Full opinion text
Opinion by Judge O’SCANNLAIN; Concurrence by Judge CANBY. O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge. We must decide whether a local ordinance imposing certain licensing requirements and operating restrictions on adult entertainment establishments violates the First Amendment. I A In 1996, the Arizona legislature amended § 11-821 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, to authorize counties to enact zoning ordinances with respect to adult entertainment establishments. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 11-821. Acting on its new authority, the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors asked its Planning and Development Department to research and to prepare a draft of what would eventually become Ordinance P-10, at issue in this case. At the behest of the county board, the planning department prepared a four-page report for board members, addressing the negative effects associated with adult-oriented businesses. In addition to discussing the Supreme Court’s decisions in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986), Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976), and Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991), the report cited seventeen studies documenting the negative secondary effects associated with adult-oriented establishments. Summarizing the findings of these studies, the report concluded that adult-oriented businesses were associated with “unlawful and unhealthy activities” and generally lead to illicit sexual behavior, crime, unsanitary conditions, and the spread of sexually-transmitted diseases if not properly regulated. Board members were provided with copies of studies from Phoenix and Los Angeles documenting such negative secondary effects, as well as a fourteen-page summary of eleven other studies. Public hearings were held with respect to the proposed ordinance on April 23, 1997. Two people spoke against the ordinance at those hearings, a local bookstore owner and John Weston, the attorney for the plaintiffs in this case. Others spoke in favor, including state senator David Peterson and state representatives Marilyn Jarrett and Karen Johnson. Most of the testimony pro and con focused on the legality of the proposed ordinance and the need for regulation in light of the perceived secondary effects associated with adult-oriented businesses. The county planning director, Ms. Herberg-Kusy, also addressed the board at these hearings, urging that the studies provided the necessary empirical data to conclude that adult-oriented businesses have a negative secondary impact on surrounding communities. The board voted unanimously to adopt the ordinance, and it became effective on May 27, 1997. B Ordinance P-10 is a comprehensive scheme for the licensing and regulation of businesses which come within its purview: that is, adult entertainment businesses. See Ordinance § 2. Businesses, managers and employees that come within the ordinance’s sweep are each required to obtain a license or permit prior to operating, or working at, an adult entertainment business. Certain procedural safeguards, at issue in this case, are in place with respect to the county’s handling of applications for licenses and permits. In addition, the ordinance contains numerous operating restrictions on adult-oriented businesses, certain of which are also at issue in this litigation. The plaintiffs in this action are Dream Palace, a live adult nude dancing establishment in Maricopa County, and certain of its managers and employees (collectively “Dream Palace”). When Ordinance P-10 became effective, Dream Palace and its managers and employees did not apply for a business license or for work permits, as required by the ordinance. Instead, on November 13, 1997, they filed suit in federal district court challenging the ordinance on First Amendment grounds, as well as certain state law grounds. In 1998, apparently at the instigation of Maricopa County, the Arizona legislature enacted Arizona Revised Statute § 11-821(B). Section 11-821(B) expressly provided Arizona counties with the authority to license and to regulate new or existing adult-oriented business, and to impose work permit requirements on nude dancers and business managers. While the state was amending the relevant statute, the county was in the process of amending Ordinance P-10. The proposed amendments were in the nature of minor clarifications; the substance of the ordinance remained unchanged. At a June 17,1998 board meeting to discuss the amendments, a total of eight further secondary effects studies were made available to board members. On September 2,1998, the board unanimously voted to approve the amendments. See Maricopa County, Az., Ordinance P-10 (Sept. 2, 1998) (Attached as Appendix to this Opinion). In the wake of the adopted amendments, Dream Palace filed an amended complaint in district court, renewing Dream Palace’s frontal assault on several provisions in the ordinance on First Amendment and state law grounds. Dream Palace simultaneously filed eight separate motions for partial summary judgment. The county filed a single cross-motion for summary judgment on all issues. On September 30, 1999, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county on all issues save two. Specifically, with respect to the requirement that an adult entertainment business must obtain a license to operate, the district court held that the procedural safeguards in place were insufficient with respect to pre-existing businesses like Dream Palace, because there was no guarantee that a pre-existing business could continue to operate pending the outcome of an appeals process. The district court also held that the requirement that nude and semi-nude dancers wear identification cards was invalid under Renton. The county has not appealed from either of these two rulings. The district court abstained from addressing the state law claims of preemption and ultra vires. Dream Palace subsequently filed a motion to alter or to amend the judgment, and asked the district court to explain its decision to abstain from addressing the state law claims. The district court denied the motion. In doing so, it explained that it did not address the state law claims because “the various motions for summary judgment have resolved all of Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims,” and that the “remaining state law claims raise delicate issues involving the interpretation and application of Arizona law.” Dream Palace timely appeals. II The Supreme Court has ruled that nude dancing of the type performed at Dream Palace is “expressive conduct” which falls “within the outer ambit of the First Amendment’s protection.” City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000) (plurality opinion). Therefore, the ordinance must be analyzed to ensure it does not unduly impair the exercise of First Amendment rights. The specific First Amendment tests that may apply, and the determination as to the proper level of scrutiny, depends for the most part on the nature of the provision that Dream Palace seeks to challenge. Here, Dream Palace challenges several provisions in the ordinance as invalid prior restraints. Those provisions will be upheld only if they provide for a prompt decision during which the status quo is maintained, and there is the opportunity for a prompt judicial decision. