Full opinion text
GREGORY, Chief Judge: I. A. On January 27, 2017-seven days after taking the oath of office-President Donald J. Trump signed Executive Order 13,769, " Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States" ("EO-1"), 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). Invoking his authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), President Trump immediately suspended for ninety days the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry of foreign aliens from seven predominantly Muslim countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP) v. Trump , 265 F.Supp.3d 570, 586 (D. Md. 2017). The President's national security officials were taken by surprise by EO-1. See J.A. 172-74 (describing confusion in the cabinet after EO-1); 455 (declaration of Former National Security Officials, stating that EO-1 did not undergo the usual deliberative process); 786 (statements of Acting Attorney General Sally Yates, explaining that she was deliberately not consulted prior to EO-1). Immediately before signing EO-1, President Trump remarked that it was "the 'Protection of the Nation from Terrorist Entry into the United States.' We all know what that means." IRAP v. Trump , 265 F.Supp.3d at 586. Just after signing, President Trump stated in an interview with the Christian Broadcasting Network that EO-1 would give preference to Christian refugees. Referring to Syria, President Trump stated that "[i]f you were a Muslim you could come in, but if you were a Christian, it was almost impossible.... And I thought it was very, very unfair." J.A. 250. One day after he issued EO-1, President Trump told reporters that implementation of EO-1 is "working out very nicely and we're going to have a very, very strict ban." J.A. 173. That same day, former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani, an advisor to the President, stated that President Trump told him that he wanted a "Muslim ban" and requested that Giuliani assemble a commission to show him "the right way to do it legally." J.A. 297. Individuals, organizations, and states across the nation challenged EO-1 in federal court, and two federal courts issued injunctions enjoining the enforcement of EO-1. See Washington v. Trump , No. 17-141, 2017 WL 462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) ; Aziz v. Trump , 234 F.Supp.3d 724, 739 (E.D. Va. 2017). In response to these injunctions, then-White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer maintained that EO-1 was lawful but promised a new order would issue soon. J.A. 127. Senior Policy Advisor Stephen Miller stated that the new order would be "responsive" to recent court rulings, but described the changes as "mostly minor technical differences" that would not invalidate the "basic policy outcome" of EO-1. J.A. 128. On March 6, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13,780, which was given the same title as EO-1 and was scheduled to take effect on March 16, 2017. 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) ("EO-2"). EO-2 revoked EO-1 but nevertheless bore many similarities to its predecessor. Invoking both 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) and 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a), President Trump re-imposed the same ninety-day ban on entry into the United States for nationals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen but removed Iraq from the list. Id. at 13,210 -12. Like its predecessor, EO-2 directed various government officials to conduct a worldwide review during the 90-day suspension period to determine whether foreign governments were providing adequate information about their nationals seeking entry into the United States. Id. The Secretary of Homeland Security was to report these findings to the President, and nations identified as providing inadequate information were to be given an opportunity to improve their practices. At the conclusion of this review, the Secretary of Homeland Security was to "submit to the President a list of countries recommended for inclusion in a Presidential proclamation that would prohibit the entry of appropriate categories of foreign nationals of countries that have not provided the information requested." Id. Like its predecessor, EO-2 was soon challenged in multiple courts and preliminarily enjoined. See Hawai'i v. Trump , 245 F.Supp.3d 1227, 1239 (D. Haw. 2017) ; IRAP v. Trump , 241 F.Supp.3d at 566. This Court (sitting en banc) and the Ninth Circuit both affirmed the injunctions on appeal. IRAP v. Trump , 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (hereinafter " IRAP I ") (en banc); Hawai'i v. Trump , 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in both cases and left the injunctions in place pending its review except as to foreign nationals who lacked a "credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States." Trump v. IRAP , --- U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 2080, 2088, 198 L.Ed.2d 643 (2017). B. On September 24, 2017, President Trump issued Proclamation No. 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (the "Proclamation"), 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017). Invoking both 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) and 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a), the Proclamation succeeds EO-2 and indefinitely suspends the entry of some or all immigrants and nonimmigrants from eight countries: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen (the "Designated Countries"). Id. at 45,165 -67. Six of these countries-Chad, Libya, Iran, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen-are majority-Muslim and have a combined population of approximately 150 million people. J.A. 234-48, 852-59. The Proclamation indicated that the worldwide review ordered by EO-2 was complete and recited some of the review's processes and results. 82 Fed. Reg. at 45,162. The Government did not make the report part of the record for the Court's review, and it conceded during oral argument that the validity of the Proclamation rises or falls on the rationale presented within its four corners. Oral Arg. 32:30-33:00. As part of the review, the Secretary of Homeland Security reportedly created a "baseline for the kinds of information required from foreign governments to support the United States Government's ability to confirm the identity of individuals seeking entry into the United States" or other benefits under the immigration laws and "to assess whether they are a security or public-safety threat." 