 90:11-90:25.) Alaniz approved Florentine’s memorandum and recommended that she send the matter to the Compliance Department. (Alaniz Dep. 87:15-88:8.) On October 13, 2009, Florentino submitted a Suspected Fraud and Abuse Form to the Compliance Department. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 107; PI. 56.1 ¶ 106; Def. Ex. U at 373-376 (“Suspected Fraud and Abuse Form”).) f. Plaintiffs pre-hearing suspension and disciplinary hearing On October 16, 2009, a pre-hearing suspension letter was sent to Plaintiff informing him that he was suspended without pay “effective immediately” until a disciplinary hearing was scheduled. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 108; PL 56.1 ¶ 107; Def. Ex. V.) On October 22, 2009, a Notice of Statement and Charges was filed and Plaintiffs disciplinary hearing was scheduled for October 29, 2009 and included a formal list of charges. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 109; PI. 56.1 ¶ 108; Def. Ex. W.) Plaintiff was accused of three counts of “gross misconduct” for “altering original eligibility documents.” (Def. Ex. W.) Plaintiff attended the October 29, 2009 Disciplinary Hearing with his union representative, Sheila Lewis; Diana Almanzar, a Compliance Analyst, Barneys, Alaniz and Florentino were also present. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 110-14; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 109-13.) The hearing was presided over by Barneys. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 111; PI. 56.1 ¶ 110.) Almanzar presented evidence of the fraud charges against Plaintiff. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 114; PI. 56.1 ¶ 113.) On December 9, 2009, Barneys issued a determination letter with her findings. (Def. Ex. Y, “Letter of Determination.”) Barneys concluded that one of the three charges of fraud could be substantiated, one could not be substantiated, and that the letter comprising the third charge was authentic and that charge was therefore unfounded. (Id. at 2-3.) Barneys recommended that Plaintiff be suspended for sixty days without pay, but since Plaintiff had already “served a 30 calendar day suspension without pay,” Plaintiff would receive credit for those 30 days. (Id.) According to Defendants, the substantiation of the fraud charge was grounds for terminating Plaintiff, but because Plaintiffs union representative had spoken with Barneys after the October 22, 2009 disciplinary hearing and recommended leniency, Barneys recommended a 60-day suspension rather than termination of Plaintiffs employment. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 116; Def. Ex. H, Deposition of Belinda Barneys at 64:17-65:22.) Plaintiffs union representative Sheila Lewis informed him that, as a condition of his suspension and reinstatement, rather than termination, he would have to plead guilty to the one charge of fraud that had been substantiated by Barneys. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 118; PI. 56.1 ¶ 117.) Plaintiff told Lewis that he would do so only under “duress.” (St. Juste Dep. 112.) Plaintiff maintains that he never admitted guilt or conceded that the substance of the fraud charge was accurate. (St. Juste Aff. ¶ 79.) Plaintiff alleges that the fraud charges against him were fabricated by Florentino and Alaniz. (St. Juste Aff. ¶ 80.) He asserts that “it was Florentino who had at one time asked me to forge certain documents and that I refused to do so.” (St. Juste Aff. ¶ 80; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 38.) A Stipulation of Settlement (“Stipulation”), dated January 11, 2010, stated the terms of Plaintiffs reinstatement. (Def. Ex. Z.) The terms of the Stipulation included an acknowledgment that the Plaintiff “pleads no contest and accepts the disciplinary penalty of a suspension without pay of thirty (30) days.” (Stipulation at 2.) Plaintiffs union representative signed the Stipulation on April 21, 2010, (id. at 4), but Plaintiff never signed it because he was never provided with a copy, (St. Juste Aff. ¶¶ 86, 87; St. Juste Dep. 112:21-22; Stipulation at 4). Although Plaintiff never signed the Stipulation, he was aware of the conditions of his reinstatement and that he was accepting the terms of the Stipulation. (PI. Dep. 118:12-19.) g. Plaintiffs reinstatement Plaintiff was reinstated in December 2009 and transferred to a team in the Bronx, where he worked under the supervision of Regina Joseph. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 130-31; PI. 56.1 ¶¶ 129-30.) Plaintiff was happy to be out from under the supervision of Alaniz and Florentino but wanted to continue working in Brooklyn, where he lived. (St. Juste Dep. 196:2-8.) Metro Plus informed Plaintiff that there was no availability on any of the Brooklyn teams. (Id. at 196:16-22.) Plaintiff was unaware if there was any available space on any of the Brooklyn teams. (Id. at 196:7-9.) Chasse directed Plaintiff to speak with the supervisors of various Brooklyn teams to determine if they had space. (Def. Ex. F, Deposition of Joseph Chasse (“Chasse Dep.”) 60:25-61:8.) Chasse states that Plaintiff was not transferred to one particular team in Brooklyn because that team required special language skills that Plaintiff did not have, and that another team at Kings County Hospital was full. (Chasse Dep. 60:3-18; Def. 56.1 ¶137.) While at the Bronx site, Plaintiff received a counseling memorandum from Joseph for his low enrollment numbers. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 138; PI. 56.1 ¶ 137.) h. Plaintiffs security incident Plaintiff believes that he was blacklisted from all North Brooklyn Metro Plus work sites. On February 9, 2010, Joseph sent an email to her employees informing the employees that due to an upcoming snow storm, they could work from any Metro Plus work site in close proximity to their home. (PL Ex. 18 at 322.) Plaintiff went to Woodhull Hospital, the closest work site to his home, but he was denied entrance and forced to travel to the Bronx. (St. Juste Aff. ¶ 16.) A few days later on February 11, 2010, Alaniz sent an email to Joseph, Chasse, Florentino and Plaintiff stating that it was “not acceptable” for Plaintiff to work at Woodhull Hospital because he represented a “security concern.” (PL Exs. 19, 22.) Florentino also sent an email on February 11, 2010, stating that Plaintiff “cannot report to Woodhull or any other site in the North Brooklyn network. Hospital police will not allow him on the premises.” (PL Ex. 22.) Alaniz was not aware of any policy that prohibited Plaintiff from working from any other North Brooklyn hospital other than Woodhull Hospital. (Alaniz Dep. 171:13-17.) Alan-iz’s supervisor, Chasse, stated that there was no policy that prohibited Plaintiff from working anywhere in Brooklyn. (Chasse Dep. 113:8-10, 114:8-23.) Florentino agreed that “after [Plaintiff] was reinstated, he had access to all sites because he was an employee.” (Florentino Dep. 193:13-24.) II. Discussion a. Standard of Review Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Bronzini v. Classic Sec., L.L.C., 558 Fed.Appx. 89, 89, 2014 WL 943983, *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 12, 2014); Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 843 (2d Cir.2013); Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 164-65 (2d Cir.2013). The role of the court is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Bduc., 444 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A genuine issue of fact exists when there is sufficient “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment; “there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. The court’s function is to decide “whether, after resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, a rational juror could find in favor of that party.” Pinto v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 F.3d 394, 398 (2d Cir.2000). The Second Circuit has “cautioned that [wjhere an employer acted with discriminatory intent, direct evidence of that intent will only rarely be available, so affidavits and depositions must be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show discrimination.” Taddeo v. L.M. Berry & Co., 526 Fed.Appx. 121, 122 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir.2010)). b. City of New York Plaintiff names the City of New York as a separate Defendant. However, Plaintiff has not made any allegations against the City of New York or its agencies. Instead, Plaintiff has made allegations against Metro Plus, a subsidiary of HHC. It is well-established that for the purposes of Title VII litigation, HHC and the City of New York are considered two distinct entities. Where, as here, there are no allegations against the City of New York or any of its agencies but rather against HHC, a separate entity, the City of New York has improperly been named as a Defendant to this suit. See Samuel v. Bellevue Hosp. Ctr., 366 Fed.Appx. 206, 206 n. ** (2d Cir.2010) (“New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation! ] is separate and distinct from the City of New York.” (citing Brennan v. City of New York, 59 N.Y.2d 791, 792, 464 N.Y.S.2d 731, 451 N.E.2d 478 (1983))); Woodard v. New York Health & Hospitals Corp., No. 04-CV-5297, 2010 WL 2735757, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 9, 2010) (“most Title VII cases have reached the conclusion that despite the fact that HHC employees are entitled to indemnification and representation by the City, HHC and the City are separate entities with separate employees”); Springer v. City of New York, No. 01-CV-14392, 2006 WL 526028, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. March 3, 2006) (finding no identity of interests between HHC and the City in a Title VII case); Centeno v. New York City, No. 02-CV-2745, 2005 WL 1126811, at *4 n. 5 (E.D.N.Y. May 12, 2005) (explaining, in dicta, that “the City of New York is not plaintiffs employer and cannot be held liable in this Title VII action [because] [t]he City of New York and the Health and Hospitals Corporation are separate legal entities”). The City of New York is not a proper party, and the Court therefore dismisses the City of New York from this action. c. Florentino, Alaniz and Stocker Plaintiff asserts a Title VII claim against Florentino, Alaniz and Michael Stocker, the Chairman of the Board of HHC. Under Title VII, a Plaintiff cannot name individuals as defendants because Title VII liability can only be imputed to an employer and not to an individual employee. See Sassaman v. Gamache, 566 F.3d 307, 315-16 (2d Cir.2009) (“individuals are not subject to liability under Title VII” (quoting Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 221 (2d Cir.2004))); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir.1995) (“individual defendants with supervisory control over a plaintiff may not be held personally liable under Title VH”). Thus Florentino, Alaniz and Stock-er are improperly named Defendants to Plaintiffs Title VII suit and Plaintiffs Title VII claims against Florentino, Alaniz and Stocker are dismissed. Although “Title VII claims are not cognizable against individuals, individuals may be held liable under ...