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 228, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990). Dream Palace also challenges several of the ordinance’s operating restrictions. We assess the constitutionality of those provisions under the “secondary effects” test enunciated by the Supreme Court in Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-54, 106 S.Ct. 925. III Dream Palace first challenges the requirement that adult entertainment businesses obtain a license prior to conducting business in Maricopa County. A The district court in this case drew a distinction between pre-existing businesses on the one hand, and new businesses on the other. Specifically, with respect to pre-existing businesses, it found that “there is no guarantee in the ordinance that existing businesses or persons working as managers or adult service providers will be able to continue operating beyond the 180 day period,” and for that reason, the licensing scheme was invalid. The district court found, however, that the remaining provisions were valid. Specifically, the district court found that “the County may regulate and license new businesses and does so in this case in as expeditious a manner as possible given administrative realities.” The district court held that, with respect to new businesses, the fact that the ordinance “does not provide for a deadline for judicial decisions” did not render the licensing scheme unconstitutional because “the County has no authority to require an absolute time period in which the state court process has to occur.” B Before reaching the merits, we must consider the county’s argument that Dream Palace, a previously existing business, lacks standing to appeal the district court’s decision that the ordinance’s licensing requirements can constitutionally be applied to new businesses. l The doctrine of standing addresses the question whether “a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). At an “irreducible minimum,” Article III of the United States Constitution requires a litigant invoking the authority of a federal court to demonstrate: (1) “that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,” (2) “that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action,” and (3) that the injury is “likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, Dream Palace asserts an overbreadth challenge to the business license requirements. Under the over-breadth doctrine, a plaintiff may challenge government action by showing that it may inhibit the First Amendment rights of parties not before the court. See Young v. City of Simi Valley, 216 F.3d 807, 815 (9th Cir.2000); 4805 Convoy, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 183 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir.1999). The overbreadth doctrine functions as an exception to “the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights,” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984), and is based on the idea that “the very existence of some broadly written laws has the potential to chill the expressive activity of others not before the court.” Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992). However, the overbreadth doctrine “does not affect the rigid constitutional requirement that plaintiffs must demonstrate an injury in fact to invoke a federal court’s jurisdiction.” 4805 Convoy, Inc., 183 F.3d at 1112 (quoting Bordell v. General Elec. Co., 922 F.2d 1057, 1061 (2d Cir.1991)); see also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 816-17, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975) (to have overbreadth standing, “[t]here must be a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Dream Palace must still satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement to raise a challenge to the ordinance. 2 At the outset of these proceedings, we think there is no dispute that Dream Palace had the necessary standing to challenge the overall licensing requirements. By its express terms, the ordinance applied to both preexisting businesses and new businesses, and Dream Palace’s refusal to apply for the necessary permit therefore placed it in danger of sustaining a direct injury; that is, prosecution for noncompliance with the ordinance. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). Only when the district court ruled that the license requirements were invalid with respect to one class of businesses, but valid with respect to another, did a serious question with respect to Dream Palace’s standing arise. The issue is therefore more properly characterized as one of mootness on appeal. Dream Palace’s challenge to the business license scheme will be moot, and hence not justiciable, if intervening events have caused it completely to lose “its character as a present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if [a court is] to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law.” Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48, 90 S.Ct. 200, 24 L.Ed.2d 214 (1969) (per curiam); see also Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 287, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (“[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties, lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” (modification in original)). The issues of mootness and standing are closely related, see United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980), though circumstances that would not support standing as an initial matter may nevertheless be sufficient to defeat a mootness challenge on appeal. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 189-92, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000); Jacobus v. Alaska, 338 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir.2003) (“The Supreme Court has emphasized that the doctrine of mootriess is more flexible than other strands of justiciability doctrine.”). The question of mootness “focuses upon whether we can still grant relief between the parties. If an event occurs while a case is pending on appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party, the appeal is moot and must be dismissed.... However, while a court may not be able to return the parties to the status quo ante ..., an appeal is not moot if the court can fashion some form of meaningful relief....” In re Pattullo, 271 F.3d 898, 901 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Arkison, 34 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir.1994) (modifications in original) (quoting Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12, 113 S.Ct. 447, 121 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992))). We must examine whether relief against the ordinance’s provisions could meaningfully improve Dream Palace’s position; if it could not, then Dream Palace has no continuing stake in the outcome sufficient to survive a mootness challenge. 3 The problem for Dream Palace is obvious: it is a pre-existing business, and the district court has previously ruled that the business license requirement cannot be applied to such businesses. That ruling has not been appealed. Since Dream Palace cannot be subject to the ordinance as it stands, it may at first be difficult to see how it has a “present, live controversy,” Hall, 396 U.S. at 48, 90 S.Ct. 200, sufficient to go forward with its claim that the ordinance is also invalid with respect to new businesses. However, the county has conceded in its brief and at oral argument that rather than challenging the district court’s ruling with respect to pre-existing businesses like Dream Palace, it is in the process of amending those provisions so that the challenged restrictions will apply to preexisting businesses. At such time, the provisions Dream Palace now seeks to challenge can and will apply to Dream Palace and its employees. It therefore appears that Dream Palace is indeed “immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury” as a result of the official conduct it seeks to challenge. Id. In Erie, the owners of the plaintiff nude dancing club filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot, because the club had ceased to operate in Erie County after the Supreme Court had granted certiorari. 