82 Fed. Reg. at 45,162. Three categories of baseline criteria were used to determine the quality of a country's information sharing and are listed in § 1 of the Proclamation. Id. at 45,162 -63. The first category involves "identity-management information," which the Proclamation states is "needed to determine whether individuals seeking benefits under the immigration laws are who they claim to be." Id. at 45,162. Criteria in this category "include whether the country issues electronic passports embedded with data to enable confirmation of identity, reports lost and stolen passports to appropriate entities, and makes available upon request identity-related information not included in its passports." Id. The second category involves "national security and public-safety information," which the Proclamation states is needed to determine whether "persons who seek entry to this country pose national security or public-safety risks." Id. Criteria include "whether the country makes available, directly or indirectly, known or suspected terrorist and criminal-history information upon request, whether the country provides passport and national-identity document exemplars, and whether the country impedes the United States Government's receipt of information about passengers and crew traveling to the United States." Id. The third category involves a "national security and public-safety assessment." Id. at 45,162 -63. This category consists of various national security risk indicators, including "whether the country is a known or potential terrorist safe haven, whether it is a participant in the Visa Waiver Program ... that meets all of its requirements, and whether it regularly fails to receive its nationals subject to final orders of removal from the United States." Id. Applying these baseline criteria, the Department of Homeland Security identified sixteen countries as "inadequate." Id. at 45,163. Thirty-one additional countries were classified as "at risk" of becoming inadequate. Id. Then followed a fifty-day engagement period during which all countries, including those not identified as "inadequate" or "at-risk," were encouraged to improve their information-sharing practices. Id. Ultimately, the Secretary of Homeland Security recommended eight countries for entry restrictions, recommendations that President Trump adopted in full. The Secretary determined that Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen continued to be "inadequate" and recommended that nationals from these countries be subjected to entry restrictions. Id. Somalia did meet the baseline criteria but was nonetheless added to the list of countries subject to entry restrictions under the Proclamation because its "government's inability to effectively and consistently cooperate, combined with the terrorist threat that emanates from its territory, present special circumstances that warrant restrictions and limitations on the entry of its nationals into the United States." Id. at 45,164 -65, 45,167. Iraq did not meet the baseline criteria but was exempted from entry suspensions in light of "the close cooperative relationship between the United States and the democratically elected government of Iraq, the strong United States diplomatic presence in Iraq, the significant presence of United States forces in Iraq, and Iraq's commitment to combating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)." Id. at 45,163. Instead, Iraqi nationals will face "additional scrutiny." Id. The Proclamation does not indicate whether any other countries that also failed the baseline were nonetheless not recommended for entry restrictions. The Proclamation imposes different restrictions on immigrants and nonimmigrants from the eight countries, but all restrictions are indefinite. Id. at 45,164, 45,169. The Proclamation suspends immigration from Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen; it exempts Venezuela, which failed the baseline criteria, but includes Somalia, which passed. Id. at 45,165 -67. The Proclamation also restricts some or all categories of nonimmigrants from all countries except Somalia, whose nationals will instead undergo additional scrutiny. Id. Specifically, it bars the issuance of all nonimmigrant visas to Syrian and North Korean nationals; of all nonimmigrant visas except F, M, and J visas to Iranian nationals; and of B-1, B-2, and B-1/B-2 visas to Libyan, Yemeni, and Chadian nationals. Id. But because the Government has "alternative sources for obtaining information to verify the citizenship and identity of nationals from Venezuela," the Proclamation only suspends B-1, B-2, and B-1/B-2 visas for "government officials ... who are responsible for the identified inadequacies." Id. at 45,166. The Proclamation only applies to foreign nationals who are outside the United States on the effective date and "do not have a valid visa" or "qualify for a visa or other valid travel document." Id. at 45,167. The Proclamation does allow for waivers, but they are discretionary and require the foreign national to prove that denying entry would cause "undue hardship," that entry would "not pose a threat to the national security or public safety of the United States," and that entry "would be in the national interest." Id. at 45,168. The Proclamation does not allow any categorical exemptions, even for the immediate relatives of American citizens. Id. at 45,168 -69. The entry restrictions were effective immediately for foreign nationals who 1) were subject to EO-2's restrictions and 2) lack a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States. Id. at 45,171. For all other affected persons, the Proclamation was scheduled to take effect on October 18, 2017. Id. C. As with EO-1 and EO-2, the Proclamation faced swift legal challenge within this circuit and in the Ninth Circuit. Three separate lawsuits were brought or amended in the District Court for the District of Maryland and are now consolidated before us on appeal. One challenge was brought by the International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), HIAS, Inc., Middle East Studies Association (MESA), Arab-American Association of New York (AAANY), Yemeni-American Merchants Association (YAMA), John Doe Nos. 1 and 3-5, Jane Doe No. 2, Muhammed Meteab, Mohamad Mashta, Grannaz Amirjamshidi, Fakhri Ziaolhagh, Shapour Shirani, and Afsaneh Khazaeli (collectively, the "IRAP Plaintiffs"). A second was brought by the Iranian Alliances Across Borders (IAAB), the Iranian Students' Foundation (ISF), and Doe Nos. 1-6 (collectively, the "IAAB Plaintiffs"). And a third was brought by Eblal Zakzok, Sumaya Hamadmad, Fahed Muqbil, John Doe No. 1, and Jane Doe Nos. 2-3 (collectively, the "Zakzok Plaintiffs"). The three cases assert that the Proclamation and EO-2 violate some or all of the INA, the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the Free Speech and Free Association Clauses of the First Amendment, the equal protection and procedural due process components of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Refugee Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The twenty-three individual Plaintiffs are all U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, and most of them have close family members who are nationals of the Designated Countries and who are in the process of applying for immigrant and nonimmigrant visas to the United States. Most of the individual Plaintiffs are also members of the Muslim faith, whether practicing or non-practicing. Three organizational Plaintiffs (IRAP, HIAS, and AAANY) "primarily provide services to clients," who are primarily either refugees or members of the Arab-American and Arab immigrant community. IRAP v. Trump , 265 F.Supp.3d at 594. The remaining organizational Plaintiffs (MESA, YAMA, IAAB, and ISF) "convene events on issues relating to the Middle East or advocate on behalf of their members." Id. All Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief. Each of these three separate cases names some or all of the following as Defendants: President Trump in his official capacity; the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Kirstjen M. Nielsen in her official capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security; the U.S. Department of State and Rex W. Tillerson in his official capacity as Secretary of