Campbell v. New York City Transit Authority (93 F. Supp. 3d 148, 2015)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MARGO K. BRODIE, District Judge:

Plaintiff Collette Campbell, currently proceeding pro se, brings the above-captioned action against the New York City Transit Authority, alleging claims of gender discrimination, age discrimination, disability discrimination, failure to accommo-. date, retaliation and creation of a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Plaintiff also brings claims for “institutional discrimination” and “institutional retaliation,” premised on gender, age, and disability. Defendant moves for summary judgment on all claims. The Court heard oral argument on March 11, 2015. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

I. Background

a. The parties

The New York City Transit Authority (“Transit Authority” or “Defendant”) is a public authority in New York City which operates public transportation systems, including the New York City subways and buses and the Staten Island Railway.

Plaintiff, born in 1956, was employed with the Transit Authority from October 1983 through August 2011. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 25, 28; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶25, 28; Pl. Aff. ¶2.) Plaintiff began working for Defendant as a railroad clerk, which involved working in a token booth and selling tokens for access to the New York City, subway system. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 26; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 26.) Plaintiff was eventually promoted to supervisor of stations as a Station Supervisor Level I, or “Level I Supervisor.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 27; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 27.) Generally, a Level I Supervisor, amongst other things,’ supervises staff in customer service, operation of station controls, and the cleaning of stations. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 29; Pl. 56.1 ¶29.) Plaintiff was subsequently reassigned to a Station Supervisor Level II, or “Level II Supervisor,” position. (Def. 56.1 ¶27; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 27.)

As a Level II Supervisor, Plaintiffs responsibilities included supervising Level I Supervisors and employees charged with cleaning subway stations, known as “cleaners.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 6; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 6.) Level II Supervisors are also expected to conduct inspections of station and station equipment, supervise and assign station personnel, and “conduct[ ] investigations.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 29; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 29.) Part of Plaintiffs job was to ensure that cleaners properly performed their duties, and to ensure that station personnel followed the rules and regulations. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 31-33; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 31-33.) Plaintiff believed that she had the authority to initiate disciplinary procedures, or to take other appropriate action, against her subordinates if they violated rules and regulations or engaged in misconduct. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 35, 38; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 35, 38.) Disciplinary procedures she employed included verbal instructions or reinstruction. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 36; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 36.) Plaintiff would also investigate potential misconduct and obtain written statements from complainants or any witnesses to the misconduct on pre-printed Transit Authority statement forms, known as “Correspondence Sheets” or “G-2” forms. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 39-40; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶39-40.) Later in the disciplinary process, matters were occasionally referred to neutral arbitrators, who resolved disciplinary charges against cleaners. (Def. 56.1 ¶43; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 43.)

As a Level II Supervisor, Plaintiff was represented, for the purposes of collective bargaining and disciplinary proceedings, by Local 106 of the Transport Workers Union, which was also known as the Transit Supervisors’ Organization (“TSO”). (Def. 56.1 ¶ 30; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 30.) Cleaners, Plaintiffs supervisees, were represented by Local 100 of the Transport Workers Union. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 44; Pl. 56.1 ¶44.) This is a different union than that which represented Plaintiff. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 44; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 44.) Each of the unions was subject to a different collective bargaining agreement, but both agreements contained disciplinary procedures. (Aff. of Cynthia Davis ¶ 3 (“C. Davis Aff.”), Docket Entry No. 79.)

Jimmy Davenport, who is not a party to this action, was a cleaner employed by Defendant. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 8; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 8.)

b. March 2009 reporting location and Davenport comment

In March of 2009, Plaintiff was able to choose a new “preference” for her position, meaning she could select a new reporting location, a “tour” (or regular shift), and a regular work scheduling, consisting of five consecutive work days and two consecutive days off (“regular days off’). (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 45-48; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 45-48.) Plaintiff selected the Utica Avenue Station on the A line (“Utica Station”) as her reporting location, which was different from her previous location. (Def. 56.1 ¶48; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 48.) Plaintiffs “tour” was 10:00 PM to 6:00 AM, and her regular days off were Friday and Saturday. (Def. 56.1 ¶49; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 49.) At Utica Station, Plaintiff ensured that the cleaners, she supervised reported for duty in uniform, and had their pass, badge and ID each day. (Def. 56.1 U 50; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 50.) When cleaners arrived at the beginning of their shifts, which corresponded to the beginning of Plaintiffs shift, they reported to Plaintiffs office, where she would perform a “uniform inspection,” checking that each cleaner was in uniform and possessed the proper credentials. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 51; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 51.) She would also require each cleaner to sign in on a sheet. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 51; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 51.) After the uniform inspection and sign-in, the cleaners would wait in the lunchroom while Plaintiff cross-referenced the sign-in sheet with her “coverage sheet,” which listed the names of cleaners scheduled to work that evening, and recorded station assignments. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 52-54; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 52-54.) This process took approximately fifteen minutes. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 54; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 54.) After Plaintiff checked that all scheduled employees were present, Plaintiff would convene a meeting to advise the cleaners of their work assignments for the shift. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 52-56; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 52-56.) Plaintiff would also read a “safety tip of the day.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 56; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 56.) Plaintiffs predecessor at Utica Station typically held a similar meeting in the lunchroom, approximately twenty-five feet from Plaintiffs office, but Plaintiff found the lunchroom distracting because it often had a television playing and sometimes employees would play chess during the shift turnover. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 57; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 57.) Other departments at Utica Station shared the lunchroom during that time of the evening. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 60; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 60.)