529 U.S. at 287, 120 S.Ct. 1382. The Supreme Court held that “[s]imply closing [the club] is not sufficient to render th[e] case moot” because of the possibility that the club owners “could again decide to operate a nude dancing establishment in Erie,” in which case, the owners would once again be subject to the city ordinance. Id. Similarly, in Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996 (9th Cir.2001), we considered a situation where an owner’s license to operate an adult cabaret had expired after the district court had rendered a decision in the city’s favor, and the owner had not sought renewal. Id. at 1011. We nonetheless held that the case was not moot because of the plaintiffs “stated intention ... to return to business.” Id. at 1012. Given the county’s expressed intention to amend the ordinance so as to have it apply to Dream Palace, the possibility of immediate injury to the plaintiff in this case is more likely to come to pass than either of the scenarios contemplated in Erie and Clark. Dream Palace will soon be subject to the'provisions it now seeks to challenge, and consequently, there is a “live controversy.” Hall, 396 U.S. at 48, 90 S.Ct. 200. We are satisfied, therefore, that its over-breadth challenge to the business license requirement is not moot. C Turning to the merits, Dream Palace asserts that the procedural safeguards with respect to the county’s decision on a license application are insufficient to protect First Amendment rights. A prior restraint exists when the enjoyment of protected expression is contingent upon the approval of government officials. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 711-13, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). Since Ordinance P-10 requires all businesses which come within its purview to apply for and to obtain a license before engaging in business, the licensing scheme is quite obviously a prior restraint, and properly analyzed as such. Prior restraints are not unconstitutional per se, however. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 225, 110 S.Ct. 596. The Supreme Court has said that to pass constitutional muster, a licensing scheme that regulates adult entertainment businesses must contain two procedural safeguards: First, “the licensor must make the decision whether- to issue the license within a specified and reasonable period during which the status quo is maintained.” Id. at 228, 110 S.Ct. 596. Second, “there must be the possibility of prompt judicial review in the event that the license is erroneously denied.” Id. 1 First, Dream Palace claims that the ordinance is invalid because it places the burden of proof in the administrative appeals process on the applicant. See Ordinance P-10 § 18 (“Respondent shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the denial ... was arbitrary or capricious and an abuse of discretion.”). The fact the burden is on the applicant during these administrative proceedings is of no consequence, at least from the standpoint of the First Amendment. In FW/PBS, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that, in the event of judicial review, the regulator must bear the burden of proof once in court. Id. at 230, 110 S.Ct. 596. The Court reasoned that under the ordinance, “the city does not exercise discretion by passing judgment on the content of any protected speech,” but merely engages in “a ministerial act that is not presumptively invalid.” Id. at 229, 110 S.Ct. 596. Furthermore, the applicant has a great deal at stake when a license application is denied, and as such “there is every incentive for the applicant to pursue a license denial through court.” Id. at 230, 110 S.Ct. 596. For these reasons, the Court concluded that “the First Amendment does not require that the city bear the burden of going to court to effect the denial of a license application or that it bear the burden of proof once in court.” Id. Precisely the same circumstances arise here. In deciding whether to issue a license, the licensor “does not exercise discretion by passing judgment on the content of any protected speech.” Id. at 229, 110 S.Ct. 596. Moreover, “[bjecause the license is the key to the applicant’s obtaining and maintaining a business,” id. at 229-30, 110 S.Ct. 596, Dream Palace has an incentive vigorously to pursue administrative review of an adverse decision. We fail to see why the First Amendment would require the county to bear the burden in administrative review proceedings, but not in court. Requiring the applicant to bear the burden of proof in administrative proceedings is, therefore, valid under the First Amendment. 2 Second, Dream Palace argues that the ordinance fails to comply with the second of the FW/PBS requirements: that there be “the possibility of prompt judicial review.” FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 228, 110 S.Ct. 596. a Dream Palace originally rested this argument on our holding in Baby Tam & Co., Inc. v. City of Las Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir.1998) (“Baby Tam I”), that an adult business could not be subjected to a content-based licensing regime where “[tjhere is no provision that a judicial hearing must be had or a decision must be rendered within a prescribed period of time.” Id. at 1101. Baby Tam I, however, is no longer good law after the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., — U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 2219, 159 L.Ed.2d 84 (2004). That case, decided after the parties’ initial briefing in this case, now provides the framework for analyzing the judicial-review provision of Ordinance P-10. The Supreme Court’s opinion in City of Littleton makes clear that the FW/PBS requirement of “prompt judicial review” must be read “as encompassing a prompt judicial decision.” Id. at 2224. In other words, the First Amendment requires that an adult business subject to a licensing scheme not only have prompt access to the courts in the event the license is denied, but also receive a prompt decision from the courts on the legitimacy of such a denial. This follows, the.Court explains, from two principles: first, that “the license for a First Amendment-protected business must be issued within a reasonable period of time, because undue delay results in the unconstitutional suppression of protected speech,” FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 228, 110 S.Ct. 596; and second, that “[a] delay in issuing a judicial decision, no less than a delay in obtaining access to a court, can prevent a license from being issued within a reasonable period of time.” City of Littleton, 124 S.Ct. at 2224 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our task, then, is to determine whether Ordinance P-10, read in its proper context within Arizona law, provides for a sufficiently prompt judicial determination of the legitimacy of a license denial. City of Littleton provides the starting point for that determination. At issue in that case was a licensing ordinance enacted by the city of Littleton, Colorado. Like