[§] 1983 for certain types of discriminatory acts, including those giving rise to a hostile work environment.” Patterson, 375 F.3d at 226 (citing Hayut v. State Univ. of New York, 352 F.3d 733, 753-54 (2d Cir.2003)) (additional citation omitted); see also Patterson, 375 F.3d at 230 (“[Generally, a public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.” (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49-50, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988))). A plaintiff however, “must establish a given defendant’s personal involvement in the claimed violation in order to hold that defendant liable in his individual capacity under § 1983.” Id. at 229. In this case, as discussed below, Plaintiffs allegations of discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment revolve almost entirely around the actions of Alan-iz. Therefore Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged Alaniz’s personal involvement. Similarly, the disciplinary charges which led to Plaintiffs suspension were initiated by Florentino. Plaintiff has therefore sufficiently alleged Florentine’s personal involvement. See Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 123 (2d Cir.2004) (“There is little doubt that [school district employee defendants] were ‘personally involved’ in the purported deprivation, or that they acted under the color of state law when they recommended against Back’s tenure and evaluated her negatively.”). Plaintiff alleges that Stocker, as Chairman of the Board of HHC, “knew or should have known of the discriminatory customs, practices and wrongful acts of the defendants described in this complaint and condoned, ratified and/or authorized.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 9.) However, Plaintiff did not argue and the record does not establish that Stocker had any personal involvement in any of the alleged violations. Accordingly, Stocker is improperly named as a defendant as to Plaintiffs § 1983 claims and all § 1983 claims against him are dismissed. d. Religious Discrimination Claims&emdash; Title VII, Section 1983 and NYSHRL Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his religion in violation of Title VII, § 1983 and NYSHRL. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual’s ... religion[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). An individual’s “religion” includes not just religious beliefs, but “all aspects of religious observance and practice,” unless the employer demonstrates that it is unable to reasonably accommodate that observance or practice “without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” § 2000e(j); see also Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152 (2d Cir.2002) (stating that “Congress delineated the scope of an employer’s duties ... by defining ‘religion’ in a substantively significant way”); Siddiqi v. N.Y. City Health & Hospitals Corp., 572 F.Supp.2d 353, 369 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (“Courts interpret [42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)] to mean that an employer cannot discriminate against any employee on the basis of the employee’s religious beliefs unless the employer shows that he cannot reasonably accommodate the employee’s religious needs without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, “[a] plaintiff may claim a violation of religious discrimination under Title VII under theories of either disparate treatment or denial of reasonable accommodation.” Bind v. City of New York, No. 08-CV-11105, 2011 WL 4542897, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (citing Feingold v. New York, 366 F.Sd 138, 149 (2d Cir.2004) (disparate treatment) and Cosme, 287 F.3d at 158 (denial of reasonable accommodation)). Plaintiff has alleged religious discrimination under both disparate treatment and failure to accommodate. i. Disparate Treatment Religious Discrimination Claim Under Title VII, § 1983 and the NYSHRL, disparate treatment religious discrimination claims are assessed using the burden-shifting framework established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See e.g., Marmulszteyn v. Napolitano, 523 Fed.Appx. 13, 15 (2d Cir.2013) (explaining that a “disparate-treatment claim” based on religion “is governed by the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas ”). Under the framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); see also Dowrich-Weeks v. Cooper Square Realty, Inc., 535 Fed.Appx. 9, 11 (2d Cir.2013); Ruiz v. Cnty. of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir.2010); Weber v. City of New York, 973 F.Supp.2d 227, 250, 2013 WL 5416868, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2013) (explaining the burden shifting analysis for religious discrimination claims). The plaintiffs burden at this stage is “minimal.” Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742). If the plaintiff satisfies this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiseriminatory reason for its actions. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742; Ruiz, 609 F.3d at 492. The defendant’s burden “is not a particularly steep hurdle.” Hyek v. Field Support Servs., 702 F.Supp.2d 84, 93 (E.D.N.Y.2010). It “is one of production, not persuasion; it ‘can involve no credibility assessment.’” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509, 113 S.Ct. 2742). “If the employer is able to satisfy that burden, the inquiry then returns to the plaintiff, to demonstrate that the proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination.” United States v. City of New York, 717 F.3d 72, 102 (2d Cir.2013). To defeat summary judgment at this stage, “a plaintiff need only show that the defendant was in fact motivated at least in part by the prohibited discriminatory animus.” Henry v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 156 (2d Cir.2010); see also Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. -, -, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2522-23, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013) (“An employee who alleges status-based discrimination under Title VII ... [must] show that the motive to discriminate was one of the employer’s motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful motives that were causative in the employer’s decision.”). 1. Prima Facie Case To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination based on disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) he belonged to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position he held; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.” Brown v. City of Syracuse, 673 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir.2012); see also Marmulszteyn, 523 Fed.Appx. at 15 (listing elements of plaintiffs prima facie case in the context of religious discrimination disparate treatment claim) (quoting Ruiz, 609 F.3d at 492). Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff, as a Muslim, is a member of a protected class. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 1; PI. 56.1 ¶ 1.) See Jiggetts v. Laguardia Airport, No. 04-CV-3969, 2007 WL 1026409, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2007) (“As a Muslim man of African-American descent ..., Jiggetts satisfies the protected class” element of his Title VII claim.). Defendants assume that Plaintiff was qualified to serve as a Medicaid ESR for Metro Plus. (Def. Mem. 4.) To satisfy this element a plaintiff must “show only that he possesses the basic skills necessary for performance of the job.” See Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir.2001) (alteration, citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants argue that the actions identified by Plaintiff were not adverse employment actions, and that they did not occur under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. (Def. Mem. 4; Def. Reply 5.) The Court discusses both of these elements below. A. Adverse Employment Action Plaintiff alleges the following constitute adverse employment actions: (1) the termination of the use of compensatory time to attend Friday prayers, (PI. Mem. 8), (2) Plaintiffs suspension in connection with fraud charges, (PI. Mem. 9-10; Transcript of Oral Argument (“Tr.”) 48:6-7), (3) the termination of the Masjid-At-Taqwa as an enrollment site, (PL Mem. 7-8; Tr. 33:6-9), (4) the generation of a counseling memorandum and counseling session on August 17, 2009 regarding excessive unscheduled absences, (PL Opp. 8; Tr. 39:23-40:2), and (5) Plaintiffs transfer to the Bronx after he was reinstated, (PL Mem. 10; Tr. 48:21-49:4). The Second Circuit has made clear that an “[a]n adverse employment action is a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.” Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir.2008) (emphasis omitted). Such action must be “more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” Brown, 673 F.3d at 150 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir.2006)); “Examples of materially adverse employment actions include termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices unique to a particular situation.” Feingold, 366 F.3d at 152 (alteration, citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed below, Plaintiff has met his burden at the prima facie stage of showing that his suspension without pay in October 2009 and the termination of his ability to use compensatory time to attend Friday prayers were adverse employment action for purposes of his disparate treatment discrimination claim. (1) Termination of use of compensatory time Plaintiff argues that Alaniz’s termination of the use of compensatory time was an adverse action. Plaintiff had an informal agreement with Florentino that he could take an extra 30 minutes to attend Friday prayers, without documenting the time on his time sheet, in exchange for working an extra 30 minutes after hours. When Alan-iz became Plaintiffs supervisor in April 2009 and learned of this arrangement, he terminated it, and told Plaintiff that he should either use annual leave or unpaid time to account for the extra 30 minutes each Friday, although in his affidavit in opposition to the motion, Plaintiff claims that Alaniz told him that he had to use unpaid leave. Alaniz also emailed Plaintiff a copy of HHC’s Operating Procedure policy regarding leave for ethnic and religious holidays, told Plaintiff that he would make a genuine effort to accommodate Plaintiffs needs and directed Plaintiff to contact the director of labor relations if he had any questions. Plaintiff argues that these events establish that Alaniz prevented Plaintiff from using compensatory time to attend Friday prayer. The record is devoid of detail as to whether Plaintiff read the HHC operating policy regarding leave for religious observances and subsequently made a formal request to take compensatory leave that was denied by Alaniz. Nor is there evidence that Alaniz pre-emptively told Plaintiff not to bother making such a request. However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could credit Plaintiffs last recollection that Alaniz insisted that Plaintiff use only unpaid leave, or find that by failing to verbally inform Plaintiff that he had the right to use compensatory leave, Alaniz denied Plaintiff the ability to use compensatory