After Plaintiff began working at Utica Station in March 2009, several cleaners, including Davenport, complained about Plaintiffs regular uniform inspection. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 63-64; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 63-64.) To address the complaints, Superintendent Justin Hyppolyte held a meeting with Plaintiff and the cleaners to clarify the rules and regulations for everyone. (Def. 56.1¶¶ 65-66; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 65-66.) At the meeting, Davenport stood up in front of everyone and asked why Plaintiff supervised “like that” and suggested her supervision style was why she had gray hair. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 67; Pl. 56.1 1167.) Plaintiff could not recall if Hyppolyte was present to hear the remark. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 68; Pl. 56.1¶ 68.) Following the meeting, Hyppo-lyte did not instruct Plaintiff to change her procedures in any way. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 70; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 70.)

c. August 6, 2009 incident

On August 6, 2009, Plaintiff was still employed as a Level II Supervisor at Uti-ca Station. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 6; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 6.) That day, Plaintiffs tour of duty was her regular 10:00 PM to 6:00 AM. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 7; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 7.) Around 10:00 PM, Plaintiff was in her office when Davenport reported for duty. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 78; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 78.) Plaintiff checked the “coverage sheet” and noted that Davenport was on “comp status,” meaning he was not scheduled for work that evening and was not cleared to work. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 79; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 72, 79.) Plaintiff informed Davenport that he had clearance to resume work on August 7, 2009, not August 6, 2009. He left her office before she could clarify with other Transit Authority officials whether he could work the shift beginning that evening, August 6, 2009. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 80-82; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 80-82.) Plaintiff initially assumed that Davenport had left Utica Station. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 82; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 82.)

Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff went to the lunchroom to look for another cleaner, and saw Davenport in the lunchroom. (Def. 56.1¶ 86; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 86.) Plaintiff instructed Davenport to leave the premises, as he was not authorized to work. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 88; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 88.) As Plaintiff recalls, Davenport responded with something like “who are you going to get to make me leave? I am not your child.... ” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 88; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 88; Tr. of Dep. of Collette Campbell (“Pl. Dep.”), annexed as Def. Ex. S, 105:2-12.) Davenport reported that Plaintiff ordered him out of the lunchroom. When he asked why she was being rude, she “told me to just leave right now and I said I was[,] she then replied T better.’ ” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 89; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 89; G-2 Correspondence Sheet of Jimmy Davenport, Def. Ex. G.) Approximately eight other cleaners were in or near the lunchroom at the time of the incident. (Def. 56.1 ¶87; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 87; G-2 Correspondence Sheets, Def. Ex. H.)

Almost immediately after the incident in the lunchroom, Plaintiff returned to her office. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 92; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 92.) Davenport entered behind her, and Plaintiff and Davenport had a verbal exchange. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 9; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 9.) Davenport and Plaintiff filed divergent reports regarding the incident. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 11; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 11.) Plaintiff reports that Davenport told her “you gray haired B[itch]. I’m going to F[uck] you up and get three people to say you threatened] me.” (Def. 56.1¶¶ 10, 97; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 10, 97.) Plaintiff started screaming, and Davenport ran .away. (Def. 56.1 ¶98; Pl. 56.1 ¶98.) Davenport reported that Plaintiff screamed “ ‘get the fuck out of my office you asshole’ with her finger pointing at [him.]” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 100; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 100.) No witnesses were present to observe the altercation in Plaintiffs office. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 9; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 9.)

Plaintiff called station command and also called her union representative, Michael Troina, from her office, and activated-the “emergency booth communications system,” which connects to Transit Authority rail control, from the station booth. (Def. 56.1¶¶ 101-02; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 101-02.) Plaintiff requested police assistance. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 106.) Plaintiff remained in the booth area until her supervisor, Denise Gregg, arrived. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 110; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 110.) Plaintiff and Gregg went to Plaintiffs office to complete her G-2 form, recording Plaintiffs version of the events. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 111; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 111.) Gregg left and soon returned with Davenport. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 111-12; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 111-12.) When Gregg returned, Plaintiff was on the telephone with Superintendent Hyppolyte. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 113; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 113.) Plaintiff alleges that Davenport requested to speak with his union, and that Gregg told Davenport that she was trying to help him. (Pl. 56.1¶ 111-12.) Plaintiff handed Gregg the telephone and went to another office to fax her G-2 form to Hyppolyte. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 114; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 114.) Plaintiff claims she also faxed a request for medical attention to Hyppolyte at this time, but admits that Hyppolyte maintained that he did not receive the fax. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 116.)

At approximately 12:55 AM on August 7, 2009, Gregg informed Plaintiff that she was being “held out of service,” meaning Plaintiff was not to finish her scheduled shift for the day. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 116-18; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 13, 116-18.) Plaintiff was instructed to report to Cynthia Davis in the Office of Labor. Relations later in the morning on August 7, 2009 to discuss the incident. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 118; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 118.) Either before or after being held out of service, Plaintiff requested medical attention. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 120; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 120'.) She filled out a second G-2 form regarding the incident, dated August 7, 2009, sometime later that night. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 111, 115; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 111, 115; G-2 Correspondence Sheets of CR Campbell, Def. Exs. E, F.) Plaintiff was taken to the hospital, where she was examined and released at approximately 4:30 AM. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 13, 121; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 13, 121.) Hyppolyte met Plaintiff at the hospital and remained with her until she was released. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 121; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 121.) At the hospital, Plaintiff reported that she had suffered an injury on duty, in the form of stress, “elevated [blood] pressure/heart” problems and headache, as a result of the incident. (Def; 56.1 ¶¶ 14, 122, 136; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 14d, 122, 136.) Plaintiff alleges that she made this report the evening of the incident. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 14d.)

Later that morning, Plaintiff spoke with Troina, her union representative. She informed Cynthia Davis that she would be unable to meet that morning due to her medical condition. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 123-24; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 123-24.) Cynthia Davis instructed Plaintiff that she needed a doctor’s note excusing her from the meeting, and indicated that Plaintiff would be disciplined if she did not bring a doctor’s note. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 125; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 125.) Plaintiff was out of work “on compensation status,” due to her medical condition, from August 7, 2009 through August 12, 2009. (Pl. Dep. 193:11-194:4; C. Davis Aff. ¶¶ 11, 13.) It is not immediately clear whether Plaintiff would have been able to return to work or whether holding her out of service carried over into the following shifts, but Plaintiff’s testimony indicates that she was absent from work on these days due to her medical issue, but was not “out of service” or on suspension. (Pl. Dep. 193:11-194:4.)