Ordinance P-10, the Littleton ordinance required adult businesses to obtain a license in order to operate; also like Ordinance P-10, it set out a list of objective circumstances that, if present, required the city to deny the license application. City of Littleton, 124 S.Ct. at 2222 (citing Littleton City Code §§ 3-14-2, 3-14-3, 3-14-5, 3-14-7, 3-14-8). The Littleton ordinance provided that the city’s final licensing decision could be “appealed to the [state] district court pursuant to Colorado rules of civil procedure.” Id. (citing Littleton City Code § 3-14-8(B)(3)). The Supreme Court held that by providing for judicial review through the ordinary process of Colorado state courts, the ordinance “offer[ed] adequate assurance, not only that access to the courts can be promptly obtained, but also that a judicial decision will be promptly forthcoming.” Id. at 2224. In so holding, the Court explicitly accepted the argument that “the First Amendment does not require special ‘adult business’ judicial review rules.” Id. Rather, the Court held, the regular judicial process of the Colorado state courts was sufficient “as long as the courts remain sensitive to the need to prevent First Amendment harms and administer those procedures accordingly.” Id. In effect, the Court in City of Littleton established a presumption that state courts function quickly enough, and with enough solicitude for the First Amendment rights of license applicants, to avoid the unconstitutional suppression of speech that arises from undue delay in judicial review. The Court provided several reasons why ordinary state-court procedures suffice. First, state courts have tools at their disposal to expedite proceedings when necessary. Id. at 2224-25. Second, there is no reason to doubt that state judges are willing to use those procedures when necessary to keep justice delayed from becoming justice denied; moreover, if some state court should fail in its duties, “federal remedies would provide an additional safety valve.” Id. at 2225 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Third, the potential harm to First Amendment values is attenuated when the licensing decision depends on reasonably objective criteria, both because the use of objective criteria is “unlikely in practice to suppress totally the presence” of a certain form of protected expression, and because the use of objective criteria typically lends itself to “simple, hence expeditious” judicial review. Id. Fourth and finally, local governments often lack the legal authority to impose deadlines on state courts; thus, it is reasonable for them to depend on state-law procedural safeguards against undue delay. Id. City of Littleton’s presumption that regular state-court review is adequate applies equally to this facial challenge to Ordinance P-10. Each of the rationales for that presumption set out by the Court in City of Littleton applies here. First, the Arizona courts have procedural tools available should it be necessary to expedite the review of a license denial. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 6(d) (“A judge of the superior court ... may issue an order requiring a party to show cause why the party applying for the order should not have the relief therein requested, and may make the order returnable at such time as the judge designates.”); Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 4(c) (“[A] special action may be instituted with or without an application for an order to show cause why the requested relief should not be granted. ... If a show cause procedure is used, the court shall set a speedy return date.”); Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 4(c) (state bar committee’s note) (“Special actions which require urgent disposition may be expedited under the show cause procedure established by the Rule, with complete flexibility in the Court to control timing.”); see also Green v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 468, 470, 647 P.2d 166 (1982) (“[B]y virtue of’ Rule 4(c), “matters ... may be determined as expeditiously as is necessary”). The ordinance ensures an applicant maximum judicial flexibility by requiring the county to “consent to expedited hearing and disposition” in state court. Second, there is no reason to doubt — ■ and Dream Palace has not disputed — that Arizona courts will be solicitous of. the First Amendment rights of license applicants. Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted, federal remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are available should county and state procedures fail to suffice. Third, as in City of Littleton, the licensing decision under Ordinance P-10 depends on a set of reasonably objective factors. Section 10(d) provides that the director of the county planning department “shall grant the license” unless any of several conditions is met, and these conditions (for example, that the applicant is not underage and has complied with applicable zoning ordinances) are reasonably objective. State courts should therefore have little difficulty in ensuring that county officials do not wrongfully deny license applications that meet the ordinance’s requirements. Fourth, Maricopa County has no legal authority to impose deadlines on Arizona state courts. This fact, of course, would not ameliorate an otherwise unconstitutional prior restraint. When the First Amendment requires certain safeguards before a system of prior restraint may be enforced, a local government cannot evade that requirement by pointing to its lack of legal authority to ensure such safeguards exist. Nevertheless, nothing prevents a county from relying on state law procedures to ensure that First Amendment interests are adequately protected. City of Littleton, 124 S.Ct. at 2225; cf. Graff v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309, 1324 (7th Cir.1993) (en banc) (holding that it was constitutionally sufficient that review of licensing decisions was available by Illinois’ common-law writ of certiorari). As long as those state procedures are themselves constitutionally adequate, the county will have satisfied the First Amendment’s requirements. In short, the ordinance in this case is similar in every relevant aspect to the ordinance upheld by the Supreme Court in City of Littleton. Moreover, Arizona’s rules of procedure “provide for a flexible system of review in which judges can reach a decision promptly in the ordinary case, while using their judicial power to prevent significant harm to First Amendment interests where circumstances require,” City of Littleton, 124 S.Ct. at 2226. Such rules of procedure satisfy the First Amendment. b In its supplemental briefing, Dream Palace advances two additional arguments for its claim that the ordinance does not provide constitutionally sufficient judicial review. First, it argues that under the “special action” procedure authorized by the ordinance, any review is purely at the court’s discretion and hence not sufficiently guaranteed. Second, it argues that review in an Arizona special action is under an abuse-of-discretion standard, and that only de novo review is constitutionally adequate. Dream Palace did not raise these arguments before the district court. Ordinarily, we decline to consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Janes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 279 F.3d 883, 888 n. 4 (9th Cir.2002); United States v. Patrin, 575 F.2d 708, 712 (9th Cir.1978). This rule serves to ensure that legal arguments are considered with the benefit of a fully