State; the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and Dan Coats in his official capacity as Director of National Intelligence; Jefferson Beauregard Sessions, III in his official capacity as Attorney General; Kevin K. McAleenan in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection; and L. Francis Cissna in his official capacity as Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Plaintiffs moved to preliminarily enjoin the Proclamation in its entirety before it took effect. They claimed that the Proclamation violated the Establishment Clause's prohibition on disfavoring religion, exceeded the President's authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) and 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1), violated 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) 's prohibition on nationality discrimination in the issuance of visas, and failed to comply with § 1182(f) 's procedural requirements. On October 17, 2017, the district court granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Proclamation's entry restrictions, subject to certain exceptions. IRAP v. Trump , 265 F.Supp.3d at 633. The district court held that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their § 1152(a) claim and their Establishment Clause claim but not on the merits of their § 1182(f) and § 1185(a)(1) claims. The district court conformed the injunction to the terms of the Supreme Court's June 2017 stay, limiting it to individuals "who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States." Id. at 631 (citing Trump , 137 S.Ct. at 2088 ). But the court declined to enjoin the Proclamation as to travelers from Venezuela or North Korea because the balance of equities favors the Government. That same day, the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawai'I also enjoined the Proclamation, concluding that it likely violated § 1182(f) and § 1152(a)(1). Hawai'i v. Trump , 265 F.Supp.3d 1140, 1160-61 (D. Haw. 2017). On December 4, 2017, the Supreme Court granted the Government's request for a complete stay pending appellate review of the two district courts' preliminary injunctions. Trump v. IRAP , 138 S.Ct. 542, 542 (2017) (mem.). In light of the stay, the relevant agencies have fully implemented the entry restrictions laid out in the Proclamation as of December 8, 2017. Dep't of State, New Court Order on Presidential Proclamation (Dec. 4, 2017) (saved as ECF opinion attachment 1) (hereinafter "State Department Statement") ("Per the Supreme Court's orders, those restrictions will be implemented fully, in accordance with the Presidential Proclamation, around the world, beginning December 8 at open of business, local time."); see also DHS, Fact Sheet: The President's Proclamation on Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (Sept. 24, 2017) (saved as ECF opinion attachment 2) (hereinafter "DHS Fact Sheet"). On December 22, 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, concluding that the Proclamation likely exceeded the scope of the President's authority under § 1182(f), failed to comply with § 1182(f) 's procedural prerequisites, and violated § 1152(a)(1) 's prohibition on nationality-based discrimination. Hawai'i v. Trump , 878 F.3d 662, 673 (9th Cir. 2017). The Government filed for a writ of certiorari on January 5, 2018, which the Supreme Court granted on January 19, 2018. Trump v. Hawai'i , No. 17-965, --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 923, --- L.Ed.2d ----, 2018 WL 324357, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2018). II. We evaluate a district court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co. , 675 F.3d 355, 366 (4th Cir. 2012). Under this standard, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and review its legal conclusions de novo. Dewhurst v. Century Aluminum Co. , 649 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2011). A preliminary injunction is "an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief." Di Biase v. SPX Corp. , 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) ). The plaintiff "need not establish a certainty of success, but must make a clear showing that he is likely to succeed at trial." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that (1) she is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) she is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in her favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. WV Ass'n of Club Owners & Fraternal Servs., Inc. v. Musgrave , 553 F.3d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter , 555 U.S. at 7, 129 S.Ct. 365 ). We turn first to the Plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits. III. "The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion." Epperson v. Arkansas , 393 U.S. 97, 104, 89 S.Ct. 266, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968) ; accord Larson v. Valente , 456 U.S. 228, 244, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982) (holding that Establishment Clause prohibits "one religious denomination [from being] officially preferred over another."). "When the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the government's ostensible object is to take sides." McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 162 L.Ed.2d 729 (2005). "[T]he Establishment Clause forbids subtle departures from neutrality, 'religious gerrymanders,' as well as obvious abuses." Gillette v. United States , 401 U.S. 437, 452, 91 S.Ct. 828, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n , 397 U.S. 664, 696, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970) ). Similarly, "any covert suppression of particular religious beliefs" is unconstitutional. See Bowen v. Roy , 476 U.S. 693, 703, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986) (plurality opinion). The Plaintiffs allege that the Proclamation violates the Establishment Clause by disfavoring Muslims. We begin by considering (and rejecting) the Government's challenges to the justiciability of Plaintiffs' claim. We then turn to Plaintiffs' likelihood of succeeding on the merits. We find that Plaintiffs have met their high burden of demonstrating that the Proclamation's purported purpose is not "bona fide" under Mandel and therefore proceed to determine whether the Proclamation has a primarily secular purpose. Examining official statements from President Trump and other executive branch officials, along with the Proclamation itself, we conclude that the Proclamation is unconstitutionally tainted with animus toward Islam. A. "Concerns of justiciability go to the power of the federal courts to entertain disputes, and to the wisdom of their doing so." Renne v. Geary , 501 U.S. 312, 316, 111 S.Ct. 2331, 115 L.Ed.2d 288 (1991). The Government raises two challenges to the justiciability of Plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim: first, Plaintiffs lack standing under Article III, and second, Plaintiffs' claim is not ripe. As we explain below, we reject both arguments and find Plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim justiciable. 