Davenport and Plaintiff each filed reports regarding the incident; Plaintiff claimed that Davenport had threatened her, and Davenport claimed that Plaintiff had cursed at him. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 11; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 11.) Plaintiff claims that Davenport’s report was “fabricated.” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 12c.) While Plaintiff had been held out of service almost immediately following the incident, (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 116-18; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 13, 116-18), Davenport was held out of service the first day he returned to work, August 9, 2009, and was suspended the following day. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 12, 130; Def. 56.1 ¶ 130.) Davenport and Plaintiff were both charged with disciplinary violations as a result of the incident. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 12; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 12.)

d. August 12, 2009 meeting and disciplinary charges

On August 12, 2009, Plaintiff reported to Cynthia Davis in Labor Relations, and brought with her the requested note from her doctor, dated August 7, 2009, which advised that she was medically able to return to work that day, August 12. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 14; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 14.) Troina, Plaintiffs union representative, accompanied Plaintiff to the meeting with Cynthia Davis. (Def. 56.1 ¶126; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 126.) Cynthia Davis served Plaintiff with disciplinary charges and conducted what is known as a “step one” hearing regarding the August 6, 2009 incident. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 14; PÍ. 56.1 ¶ 14c.) The disciplinary charges recommended Plaintiffs dismissal. (Dep. of Cynthia Davis, Pl. Ex. D (“C. Davis Dep.”) 51:25-52:6, Docket Entry No. 75-2; Employee DAN History for Collette Campbell, dated Jan. 8, 2010, Pl. Ex. E at CLD108, Docket Entry No. 75-2 (noting six disciplinary charges dated August 6, 2009, with recommended penalties of dismissal).) Cynthia Davis contends that dismissal was recommended based on “an allegation of threats, of being threatened and being treated not properly by a supervisor and being yelled at and made to feel threatened [which] was made against [Plaintiff] by this cleaner.” (C. Davis Dep. 53:12-19.) Plaintiff was suspended until August 18, 2009. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 14e, 18a; Pl. Dep. 193:19-22; C. Davis Dep. 49:11-14, 60:3-6, 62:17-25; Daily Notice dated Aug. 19, 2009, Def. Ex. O.)

At the August 12, 2009 hearing, Cynthia Davis explained that because there were no witnesses to the incident in the office, there was a “credibility issue” between Plaintiff and Davenport. Cynthia Davis explained that Davenport’s disciplinary charges would be presented to an arbitrator prior to Plaintiffs charges, and commented that if Davenport’s charges were sustained after an arbitration hearing, she would “take care of’ the charges against Plaintiff. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 129; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 129.) On August 18, 2009, what is known as a “step two” hearing in the grievance process was held before a hearing officer, which Plaintiff, Troina, and Cynthia Davis attended. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 132; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 132.) The penalty of dismissal was sustained. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 133; Disciplinary Notification for Collette Campbell, Def. Ex. L at P094.) Implementation of the penalty was delayed, however, pending resolution of Plaintiffs grievance before a neutral arbitrator. {In re Arbitration between Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transp. Op. Auth. and Local 106, Transit Supervisors Org., Def. Ex. P. at 7.) At the meeting] Plaintiffs suspension was lifted and she was permitted to return to work the following day. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 133; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 133; Daily Notice dated Aug. 19, 2009, Def. Ex. O.)

At the August 12, 2009 meeting, Plaintiff told Cynthia Davis that she had sustained an injury on duty on August 6, 2009. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 21(2).) Following the meeting, Cynthia Davis requested that Troina accompany Plaintiff to the medical clinic, but Plaintiff declined to have him accompany her. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 14e.)

Although Plaintiff presented a note from her doctor on August 12, 2009 which indicated she was able to return to work, Plaintiff remained on leave, collecting workers’ compensation benefits, until April 5, 2010. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 15; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 15a-c.) Plaintiff alleges that the period from October 7, 2009, through December 29, 2009, was qualifying medical leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 18.) During the course of Plaintiffs leave, Davenport’s disciplinary charges, resulting from the August 6, 2009 incident, were adjudicated and Davenport was suspended for thirty work days, or six weeks, without pay. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 16, 131; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 16, 131.) This penalty was imposed pursuant to an agreement by stipulation, in which Davenport admitted to a single disciplinary charge for insubordination. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 16a.)

Plaintiff returned to work from medical leave on April 5, 2010, and on July 6, 2010, an arbitration hearing was held to review her disciplinary charge relating to the August 6, 2009 incident. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 145; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 145.) Although Plaintiff contends that the hearing was “unlawful discipline” and was “an improper tri-partite hearing consistent with the [Station] Supervisor Level I’s” collective bargaining agreement, Plaintiff admits that the hearing was held. (Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 145, 21(10).) Plaintiffs disciplinary charge was dismissed by the arbitrator. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 16; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 16c; Def. Ex. P.)

e. Workers’ compensation claim

Plaintiff completed an injury on duty form on August 7, 2009. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 134; Pl; 56.1 ¶ 134.) She alleged that she had suffered an injury which involved her feeling “upset, stressed” and having “elevated [blood]pressure/heart[trouble]” as a result of the August 6, 2009 incident. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 135-36; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 135-36.) Defendant contested Plaintiffs workers’ compensation claim, arguing that there was no accident within the meaning of the workers’ compensation law. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 138; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 138.) Plaintiff alleges that her claim was “falsely controverted.” (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 138.) Plaintiffs workers’ compensation claim was ultimately sustained by the Workers’ Compensation Board. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 142; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 142.) While Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was granted full benefits from August 6, 2009 through April 5, 2010, along with contractual differential pay, (Def. 56.1 ¶ 144), Plaintiff appears to dispute this fact, (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 143).