developed factual record, offers appellate courts the benefit of the district court’s prior analysis, and prevents parties from sandbagging their opponents with new arguments on appeal. We have, however, laid out several narrow exceptions to the rule — among them, the case in which “the issue is purely one of law, does not affect or rely upon the factual record developed by the parties, and will not prejudice the party' against whom it is raised.” Janes, 279 F.3d at 888 n. 4; see also Patrin, 575 F.2d at 712. That exception applies here. Dream Palace’s new arguments are based entirely in law and do not rely on the factual record. Maricopa County will not be prejudiced by Dream Palace’s failure to advance the arguments below; it has had, and has taken advantage of, a full opportunity to brief its response to the new arguments. Even when a case falls into one of the exceptions to the rule against considering new arguments on appeal, we must still decide whether the particular circumstances of the case overcome our presumption against hearing new arguments. In this case, a decision of this Court bearing directly on the issue of judicial review of adult-business licensing decisions — Baby Tam I — was displaced by a Supreme Court decision after the proceedings in the district court were complete. Thus, Dream Palace made its decision to rely below on Baby Tam I within a very different legal landscape from the one that now obtains. For that reason, we exercise our discretion to consider the new arguments advanced by Dream Palace. i First, Dream Palace argues that the “special action” review provided for by the ordinance is inadequate because, under Arizona law, the exercise of jurisdiction in a special action is purely at the court’s discretion. Thus, it contends, there is no guarantee that a court will hear the merits of a denied license applicant’s claim. The Supreme Court’s holding that a “prompt judicial determination must be available,” FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 239, 110 S.Ct. 596, would be drained of its force if it did not mean that a would-be licensee whose application is denied must have access to a court that is required to review the license denial on its merits. We must therefore determine whether Arizona law so provides. Ordinance P-10 provides that a final denial of a license application may be appealed to the Superior Court (the state trial court) “by special action or other available procedure.” As the Supreme Court emphasized in City of Littleton, nothing requires a state or local government to write the details of judicial review procedures into the licensing ordinance. See 124 S.Ct. at 2226. Thus, if there is any procedural route by which an applicant may obtain full review on the merits, we must reject Dream Palace’s argument. The parties vigorously dispute whether the “special action” proceeding is constitutionally sufficient. The special action is a proceeding under Arizona law, created by rule in 1970, that takes the place of the old common law writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. A special action may be instituted in Superior Court or in the appellate courts, see Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 4(a), but Ordinance P-10 authorizes appeal to the Superior Court and so it is that procedure that concerns us here. When a plaintiff seeks special action review in the Superior Court, “the judge must first exercise his discretion and decide whether to consider the case on its merits.” Bilagody v. Thorneycroft, 125 Ariz. 88, 92, 607 P.2d 965, 969 (1979). Were this discretion unbounded, the special action would, of course, provide no guarantee of judicial review on the merits. If, on the other hand, the judge’s “discretion” does not include the ability to dismiss a petition where it is the only route by which the petitioner can bring a constitutional challenge, then the mere use of the term “discretion” will not prevent the review from being constitutionally sufficient. Arizona law in this area is not entirely pellucid. The Arizona Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he decision to accept jurisdiction of a special action petition is highly discretionary with the court in which the petition is filed.” Gockley v. Ariz. Dept. of Corrections, 151 Ariz. 74, 75, 725 P.2d 1108, 1109 (1986). This statement seems, on its face, to suggest that a court could dismiss a petition for reasons unrelated to the constitutional merits of the claim, leaving a petitioner without remedy. The Court of Appeals’ decision in Bilagody, however, suggests that a Superior Court would be abusing its discretion — and hence subject to reversal — if it were the only available venue for, and yet refused to hear, a claim that a license denial violated the First Amendment. In Bilagody, the Arizona Court of Appeals considered a Superior Court judge’s decision to decline jurisdiction over a special action in which the plaintiff challenged, on due process grounds, the state’s suspension of his driver’s license. See 125 Ariz. at 89-92, 607 P.2d at 966-69. The court affirmed the dismissal “on the basis that the appellant had available an adequate remedy by appeal,” 125 Ariz. at 92, 607 P.2d at 969, but added: Were we to conclude, however, that the due process issue could not subsequently be raised, it would be necessary to reconsider the scope of the trial court’s discretion to refuse to decide the issue in a special action. As Justice Holmes once observed in another context: “(I)t is plain that a State cannot escape its constitutional obligations by the simple device of denying jurisdiction in such eases to Courts otherwise competent.” 125 Ariz. at 92 n. 4, 607 P.2d at 969 n. 4 (quoting Kenney v. Supreme Lodge of the World, Order of Moose, 252 U.S. 411, 415, 40 S.Ct. 371, 64 L.Ed. 638 (1920)). The court’s language here strongly suggests that it is not within the Superior Court’s discretion to refuse to consider the merits of that claim unless some other avenue is open for the petitioner’s challenge. Arguing otherwise, Dream Palace points us to language in State ex rel. Dean v. City Court of City of Tucson, 123 Ariz. 189, 598 P.2d 1008 (1979), where the Court of Appeals noted that “[t]he denial of special action relief is a discretionary decision which will be upheld for any valid reason disclosed by the record.” 123 Ariz. at 192, 598 P.2d at 1011. We have no reason to think, however, that the Arizona courts would find any “reason” to be “valid” that would deny a license applicant the review on the merits that the Constitution requires. Cf. City of Littleton, 124 S.Ct. at 2225 (finding “no reason to doubt” that Colorado state judges would exercise their powers so as to avoid First Amendment harms). Dean itself did not deal with a constitutional claim; it merely upheld a Superior Court’s decision not to review the City of Tucson’s challenge to a municipal court’s erroneous acquittal of a woman charged with a traffic violation, because double jeopardy principles would bar any further proceedings against her even if the City’s claim were successful. At most, then, Dean held that denial of review in a special action proceeding is appropriate where a holding for the plaintiff would have no real effect. Thus, our reading of Arizona law inclines us to the view that the Superior Court does not have the kind of “discretion” over special action review that would render the process constitutionally insufficient. Cf. Graff v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309, 1324-25 (7th Cir.1993) (en