1. First, the Government claims that Plaintiffs have not properly alleged an injury-in-fact sufficient to satisfy Article III's standing requirement. We disagree. For many of the same reasons as in IRAP I , we find that many of the individual Plaintiffs and two of the organizational Plaintiffs have standing because they have sufficiently alleged personal contact with unconstitutional religious animus. See 857 F.3d at 582-86. Article III of the Constitution gives this Court jurisdiction only over "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, sec. 2, cl. 1. One element of a "case" or "controversy" is that the plaintiff have standing-that is, "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination." Massachusetts v. EPA , 549 U.S. 497, 517, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007) (quoting Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) ). The Supreme Court has articulated three requirements that together are the "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing." Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The plaintiff "must show (1) it has suffered an 'injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc. , 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (citing Lujan , 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 ); accord Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547-48, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). An organization has associational standing to sue "on behalf of its members when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Laidlaw , 528 U.S. at 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693. We review de novo the district court's finding of standing. Peterson v. Nat'l Telecomms. & Info. Admin. , 478 F.3d 626, 631 n.2 (4th Cir. 2007). Plaintiffs must have standing for every claim. Bostic v. Schaefer , 760 F.3d 352, 370 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno , 547 U.S. 332, 352, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006) ). They also must have standing for every form of relief. Laidlaw , 528 U.S. at 185, 120 S.Ct. 693. But the "Supreme Court has made it clear that 'the presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III's case-or-controversy requirement.' " Bostic , 760 F.3d at 370-71 (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst'l Rights, Inc. , 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2, 126 S.Ct. 1297, 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006) ). And the same injury can provide Plaintiffs with standing for multiple claims. E.g. , id. at 371-72 (finding same injury provided standing for both Due Process and Equal Protection claims). When evaluating standing, we "must be careful not to decide the questions on the merits for or against the plaintiff, and must therefore assume that on the merits the plaintiffs would be successful in their claims." Cooksey v. Futrell , 721 F.3d 226, 239 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting City of Waukesha v. EPA , 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ); see also Meese v. Keene , 481 U.S. 465, 473, 107 S.Ct. 1862, 95 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987). Plaintiffs here have alleged that the Proclamation violates the Establishment Clause, which bars government action that establishes or disfavors religion. U.S. Const. amend. I ; Everson v. Bd. of Educ. , 330 U.S. 1, 15, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947). Thus, we must assume that the Proclamation does harbor unconstitutional animus against Islam. The "concept of injury for standing purposes is particularly elusive in Establishment Clause cases." Suhre v. Haywood Cty. , 131 F.3d 1083, 1085 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Murray v. City of Austin , 947 F.2d 147, 151 (5th Cir. 1991) ). Unlike Free Exercise Clause claims, Establishment Clause claims do not require "proof that particular religious freedoms are infringed." Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp , 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963) (citing McGowan v. Maryland , 366 U.S. 420, 429-30, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961) ). Instead, Establishment Clause injuries are often "spiritual and value-laden, rather than tangible and economic." Moss v. Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. Seven , 683 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As a result, Establishment Clause injury-in-fact "may be shown in various ways," Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn , 563 U.S. 125, 129, 131 S.Ct. 1436, 179 L.Ed.2d 523 (2011), including through "noneconomic or intangible injury," Suhre , 131 F.3d at 1086. For example, "[f]eelings of marginalization and exclusion are cognizable forms of injury, particularly in the Establishment Clause context, because one of the core objectives of modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been to prevent the State from sending a message to non-adherents of a particular religion 'that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community.' " Moss , 683 F.3d at 607 (quoting McCreary, 545 U.S. at 860, 125 S.Ct. 2722 ). A plaintiff can also suffer cognizable injury from: paying money damages to the government, McGowan , 366 U.S. at 424-25, 81 S.Ct. 1101 ; having one's employees pay money damages to the government, Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley , 366 U.S. 582, 592, 81 S.Ct. 1135, 6 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) ; receiving a letter that promotes a religious education course, Moss , 683 F.3d at 607 ; paying taxes, when Congress enacts legislation pursuant to its taxing and spending powers, Flast v. Cohen , 392 U.S. 83, 106, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968) ; changing one's behavior or assuming special burdens, Suhre , 131 F.3d at 1088-89 ; participating in state-mandated religious exercises, such as school prayer, Schempp , 374 U.S. at 224-26 & n.9, 83 S.Ct. 1560 ; being exposed to state-sponsored religious exercises, such as legislative prayer, Marsh v. Chambers , 463 U.S. 783, 786 n.4, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983) ; experiencing employment discrimination, In re Navy Chaplaincy , 534 F.3d 756, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ; and having personal contact with state-sponsored religious displays, Suhre , 131 F.3d at 1086. A cognizable injury need not rest on a single isolated fact but can instead arise from multiple related factors. See Moss , 683 F.3d at 607. The common thread among these different forms of cognizable legal injury is "personal contact" with the alleged establishment or disfavoring of religion. Suhre , 131 F.3d at 1086. In other words, Establishment Clause injuries-like all injuries-in-fact-must be particularized: they "must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Spokeo , 136 S.Ct. at 1548. This is because a "mere abstract objection to unconstitutional conduct is not sufficient to confer standing." Suhre , 131 F.3d at 1086. Nor is a "firm[ ] commit[ment] to the constitutional principle of separation of church and State," Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc. , 454 U.S. 464, 486, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (citation omitted), nor a general disagreement with government policy, Moss , 683 F.3d at 604. Instead, Plaintiffs must allege a "personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error." Valley Forge , 454 U.S. at 485, 102 S.Ct. 752. The district court concluded that numerous individual Plaintiffs had "asserted specific, intangible injuries resulting from [their] personal contact with the alleged Establishment Clause violation." IRAP v. Trump , 265 F.Supp.3d at 600. We agree. The Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the