At a hearing held on February 8, 2010, before the Workers’ Compensation Board, the judge presiding over the hearing found that Plaintiff was entitled to workers’ compensation payments for the period of October 7, 2009 through November 30, 2009, for a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. (Tr. of Workers’ Comp. Hrg. on Feb. 8, 2010, PI. Ex. H, 47.) The judge reserved decision for the periods of August 7, 2009 through October 7, 2009, and November 20, 2009,- through February 8, 2010, pending Plaintiff’s presentation of further medical evidence. (Id.) The judge indicated that the case would have a follow-up hearing that May. (Id. at 46.) Plaintiff indicated that there was a decision from the Board that April. (PI. 56.1 ¶ 143.) Though Plaintiff disputes Defendant’s statement that sheAvas granted full benefits from August 7, 2009 through April 5, 2010, Plaintiffs main contention appears to be that she was unlawfully denied her contractual differential pay. (PL 56.1 ¶ 143.) Plaintiffs workers’ compensation case history, maintained by the Transit Authority, indicates that Plaintiff was awarded benefits in varying amounts for the period between August 7, 2009 and April 5, 2010. (Workers’ Compensation Case History, PI. Ex. E, at CLD58.)

f. January 2010 investigation into chronic absenteeism

During the winter of 2009, the Transit Authority’s Sick Investigation Unit was directed to review the sick leave usage of various subway supervisors, including Level I and Level II Supervisors. (Aff. of Denise Washington Aff.. (“Washington Aff.”) ¶¶ 4-7, Docket Entry No. 80.) As a result of the investigation, many supervisors, including Plaintiff, were served with disciplinary charges for chronic absenteeism. According to Defendant, Plaintiffs disciplinary charge established that she was sick without pay on six occasions from January 2009 through April 2009, for a total of 25 days, and was sick for 6 days in May 2009 — which absences totaled 31 sick days over a period of 19 weeks. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 149; Def. Ex. R, annexed to Def. Mot. for Summary Judgment, Docket Entry No. 80-19; PI. Confidential Ex. at TA-2 — TA-6, Docket Entry No. 75-4.) Plaintiff contends that the time period included her FMLA leave at the end of 2009, improperly included Plaintiffs workers’ compensation dates leave, and that there were otherwise “no deficiencies in the [P]laintiffs absences.” (PI. 56.1 ¶ 147e.) There was no policy in place regarding the definition of chronic absenteeism, nor was there a policy forbidding the number of absences with which Plaintiff was charged. (PI. 56.1 ¶ 149; PI. Ex. O, Docket Entry No. 75-3.) Plaintiff contested the charges at a “step one” meeting on January 14, 2011 and at a “step two” meeting on March 9, 2011. (Disciplinary Notification for Collette Campbell dated Jan. 11, 2010, Def. Ex. R.) Because the charge against Plaintiff for chronic absenteeism was still pending when she retired, the charge was withdrawn without resolution. (C. Davis Aff. ¶ 15.)

g. Plaintiffs retirement

On March 8, 2010, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Def. 56.1 ¶ 19; PL 56.1 ¶ 19.) In the charge, Plaintiff asserted claims of sex, age and disability discrimination as well as a retaliation claim. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 20; PI. 56.1 ¶ 20.)

Plaintiff submitted her retirement papers in May or June of 2011, and her retirement became effective on August 29, 2011. (PI. Aff. ¶ 2; PI. Dep. 14:10-15:13.)

II. Discussion

a. Standard of review

Summary judgment is proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Bronzini v. Classic Sec., LLC, 558 Fed.Appx. 89, 89 (2d Cir.2014); Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 843 (2d Cir.2013); Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 164-65 (2d Cir.2013); Redd v. N.Y. Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 174 (2d Cir.2012). The role of the court is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Redd, 678 F.3d at 174 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A genuine issue of fact exists when there is sufficient “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment; “there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. The court’s function is to decide “whether, after resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, a rational juror could find in favor of that party.” Pinto v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 F.3d 394, 398 (2d Cir.2000).

The Second Circuit has cautioned that “ ‘[wjhere an employer acted with discriminatory intent, direct evidence of that intent will only rarely be available, so affidavits and depositions must be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show discrimination.’ ” Taddeo v. L.M. Berry & Co., 526 Fed.Appx. 121, 122 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir.2010)). Finally, the court “must construe the pro se plaintiffs claims liberally in deciding the motion for summary judgment.” Thompson v. Tom Vazquez Janitorial, No. 05-CV-808, 2006 WL 3422664, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2006) (citing Sawyer v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO, 180 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir.1999)); see also Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 471 F.3d 363, 369 (2d Cir.2006) (“This Court will construe briefs submitted by pro se litigants liberally.”).

b. Hostile work environment

Plaintiff claims that the actions of Davenport and of Defendant, including and following the August 6, 2009 incident, created a hostile work environment “and affected the terms and condition[s] of [Plaintiffs] employment.” (PI. Aff. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff argues that Davenport subjected her to “sexual ... harassment” through his comments on August 6, 2009. (PI. 56.1 ¶ 97; Charge of Discrimination, dated Mar. 8, 2010, annexed to Def. Mot. as Ex. D (“EEOC Charge”), 1.) She further argues that, following the incident, Defendant’s “actions, reactions, and inactions towards [Plaintiff] created a hostile work environment culminating” in her early retirement. (PL 56.1 ¶ 17.) Plaintiff also contends that Defendant “knew, tolerated and ratified the ageist and sexually harassing hostile work environment in which Plaintiff was forced to work .... and refused to abate and to remediate the resultant hostile work environment,” which was hostile to Plaintiff on the basis of her age and sex. (Am. Compl. at ECF No. 9.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not presented facts that would support a claim for a hostile work environment, noting that a single incident “rarely” constitutes harassment, (Def. Mem. 8), and that Plaintiff cannot establish that any of the actions taken by her supervisors were connected to her gender, age or purported disability, (Def. Mem. 14,16).