banc). In any event, we need not delve deeper into the vagaries of Arizona civil procedure law, because the special action is not the only procedure available to contest a license denial. Ordinance P-10 authorizes appeal from a denial not only by special action, but also by any “other available procedure.” That would include, for example, a regular lawsuit seeking an injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance after a contested license denial. It would also include a suit under Arizona’s declaratory judgment statute, A.R.S. § 12-1831 et seq., which provides that [a]ny person ... whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a ... municipal ordinance ... may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the ... ordinance ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. A.R.S. § 12-1832. Dream Palace argues that this language authorizes a declaratory action only to determine the constitutionality or meaning of an ordinance, not to contest the denial of a license application. But the statute permits a plaintiff to “obtain a declaration of rights” under an ordinance, and Ordinance P-10 gives a qualified applicant the right to a license. See Ordinance P-10, § 10(d) (“The Director shall grant the license ... to an applicant who has completed all requirements for application, unless the Director finds any of the following conditions .... ” (emphasis added)). We see no reason why a declaratory action would not lie under these circumstances. Because these procedural routes — a suit for an injunction and a declaratory action — are open to an applicant whose license is denied, we need not conclusively resolve the parties’ debate over the sufficiency of the special action proceeding. ii Dream Palace also argues that review in an Arizona special action is inadequate because it is under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. We disagree with that characterization of Arizona law. A court in a special action considers not only whether the defendant has abused his discretion, but also “[wjhether the defendant has failed ... to perform a duty required by law as to which he has no discretion.” Ariz. Rules of Procedure for Special Actions 3(a). Ordinance P-10 imposes a duty on the county planning director to issue a license unless certain disqualifying conditions obtain; it gives .the director no discretion to deny a qualified application. A reviewing court will thus have no reason to defer to the director’s decision. Dream Palace, however, argues that a special action court will defer to the county’s determination of whether the facts establish a disqualifying condition. Again, we do not think this contention accurately reflects Arizona law. It is true that the Arizona Court of Appeals has held, in a case not involving the First Amendment, that a court hearing a special action challenge to an administrative decision “may not weigh the evidence on which the decision was based.” Ariz. Dep’t of Public Safety v. Dowd, 117 Ariz. 423, 426, 573 P.2d 497, 500 (Ariz.Ct.App.1977). But the Arizona Supreme Court has held that “appellate courts must engage in independent review of ‘constitutional facts’ in order to safeguard first amendment protections.” Dombey v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 150 Ariz. 476, 482, 724 P.2d 562, 568 (1986) (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 512, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984)). We have no reason to think that Arizona courts will not assiduously carry out their duty to ensure 'that meaningful judicial review is not evaded through biased fact-finding. Finally, as discussed above, a special action is not the only judicial procedure available to a denied license applicant, who may also obtain review through a suit for an injunction or declaratory relief. Neither of those procedures calls for any heightened deference on the part of the state court. c In light of City of Littleton, and having rejected both of Dream Palace’s new arguments for its unconstitutionality, we are satisfied that Ordinance P-10 provides the opportunity for both access to judicial review and a prompt judicial decision, as the First Amendment requires. Of course, if some undiscovered quirk of state procedure were to prevent an applicant from receiving meaningful judicial review, a challenge to the ordinance as applied would lie in federal court. See City of Littleton, 124 S.Ct. at 2225 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also id. at 2228 (Banter, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (“If there is evidence of foot-dragging,-.immediate judicial intervention will be required, and judicial oversight or review at any stage of the proceedings must be expeditious.”). IV Dream Palace also contests the adequacy of the procedural safeguards in the ordinance to sustain the validity of the prior restraints involved in the manager and dancer work permit requirements. A Sections' 7 and 8 of the ordinance provide that adult-oriented business managers and adult service providers may not work in an adult entertainment establishment unless they first secure permits. Ordinance § 7, 8. Application for said permits “shall be made in the same manner as application for an adult business license .Id. The upshot is that all of the procedural safeguards with respect to the issuance of business licenses — the requirement of a speedy decision, and the provisions for administrative appeals and judicial review — apply equally to applications for work permits. Permit applicants are provided with an additional safeguard: upon receipt of a properly filed application, the county is required to issue a temporary permit to the applicant, see id. § 10(b), and in the event of an adverse decision on the application, the temporary permit remains in place until the exhaustion of the administrative and judicial review of that decision. See id. §§ 18, 19. B 1 First, Dream Palace renews its argument that placing the burden of proof on managers and dancers in the administrative proceedings violates their First Amendment rights. For the reasons we previously stated, we reject this argument. See supra section III.C.l. Because the county “does not exercise discretion by passing judgment on the content of any protected speech,” FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 229, 110 S.Ct. 596, and because permit applicants have every incentive vigorously to pursue an administrative remedy in the event of an adverse decision on an application, requiring permit applicants to bear the burden of proof is valid under the First Amendment. 2 Second, Dream Palace argues that requiring managers and dancers to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review constitutes a pri- or restraint. We reject this argument: we read nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision in FW/PBS that signals disapproval with the common requirement that an applicant exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review. We reiterate that the critical issues with respect to the applicant’s First Amendment rights are “a specified and reasonable period during which the status quo is maintained,” and the “possibility of prompt judicial review.” Id. at 228, 110 S.Ct. 596. Requiring administrative exhaustion implicates neither of these two constitutional prerequisites. The ordinance guarantees a “specified and reasonable time” within which an administrative decision must be made, and the applicant, temporary permit in hand, may continue to work pending the outcome of administrative and judicial review. See Ordinance P-10 § 10(b), 18, 19. FW/PBS’s requirements are therefore satisfied. In 1805 Convoy, we held that “[o]nce administrative remedies have been exhausted, a party whose license has been suspended or revoked may seek judicial review.” 