leave to attend Friday prayers. Plaintiff took the time off each week as unpaid leave for a period of two to three months, although the parties dispute whether he did so by choice or because Alaniz “insisted” that it be documented as unpaid leave. With this view of the record, in light of the fact that Plaintiff was not paid for approximately 30 minutes that he took off for religious observances on Friday afternoons, for a period of two to three months, the termination of Plaintiffs ability to use compensatory time had a materially adverse impact on Plaintiff sufficient to establish an adverse employment action. See Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 373 (2d Cir.2002) (noting that a materially adverse employment action must have an impact on “some tangible job benefits such as compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Ebanks v. New York City Dep’t of Envt’l Prot., No. 05-CV-3172, 2009 WL 891796, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009) (finding that “failure to authorize overtime and/or compensatory time” was an adverse employment action). (2) Suspension resulting from charges of fraud Plaintiffs October 2009 suspension without pay is an adverse employment action. See Weber, 973 F.Supp.2d at 251-52, 2013 WL 5416868, at *14 (finding that initiation of disciplinary charges culminating in 60-day suspension without pay was an adverse employment action); Hill v. Rayboy-Brauestein, 467 F.Supp.2d 336, 348, 355-56 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (“Plaintiffs ten-day suspension [without pay] is an adverse employment action, as it is a material alteration of Plaintiffs working conditions.”); McPhatter v. New York City, No. 06-CV-1181, 2009 WL 2412980, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 2009) (“Suspension without pay is, indeed, ordinarily an adverse employment action.” (citing Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir.2001))), aff'd, 378 Fed.Appx. 70 (2d Cir.2010). (3) Discontinuation of mosque as enrollment site Plaintiff alleges that the discontinuation of Masjid-Ab-Taqwa as an enrollment site constitutes an adverse employment action, because it had an adverse impact on Plaintiffs ability to enroll new participants in Medicaid, thereby affecting his productivity. (PI. Mem. 16; Tr. 33:11-13.) Defendants argue that the discontinuation of the use of the mosque as an enrollment site amounts to nothing more than Plaintiffs “subjective dissatisfaction” with his job assignment. (Def. Reply 6.) As evidence that the mosque had been productive and that its discontinuation therefore adversely affected Plaintiffs ability to enroll new participants, Plaintiff relies on the fact that the mosque had been open for a period of ten months prior to Alaniz’s decision to discontinue it as an enrollment site, four months longer than the initial period required for an enrollment site to be considered productive according to Plaintiff. (Tr. 38:22-39:6.) Plaintiffs argument that the mosque must have been productive because it was open for ten months, without any evidence showing the productivity of the mosque, is speculative. Plaintiff does not present any evidence of the number of people he enrolled at the mosque during the time he worked at that location in support of his claim that it was productive. Plaintiff instead points to his performance evaluation for 2008-09, which shows the total number of participants enrolled by Plaintiff in each month between October 2008 and September 2009. (Def. Ex. R at 55.) However, this evaluation does not specify the location where Plaintiff recruited these individuals, nor does it indicate any specific number of individuals Plaintiff enrolled from the mosque site. Plaintiff also refers to the testimony of Joseph, his supervisor in the Bronx, who testified that she and her supervisor were willing to resume using the mosque as a site for enrollment, because they believed that Plaintiff “had good community standing,” and it might “get numbers for [Plaintiff] and increase his productivity,” (Joseph Dep. 51:18-25), and the fact that the mosque was in fact reinstated as an enrollment site subsequent to his transfer to the Bronx, (Joseph. Aff. ¶ 43), to argue that the mosque was always productive. The testimony of Plaintiffs supervisor in the Bronx, that she was preparing to resume recruitment at the mosque “to help the community,” and to help Plaintiff “increase his productivity,” provides no support for Plaintiffs claim that the mosque was productive at the time it was closed. Plaintiff also argues that Defendants have not presented any evidence to demonstrate that the mosque was not productive, but instead have only said that it was not. Plaintiff misplaces the burden of production at this prima facie stage on Defendants. The absence of evidence in the record showing the productivity of the mosque and connecting that productivity to Plaintiffs productivity prevents Plaintiff from demonstrating that Alaniz’s discontinuance of the mosque as an enrollment site had a materially adverse impact on the terms and conditions of Plaintiffs employment. Although Plaintiffs burden at the prima facie stage is “minimal,” without any evidence showing that the mosque was productive or linking a decrease in Plaintiffs productivity to the discontinuation of the mosque as an enrollment site, Plaintiff cannot meet even this minimal burden to show that the discontinuance harmed him materially. (4) Counseling memorandum for sick days Plaintiff argues that the notice he received on August 17, 2009, requiring him to appear for a counseling session constitutes