To establish a hostile work environment claim under Title VII and the ADEA, a plaintiff must provide evidence “that the complained of conduct: (1) is objectively severe or pervasive — that is, creates an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive; (2) creates an environment that the plaintiff subjectively perceives as hostile or abusive; and (3) creates such an environment because of the plaintiffs [gender or age].” Sotomayor v. City of New York, 862 F.Supp.2d 226, 260-61 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (quoting Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir.2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted) aff'd, 713 F.3d 163 (2d Cir.2013). To withstand summary judgment, a plaintiff must show “either that a single incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a series of incidents were sufficiently continuous and concerted to have altered the conditions of her working environment.” Desardouin v. City of Rochester, 708 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 570 (2d Cir.2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mathiram-puzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70, 78-79 (2d Cir.2008) (A single incident may support a hostile work environment claim, but that incident must be so severe as to “constitute an ‘intolerable alteration’ of the plaintiffs working conditions so as to substantially interfere with or impair his ability to do [her] job.” (quoting Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 153 (2d Cir.2000)) (internal citations omitted)); Leon v. Dep’t of Educ., 16 F.Supp.3d 184, 203 (E.D.N.Y.2014) (“To state a claim for a hostile work environment, the Plaintiff must show that ‘the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.’ ” (quoting Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen, Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 240 (2d Cir.2007))). The Second Circuit distinguishes between “[complaints of] sexual assaults; [other] physical contact!, whether amorous or hostile, for which there is no consent express or implied]; uninvited sexual solicitations; intimidating words or acts; [and] obscene language or gestures” and “the occasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo, of coarse or boorish workers,” which are not protected under the law. Redd, 678 F.3d at 177 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). If the hostile conduct originates from a worker, the plaintiff must also establish that the hostile work environment can be imputed to the employer in order to establish that an employer is liable for a hostile work environment. Dall v. St. Catherine of Siena Med. Ctr., 966 F.Supp.2d 167, 189 (E.D.N.Y.2013) (citing Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. -, -, 133 S.Ct. 2434, 2443, 186 L.Ed.2d 565 (2013) and Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir.2013)). Finally, “it is axiomatic that in order to establish a sex-based hostile work environment under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct occurred because of her sex.” Desardouin, 708 F.3d at 105 (quoting Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir.2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence that would establish a hostile work environment claim under either Tile VII or the ADA. Aside from broad allegations that Defendant created a work environment that was hostile to Plaintiff on the basis of her age and sex, the only evidence of conduct Plaintiff presents relates to Davenport’s conduct in March of 2009 and on August 6, 2009. Furthermore, Plaintiff has presented no evidence, aside from the fact that Davenport commented on the color of her hair and called her a “bitch,” to demonstrate that the incident was related to her age or sex. See Ugactz v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 10-CV-1247, 2013 WL 1232355, at *18 (E.D.N.Y.Mar. 26, 2013) (“Plaintiff has not presented any evidence from which a jury could infer that his work environment was objectively hostile, let alone permeated with any age or disability discriminatory animus.”); Stofsky v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 635 F.Supp.2d 272, 293 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (“Plaintiff has introduced no evidence of any gender-related or age-related comments made or actions taken by any District administrator or co-worker,” with the exception of a few comments as to the plaintiff’s age on unspecified occasions, which “would not be sufficient to survive summary judgment.” (citing Douglas v. Dist. Council 37 Mun. Employees’ Educ. Fund Trust, 207 F.Supp.2d 282, 291 (S.D.N.Y.2002))). The Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs, hostile work environment claims.

c. Title VII, ADA, and ADEA discrimination claims

Plaintiff argues that Defendant used the August 6, 2009 incident and Plaintiffs resulting diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder and hypertension to “unlawfully retaliate and discriminate” against Plaintiff. (Pl. Aff. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant applied a different decision-making and disciplinary process to her as a result of the incident, and alleges it was discriminatory not to subject her and Davenport to same process. (Pl. Aff. ¶ 9b; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 18.) Plaintiff also contends that her 2010 write-up for chronic absenteeism was a pretext, though she does not allege what the write-up was intended to conceal. (Pl. Aff. ¶ 5c.) Broadly, Plaintiff asserts claims of gender, disability, and age discrimination.

Claims of employment discrimination under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA are assessed using the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Mills v. S. Conn. State Univ., 519 Fed.Appx. 73, 74-75 (2d Cir.2013) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework to Title VII gender discrimination claim); Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 106 (applying framework to ADEA age discrimination claim); Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir.2006) (applying framework to ADA disability discrimination claim). Under the framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); see also Ruiz v. Cnty. of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir.2010). A plaintiffs burden at this stage is “minimal.” Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742). To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title YII, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position in question; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under “circumstances giving rise to an inference of gender discrimination.” Mills, 519 Fed.Appx. at 75; see also Doe v. City of New York, 473 Fed. Appx. 24, 27 (2d Cir.2012). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the defendant is covered by the ADA; (2) plaintiff suffers from or is regarded as suffering from a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (3) plaintiff was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because of [her] disability or perceived disability.” Kinneary v. City of New York, 601 F.3d 151, 155-56 (2d Cir.2010) (citations omitted); see also Adams v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 560 Fed.Appx. 47, 48-49 (2d Cir.2014) (quoting McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir.2013)) (outlining requirements for prima facie case under the ADA); Leon, 16 F.Supp.3d at 196 (citing Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 198 (2d Cir.2004)) (same). To meet her initial burden and establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) that she was within the protected age group, (2) that she was qualified for the position, (3) that she experienced adverse employment action, and (4) that such action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Gorzynski, 596 F.3d at 107.

If the plaintiff satisfies this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742; Ruiz, 609 F.3d at 492. The defendant’s burden “is not a particularly steep hurdle.” Hyek v. Field Support Servs., 702 F.Supp.2d 84, 93 (E.D.N.Y.2010), aff'd 461 Fed.Appx. 59 (2d Cir.2012). It “is one of production, not persuasion; it ‘can involve no credibility assessment.’ ” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509, 113 S.Ct. 2742). If the defendant offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for its action, summary judgment must still be denied, however, if the plaintiff can show that the explanation was pretext. To make a sufficient showing at this final stage, the plaintiffs burden varies based on the type of claim she brings. For Title VII claims, “the evidence in plaintiffs favor, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, [must be] sufficient to sustain a reasonable finding that his dismissal was motivated at least in part by ... discrimination.” Adamczyk v. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 474 Fed.Appx. 23, 25 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Grp., Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir.2007)); see also Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. -, -, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2522-23, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013) (“An employee who alleges status-based discrimination under Title VII need not show that the causal link between injury and wrong is so close that the injury would not have occurred but for the act. So-called but-for causation is not the test. It suffices instead to show that the motive to discriminate was one of the employer’s motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful motives that were causative in the employer’s decision.”); Edwards v. Huntington Union Free Sch. Dist., 957 F.Supp.2d 203, 209-10 (E.D.N.Y.2013) (explaining the burden shifting analysis for Title VII discrimination claims). However, a “ ‘plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim pursuant to the ADEA’ satisfies this burden by presenting facts, which ‘taken in [her] favor, suffice to show that a triable issue exists as to whether [her] age was a ‘but for’ cause of [her] termination.’” Delaney v. Bank of Am. Corp., 766 F.3d 163, 168 (2d Cir.2014) (quoting Gorzynski 596 F.3d at 106) (original alterations omitted). “The condition that a plaintiff’s age must be the ‘but for’ cause of the adverse employment action is not equivalent to a requirement that age was the employers only consideration, but rather that the adverse employment action would not have occurred without it.” Id. at 169 (quoting Fagan v. U.S. Carpet Installation, Inc., 770 F.Supp.2d 490, 496 (E.D.N.Y.2011)) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). “[T]he question of whether the heightened, but-for standard of causation ... applies to claims asserted under the ADA, is one that has not yet been addressed by the Second Circuit.” Sherman v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 71 F.Supp.3d 332, 348, 2014 WL 7370033, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2014) (quoting Castro v. City of New York, 24 F.Supp.3d 250, 269 n. 34 (E.D.N.Y.2014)) (internal quotation marks and original alteration omitted).