183 F.3d at 1114 (emphasis added). We make explicit now what was implicit in our decision in 1805 Convoy: requiring applicants to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review does not violate the First Amendment, so long as an administrative decision is rendered within a specified, reasonable time, “during which time the status quo is maintained.” FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 228, 110 S.Ct. 596. 3 Finally, Dream Palace’s argument that placing the burden of seeking judicial review on managers and dancers constitutes a prior restraint is foreclosed by our decision in Baby Tam III. See infra n. 6. In Baby Tam III, we held that “placing the burden of instituting proceedings on the state does not apply to licensing schemes such as the one challenged here.” 247 F.3d at 1008. V Dream Palace’s next challenge is to the disclosure requirements with respect to manager and employee work permit applications. Section 6 of the ordinance specifies the process applicants must follow in applying for a work permit, pursuant to which permit applicants are required to submit information regarding their full true names, including “aliases or stage names” previously used, as well their current residential address and telephone numbers. Section 9 in turn provides that any information a permit applicant submits to the county “shall be maintained in confidence ... subject only to the public record laws of the State of Arizona.” Dream Palace’s argument proceeds in two steps: First, it argues that requiring such disclosure by itself is invalid under the First Amendment. Second, and in the alternative, it asks for injunctive relief against disclosure of said information to the public. We take each step in turn. A Dream Palace’s assertion that requiring disclosure of information regarding names, addresses, and telephone numbers to the county violates the First Amendment is essentially foreclosed by our decision in Kev, Inc. v. Kitsup County, 793 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir.1986). In Kev, we considered a challenge to a city ordinance requiring nude dancers applying for a work permit to provide to the city their name, phone number, birth date, and aliases, past and present. Id. at 1059. We found that requiring disclosure of such information would not “discourage ... a prospective dancer from performing. None of the information required by the County unreasonably diminishes the inclination to seek a license.” Id. Because the required disclosure did not “inhibitf] the ability or the inclination to engage in the protected expression,” it was a valid licensing requirement. Id. at 1060. The required disclosures under the ordinance at issue in this case, and the city ordinance at issue in Kev, are indistinguishable, and Kev therefore controls. B Dream Palace urges in the alternative that, even if we find the required disclosures to the County valid, we should grant injunctive relief to prevent the county from disclosing that information to the public. The requirements for the issuance of a permanent injunction are (1) the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury; and (2) the inadequacy of remedies at law. G.C. & K.B. Investments, Inc. v. Wilson, 326 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir.2003). The district court’s refusal to grant a permanent injunction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. The potential First Amendment problem here arises from the interplay between county and state law. While Section 9 of the ordinance provides that “information provided by an applicant in connection with the applicant for a license or permit under this ordinance shall be maintained in confidence by the Director,” that confidentiality protection is “subject ... to the public record laws of the State of Arizona.” Arizona law in turn provides that “[p]ublic records and other matters in the custody of any officer shall be open to inspection by any person at all times during office hours.” Az.Rev.Stat. § 39-121 (emphasis added). The county does not dispute that applicant information provided to the county is a “public record” within the meaning of this provision, and that those records are “presumed open to the public for inspection as public records.” Carlson v. Pima County, 141 Ariz. 487, 490, 687 P.2d 1242 (1984). The public right of inspection may be overcome in the interest of “confidentiality, privacy, or the best interests of the state.” Id. The State, however, “has the burden of overcoming the legal presumption favoring disclosure.” Scottsdale Unified School District No. 48 of Maricopa County v. KPNX Broadcasting Co., 191 Ariz. 297, 300, 955 P.2d 534 (1998) (quoting Cox Az. Pubs., Inc. v. Collins, 175 Ariz. 11, 14, 852 P.2d 1194 (1993)). The potentially dangerous consequences that the interplay of these rules poses to permit applicants is obvious. Should an erotic dancer, say, wish to apply for a work permit, as required by the ordinance, he or she must provide information regarding true name, including aliases or other names used in the past five years, as well as current home address and telephone number. Under Arizona law, that information is presumptively available to anybody who pleases to ask for it, and the county, though it may refuse to provide such information to the public, has the burden in subsequent proceedings of overcoming the statutory presumption in favor of disclosure. The “confidentiality” provision included in the ordinance is essentially a nullity, because that provision is made “subject ... to the public record laws of the State of Arizona.” Ordinance P-10 § 6. The exception therefore swallows the rule. . The Sixth Circuit confronted a similar problem in Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. The Metropolitan Gov. of Nashville & Davidson County, TN., 274 F.3d 377 (6th Cir.2001). The Nashville ordinance at issue in that case required permit applicants to divulge certain personal information about themselves, including their current and former residential addresses. Id. at 393. That information was presumptively available to the public pursuant to the Tennessee Open Records Act. See id. at 394. The court found there was “significant ' evidence that the requirement that applicants submit their names and past and current addresses to a public forum poses serious risks to their personal security.” Id. at 394. The court concluded that “permit applicants’ names and current and past residential addresses constitute[s] protected private information” and therefore it was “exempted from Tennessee’s Open Records Act.” Id. at 395. In N.W. Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Houston, 352 F.3d 162 (5th Cir.2003), the Fifth Circuit reasoned similarly in reversing a Texas district court’s injunction against a Houston ordinance that required employees and managers of adult entertainment businesses to divulge information regarding phone numbers and addresses to the city when applying for a permit. Id. at 195. The court held that state law already rendered the information confidential and unavailable to the public; thus, it reasoned, requiring applicants to supply the information did not infringe their First Amendment rights. Id. The Fifth Circuit panel therefore reversed the Texas district court’s injunction. It did not disagree that where there is no guarantee of confidentiality, “concerns about public disclosure ... are not inconsequential.” N.W. Enters. v. City of Houston, 27 F.Supp.2d 754, 842 (S.D.Tex.1998), rev’d in part, 352 F.3d at 198. As the district court in N.W. Enterprises reasoned: Adult entertainers may anonymously (or through stage names) put their bodies on display in front of strangers, but these actions do not imply a willingness to publicize the entertainers’ personal information through which customers or other private persons may trace the entertainers to their homes or otherwise invade their privacy without permission. The fact that an entertainer is willing to dance publicly or a manager is willing to be employed in a sexually oriented business that deals with the public, or the fact that a determined harasser or stalker might conceivably follow an entertainer home after she leaves work, does not mean that adult entertainers and managers have voluntarily sacrificed all privacy rights and need for safety protections. Id. at 842-43. In Clark, we ourselves recognized the potential danger from public disclosure of information provided to the government in the course of applying for a work permit posed for nude dancers, albeit in the course of deciding whether or not an owner-operator of a nude dancing club had overbreadth standing to raise the rights of his managers and employees. See Clark, 259 F.3d at 1010. We recognized in that case the possibility “that cabaret patrons could obtain such personal information and harass the entertainers at their homes, or worse.” Id. at 1010. Because of the potential danger, we concluded that “there is a risk cabaret employees will engage in self-censorship and avoid participating in protected activity ....” Id. We agree with this analysis. The First Amendment does not permit the county to put employees of adult entertainment establishments to the choice of either applying for a permit to engage in protected expression in circumstances where they expose themselves to “unwelcome harassment from aggressive suitors and overzealous opponents” of such activity, N.W. Enters., 27 F.Supp.2d at 842, or of choosing not to engage in such activity out of concern for their personal safety. The chilling effect on those wishing to engage in First Amendment activity is obvious. Given the choice with which they are faced, we think it likely that those willing to engage in such activity will decline to do so, and Dream Palace has introduced affidavit testimony to that effect. Because the interplay of county and state law on this point “inhibits the ability or the inclination to engage in ... protected expression,” Kev, 793 F.2d at 1060 (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945)), we must conclude that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to enjoin the county from disclosing to members of the public information provided to it from permit applicants. Upon remand, the district court shall grant an appropriate injunction in accordance with this opinion. VI A We turn now to Dream Palace’s challenges to certain operating restrictions contained in the ordinance, the first of which is to the prohibition on the provision of adult services between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. on Monday through Saturday or between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon on Sunday. See Ordinance P-10 § 13(f). Our consideration of Dream Palace’s challenge is largely controlled by our recent decision in Fair Public Policy v. Maricopa County, 336 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.2003). In that case, we joined six other circuits in holding that hours of operation restrictions on adult entertainment businesses were constitutional under the secondary effects test so long as the “predominate concerns” motivating the ordinance were “the secondary effects” of adult speech. See id. at 1160. Of course, that we have established the general proposition that hours of operation restrictions may pass muster under the First Amendment does not relieve us of our duty to put the county to its proof in this case. Compare DiMa Corp., 185 F.3d at 826 (Seventh Circuit holds town ordinance regulating hours of operation valid under Renton), with Schultz, 228 F.3d at 846 (Seventh Circuit evaluates anew whether city has met its evidentiary burden under Renton). The familiar three-part analytical framework established in Renton applies. First, we must determine whether the regulation is a complete ban on protected expression. Renton, 475 U.S. at 46, 106 S.Ct. 925. Second, we must determine whether the county’s purpose in enacting the provision is the amelioration of secondary effects. Id. at 47. If so, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny, and we must ask whether the provision is designed to serve a substantial government interest, and whether reasonable alternative avenues of communication remain available. Id. B 1 Our first task is to determine whether § 13(f) amounts to a complete ban on protected expressive activity. Renton, 475 U.S. at 46, 106 S.Ct. 925; Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 434, 122 S.Ct. 1728 (plurality opinion); Fair Public Policy, 336 F.3d at 1164. Section 13(f) is obviously not a complete ban, prohibiting as it does the provision of adult services during certain nighttime hours and until noon on Sundays. “The ordinance is therefore properly analyzed as a time, place, and manner regulation.” Renton, 475 U.S. at 46, 106 S.Ct. 925. 2 Second, we must determine whether section 13(f) is designed to combat the secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments on the surrounding community, “namely at crime rates, property values, and the quality of the city’s neighborhoods.” Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 434, 122 S.Ct. 1728 (plurality opinion). We look to the full record to determine whether the purpose of the statute is to curb secondary effects. Fair Public Policy, 336 F.3d at 1165 (quoting Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d 545, 552 (9th Cir.1998)). In doing so, we will “rely on all objective indicators of intent, including the face of the statute, the effect of the statute, comparison to prior law, facts surrounding enactment, the stated purpose, and the record of proceedings.” Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 551 (internal quotation omitted). All objective indicators are that, in prohibiting the provision of adult service during nighttime hours, the county’s predominant concern was with the amelioration of secondary effects. As with the statute at issue in Fair Public Policy, section 13(f) here applies to establishments protected by the First Amendment — adult movie theaters, book stores and video stores— and establishments that enjoy no such protection: massage parlors. See Ordinance P-10 § 2. Fair Public Policy, 336 F.3d at 1165. Justice Kennedy in Alameda Books found it significant that the ordinance at issue in that ease was “not limited to expressive activities. It also extends ... to massage parlors, which the city has found to cause similar secondary effects.” 535 U.S. at 447, 122 S.Ct. 1728 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Section 1 of the ordinance, moreover, amounts to a declaration of purpose, wherein the county board acknowledges that “adult oriented businesses may and do generate secondary effects that are detrimental to the public health, safety and welfare.” Specifically, those second