Proclamation-which we must assume does unconstitutionally disfavor Islam, Cooksey , 721 F.3d at 239 -has caused many Plaintiffs to suffer two related personal injuries. First, they, as members of the disfavored religion, are the "victims of this alleged religious intolerance" who are suffering "[f]eelings of marginalization and exclusion." Moss , 683 F.3d at 606-07 ; cf. id. (finding certain plaintiffs lacked standing because they were members of favored religion and so were "seeking to vindicate ... the rights of others"). Second, they are experiencing prolonged separation from close family members who have been rendered categorically ineligible for visas. See Bostic , 760 F.3d at 371-72 (finding same injury provided standing for two different claims). Because these are actual, concrete injuries that "affect the plaintiff[s] in a personal and individual way," Plaintiffs have suffered a cognizable injury-in-fact. Spokeo , 136 S.Ct. at 1548 (citation omitted); see Moss , 683 F.3d at 607 (locating cognizable injury-in-fact in several related facts). For example, IRAP Plaintiff John Doe No. 5 is a Muslim and U.S. citizen of Yemeni origin who is sponsoring his mother, also Yemeni, in her application for an immigrant visa. J.A. 573-75. His uncle is sponsoring his grandmother, who has Alzheimer's disease. Id. "Since the ban," John Doe No. 5 has "heard anti-Islamic comments more frequently," and he or someone he knows experiences Islamophobia "[a]lmost every week." Id. He says that "in the days after the ban, a man came into my grocery store and said that I make this country worse, and that he was happy with the ban." Id. IRAP Plaintiff John Doe No. 4 is a non-practicing Muslim whose Iranian wife is seeking an immigrant visa to the United States. J.A. 587-89. He states that he felt "insulted" and "demeaned" by the travel restrictions because they "felt like collective punishment" and that the Proclamation "has made [him] feel this more strongly." Id. He also notes that since the first travel ban was issued in January 2017, he gets "more suspicious looks from people" and feels that he is "being labeled as a Muslim more often." Id. IAAB Plaintiff Doe No. 6 is an Iranian Muslim and lawful permanent resident whose mother-in-law's nonimmigrant visa application was recently denied pursuant to the Proclamation. J.A. 1174-76; Mot. Suppl. R. 2, Ex. A, Dec. 22, 2017, ECF No. 162. He states that he feels "personally attacked, targeted, and disparaged by this new Proclamation, which shows hostility to Iranians generally and to Muslims in particular." J.A. 1175. He feels "like an outsider in the country that I call my home" and fears for his safety and the safety of his loved ones. Id. Zakzok Plaintiff Fahed Muqbil is a U.S. citizen of Yemeni origin and a practicing Muslim who is sponsoring his wife, also Yemeni, for an immigrant visa. J.A. 1244-48. He states that the Proclamation makes him feel as if he and his fellow American Muslims "are unwanted, different, and somehow dangerous merely because of [their] religion." Id. He feels "condemned and penalized for practicing Islam" and treated "as a second class citizen simply because of [his] Islamic faith." Id. These are personal, particularized injuries cognizable under Article III because they are suffered "as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error." Valley Forge , 454 U.S. at 485, 102 S.Ct. 752. The Government argues that the district court erred by conflating the "injury-in-fact from an alleged Establishment Clause violation with the question whether the violation was of the individual's own Establishment Clause rights." First Cross-Appeal Br. 27 (hereinafter "First Br.") (emphasis omitted). We disagree. A cognizable Establishment Clause injury need "not include proof that particular religious freedoms are infringed," Schempp , 374 U.S. at 225 n.9, 83 S.Ct. 1560, nor direct regulation or discrimination by the government. Article III standing in this context can arise from paying taxes, Flast , 392 U.S. at 106, 88 S.Ct. 1942 ; hearing legislative prayer as a member of that body, Marsh , 463 U.S. at 786 n.4, 103 S.Ct. 3330 ; or looking at a religious display, Suhre , 131 F.3d at 1086. Indeed, in Moss , we found standing based in part on simply receiving a letter promoting a religious education course. 683 F.3d at 607. Nor is this case similar to In re Navy Chaplaincy , in which the plaintiffs based their standing on hearing a " 'message' of religious preference." 534 F.3d at 759. There, the plaintiffs' expansive theory of message-based standing would have permitted "any recipient of the Navy's 'message,' " including "the judges on th[e] panel," to have standing to challenge the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. Id. at 764. But Plaintiffs do not claim standing solely because they heard about the Proclamation-mere awareness of religious animus, without more, is insufficient. Instead, many of the individual Plaintiffs here have alleged a violation of their own Establishment Clause rights, and they have presented evidence that the violation is particular to them: they have articulated specific feelings of "marginalization and exclusion," Moss , 683 F.3d at 607, and they are facing prolonged separation from family members deemed categorically ineligible to enter the country. Both injuries are caused by the Proclamation, which at this stage we must assume excludes Plaintiffs' relatives based on religious animus. Cooksey , 721 F.3d at 239. And both injuries can be remedied if the Proclamation is enjoined. Whether these Plaintiffs' relatives are issued visas and admitted to the country is beyond the scope of this litigation and ultimately not subject to judicial review. But a plaintiff need "not show that a favorable decision will relieve his every injury." Larson , 456 U.S. at 242-43 & n.15, 102 S.Ct. 1673 (holding that plaintiffs had standing to challenge one part of state law requiring registration under charitable solicitation statute, even if plaintiffs might ultimately be required to register for different reasons); accord Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke , 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978). Instead, "a plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement when he shows that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury to himself," Larson , 456 U.S. at 242-43 & n.15, 102 S.Ct. 1673 -here, the discrete expression of government animus against Islam and the prolonged (verging on permanent) separation of family members. Thus, the individual Plaintiffs have standing under Article III to bring their Establishment Clause claim. For the same reasons, we adopt and affirm the district court's finding that MESA and YAMA have associational standing to assert an Establishment Clause claim on behalf of their members. IRAP v. Trump , 265 F.Supp.3d at 601. Both have identified at least one member who has suffered feelings of marginalization and exclusion in his community and who has a close family member actively seeking an immigrant visa. J.A. 556 (MESA), 612-13 (YAMA). The interests are "germane to the organization's purpose" and there is no reason the individual members must participate in the lawsuit. Laidlaw , 528 U.S. at 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693 ; IRAP v. Trump , 265 F.Supp.3d at 601. Thus, MESA and YAMA have associational standing as to the Establishment Clause claim. Unlike the plaintiffs in Valley Forge , Plaintiffs here have not "roam[ed] the country in search of governmental wrongdoing." 