i. Prima facie case of discrimination

1. Protected group and qualification

Plaintiff raises claims of discrimination on the basis of her gender, disability, and age. It is not disputed that Plaintiff is a woman, and Defendant does not appear to dispute that Plaintiff was qualified for her position. Plaintiff brings her disability claim on the grounds that Defendant perceived that Plaintiff was disabled as a result of the verbal interaction with Davenport on August 6, 2009. (PL 56.1 ¶ 17 n. 9.) Plaintiffs claim of age discrimination is based on the references, made by Davenport, in March and August of 2009 regarding Plaintiff’s gray hair, and on Plaintiff’s age at the time of the incident. Plaintiffs claim of gender discrimination is based on the fact that she is a woman, and on the gendered term, “bitch” used by Davenport on August 6, 2009.

2. Adverse action

• Plaintiff argues that she was subject to several adverse actions as a result of discrimination based on her gender, disability and age. She points to six events in particular: (1) Gregg held Plaintiff out of service following the August 6, 2009 incident; (2) Defendant served her with disciplinary charges as a result of the incident; (3) Defendant pursued the charges against her — which the Court construes to include the August 12-18 suspension; (4) Defendant failed to investigate, and presumably discredit, Davenport’s allegations against Plaintiff; (5) Defendant controverted Plaintiffs workers’ compensation claim; (6) Defendant served Plaintiff with disciplinary charges for chronic absenteeism. Plaintiff argues that she “involuntarily quit/retired” as a result of all of Defendant’s actions, and was thus constructively discharged. (PI. Aff. If 2.) Other than being held out of service which, the Court will assume without deciding was an adverse action, as discussed below, Plaintiff cannot show that any of the other actions were adverse.

“An adverse employment action is a ‘materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment,’ which can include ‘termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, [or] significantly diminished material responsibilities,’ among other possibilities.” Adams, 560 Fed.Appx. at 49 (alteration in original) (quoting Sanders v. N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., 361 F.3d 749, 755 (2d Cir.2004)); see also Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 152 (2d Cir.2004); Albuja v. Nat’l Broad. Co. Universal, Inc., 851 F.Supp.2d 599, 606 (S.D.N.Y.2012) (noting that to satisfy the “adverse employment action” requirement, a plaintiff must show that the action affected “some ‘tangible job benefits’ such as ‘compensation, terms, conditions or privileges’ of employment.” (quoting Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 373 (2d Cir.2002))). Such action must be “more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” Brown v. City of Syracuse, 673 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir.2012) (quoting Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir.2006)). “[Disciplinary memoranda and evaluations are adverse employment actions only if they affect ultimate employment decisions such as promotion, wages, or termination.” Eldridge v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 968 F.Supp.2d 546, 557 (W.D.N.Y.2013) (quoting Regis v. Metro Jewish Geriatric Ctr., No. 97-CV-0906, 2000 WL 264336, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2000)); see also Henry v. NYC Health & Hosp. Corp., 18 F.Supp.3d 396, 407 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (“[T]he threat of disciplinary action, without more, does not constitute an adverse employment action.” (citing Honey v. Cnty. of Rockland, 200 F.Supp.2d 311, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) and Bowles v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., Nos. 00-CV-4213, 03-CV-3073, 2006 WL 1418602, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006), aff'd, 285 Fed.Appx. 812 (2d Cir.2008))).

A. August 6, 2009 discipline

As a result of the August 6, 2009 altercation with Davenport, Plaintiff was held out of service in the early hours of August 7, 2009, was served with disciplinary charges on August 12, 2009, and was suspended from August 12, 2009 through August 18, 2009. It is not clear from the record whether the holding out of service or the suspension resulted in lost pay or another material loss of benefits. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude that her removal from work on August 7, 2009 and suspension constituted an adverse employment action.

Instituting disciplinary proceedings which result in a suspension without pay can constitute an adverse employment action. See Weber v. City of New York, 973 F.Supp.2d 227, 251 (E.D.N.Y.2013) (finding that unsatisfactory performance evaluations culminating in suspension were a “materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment ... [that was] more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities” (alterations in original) (quoting Bowles v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 285 Fed.Appx. 812, 814 (2d Cir.2008) and collecting cases)); Morales v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Labor, 865 F.Supp.2d 220, 244 (N.D.N.Y.2012) (“There is no question that plaintiffs one-week suspension without pay qualifies as an adverse employment.”) (citing Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 223-24 (2d Cir.2001)). However, a suspension with pay, particularly when implemented during an investigation into misconduct, does not, without more, constitute an adverse action. Brown, 673 F.3d at 150-51 (adding that “ ‘[p]aid suspension during an investigation could thus potentially be adverse if the employer takes actions beyond an employee’s normal exposure to disciplinary policies’ ” and reiterating that “a suspension with pay may sometimes rise to the level of an adverse employment action” (quoting Joseph, 465 F.3d at 92 n. 1)).