an adverse employment action because it is the first step in the disciplinary process, and it remains on Plaintiffs record. (PI. Mem. 8 (citing Harris Dep. 98-99).) Plaintiff emphasizes that “the basis for the ‘excessive unscheduled days taken’ was simply fabricated.” (PI. Mem. 9.) However, even if Plaintiff is correct that the counseling memorandum was unjustified, such a counseling memorandum, standing alone, does not constitute an adverse employment action. See Morales v. NYS Dep’t of Labor, 865 F.Supp.2d 220, 244 (N.D.N.Y.2012) (“Consequently, the issuance of a counseling memorandum and a notice of discipline, without any further evidence regarding a materially adverse effect thereof, is not an adverse employment action as a matter of law.”), aff'd, 530 Fed.Appx. 13 (2d Cir.2013); see also Risco v. McHugh, 868 F.Supp.2d 75, 113 (S.D.N.Y.2012) (“The preparation of two counseling memoranda ... is insufficient to establish a materially adverse action as a matter of law.”); Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 335 Fed.Appx. 108, 110 (2d Cir.2009) (issuance of two counseling memoranda does not constitute an adverse employment action); Stoddard v. Eastman Kodak Co., 309 Fed.Appx. 475, 479 (2d Cir.2009) (holding that counseling memorandum could not be considered an adverse employment action absent evidence that it resulted in any alteration of plaintiffs working conditions or job responsibilities). Although the record is unclear as to whether the memorandum generated on August 17, 2009 resulted in a counseling session in August 2009 (in addition to the counseling session scheduled for October 17, 2009), even if such a session had been held, according to Plaintiff the charges were dropped at that session. In the absence of any resulting discipline, the issuance of a counseling memorandum or even attendance at a counseling session is not an adverse employment action as there is no evidence that this had a materially adverse effect on Plaintiffs employment. (5) Transfer to the Bronx Plaintiffs transfer from a Brooklyn work site to a Bronx site upon his reinstatement after his suspension was not an adverse employment action. Nor was Defendant’s failure to transfer him back to Brooklyn. While a “nominally lateral transfer, even without any loss in salary, can constitute an adverse employment action under Title VII,” the plaintiff must “show that the transfer created a materially significant disadvantage.” Pacheco v. New York Presbyterian Hosp., 593 F.Supp.2d 599, 617 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (quoting de la Cruz v. New York City Human Res. Admin. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 82 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir.1996) and Galabya v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 641 (2d Cir.2000)); see Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 170 (2d Cir.2012) (“A lateral transfer that does not result in a reduction in pay or benefits may be an adverse employment action so long as the transfer alters the terms and conditions of the plaintiffs employment in a materially negative way.” (quoting Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assoc. v. City of New York, 310 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir.2002))); Moore v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 999 F.Supp.2d 482, 497, 2013 WL 7759749, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2013) (A transfer denial is adverse when “ ‘the sought for position is materially more advantageous than the employee’s current position, whether because of prestige, modernity, training opportunity, job security, or some other objective indicator of desirability.’ ” (quoting Beyer v. County of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 2008))). Plaintiff was transferred to the Bronx after he was investigated and suspended for fraud while working at Woodhull Hospital in Brooklyn. Plaintiff did not want to continue working under Florentino and Alaniz at Woodhull Hospital. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 135; PI. 56.1 ¶ 135.) Plaintiff has not proffered evidence to demonstrate that his transfer to the Bronx “alter[ed] the terms and conditions of [his] employment in a materially negative way.” See Ayiloge v. City of New York, No. 00-CV-5051, 2002 WL 1424589 at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2002) (“The materiality of a transfer cannot be demonstrated where a plaintiff offers no evidence, save his own unsupported, conclusory statements, that his new position is any less prestigious or that his duties have been significantly altered.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)) Cf. Lore, 670 F.3d at 171 (transfer from office of the chief of police to uniformed community relations position adverse employment action for purposes of employment discrimination claim, as the change connoted a considerable reduction in prestige). Rather, Plaintiff argues that the placement in the Bronx location, the furthest possible location from Plaintiffs home, made it difficult for him to get to work. (Tr. 50:14-17.) However, an increase in commute time, by itself, while inconvenient, is insufficient to show that a transfer has had a materially adverse impact. See Smalls v. Allstate Ins. Co., 396 F.Supp.2d 364, 371 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (finding that a transfer resulting in a longer commute “an inconvenience, not an adverse employment action” (citing Galabya, 202 F.3d at 640)). Although the transfer required extra travel time for Plaintiff, it is not an adverse employment action. Defendants’ failure to transfer Plaintiff back to Brooklyn is also not an adverse employment action. Plaintiff requested to be transferred to an office in Brooklyn but was told that none were available. A denial of a lateral transfer is not an adverse employment action. See Taylor v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., No. 11-CV-3582, 2012 WL 5989874, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012) (finding that denial of request for transfer that would have reduced plaintiffs daily commute by more than four hours not adverse, where there was no evidence “that the transfer would have offered her materially different terms and conditions of employment, such as more money, prestige, or authority”); Charles v. Connecticut, Judicial Branch, Ct. Support Servs. Div., 556 F.Supp.2d 123, 128 (D.Conn.2008) (finding that employer’s decision not to transfer plaintiff from the Milford office to the New Haven office was not adverse employment action); Pimentel v. City of New York, No. 00-CV-326, 2002 WL 977535, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2002) (holding that denial of request for a lateral transfer from Manhattan to Brooklyn office not an adverse employment action), aff'd, 74 Fed.Appx. 146 (2d Cir.2003). Accordingly, neither Plaintiffs transfer to the Bronx, nor the failure of Defendants to transfer him back to an office in Brooklyn, was a materially adverse action for purposes of Plaintiffs discrimination claim. In sum, the termination of Plaintiffs ability to use compensatory time to attend Friday prayers, and Plaintiffs suspension without pay in October 2009 qualify as materially adverse employment actions for purposes of his disparate treatment religious discrimination claim. B. Inference of Discrimination Inference of discrimination “is a ‘flexible [standard] that can be satisfied differently in differing factual scenarios.’ ” Howard v. MTA Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 866 F.Supp.2d 196 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (quoting Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir.1996)); see also Moore v. Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr., No. 11-CV-3625, 2013 WL 3968748, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 2013) (same). “No one particular type of proof is required to show that Plaintiffs termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” An inference of discrimination can be drawn from circumstances such as “the employer’s criticism of the plaintiffs performance in ethnically degrading terms; or its invidious comments about others in the employee’s protected group; or the more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group; or the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs [adverse employment action].” Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 468 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Chambers v. TRM Copy Centers Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir.1994)); see also Abdul-Hakeem v. Parkinson, 523 Fed. Appx. 19, 20 (2d Cir.2013) (finding that an inference of discrimination can be raised by “showing that an employer treated [an employee] less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside his protected group” (quoting Ruiz, 609 F.3d at 493)); Russell v. Cnty. of Nassau, 696 F.Supp.2d 213, 232 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (“a discriminatory race and/or color motive can be inferred if a plaintiff was treated differently than similarly situated white employees or if the defendants engaged in a pattern of discriminatory treatment of African-American employees” (citing Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 468 and Johnson v. Cnty. of Nassau, 480 F.Supp.2d 581, 597 (E.D.N.Y. 2007))). However, a plaintiffs own subjective belief that he was discriminated against because of his religion is insufficient to sustain a religious discrimination claim. See Boyar v. City of New York, No. 10-CV-65, 2010 WL 4345737, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2010) (finding that “[w]hile [the plaintiff] states his belief that his religion played a role in these decisions, personal belief is insufficient to defeat defendants’ summary judgment motion” on plaintiffs discrimination claim (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Sicular v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Homeless Servs., No. 09-CV-0981, 2010 WL 423013, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2010) (finding that the plaintiffs “personal belief ... that his being Jewish played into the prejudices of the individual defendants and reinforced their animosity against him is insufficient to defeat defendants’ summary judgment motion.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 09-CV-0981, 2010 WL 2179962 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2010), aff'd, 455 Fed.Appx. 129 (2d Cir.2012). Plaintiffs burden at this stage of the prima facie case is to show that the adverse employment actions he experienced took place under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See Marmulszteyn, 523 Fed.Appx. at 15 (listing fourth element of plaintiffs prima fa-cie showing as “the adverse action took place under circumstances giving rise to the inference of discrimination” (quoting Ruiz, 609 F.3d at 492)). Here, the termination of Plaintiffs use of compensatory time to attend Friday prayers and Plaintiffs suspension without pay as a result of disciplinary charges are adverse employment actions. Plaintiff argues that when Alaniz’s actions are viewed collectively, an inference of discrimination