454 U.S. at 487, 102 S.Ct. 752. Instead, the purported government wrongdoing has found them. We conclude that many of the individual and two of the organizational Plaintiffs have standing to bring an Establishment Clause claim. 2. Second, the Government argues that Plaintiffs' claim is not ripe until one of their relatives has been rejected for a visa and a waiver. During the pendency of this litigation, the mother-in-law of IAAB Plaintiff Doe No. 6 was denied both. Mot. Suppl. R. Ex. A, Dec. 22, 2017, ECF No. 162 ("This is to inform you that a consular officer found you ineligible for a visa under Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 9645."). The Government's argument is therefore moot and by its own statements the claim of IAAB Plaintiff Doe No. 6 is ripe. First Br. 23 ("If any alien in whose entry a U.S. plaintiff has a cognizable interest is found otherwise eligible for a visa and denied a waiver, then that plaintiff can bring suit at that time[.]"). Nevertheless, we must also reject the Government's contention on the merits because it rests on a misapprehension of Plaintiffs' claim. The doctrine of ripeness is designed "to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties." Abbott Labs. v. Gardner , 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). "To determine if a case is ripe, we 'balance the fitness of the issues for judicial decision with the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.' " Lansdowne on the Potomac Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Lansdowne, LLC , 713 F.3d 187, 198 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Miller v. Brown , 462 F.3d 312, 319 (4th Cir. 2006) ). "A case is fit for judicial decision when the issues are purely legal and when the action in controversy is final and not dependent on future uncertainties." Miller , 462 F.3d at 319. And a case will cause hardship when it "create[s] adverse effects of a strictly legal kind." Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club , 523 U.S. 726, 733, 118 S.Ct. 1665, 140 L.Ed.2d 921 (1998). "When considering hardship, we may consider the cost to the parties of delaying judicial review." Miller , 462 F.3d at 319. Ripeness here comes from the "imposition of the barrier," not the ultimate denial of a visa or waiver. Gratz v. Bollinger , 539 U.S. 244, 262, 123 S.Ct. 2411, 156 L.Ed.2d 257 (2003) (finding that a student had standing to challenge a school's affirmative action program even though the student had not actually applied, much less been rejected). As of December 8, 2017, the relevant agencies have fully implemented the travel restrictions detailed in the Proclamation. State Department Statement, supra . Accordingly, Plaintiffs' family members are now categorically inadmissible unless they meet the high standard for a waiver. Id. The relief Plaintiffs seek is not the issuance of a visa or waiver to their relatives, which is subject to the many limitations established by Congress in the INA and to the discretion of consular officials. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1), 1201 ; 6 U.S.C. § 236(b)(1). Instead, Plaintiffs merely ask that their relatives go through the same individualized vetting process that the executive branch applies to nationals from all other countries-an individualized vetting process that has already been denied them. Because the agencies have fully implemented the travel restrictions, the legality of those restrictions is "fit for judicial decision." Miller , 462 F.3d at 319. The issues raised by Plaintiffs-including whether the Proclamation's travel restrictions violate the Constitution-are "purely legal." Id. And the agencies' implementation of these restrictions is certainly "final." Id. Therefore, the cost to the parties of delaying judicial review would be to functionally deprive them of any judicial review. Indeed, if we waited until all of Plaintiffs' family members were denied visas, the Government would surely argue that the claim is then moot because they cannot demonstrate that their relatives would apply again. We reject this circular interpretation of ripeness. We conclude that Plaintiffs' claim is ripe for review. B. In assessing Plaintiffs' Establishment Clause challenge, we first ask whether the proffered reason for the Proclamation is "facially legitimate and bona fide." Kleindienst v. Mandel , 408 U.S. 753, 770, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972) ; see IRAP I , 857 F.3d at 588-93. The Proclamation's stated purpose is "to protect [U.S.] citizens from terrorist attacks and other public-safety threats" and "to encourage foreign governments to improve their information-sharing and identity-management protocols and practices and to regularly share identity and threat information with our immigration screening and vetting systems." 82 Fed. Reg. at 45,162. The Mandel standard, read through the lens of Justice Kennedy's opinion in Kerry v. Din , imposes a heavy burden on Plaintiffs, but not an insurmountable one. See --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 2128, 2139-41, 192 L.Ed.2d 183 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). It clearly affords the political branches substantial deference. Yet it also accounts for those very rare instances in which a challenger plausibly alleges that a government action runs so contrary to the basic premises of our Constitution as to warrant more probing review. Plaintiffs argue that the Proclamation is one of those rare instances. Assuming without deciding that the proffered purpose of the Proclamation is "facially legitimate," we turn to the question of whether it is "bona fide" as required by Mandel . Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Din elaborated on this "bona fide" requirement. An action is not considered "bona fide" if Plaintiffs make an "affirmative showing of bad faith," which they must "plausibly allege[ ] with sufficient particularity." See id. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Mandel , 408 U.S. at 770, 92 S.Ct. 2576. Upon such a showing, a court may "look behind" the Government's proffered justification for its action. See Din , 135 S.Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Marczak v. Greene , 971 F.2d 510, 516-18 (10th Cir. 1992). Therefore, to advance their First Amendment claim, Plaintiffs must have "plausibly alleged with sufficient particularity" that the Proclamation's invocation of national security is a pretext for an anti-Muslim religious purpose. In the extraordinary case before us, resolution of that question presents little difficulty. Unlike Din and Mandel , in which the Government had a "bona fide factual basis" for its actions, Din , 135 S.Ct. at 2140 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment), here the Government's proffered rationale for the Proclamation lies at odds with the statements of the President himself. Plaintiffs here do not just plausibly allege with particularity that the Proclamation's purpose is driven by anti-Muslim bias, they offer undisputed evidence of such bias: the words of the President. This evidence includes President Trump's disparaging comments and tweets regarding Muslims; his repeated proposals to ban Muslims from entering the United States; his subsequent explanation that he would effectuate this "Muslim" ban by targeting "territories" instead of Muslims directly; the issuance of EO-1 and EO-2, addressed only to majority-Muslim nations; and finally the issuance of the Proclamation, which not only closely tracks EO-1 and EO-2, but which President Trump and his advisors described as having the same goal as EO-1 and EO-2. See IRAP I , 857 F.3d at 591 ; see, e.g. , J.A. 168, 756, 779, 791, 794, 808-12, 815-17, 820. The President's own words-publicly stating a constitutionally impermissible reason for the Proclamation-distinguish this case from those in which courts have found that the Government had satisfied Mandel 's"bona fide" prong. In Bustamante v. Mukasey , for example, the court held that "the reason given by the consular official in support of the visa denial was ... bona fide" because there was "no reason to believe that the consular official acted ... in anything other than good faith" in relying on information that the visa applicant "was involved in drug trafficking." 