Because suspension without pay typically meets the “materially adverse” standard, Plaintiff has presented a question as to whether these actions could constitute adverse actions under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA. Given the information before the Court, Plaintiff has demonstrated an issue of fact as to whether holding her out of service and suspending her could constitute adverse actions. For the purposes of deciding Defendant’s motion, the Court will treat (1) holding Plaintiff out of service, and (2) suspending her on August 12, 2009 as “adverse actions.”

B. Other actions

As for the disciplinary charges served on Plaintiff for chronic absenteeism, Plaintiff has not shown that the charges led to any change in the conditions of her employment. Here, the evidence shows that the charges for chronic absenteeism were held pending through Plaintiffs retirement, were withdrawn upon her retirement, and never had any impact on Plaintiffs employment. Thus, the service of the chronic absenteeism charges is not an adverse employment action. See Eldridge, 968 F.Supp.2d at 557 (noting that disciplinary memoranda are adverse “only if they affect ultimate employment decisions such as promotion, wages, or termination” (quoting Regis, 2000 WL 264336, at *8)); Morales, 865 F.Supp.2d at 244 (noting that although Plaintiff characterized disciplinary counseling memoranda as punitive, her evidence did not show “that any caused a decrease in her salary, a change in her title, a loss in her benefits, or any other change in her employment status”) (citations omitted); cf. Weeks v. New York State (Div. of Parole), 273 F.3d 76, 86 (2d Cir.2001) (finding “notice of discipline” and “counseling memo” insufficient to constitute adverse action when the plaintiff did “not describe its effect or ramifications, how or why the effect would be serious, [or] whether it went to any file”), abrogated on other grounds by Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002).

Furthermore, Plaintiff cannot show that the failure to investigate Davenport’s claim against her affected any of her tangible job benefits, and thus cannot show that this was an adverse action. See Wright v. Monroe Cmty. Hosp., 493 Fed. Appx. 233, 237 (2d Cir.2012) (noting that failure to take action against coworker for altercation was not adverse action). Plaintiff also concedes that she was paid workers’ compensation benefits in full, thus the decision to controvert her workers’ compensation claim did not constitute adverse action as it did not result in a material loss of benefits.

C. Constructive discharge

Plaintiff contends that her retirement was not voluntary, and was a constructive discharge. (Pl. 56.1 ¶ 151.) A constructive discharge is “functionally the same as an actual termination” and therefore is considered an adverse employment action. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 159 L.Ed.2d 204 (2004). It occurs only “when an employer ‘intentionally creates a work atmosphere so intolerable that [the plaintiff] is forced to quit involuntarily.’ ” Borski v. Staten Island Rapid Transit, 413 Fed.Appx. 409, 411 (2d Cir.2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 152 (2d Cir.2003)); Andersen v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 481 Fed.Appx. 628, 632 (2d Cir.2012) (constructive discharge exists when an employer “intentionally created an intolerable work atmosphere that force[d the plaintiff] to quit involuntarily”) (quoting Serricchio v. Wachovia Secs. LLC, 658 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir.2011)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 836, 184 L.Ed.2d 652 (2013); Stofsky v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 635 F.Supp.2d 272, 299 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (“Constructive discharge occurs when the employer, rather than acting directly, deliberately makes an employee’s working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation.”) (quoting Morris v. Schroder Capital Mgmt. Int’l, 481 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir.2007)). “ ‘[A] constructive discharge cannot be proven merely by evidence that an employee preferred not to continue working for that employer’ or that ‘the employee’s working conditions were difficult or unpleasant.’ ” Miller v. Praxair, Inc., 408 Fed.Appx. 408, 410 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Spence v. Maryland Cas. Co., 995 F.2d 1147, 1156 (2d Cir.1993)); Edwards, 957 F.Supp.2d at 213 (“The standard for constructive discharge is demanding, and it ‘cannot be proven merely by evidence that an employee ... preferred not to continue working for that employer ... [or that] the employee’s working conditions were difficult or unpleasant.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting Madray v. Long Island Univ., 789 F.Supp.2d 403, 409-10 (E.D.N.Y.2011))).

Constructive discharge requires evidence (1) that the employer acted deliberately or intentionally in bringing about the complained of work conditions, and (2) that the conditions were “intolerable.” Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 229 (2d Cir.2004); see also Rogers v. Roosevelt Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 09-CV-3862, 2012 WL 6163130, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2012) (using the Petrosino two-part analysis), ajfd, 553 Fed.Appx. 88 (2d Cir.2014). In order to meet the first requirement, the plaintiff must, at a minimum, show that the employer acted deliberately in bringing about the intolerable work conditions. Petrosino, 385 F.3d at 229-30; see also Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir.2000) (“[S]omething beyond mere negligence or ineffectiveness is required.”). Next, in order to determine whether the work conditions were “so intolerable as to compel resignation,” the conditions must be “assessed objectively by reference to a reasonable person in the employee’s position.” Petrosino, 385 F.3d at 230; see also Miller, 408 Fed.Appx. at 410 (“ ‘The inquiry is objective: Did [the] working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign?’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting Pa. State Police, 542 U.S. at 141, 124 S.Ct. 2342)); Serricchio, 658 F.3d at 185 (“Working conditions are intolerable if they are so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.”) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff has not shown that her retirement was involuntary or that she was constructively discharged. Plaintiff argues that she became a “lame duck” supervisor following the August 6, 2009 incident because the altercation with Davenport, and her need to fight disciplinary charges following the incident, undermined her authority with her subordinates, making her workplace intolerable. At oral argument, Plaintiff indicated that she felt that, as a supervisor, she should not have been disciplined in the same way Davenport was, further suggesting that her authority was undermined. Plaintiff has not shown any evidence that her work environment was intolerable. At most, the evidence shows that her working conditions may have been unpleasant. Plaintiff, however, has not pointed to any incident involving her other subordinates or supervisees to implicate the fact that her authority was undermined. Plaintiff’s belief that she was a “lame duck” or that her authority was undermined is insufficient to show that her workplace was intolerable. While it may have been an unpleasant environment for Plaintiff because of her belief, “a constructive discharge cannot be proven merely by evidence that ... the employee’s working conditions were difficult or unpleasant.” Miller, 408 Fed.Appx. at 410 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). There is no evidence to support her contention that it was so unpleasant that a reasonable person in her position would have felt compelled to resign.