can be drawn based on the numerous negative actions that Alaniz took with respect to the mosque and the fact that Plaintiff is Muslim. (Tr. 51:5-10.) Plaintiffs argument is that an inference of discrimination can be drawn from the combined facts of: Alaniz refusing to permit Plaintiff to arrive late to a meeting on April 3, 2009, Alaniz’s verbal remarks that Plaintiffs thawb was “unprofessional according to American culture,” and remarks that Plaintiffs attendance at Friday prayers was subject to Alaniz’s discretion and was “stealing company time,” Alaniz looking for Plaintiff at Plaintiffs station at a time that he knew Plaintiff was attending Friday prayers, Alaniz’s discontinuance of the use of compensatory time by Plaintiff to attend Friday prayers, the initiation of a counseling session based on unscheduled absences that Plaintiff alleges were “fabricated” by Alaniz, and the initiation of fraud charges against Plaintiff that Plaintiff likewise alleges were fabricated by Florentino, at Alaniz’s urging. The evidence before the Court does not support the inference that Alan-iz’s conduct was motivated by Plaintiffs religion. Moreover, even assuming that it did, there is no evidence that Alaniz’s bias was a cause of Plaintiffs 60-day suspension without pay as a result of the charges of fraud, or affected his decision to terminate Plaintiffs enjoyment of compensatory time to attend Friday prayers. See Tad-deo, 526 Fed.Appx. at 123 (the “factual dispute at issue [in evaluating inference of discrimination] is whether a discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent” (citation omitted)). Viewing all of Alaniz’s conduct and statements together, the picture that emerges is of a manager with a “hard knock” managerial style that, in Plaintiffs own words, “made a very uncomfortable work environment for everyone.” (See PI. Ex. 13; Tr. 59:22) Plaintiff contends that Alaniz’s refusal to permit Plaintiff to arrive late to the April 8, 2009 meeting, when juxtaposed with the latitude afforded to other employees from Woodhull Hospital and Alaniz’s subsequent termination of Plaintiffs use of compensatory time to attend Friday prayers, is evidence of religious bias. However, Plaintiff does not present any evidence that other individuals were permitted to arrive late for the meeting, nor does he claim that Alaniz’s refusal to allow Plaintiff to arrive late was accompanied by any denigrating remarks. Plaintiff must still establish that the treatment complained of was motivated by unlawful discrimination. See White v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 05-CV-2064, 2008 WL 4507614 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008) (“Simply put, plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct occurred because of, not incidental to, the protected characteristic.”). Likewise, there is also no evidence to support Plaintiffs allegation' that Alaniz patrolling the office and looking to ensure that “people are where they are supposed to be,” (Alaniz Dep. 123:23-24), is indicative of any religious discriminatory animus. Alaniz went to look for Plaintiff when he discovered that there was no documentation providing for Plaintiff to be on an extended lunch hour on Fridays. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that Alaniz did not require the same documentation for non-Muslim co-workers or that he did not check up on non-Muslim co-workers in the same manner. To the contrary, Plaintiff asserts that Alaniz created an uncomfortable work environment for everyone. (PI. Ex. 13.) Absent any evidence that Alaniz did not look for other, non-Muslim co-workers in a similar manner or require documentation for their absence, or that Alaniz was otherwise motivated by religious bias, this level of excessive monitoring and scrutiny by Alaniz is insufficient to raise an inference of discriminatory bias. Plaintiff also argues that the issuance of the August 17, 2009 counseling memorandum for excessive unscheduled absences creates an inference of discrimination because the basis for the issuance of the memorandum was entirely fabricated by Alaniz. Even if this speculative allegation were true, Plaintiff still has not shown that Alaniz fabricated such charges because of religious bias. See Watson v. Geithner, No. 11-CV-9527, 2013 WL 5441748 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013) (“Moreover, even if the counseling memoranda did qualify as adverse employment actions, Plaintiff never explains how an inference of discrimination should be drawn from the mere fact that [her supervisor] lied about the circumstances surrounding the memoranda.”). In the same manner, Plaintiffs claim that the initiation of disciplinary charges against Plaintiff for fraud by his supervisor Florentino raises an inference of discrimination by Alaniz is wholly speculative and unsupported by any evidence in the record. Indeed, the record shows that Florentino was so supportive of Plaintiff that she agreed to accommodate his need for additional time to attend prayer services by not requiring Plaintiff to document his absence. As to the statements by Alaniz that Plaintiffs thawb was “unprofessional according to American culture,” and that Plaintiff was “stealing company time” by using compensatory time to attend Friday prayers, (St. Juste Aff. ¶ 51; St. Juste Dep. 174:18-174:25), and Alaniz’s decision to close the Masjid-At-Taqwa as an enrollment site, the Court does not find them to be examples of any overt religious discriminatory animus. Likewise, Alaniz’s termination of Plaintiffs ability to informally use compensatory time to attend Fr