531 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008). Similarly, in Cardenas v. United States , the court held that a consular official "provided a bona fide factual reason" for denying a visa, and plaintiff made no allegations to "raise a plausible inference that the officer acted in bad faith." 826 F.3d 1164, 1172 (9th Cir. 2016). In no prior cases have plaintiffs alleged-let alone offered undisputed evidence-that any government official made public statements contradicting the asserted "bona fide" reason for the governmental action. Plaintiffs have done so here. This, of course, does not mean that Plaintiffs have established that the Proclamation violates the Constitution. As we explained in IRAP I , 857 F.3d at 592-93, to do so, Plaintiffs must show that the Government cannot meet the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman , 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). To prevail under Lemon , a governmental entity must show that its challenged action (1) "ha[s] a secular legislative purpose," (2) with "its principal or primary effect ... one that neither advances nor inhibits religion," and (3) which does "not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' " Lemon , 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105 (quoting Walz , 397 U.S. at 674, 90 S.Ct. 1409 ). Moreover, the Government must satisfy all three prongs of Lemon to fend off an Establishment Clause challenge. Edwards v. Aguillard , 482 U.S. 578, 583, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 96 L.Ed.2d 510 (1987). Plaintiffs' challenge centers on the first prong. They maintain that the Government has failed to demonstrate that the Proclamation "has 'a secular legislative purpose' " that is "genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective." McCreary , 545 U.S. at 860, 864, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (quoting Lemon , 403 U.S. at 612, 91 S.Ct. 2105 ). To meet this requirement, the Government must show that the primary purpose, not just a purpose, of the Proclamation is secular. See Edwards , 482 U.S. at 594, 107 S.Ct. 2573. The Supreme Court has instructed that, to determine the primary purpose of a challenged government action, judges must view the challenged government action as a reasonable "objective observer." McCreary , 545 U.S. at 862, 125 S.Ct. 2722. To that end, when a court examines the purpose of a challenged government action, it acts as an "objective observer" to discern the "official objective ... from readily discoverable fact, without any judicial psychoanalysis of the drafter's heart of hearts." Id. In this role, a court must look to "openly available data" and make a "commonsense conclusion" to determine whether a "religious objective permeated the government's action." Id . at 863, 125 S.Ct. 2722. The court should examine the "historical context" of the government action and the "specific sequence of events" leading to the government action. Edwards , 482 U.S. at 595, 107 S.Ct. 2573. The Government maintains that the Proclamation's facial neutrality establishes that it is "not intended to discriminate on the basis of religion." First Br. 43. But even if the Proclamation's "stated objective is religiously neutral," that cannot be "dispositive" as "the entire premise of our review under Lemon is that even facially neutral government actions can violate the Establishment Clause." IRAP I , 857 F.3d at 595. No "reasonable observer" would accept such a "transparent claim to secularity" without also considering context and history. See McCreary , 545 U.S. at 863-84, 869, 125 S.Ct. 2722. The President's own statements provide the relevant history and context here. Perhaps in implicit recognition of the rawness of the religious animus in the President's pre-election statements, the Government urges us to disregard them. This is a difficult argument to make given that the President and his advisors have repeatedly relied on these pre-election statements to explain the President's post-election actions related to the travel ban. See, e.g ., J.A. 1502-03. And, in McCreary , the Supreme Court reminded us that "the world is not made brand new every morning." McCreary , 545 U.S. at 866, 125 S.Ct. 2722. Because "reasonable observers have reasonable memories," these statements certainly provide relevant context when examining the purpose of the Proclamation. Id . However, we need not and thus do not rely on pre-election statements in assessing the constitutionality of the Proclamation. We need not do so because the President's inauguration did not herald a new day. Rather, only a week after taking office, President Trump issued EO-1, which banned the entry of citizens of six Muslim majority countries, provided exemptions for Christians, and lacked any asserted evidence indicating a genuine national security purpose. The very next day, January 28, 2017, Rudy Giuliani, an advisor to President Trump, explained that EO-1's purpose was to discriminate against Muslims. J.A. 808-10, 815-16. A reasonable observer could certainly conclude that in banning entry into the United States of 180 million Muslims, approximately 10% of the world Muslim population, EO-1 was crafted to deliver, as Giuliani said, on President Trump's promise to "ban Muslim immigration to the United States." See J.A. 809, 820. This is particularly so given that every federal judge who considered the matter enjoined EO-1, finding that it likely violated the Constitution. Shortly after issuance of these injunctions of EO-1, President Trump issued EO-2, which he and his advisors characterized as being substantially similar to EO-1. The President described EO-2 as "a watered down version of the first order." J.A. 779. Senior Policy Advisor Stephen Miller similarly explained that the changes to EO-2 were "mostly minor technical differences," and promised that they would result in "the same basic policy outcomes for the country." J.A. 756. Then-White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer confirmed that "[t]he principles of the [second] executive order remain the same." J.A. 168. We subsequently found EO-2 also impermissibly motivated by religion, and upheld an injunction of it. IRAP I , 857 F.3d 554. In the months that followed, the President continued to express his desire to return to "the original Travel Ban," rather than "the watered down, politically correct version" in EO-2. J.A. 791. On June 5, 2017, President