Moreover, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that would support a finding that Defendant deliberately brought about the condition she complained of. See Adams, 560 Fed-Appx. at 50 (finding no material question of fact as to whether the plaintiff was constructively discharged when he informed his supervisors about harassment from a coworker, noting the employer was, “ ‘at most, ineffective or even incompetent [in] handling [ ] the matter,’ which ‘does not rise to the level of deliberate action required by our precedent’ ” (quoting Whidbee, 223 F.3d at 74)). Furthermore, the evidence suggests that Plaintiff was transferred to another reporting location following the incident in response to .her complaints about her working conditions, (PI. Dep. 242:12-243:5), undermining any argument that Defendant deliberately brought about the working conditions of which Plaintiff complains. As to Plaintiffs claim that being held out of service undermined her authority, it is unclear what material effect, if any, holding her out of service had on Plaintiffs employment over the nearly two years she remained with the Transit Authority-following the incident. Her claim for constructed discharge fails.

3. Inference of bias or discrimination

Plaintiff must further show that the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. Inference of discrimination “is a ‘flexible [standard] that can be satisfied differently in differing factual scenarios.’ ” Howard v. MTA Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 866 F.Supp.2d 196, 204 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (quoting Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir.1996)). “No one particular type of proof is required to show that Plaintiffs termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” Moore v. Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr., No. ll-CV-3625, 2013 WL 3968748, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 2013) (citations omitted). An inference of discrimination can be drawn from cireum-stances such as “the employer’s criticism of the plaintiffs performance in ethnically degrading terms; or its invidious comments about others in the employee’s protected group; or the more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group; or the sequence of events leading to the plaintiffs [adverse employment action],” Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 468 (2d Cir.2001) (citation omitted), or by “showing that an employer treated [an employee] less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside his protected group,” Abdul-Hakeem v. Parkinson, 523 Fed.Appx. 19, 20 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting Ruiz, 609 F.3d at 493). “In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial,” a court is obliged to “ ‘carefully distinguish between evidence that allows for a reasonable inference of discrimination and evidence that gives rise to mere speculation and conjecture.’ ” Woodman v. WWORTV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 75 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 448 (2d Cir.1999)).

Plaintiff has shown no connection between her removal from service or suspension and her gender, age, or disability. Plaintiffs various arguments about the way she was treated following the August 6, 2009 incident do not raise an inference of discrimination. Plaintiff' argues that she and Davenport, a younger man, were similarly situated and were not treated similarly following the August 6, 2009 incident, when she was held out of service the day of the incident and Davenport was not held out of service until he returned to work. (PI. 56.1 ¶ 12, 21.) Plaintiff, at oral argument, contended that Gregg was biased toward Davenport because she knew him, and thus treated him differently. However, the record shows that Plaintiff and Davenport were treated similarly. Plaintiff and Davenport were both held out of service on their first day of active duty following the incident, and both were suspended pending investigation into the incident. Furthermore, the ultimate outcome of the disciplinary charges relating to the August 6, 2009 incident does not support an inference of discrimination against Plaintiff: Plaintiffs charges were dismissed following arbitration, and Davenport’s charges were sustained and accompanied by a six-week suspension.

Plaintiff has done no more than point to various ways in which she feels she was mistreated and argue that it must have been because of her sex, age, or disability. This is not sufficient to sustain a claim of discrimination. See Howard v. City of New York, 602 Fed.Appx. 545, 547, 2015 WL 895430, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2015) (analyzing Section 1981 race discrimination claim, noting that remarks by someone other than a decision-maker, tied to adverse action by nothing more than “mere speculation” do not support an inference that adverse action was motivated by bias); id. at 548, 2015 WL 895430 at *3 (“In sum, [the plaintiff] has done little more than cite to his alleged mistreatment and ask the court to conclude that ‘it must have been related to his race. This is not sufficient.’ ” (quoting Lizardo v. Denny’s, Inc., 270 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir.2001))); Dorfman v. Doar Commc’ns, Inc., 314 Fed.Appx. 389, 390-91 (2d Cir.2009) (“The incidents upon' which Appellant bases his claim ... lack any hint of age discrimination beyond that provided by mere speculation.” (citing Bickerstaff, 196 F.3d at 452)). “In the absence of any circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus other than the differential treatment, the inference that the difference in treatment is attributable in part to discrimination would be based on speculation rather than on evidence or a rational inference.” Setelius v. Nat’l Grid Elec. Servs. LLC, No. 11-CV-5528, 2014 WL 4773975, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2014).

Because Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden to establish a prima facie case of gender, age, or disability discrimination under Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA, the Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on these claims.

ii. Failure to accommodate under the ADA

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to accommodate her disability, but provides no facts in support of this allegation, nor has she provided any argument in opposition to the motion for summary judgment as to her claim of failure to accommodate. Failure to accommodate is a type of disability discrimination that also follows the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme. In order to establish a prima facie case for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is a person with a disability under the meaning of the ADA, (2) her employer is a covered entity, (3) the plaintiff could perform the essential functions of her job with an accommodation, and (4) the defendant refused to make such an accommodation. McBride v. BIC Consumer Products Mfg. Co., Inc., 583 F.3d 92, 96-97 (2d Cir.2009); see also Ugactz, 2013 WL 1232355, at *7 (same); Rogers, 2012 WL 6163130, at *5 (same). Plaintiff has failed to show that she made any request for an accommodation that was denied. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs failure to accommodate claim is granted.

d. Retaliation

Plaintiff argues that Defendant used the August 6, 2009 incident and Plaintiffs resulting diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder and hypertension “to unlawfully retaliate and discriminate” against Plaintiff. (PL Aff. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff claims that her complaints related to the August 6, 2009 incident were protected activity because she believed that she was reporting discrimination based on age and sex, in the form of Davenport’s offensive conduct, and on disability, in the form of her request for medical