Trump stated that the "Justice Dept. should ask for an expedited hearing of the watered down Travel Ban before the Supreme Court-& seek much tougher version!" and that "The Justice Dept. should have stayed with the original Travel Ban, not the watered down, politically correct version they submitted to [the Supreme Court]." Id. (statements issued via Twitter). The very next day, then-White House Press Secretary Spicer explained that President Trump's tweets are "official statements by the president of the United States." J.A. 794, 1521. Only nine days before issuing the Proclamation, President Trump tweeted, "The travel ban into the United States should be far larger, tougher and more specific-but stupidly, that would not be politically correct!" J.A. 832. The President also continued to express what any reasonable observer could view as general anti-Muslim bias. In an August 17, 2017, tweet, the President endorsed an apocryphal story involving General Pershing and a purported massacre of Muslims with bullets dipped in a pig's blood, advising people to "[s]tudy what General Pershing ... did to terrorists when caught. There was no more Radical Islamic Terror for 35 years!" J.A. 806. On November 29, 2017, President Trump retweeted three disturbing anti-Muslim videos entitled: "Muslim Destroys a Statue of Virgin Mary!" "Islamist mob pushes teenage boy off roof and beats him to death!" and "Muslim migrant beats up Dutch boy on crutches!" J.A. 1497-99. The three videos were originally tweeted by an extremist political party whose mission is to oppose "all alien and destructive politic or religious doctrines, including ... Islam." J.A. 1508. When asked about the three videos, President Trump's deputy press secretary Raj Shah responded by saying that the "President has been talking about these security issues for years now, from the campaign trail to the White House" and "the President has addressed these issues with the travel order that he issued earlier this year and the companion proclamation." J.A. 1502-03. The Government does not-and, indeed, cannot-dispute that the President made these statements. Instead, it argues that the "statements that occurred after the issuance of EO-2 do not reflect any religious animus" but reflect "the compelling secular goal of protecting national security from an amply-documented present threat." First Br. 52. We cannot agree. Rather, an objective observer could conclude that the President's repeated statements convey the primary purpose of the Proclamation-to exclude Muslims from the United States. In fact, it is hard to imagine how an objective observer could come to any other conclusion when the President's own deputy press secretary made this connection express: he explained that President Trump tweets extremist anti-Muslim videos as part of his broader concerns about "security," which he has "addressed ... with ... the proclamation." J.A. 1502-03. The Government correctly points out that the President's past actions cannot "forever taint" his future actions. See McCreary , 545 U.S. at 874, 125 S.Ct. 2722 ; First Br. 18. President Trump could have removed the taint of his prior troubling statements; for a start he could have ceased publicly disparaging Muslims. But "an implausible claim that governmental purpose has changed should not carry the day in a court of law any more than in a head with common sense." McCreary , 545 U.S. at 874, 125 S.Ct. 2722. In fact, instead of taking any actions to cure the "taint" that we found infected EO-2, President Trump continued to disparage Muslims and the Islamic faith. The Government unconvincingly claims that the substantive differences between the Proclamation and EO-1 and EO-2 reflect the elimination of any anti-Muslim bias. To be sure, the Proclamation does differ in some respects from the previous Executive Orders. For example, the Proclamation bans citizens from two non-majority Muslim countries, North Korea and Venezuela. Although the Proclamation affects only very few persons from those countries as opposed to the many tens of thousands from the other Muslim-majority countries, the Government asserts that "[t]he inclusion of those [two] non-Muslim-majority countries in the Proclamation underscores [a] religion-neutral purpose." First Br. 50. Again, we disagree. In McCreary , the Supreme Court found that despite the court-ordered addition of secular texts to a twice-challenged display of the Ten Commandments in state courthouses, "[n]o reasonable observer could swallow the claim that the Counties had cast off the objective so unmistakable in the earlier displays." 545 U.S. at 872, 125 S.Ct. 2722. Here, a reasonable observer could hardly "swallow the claim" that the addition of North Korea and Venezuela to the twice-enjoined travel ban was anything more than an attempt to "cast off" the "unmistakable" religious objective of the earlier executive orders. See id . Nor does the "months-long" "multi-agency review," First Br. 43, 47, on which the Proclamation assertedly rests, establish that its primary purpose is secular. Although in its briefs the Government repeatedly invoked this review, the Government chose not to make the review publicly available and so provided a reasonable observer no basis to rely on the review. Perhaps in recognition of this, at oral argument before us the Government expressly disavowed any claim that the review could save the Proclamation. Instead, the Government conceded that the Proclamation rises and falls on its own four corners. Oral Arg. at 32:27-33:00. Even if we considered the review, we could not conclude that it demonstrates that the Proclamation has a secular purpose. This is because the criteria allegedly used in the review to identify problematic countries lie at odds with the list of countries actually included in the Proclamation. Like the district court, we do not note "the apparent disconnect between the identified problem[s]" in the review and "the broad, nationality-based travel ban to evaluate the merits" of the Proclamation as a policy. See IRAP v. Trump , 265 F.Supp.3d at 626-27. Rather, we do so "only to assess whether the Proclamation persuasively establishes that the primary purpose of the travel ban is no longer religious animus." See id. The contradiction between what the Proclamation says -that it merely reflects the results of a religion-neutral review-and what it does "raises serious doubts" about the Proclamation's proffered purpose, and undermines the Government's argument that its multi-agency review cured any earlier impermissible religious purpose. See The Florida Star v. B.J.F. , 491 U.S. 524, 540, 109 S.Ct. 2603, 105 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). In sum, the face of the Proclamation, read in the context of President Trump's official statements, fails to demonstrate a primarily secular purpose. To the objective observer, the Proclamation continues to exhibit a primarily religious anti-Muslim objective. Our constitutional system creates a strong presumption of legitimacy for presidential action and we often defer to the political branches on issues related to immigration and national security. But the disposition in this case is compelled by the highly unusual facts here. Plaintiffs offer undisputed evidence that the President of the United States has openly and often expressed his desire to ban those of Islamic faith from entering the United States. The Proclamation is thu